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Across the African continent the land and resource rights
of the rural poor are threatened by inappropriate policies
and institutions (including global treaties); unequal social,
political and economic relations; the actions of powerful
vested interests (wealthy national or local elites, inter-
national aid organisations, multinational corporations);
and the weakness of grassroots organisations. It is against
this background that the Pan-African Programme on
Land and Resource Rights (PAPLRR) Network’s ini-
tiative to analyse, understand and engage with these
issues was conceptualised by four African centres of ex-
cellence that subsequently developed the programme in
2001.
The unique contributions Africa can make are seldom
taken seriously in international natural resource policy-
making debates. One reason could be that the African
voice on land and resource rights is perhaps not as strong
in international forums as it should be. By coming
together in forums such as PAPLRR, Africans are able to
share their concerns and develop capacity to articulate
their opinions and influence outcomes in the in-
ternational arena.
Defining an agenda for advocacy and strategic
engagement with governments, and building links across
divides between scholars, practitioners and advocacy
groups, is an emphasis of PAPLRR into the future. A key
focus of the programme is the role of land and resource
rights in the struggle against poverty, exploitation and
oppression as well as their contribution in solving real
world problems of African people, not as academic
objects to be studied, but as key components of the
struggle.
PAPLRR is hosted and co-managed by four African
partner organisations, each of which co-ordinated and
hosted one international meeting in its respective region
during the initial phase of the programme. The partners
are the African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS),
Kenya; Community Conservation and Development
Initiatives (CCDI), Nigeria; the Programme for Land and
Agrarian Studies (PLAAS), School of Government,
University of Western Cape, South Africa; and the Social
Research Centre (SRC), American University in Cairo,
Egypt.
The objective of PAPLRR is to develop and articulate a
pan-African voice on land and resource rights, policies
and advocacy, and engage with other stakeholders at
regional and international research and policy-making
events. Among other things, PAPLRR is an attempt to
undertake networking and experience-sharing amongst
Africans on their own continent, amongst themselves,
rather than at the behest of outsiders. PAPLRR attempts
to shift the balance and re-locate the centre of debate,
learning and knowledge on land, resource tenure and
rights in Africa, back to the continent where it belongs.
The rationale for PAPLRR is that, across the African
continent, policies have been formulated and re-
formulated with little regard to their implications for land
and resource use. Scholars, researchers and practitioners
should have an opportunity to contribute to these
developments and enhance the policy-making process.
Since the developments are happening on a wide scale,
coming together to discuss and share knowledge and
understanding on what is taking place in different
countries may help bring about new opportunities to
effectively influence policy.
PAPLRR’s activities
Three central themes were identified by the partner
organisations as sufficiently common to guide
PAPLRR’s work programme. The themes are: land and
resource tenure, in both local and national contexts but
also within; wider economic contexts and en-gagements
(for example, international trade and global environmen-
tal treaties); and roles and relationships in research,
advocacy, policy and capacity building around land and
resource rights, and their implications of analysis for
strategies and actions. A key analytical thrust is the
political economy of land and resources.
Based on these themes, PAPLRR’s activities were
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a series of workshops at which a small but core
group of African researchers, practitioners and
advocacy activists met to develop common
understandings of land and resource rights, together
with strategies and actions to secure rights for the
rural poor;
networking visits between institutions across the
four participating African sub-regions; and
engagement with policy makers and other
researchers and practitioners, at international and
regional events such as the World Summit on
Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in Jo-
hannesburg, South Africa in August/September
2002.
In line with its original conceptualisation, PAPLRR
established a small but fairly consistent pool of core par-
ticipants  (about 10 for each sub-region) who participated
at each of the four international meetings that produced
materials, some of which have been included in this
book. It was not an easy task to select the papers for this
publication. (See the full list of papers in Appendix 2.)
The initial group of core participants was central to the
implementation and growth of the programme. Al-
though no strict and common selection criterion was
applied, each partner identified participants to represent
their respective regions based on a fairly flexible
understanding of the programme. As at the end of 2003,
PAPLRR’s active membership was 42 (13 female and 29
male), representing 19 African countries altogether.
A series of workshops was hosted in the first phase of
PAPLRR, with SRC hosting the inaugural workshop in
March 2002 in Cairo, Egypt. The three central themes of
the programme: land and resource tenure; wider econo-
mic contexts and engagements and roles and relation-
ships in research, advocacy, policy and capacity building
formed the content of the workshop discussions.
The second workshop was held in Lagos, Nigeria in
July 2002, and hosted by CCDI. The focus was on civil
society advocacy for land rights, deliberately so, given
PAPLRR’s preparations to engage the World Summit on
Sustainable Develoment (WSSD) in Johannesburg,
South Africa a few months later. A milestone output of
the Lagos meeting, and indeed PAPLRR is the Lagos
Declaration on Land and Resource Rights in Africa,
which was drafted and adopted at the same meeting. The
statement was distributed, in both hard and electronic
copy forms, with other networks and at the WSSD
conference. (See Appendix 1 for the full text of the Lagos
Declaration Statement.)
ACTS hosted the third workshop in Nairobi, Kenya in
November 2002 where the following themes were
discussed; struggles for real land and resource rights;
implications of the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (Nepad) and associated foreign invest-
ments on land and resource rights; implications of the
World Trade Organization and associated trends on
resource rights; and democratisation and governance of
land and resource rights.
The fourth and final workshop was held in May 2003 in
Cape Town, and hosted by PLAAS. The objective of this
meeting was to explore the Nepad policy and its
implications for land and agriculture, tenure security,
property rights and natural resource management, as well
as explore the opportunities and constraints for civil
society engagement within that policy framework.
Background to this book
PAPLRR builds and strengthens links between African
researchers, development practitioners and advocacy
groups in a bid to enhance their capacity to critically
analyse national and international economic and political
forces at various levels. Research findings and
practitioners’ perspectives have been, and will continue
to be, communicated at strategic policy events such as
the WSSD (referred to above), the African Ministerial
Conference on Environment (AMCEN) and the Global
Biodiversity Forum (GBF) to enhance and demonstrate
the capacity of Africans to engage in, and influence,
policy outcomes.
This takes place within international frameworks and
treaties, including the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),
the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertifica-
tion (UNCCD); and in arenas such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO). The challenge for Africa is to link
the decisions taken at these macro levels to the micro
context in which ordinary people live. Patricia Kameri-
Mbote (page 48) discusses the land and resource rights
implications in Africa of selected international frame-
works and conventions.
There are important commonalities that bring Africans
together, including common concerns around land and
resource rights. Firstly, across Africa poor people’s land
and resource rights are still insecure and inadequately
recognised in law. The rights of women and minority
groups are also weak and insecure. Africa’s shared
history of colonial rule and its consequences could be the
reason for such a situation. In some countries, NGOs
and other civil society formations are severely hampered
in their attempts to improve matters – see, for example,
the situation in Egypt as outlined by Abdel Ismail (page
135). The sharp divide between customary and statutory
law in property regimes compounds this issue. The
commonalities and differences between African people
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as well as the challenges they face were extensively
discussed at the PAPLRR inaugural meeting in Cairo.
Smokin Wanjala (page 9) picks up this discussion by
exposing the vagaries of colonialism, which led to class
differentiation, and social formations that profoundly
define land rights and tenure in east Africa today. The
same pattern, characterised by alienation, exploitation
and subjugation of local populations, was also witnessed
in southern Africa where some of the present land
reform challenges (in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South
Africa) can be traced to colonial history as ably captured
by Nelson Marongwe (page 18), Stephen Greenberg
(page 113), as well as Ben Cousins and Aninka Claassens
(page 139). The undemocratic and exploitative nature of
the colonial state informed the policies, laws, and
institutions that were to characterise the independent
states. In most cases, the colonial legal system was
adopted wholesale, although in some instances reforms
to dismantle the system are vigorously being pursued.
Secondly, the way in which colonial states took control
and ownership of land in order to establish their territory
means that vast areas of land across the continent legally
belong to the state while the people who actually use the
land have secondary rights on such land. This trend is
particularly evident and problematic in Africa where
large areas of land were (and sometimes still are) in
private hands, often minorities of European settlers. The
fact that the state has the ultimate rights to land creates
many problems, including vague or insecure land tenure
arrangements in some parts of the continent. Clement
Ng’ong’ola discusses the effect of constitutional
property rights on land reform in four southern African
countries (page 60). Koffi Alinon discusses the legal
pluralism which bedevils secure tenure in Francophone
West Africa (page 41) and Hubert Ouédraogo outlines
the need for those countries to encourage a research-
based approach to solving their problems (page 105).
Cousins and Claassens build a comprehensive picture of
the struggle to secure communal tenure in South Africa
while John Mope Simo discusses how the proclamation
of a new national park in Cameroon has affected the
rights of the people living there (page 85).
As a result of colonialism, Africa shares a history of
exploitation, a history of struggle against exploitation in
all forms and shades and a struggle for freedom, in-
dependence or liberation. This is part of a shared history
which gave rise to PAPLRR that brings Africans together
to share a continuing struggle for certain basic rights and
freedoms. It is because of these commonalities and
shared history that Africa continues to seek unity and
solidarity through efforts such as the African Union and
Nepad. Such commonalities provide a common basis for
engaging the rest of the world on what Africa needs to do
for its own development.
The issue of Nepad is a current and critical development
that PAPLRR engages with in so far as its implications
for agriculture, food security and land and resource
rights for the poor are concerned. Although the
discussions are not exhaustive, Daniel Omoweh (page
95) and Rawia Tawfic (page 30) examine the op-
portunities and constraints of the Nepad policy
framework. As Omoweh says, land and natural resources
are so central to the African development process that
they cannot be relegated to the kind of cursory treatment
they are given in Nepad, given that Africa’s huge
resource endowments partly account for its colonisation
in the first place. The struggles to retain or regain access
to these resources by domestic and external forces
continue to this day.
Despite the good intentions of Nepad, PAPLRR
criticises its neo-liberal premise and opening up African
economies to external investment by securing property
rights for foreign capital. Nepad is silent on the practical
steps, modalities, an enabling policy framework, and the
relevant institutions for safeguarding and enhancing the
land and resource rights of the rural and urban poor. The
poor people’s productive capacities should rather be
enhanced to regenerate local economies – the very basis
for meaningful and sustainable African development. To
this end, a mass-driven Land Initiative is an absolute
necessity, given the agrarian nature of the African
economy, building on experience such as that of the east
African countries discussed by Michael Odhiambo (page
126). Such an initiative should be premised on full
engagement of relevant civil society structures, the state
and the poor people. Omoweh’s paper and the Lagos
Declaration (page 159) discuss Nepad in greater detail.
PAPLRR observes that African economies, particularly
since independence, have not posted strong records of
economic performance and development. As a result,
chronic poverty and declining production continue to
haunt the continent. This is yet another commonality
shared by Africans, as is the need to locate the role of land
and resource rights to deal with these challenges. The
notion of land and resource rights should be set against
the backdrop of good governance where civil and
political rights ought to be equated with socio-economic
rights, and perhaps incorporated in the structure of
African societies and constitutions.
In this regard, demands for land reforms are an integral
part of the continuing development struggles of the
poor. Wanjala, Marongwe and Greenberg highlight the
somewhat mixed results of redistributive land reform
policies in east and southern Africa. One of the points
that emerges is that racialised inequality in land
ownership and resource use features prominently as a
major issue in southern Africa.
Africa is faced with the threat of an increased pace and
scope of globalisation, characterised by new kinds of
INTRODUCTory overview
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mechanisms to integrate economies into the global
system of production and distribution. One of
PAPLRR’s central themes is the huge implication of
globalisation for land and resource rights of the poor. In
his paper, Habib Ayeb speaks out against how the
Egyptian state has turned the common good of water
into a commodity for sale in an attempt to draw foreign
investment (page 75). Collusion of national and local
elites with powerful international actors is one major
threat for resources, especially common property
resources on which the poorest rely for their livelihoods.
Threats of such collusions are real and common in many
African contexts, providing yet another basis for
PAPLRR’s sharing of experiences and analytical under-
standing.
Another global phenomenon is the proliferation of
international treaties, especially over the last two
decades, which impact on Africa’s resource base, use and
governance. African governments routinely sign-up for
these treaties and yet the effects of such treaties on local
people are not fully understood. Kameri-Mbote suc-
cinctly illustrates the linkages be-tween international
treaties and local livelihoods in her discussion on how the
pursuit of national, regional and even international goals
of poverty reduction and food security are linked to
access and enjoyment of secure land and resource rights.
In Africa and more particularly Nepad, poverty
reduction is largely premised on land productivity in
addition to access to basic services, markets and health
care. Thus, secure rights to land and other resources
underpin secure livelihoods and shelter by reducing
vulnerability to shocks and guaranteeing a level of self-
provisioning and supplementary incomes from basic
foodstuffs. Insecure land and resource rights have been
linked with social unrest in the Great Lakes region
(Rwanda, Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo),
with adverse impacts on both long-term and short-term
development.
So, despite many differences, Africans also have a lot in
common. This provides impetus for dialogue in search of
mutual understanding on various issues. However, there
is need to recognise differences and appreciate that each
society is unique and internally heterogeneous across the
nation state in respect of language, culture, institutions
and laws. Besides, Africa has slightly different responses
to the common history of colonial rule and different
post-colonial development paths with different out-
comes found across the continent. It is equally important
to recognise that concerns for redistribution of certain
resources, for example land in southern Africa or water
in north Africa, are not necessarily as pertinent in other
parts of the continent.
Underlying these socio-economic and institutional dif-
ferences are ecological variations across Africa, from
very dry areas to very wet areas, and from forests to
savannas and grasslands. These variations make a huge
difference to PAPLRR’s analysis of the importance of
rights in resource management regimes and it is
important to understand and recognise these differences.
For example, the English-speaking world’s concept of
‘common property’ is not found in the French language.
For this reason, it is difficult to even begin to theorise
issues of common property among Africans from
different legal traditions. Nevertheless, despite all these
challenges we, as Africans, have to reach out to one
another across these differences and find ways of work-
ing together for our common good.
PAPLRR is thus engaging in a challenging and difficult
enterprise of seeking common ground, recognising and
appreciating differences and reaching out across lin-
guistic barriers to undertake the analysis of land and
resource rights in Africa. It is a difficult undertaking,
especially when it comes to highly contested and
politicised issues of land and resource rights. In Africa, as
elsewhere, talking about land and resource rights
invariably leads to discussions about power and politics.
Emerging issues
There are important issues emerging from the land and
resource rights analysis being undertaken by PAPLRR.
Firstly, current institutional arrangements for claiming
and maintaining strong land and resource rights for the
poor are questionable. A critical question that arises is:
what institutional arrangements promote down-ward
accountability and representation of the rural poor, in
negotiations for international agreements, to protect
their land and resource rights?
Secondly, in order to secure the land and resource rights
of the rural poor, there is need for comprehensive and
inclusive tenure reforms. Linked with tenure security is
the need for a clear distinction between customary and
statutory tenure in land reform processes. Most im-
portantly, the optimal role for customary tenure in land
and resource tenure reform should be investigated.
Customary tenure was subjected to many colonial dis-
tortions and yet remains a potential solution to
landlessness and guarantor of land rights in Africa. At the
same time customary tenure protects poor people from
market forces, for example, the Ugandan Land Act of
1998 recognises customary tenure as a measure to keep
landlessness in check. Addressing tenure issues is integral
to preventing and managing Africa’s conflicts arising
from unfair or inequitable rights of access, right to use
and own land and other natural resources. Wanjala and
Cousins & Claassens raise these and other pertinent
issues in their discussions.
Thirdly, the role of land and resource rights in Africa’s
conflicts is a crucial issue that requires attention in
PAPLRR discussions. Uneven land and resource rights
are strong causes of conflicts on the continent, including
in Zimbabwe, Nigeria and the Great Lakes region. An
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issue deserving more attention is the role of land and
resource rights in building and sustaining peace. Maybe
PAPLRR could consider ways to incorporate land and
resource rights issues into the ongoing efforts to develop
peace and security policies within the African Union and
sub-regional bodies across the continent.
Fourthly, the issue of who decides which rights for what
individuals and groups is a key theme whose implications
should be fully understood. More specifically, the role of
the state in formulating rules and mediating tenure
arrangements needs to be scrutinised and creative
alternatives developed. Today, states represent impor-
tant property rights holders who have their rights
protected by international law. States are also granted
permanent sovereignty over their natural resources.
Thus, states can own, directly control and utilise land and
natural resources through any of their administrative
structures or grant user rights to preferred beneficiaries.
States are in a peculiar position as grantors and
guarantors of property rights, both at the local and
international level, as well as holders in their own right.
In postcolonial societies the destabilisation caused by
colonial rule contributed to the breakdown of social,
political and economic communal structures which saw
states moving in to replace the centres of power in all
areas, including property holding. In the process, states
took over most of the properties previously held by
communities and thus have come to monopolise
common property resources. This development has far-
reaching implications for land reform in many African
countries and puts states in an unfair position with
respect to mediating over property relations.
Fifthly, PAPLRR observes that Nepad is a key emerging
policy arena in which the fundamental role of secure land
and resource rights should be widely understood. Civil
society must find effective ways of engaging with Nepad.
Other key policy issues for engagement are the various
global fora, including the WTO, where critical debates
around the place of Africa within the global political
economy are both possible and necessary.
Sixthly, privatisation is a major force in the world today.
Dominant neo-liberal economic frameworks foster
privatisation with highly negative consequences for the
rural poor. The issue of privatisation, in its many
contexts, needs continuous engagement while counter-
strategies to protect vulnerable groups and subdue the
forces of capital are developed.
The seventh point is with regards to social movements
and civil society’s roles for land and resource rights
advocacy and lobbying. PAPLRR identifies a number of
challenges both at regional and sub-regional levels.
According to Odhiambo, funding remains a major
impediment to land and resource rights and policy
networks. A lack of funding is an undeniable problem,
but even where funding is available, the Tanzanian
experience shows that donors may have other agendas
which are not necessarily consistent with local interests.
Greenberg observes that the most important require-
ment for meaningful grassroots movements is their
ability not only to capture, but also to hold onto, space in
which the movements and their occupation of the land is
recognised, however the latter may have come about.
While issues and developments underpinning resource
policies may shift radically and rapidly in response to
events on the ground, such changes require movements
that are prepared to act ahead of policy as well as within
it. Social movements should lead the state rather than tail
it. In most cases of successful resource capture around
the world, the state has been compelled to recognise and
even support occupations through post-hoc legalisation.
The current character of the African state demands that
sustained civic organisation be built to demand pro-
gressive change. Key issues include what sort of support
is required to build and maintain independent grassroots
organisations, and how best this support can be
provided. In particular, how can the radical middle class
engage fully with emerging grassroots movements
without imposing its own prejudices and assumptions on
the movements?
There needs to be an identification of interests between
the radical intelligentsia and the landless, based on the
imperative that the majority of the population should
have secure access to land. A related political and
organisational matter is the willingness of the radical
middle class to work directly and consistently with the
landless and their organisations.
While NGOs may provide valuable assistance in
nurturing and maintaining grassroots independent
organisations, there are limits, especially in the context of
growing NGO professionalism. A voluntary, politically
and morally-based approach is preferable, for it allows
individuals to remain outside circuits of institutional
power. While debates on methods and forms of support
should be encouraged, the limits of support from de-
velopmental institutions should be understood and
transcended.
Lastly, according to Greenberg, the movement of
landless people in South Africa provides an important
example of the potential for tactical and practical co-
operation between rural and urban grassroots move-
ments. Inside the struggles of the landless, tendencies
that seek to promote working class leadership of the
movement should be supported and encouraged. It is
only then that the theoretical rights won in the struggle
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The way forward
Despite its recent entrance onto the land and resource
rights research and advocacy scene, PAPLRR is making
an impact and can be viewed as a successful initiative.
Given the objectives and work programme set before it,
PAPLRR is doing well despite operational challenges.
The Lagos Declaration Statement is a good entry point to
consolidate the struggle and translate current gains into a
practical and meaningful advocacy work programme on
the continent.
PAPLRR locates a niche in relation to other initiatives on
resource rights. However, PAPLRR’s focus and ob-
jectives may require narrowing for it to become more
influential and effective. It is therefore necessary for
PAPLRR to take a strategic decision on its future
activities, and among these consider advocacy, research,
information sharing, capacity building, or a combination
of some or all of these. Effective and successful
collaboration takes place around a single issue, rather
than a variety of interests, in knowledge networks.
Within such a strategic decision could also be a con-
sideration to institutionalise PAPLRR for sustainability
into the future. PAPLRR will need to engage policy and
build effective relationships with other networks and the
experiences of the WSSD should serve as a learning
curve for future policy engagement strategies.
It is not easy to claim PAPLRR’s success in creating an
African voice on land and resource rights. However, one
thing is certain – PAPLRR is making an impact. The
groundwork for such an objective has been successfully
laid and reasonable progress in developing individual and
institutional expertise in this respect achieved. A network
of researchers, activists and development practitioners
has been established and is well networked for action.
Necessary considerations for the growth of PAPLRR
should include securing funding and positioning the
network as a credible source of information for civil
society, the rural poor and policy makers, as well as
achieving more geographical spread across Africa.
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Section 1:
Land and resource rights in africa:
regional overviews
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LAND AND RESOURCE TENURE,
POLICIES AND LAWS in EAST AFRICA
Introduction
For most of sub-Saharan Africa, land defines the social,
economic, and political relations in society. Land
provides the basis upon which planners predicate their
strategies of development and, in this regard, it is the
most crucial factor of production. Land is both a
resource and a focal point of social identity and solidarity.
Being the most extensive form of property, it determines
the nature of power relations in society. The manner in
which land rights are defined and allocated attract
substantial normative, institutional, and administrative
arrangements in a legal system.
In agrarian societies such as those of east Africa, land
policies and tenure systems have retained an unchanging
centrality in the countries’ political economies. As the
political systems in the region undergo the hiccups of
transition, the land question remains the single most
contentious issue in the search for a more just society.
Three eras in the history of these countries have
impacted upon the policy, institutional, normative and
political dimensions of land relations. These are the
colonial period, characterised by alienation and
exploitation of land resources by the colonial regime; the
post–colonial period, characterised by the deve-
lopmentalist ideology of cash crop production for the
export market; and the multiparty era, characterised by
the ideology of globalisation and the free market
economy.
Land tenure during the
colonial period
The colonial period witnessed the alienation of land and
displacement of the local people from their lands into
what were infamously called ‘reserves’. The colonial
regimes then set in motion discriminatory policies, which
would maximise their exploitation of land resources and
the institutionalisation of colonial agriculture. Law
played an instrumental role in this strategy.1 Africans
were considered incapable of owning land in the sense in
which the concept of ownership is understood in English
jurisprudence. (See, for example, Okoth-Ogendo 1996
and Wanjala 2000). Customary law was not only regarded
as inferior to English law, but also as lacking the juridical
attributes to put land ownership into operation.
A dual system of land law was therefore introduced in the
colony to legitimise this unequal development. English
land law would apply to the areas which had been set
apart for white settlers. These areas, which in the case of
Kenya came to be known as the ‘white highlands’, were
the more arable and inhabitable. Native law and custom
were to apply in the African reserves. While the settlers
held large chunks of fertile land, the Africans were
squeezed into areas that were not immediately required
for European settlement. These policies had the net
effect of creating social economic maladjustment within
the African communities. Poverty, disease, famine and
ethnic tensions came to characterise the daily lives of the
African people. These developments in turn led to
political agitation and organisation. With colonial land
policies increasingly becoming untenable, the need for
reform became urgent.
At first, the colonial authorities adopted legislative
measures that were purely administrative in effect. For
example, the Native Lands Trust Ordinances, promul-
gated in the 1930s, created native lands trust boards to
manage African affairs in the reserves. These boards
consisted almost exclusively of Europeans, with only one
slot being reserved for an African – if a suitable one could
be found. The boards that were established to manage
settler affairs, on the other hand, were mainly comprised
of settlers, with minimal representation by colonial
officials.
Thus the concept of trusteeship, with its inherent
paternalism, became firmly anchored in colonial land law
and policy. In Kenya, further reforms saw the removal of
African reserves from the purview of the Crown Lands
Ordinance of 1915, through the promulgation of the
SMOKIN WANJALA
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Native Lands Trust Ordinance of 1938. On the part of
the authorities, such action was intended to give a false
sense of security to the Africans about  their lands, which
had been gazetted as native lands. In reality however, the
move was calculated to consolidate the control of
African affairs through the system of indirect rule. But
sooner or later, the real issue would have to be addressed
by the colonial regime if the discontent among the people
was to be contained, even if for a while.
The problems then being experienced in the reserves
were a direct result of the policies of land alienation,
displacement and exploitation of African labour. The
official argument embraced by the colonial regime was
that the problems in the reserves were not a result of the
lack of land caused by unfair policies. The problem, it
was officially argued, was one of defective tenure
arrangements. In this regard, customary land tenure was
considered as being inimical to sound land-use and
agricultural development.
This was the position advanced by the East African Royal
Commission and the plan for the reform of African land
tenure prepared by RJM Swynnerton (1955). The
Swynnerton plan became the blueprint for land tenure
reform programmes in Kenya during the period just
before independence in 1963. Henceforth, through the
process of land adjudication, consolidation and
registration, individualisation of tenure was to be
vigorously pursued as a panacea for under-development.
The reforms had a profound impact on the social
formations of the emergent post-independent state.
While the ultimate objective was to transform indigenous
tenure, the real effect of these land reforms was to create
socially antagonistic classes based on the amount of land
accumulated. It was to be expected that at independence,
the nationalist government would embark upon a radical
land redistribution programme to resettle the hundreds
of thousands of displaced peasants. After all, the armed
peasant struggle (the Mau-Mau) was ignited by the need
to recapture stolen lands from colonial invaders. But a
combination of factors ensured that the much-
anticipated reforms never actually materialised.
The inherent contradictions and injustices in the colonial
state had created a privileged class of white settlers and a
few African loyalists on the one hand, and a disinherited
African peasantry on the other. The former had
accumulated large amounts of land far exceeding their
immediate or medium term needs. The latter had been
reduced to mere providers of cheap labour. This state of
affairs could either be destroyed through revolutionary
policies as was the case in Tanzania; or be maintained
through the politics of accommodation as was the case in
Kenya. Indeed the constitutional negotiations that
preceded independence revolved around the land
question.
At the end of it all, the nationalists not only recognised
the sanctity of private property in land but also
legitimised the colonial expropriations. (For a detailed
analysis, see Kanyinga 2000.) The independence Consti-
tution of Kenya recognised and protected private
property in an elaborate Bill of Rights. The Constitution
was a product of a negotiated settlement, which ensured
that the interests of the white land-owning minority were
safeguarded. The nationalist government also sought to
placate institutions which were crucial for the supply of
finance capital by not embracing radical land reforms. In
the ensuing political struggles within the political
aristocracy that followed, the radical wing was
vanquished. The liberals adopted the developmentalist
paradigm. Policies of economic growth and modernisation
were promoted at the expense of economic redistribu-
tion and social empowerment.
Tragically for Kenya, the undemocratic and exploitative
nature of the colonial state informed the policies, laws,
and institutions that were to characterise the
independent state. The colonial legal system was adopted
wholesale, and land tenure reforms initiated by the
colonial regime were vigorously pursued. Individual
tenure was to be the stimulant of agricultural pro-
duction.2 This decision firmly anchored English property
law as the jurisprudential embodiment of individual
ownership of land in Kenya. Customary law was to
regulate land relations under customary tenure. Where a
conflict arose between customary law and English law,
the courts were to decide on the basis of the merits of the
case. Where the land in question was registered, under
the imposed law, courts always ruled that the fact of
registration had extinguished any claims to such land
based on African customary law.3
Public land, on the other hand, was vested in the
President. This was in conformity with the English
notions of land ownership where technically, no one
owns land but the Crown. Monarchical powers were
therefore equated with presidential powers. Through the
enabling provisions of the Government Lands Act, the
President could now make grants of such public land to
individuals and collectivities either in leasehold or
freehold. In other words, the President now enjoyed the
same powers the Governor had had over land in the
colony. Land that had been administered under the
Native Lands Trust Ordinance was now vested in the
respective county councils to be held by the latter for the
benefit of the local inhabitants, in accordance with the
applicable customary law.
Three types of tenure emerged out of these legal
arrangements, namely individual or private tenure,
African customary tenure, and public tenure. To this day,
land relations operate within these frameworks of tenure.
These in turn have generated different social classes.
Some of these classes are inherently antagonistic while
others are symbiotic. Indeed the land reform discourse in
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Kenya today is informed by the conflicts, tensions and
contradictions that characterise human relations in
society. Basically, the land problem revolves around
questions of control and access to land resources, land
use imperatives, historical claims to land, gender
relations and rights to land, urban shelter and informal
economic activity, foreign investment, and cultural
expression. The prevailing land tenure and the political
dispensation largely determine how these issues are dealt
with. The political dispensation is critical because it
brings into focus the role of the state. The state, as the
ultimate repository of political power, plays an important
role in arbitrating between conflicts and setting the policy
framework. In this regard, the state can play the role of an
impartial arbiter or be an integral part of the conflict.
In Tanzania, the nationalist government rejected the land
market reforms that had been advocated by the colonial
regime. Instead, the policy of villagisation was adopted.
Freehold tenure was replaced by leasehold tenure. The
first five national development plans called for the
settlement of peasants in new villages supervised by a
government agency. Land tenure in these villages was
based on statutory rather than customary law. The latter
was considered primitive and inimical to the needs of a
modern society. After the 1967 Arusha Declaration, all
land in Tanzania was nationalised then followed by
forced resettlement of thousands of peasants and
pastoralists in new villages. Agricultural production was
to take the route of ‘transformation’ and ‘improvement’.
Transformation meant the translocation of people into
new environments where they would be required to farm
using new technologies.
The other strategy of transformation was the
establishment of larger parastatals to which large tracts of
land were alienated for purposes of commercial
agriculture. The ‘improvement’ approach simply entailed
the provision of capital and other farm subsidies that, if
deployed, would lead to improved productivity and
lifestyles.
In Uganda, the post-colonial government centralised all
former Crown lands and placed them under the
superintendence of a land commission. This led to the
accumulation of large amounts of land by the politically
powerful at the expense of the peasantry. In an attempt
to forestall this development, the government enacted
the 1969 Public Lands Act, which sought to protect the
rights of peasants who had been declared tenants of the
Crown. This law also placed a ceiling on the amount of
land that an individual could acquire. In terms of
development strategy, the government adopted policies
of transformation and improvement along the lines
followed by Tanzania. Group farms were established
through the translocation of peasants from their
traditional settings onto uninhabited land. The
government then provided subsidised farm inputs to the
farmers. The peasants who were not uprooted from their
farms were encouraged to improve their farming and
production techniques through credit and farm
subsidies.
The land tenure laws and policies initiated by the
government were interrupted by the military coup of
1971. Following the coup, the military regime enacted
the 1975 Land Reform Decree. This decree nationalised
all land in Uganda and declared all citizens to be tenants
at the mercy of the state. The military regime created yet
another landed class, drawn largely from the military, at
the expense, yet again, of the peasantry. Critically,
Uganda was thrown into a confusion of tenure as all
institutions of governance were taken over and distorted
by ad hoc policies. It was not until the 1990s that the
situation regarding land tenure was clarified following
the enactment of the Land Act.
Control and access rights
to land in eastern Africa
The historical developments discussed in the forgoing
section have had far-reaching and varying effects on
control and access rights to land of the majority of the
people in the east African region.
Kenya
Land-ownership patterns in Kenya have followed the
predominantly class differentiation strategies of the
colonial era. Within the regime of private or individual
tenure, there are three distinct classes: large-scale,
average-scale and small-scale landowners. The first
category constitutes the landed nobility. This is the group
that either took over the plantation farms left by
departing settlers, or acquired large chunks of land
through purchase or outright privatisation. It comprises
a small percentage of white settlers, former colonial
home guards and their offspring, the ruling political elite
and latter-day primitive accumulators and capitalists. At
the far end of the spectrum, there is a group of
opportunists and sycophants who periodically pander to
the whims of the ruling clique in return for grants of land.
Between them they own disproportionately large tracts
of land. They are also the dominant political class. By
controlling the main factor of production in the country’s
economy, this class exerts a pervasive influence on the
social, economic and political affairs of the nation.
The average scale landowners are usually middle class
wage earners and entrepreneurs. Some in this category
are also political apparatchiks. The majority, however,
are small-scale landholders. These are the peasants who
were hooked onto the phenomenon of individual
ownership of land through tenure reform. This process
was supposed to enhance land productivity. Yet the
element of exclusivity, inherent in individual ownership,
has over the years created social economic disequilibria
among communities. Private registration led to the
disinheritance of many from what they had come to
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regard as their ancestral land. This led to irreparable
social disharmony, condemning whole communities to a
permanent state of hostility.
The peasants are expected to derive a decent livelihood
from within the confines of their boundaries. While this
was possible in the early days of independence, radically
changing demographic, climatic and economic condi-
tions have reduced the viability of these units as life-
sustaining centres. Poverty is widespread in most of the
peasant holdings. Research shows that, contrary to
assumptions about the benefits of individual ownership,
there is no direct link between individual title and
agricultural productivity.
Then there are the landless, whose ranks continue to
swell. In the eyes of the law, these people do not have any
recognisable or protectable rights over land. They are
referred to as ‘squatters’, ‘trespassers’, or ‘adverse
possessors’. Many of these are victims of historical
processes of disinheritance, while others have been born
into the resultant injustice that perpetuates property
inequalities. Landlessness for these people has meant a
life of squalor and serfdom. No systematic effort has
been made to comprehensively address the plight of the
landless. Past resettlement efforts have been undertaken
haphazardly to suit the political expediency of the time.
The phenomenon of ‘squatterism’ poses a real danger to
social stability.
The trust land areas, where privatisation has yet to take
place, are characterised by uncertainty of tenure. The
constitutional position is that such land is supposed to be
held by the relevant county council on behalf of the area
residents, in accordance with the applicable customary
law. Yet, in contravention of constitutional provisions,
tracts of land have been allocated to individuals in total
disregard of the interests of the local inhabitants. In areas
where agriculture is a viable economic activity, and where
the theories of the value of individual ownership would
justify the process, the government adopted a cynical
approach to land adjudication and registration. The
rationale for this kind of strategy by the then government
was to be found in the political economy of land.
Governmental control of land resources is a critical
factor for political self-perpetuation. In a largely agrarian
society, political loyalty is ensured by the possibility of
accessing land resources through the largesse of
government.
In areas that are not capable of supporting rain-fed
agricultural activity, especially crop production – such as
semi-arid and arid areas – economic activity largely
depends on the availability of scarce water and pasture.
Livestock production and marketing is the main
economic activity in these areas. But the scarcity of water
and pasture has resulted in armed conflict between
residents. These conflicts are further exacerbated when
they take on an ethnic and political connotation, as so
often happens in Kenya.4 So, the economics of access to
and control of land resources remains critical to any land
reform programme.
Tanzania and Uganda
Unlike Kenya, the governments of Tanzania and Uganda
undertook land reforms that culminated in new land
legislation. Following the structural adjustment
programmes of the 1980s, both countries came under
increasing pressure to reform their land tenure systems
with a view to establishing a land market. The socialist
policies in Tanzania and the chaos in Uganda after the
military coup combined to stifle the emergence of private
property in land. Without secure property rights, it would
not be possible to develop a land market. The Tanzanian
government appointed a land commission and, based on
its report, enacted a comprehensive Land Act defining
and describing various land rights ranging from
customary to individual private rights of occupancy.5
Following a World Bank and United States Agency for
International Development (USAID)-sponsored study
(Makerere Institute of Social Science and Land Tenure
Center of the University of Wisconsin 1989) it was
recommended that a land market should be developed in
Uganda to stimulate agricultural production. Such a
market would provide a mechanism for transferring land
from inefficient to efficient farmers. The result was the
enactment of the 1998 Land Act. (See also Bank of
Uganda 1990, 1993.) These reforms resulted in the
creation of a powerful social class of landed individuals
who acquired superior political leverage over other
classes. This development in turn led to social
antagonisms and tensions such as those in neighbouring
Kenya. The social economic fallout of the uncritical
individualisation of tenure in Kenya led to the
appointment of a commission by the President to
examine and review the country’s land tenure systems
and laws. The developments in the three neighbouring
countries indicate that the challenge of land reform is far
from over. Some of the challenges will certainly confront
policy makers and governments not only in the region,
but also in parts of Africa where land remains the focal
point of social and economic realisation.
Enduring challenges
Urban tenure for the poor
As the east African countries and other parts of Africa
grapple to re-energise their economies through macro
and micro reforms, one of the daunting tasks they face is
to secure the land rights of the urban poor. Economic
activity in many Third World countries has been
restricted to urban satellites. This phenomenon has been
occasioned by the failure to transform rural economies
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into dynamic self-generating enclaves capable of sus-
taining ever-growing populations.
With the increasing number of people continuing to
gravitate towards the cities has come increasing pressure
for shelter and land on which to build shelters. Many
housing structures in urban areas are fragile and
inadequate for decent human life. The semi-modern
housing estates cropping up in suburban environs are not
aimed at addressing the need for shelter. They are capital
investments, which are way out of the reach of the urban
poor.6
It is in the urban areas where much of the informal
economic activity takes place – especially between the
middle and lower classes. These economic activities take
the form of petty trade and merchandising, warehousing,
service delivery, and low-scale industrial production. All
these activities depend on some form of access to and
control of title to land. But the existing legal ar-
rangements do not facilitate the urban poor’s access to
land. In fact, it can be argued that in the Kenyan context,
the law does not recognise land tenure outside the
framework of the traditional forms of property holding.
Thus, unless an individual can claim title to land on the
basis of a freehold or a leasehold title, or has a claim
under customary law, occupation of land by other means
is bound to be tenuous in legal terms. Indeed this is the
tragedy that has befallen many people who do not have
such traditional titles to land.
For economic activity to prosper and to accommodate
the poor in urban areas, innovative forms of tenure are
needed to coexist with traditional ones – for example,
legislation that confers powers on executive authorities
to make grants of un-alienated government land either in
leasehold or freehold. Apart from the fact that these
powers are too wide to be exercised in the public interest,
it is also clear that presidential grants were not intended
to take care of the needs of the urban poor. Instead,
public land in urban areas has been privatised,
completely without regard for the public interest.
Beneficiaries of such grants have been individuals with
good political connections.
Increasingly, economic activity is being viewed in terms
of the classical market economy ideology which
emphasises private property. Activity that entails access
to land resources or space by the urban poor for self-
economic realisation is not considered ‘economic’.
There is no legal protection of such access to land. The
interests of the individual have tended to take
precedence over the interests of the majority. In recent
times Kenya has witnessed the unbridled destruction of
many temporary structures in the three major towns of
Nairobi, Mombasa, and Kisumu. These structures, so-
called kiosks are a haven of informal economic activity.
The officially sanctioned destruction of these structures
has been based on the fact that the owners do not have
title to the land or the space they occupy. The temporary
licences, which the local authorities sometimes grant to
the owners, are considered inferior in the face of either a
leasehold or freehold title that an individual may acquire
over the same piece of land. Official destructive action
has intensified levels of poverty and rendered many
people even more vulnerable.7 There is a need to rethink
the issue of tenure in urban areas. The time has come for
the concept of tenure to be freed from the notion of a
fixed connection to the soil. As far as urban economic
activity is concerned, what is needed are forms of tenure
that can accommodate the fluid and multifarious
requirements of human survival. Governments should
devise, legislate and implement forms of land tenure that
confer rights of access to the urban poor for purposes of
facilitating their economic activities. Even if such rights
are transitory and temporary, they may be qualitatively as
good as any other form of tenure.
Gender and rights to land
Property rights, by their very nature, are an expression of
power relations. The manner in which the rights are
allocated and regulated in society often determines the
ensuing relations. In the countries under discussion,
women constitute the majority. They provide both
domestic and on-farm labour, and play a critical part in
the economic and social life of the nations. Yet, it is a
paradox that the land rights regimes do not adequately
secure the rights of women over this vital resource.
Although the countries’ constitutions outlaw discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex, some of them allow such
discrimination to take place in questions of personal law
such as marriage, divorce and burial.8
In matters relating to land rights, the applicable laws do
not specifically discriminate against women. But the
application of customary laws in marriage has, to the
extent that customary law may provide for discrimina-
tory practices, diminished the capacity of women over
land rights. Although the Law of Succession Act is largely
gender-blind with regard to inheritance of property upon
the death of a spouse, actual practices among many
communities in Kenya discriminate against women.
Under many customary laws, women have no
identifiable rights over land. In some communities, the
husband solely inherits all of the wife’s property, whether
it was acquired before or after the marriage took place.
It is important that this situation be clarified so as to
secure the rights of women to land.9 This would entail the
explicit prohibition of customary laws and practices that
discriminate against women in questions of property
ownership and inheritance (see Benschop 2001). Such
action would go a long way towards enhancing the
ongoing struggle for democratisation and ensuring re-
distribution and social justice.
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Land use imperatives
One of the concerns regarding land resources in eastern
Africa, and indeed most of sub-Saharan Africa, is the
tension between access to and control of land and its
efficient use. All these countries have a rigid framework
for the protection of property rights embodied in their
constitutions. Private property, from the point of view of
those in whom rights of property are vested, is
sacrosanct. Such property is not to be compulsorily
acquired unless it is in the public interest. Moreover, such
acquisition must be followed by full and prompt
compensation. Apart from the freedom against arbitrary
acquisition by the state, landowners are also protected
from unjustified interference in how they may use their
land. Such interference by the state is only possible
through the instrumentality of sectoral planning
legislation.10
The government of the day may control land use
practices that are considered inimical to the integrity of
land and long-term sustainable use. Thus, practices that
may result in soil degradation and erosion, for example,
can be prevented through specific legislation. The
assumption underlying this legislative regulation is that it
is necessary for the greater good of society. Experience
shows, however, that there has been an over-emphasis
on control and access to land as opposed to the efficient
use of same. Questions of tenure more often than not
take precedence over questions of land use. This has led
to a situation where there are no national policies to
harmonise the relationship between property rights and
use responsibilities.
This anomalous situation can be explained by the fact
that the politics of liberation was informed by the need to
reclaim lost or conquered lands. The type of policies and
legal arrangements that would determine the nature of
land ownership largely informed the political discourse
that followed. Thus, questions of tenure took pre-
cedence over questions of land use practices. Having
become a central factor in the post-independent state,
and in the political struggles that followed, the issue of
who would control access to land became too important.
Official policy largely disregarded the need for land-use
planning and conservation. More emphasis was placed
on land acquisition than land conservation. In countries
that retained the colonial tenure system, the ruling clique
had to continue expanding the domain of private tenure
at the expense of public tenure.
The unmitigated shrinkage of public tenure has led to the
destruction of important land resources such as rare
indigenous forests and other genetic resources. The
situation was exacerbated by the fact that any legal
challenges to state-sponsored destruction of national
biodiversity were met with rigid common law rules.11
Although the international legal regime has challenged
the sovereignty of states with regard to matters of the
environment, governments have often signed and
ratified the relevant instruments without any commit-
ment to abide by the principles embodied in these
instruments. Even with the domestication of some of the
principles in the international treaties, official action to
implement the law has not been freely forthcoming.12
The net effect has been the postponement of questions
of intergenerational equity in the acquisition and use of
natural resources.
Globalisation and land
rights for the poor
In tandem with the increasing sensitivity of the
international community to matters of environmental
conservation, there is a globalisation movement. This
parallel development in the internationalisation of
human affairs should ordinarily bode well for the rights
of the poor. Since certain aspects of land-related rights
are recognised by the international law of human rights,
it would not be idle to argue that this dual movement
should secure the land rights of the vulnerable and
voiceless.
Yet, the processes of globalisation and the human rights
movement do not share similar ideologies. Globalisation
is largely the internalisation of world social economic
trends according to the dictates of the dominant cultures
of Western capitalist economies.
Given the asymmetry of economic power between the
developed world and the under-developed countries of
the Third World, globalisation is an inherently unequal
process.13 The human rights movement, on the other
hand, is founded upon the dictates of human dignity and
social justice. Right from the moment the idea of human
rights took root at the United Nations, it became
encapsulated in the ideological tensions that characterised
the Cold War superpower relations.
On the one hand of the ideological divide, the emphasis
was placed on civil and political rights, while on the other,
the emphasis was on social and economic rights. The
stultification of the human rights movement over the last
40 years was due to this ideological tension. What this
meant for land rights of the poor is that they did not
attract the attention of policy planners in countries that
had chosen neo-liberal economic models of develop-
ment. This suggests that property rights of the poor
might have flourished under a more socialist economic
arrangement.
But even within the context of such an economic
dispensation, the land rights of the poor would have been
recognised only within the hegemonic development
plans of a centrally planned economy. This is what
happened in Tanzania. In countries like Kenya, the state
was identified as the main engine of development. The
macroeconomic goal was growth and modernisation.
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The provision of basic social services such as food,
shelter, clean water and health facilities was relegated to
the bottom of the list of development priorities. The
emphasis on macroeconomic growth meant a de-
emphasis on socio-economic empowerment and poverty
eradication. With increasing poverty and low economic
growth recorded in most African countries, in came the
structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s.
The programmes advocated the free market, as an
alternative to the state, as the agent for economic
development. The failure of the developmentalist model
was characterised by a decline in per capita incomes,
deterioration of social services, poor and non-existent
infrastructure, intensifying levels of poverty and
environmental degradation, and rampant corruption.
But the architects of the structural adjustment
programmes did not attribute the failure of the state to
the inherent contradictions of primitive capitalism. They
either chose to ignore or did not take into account the
phenomenon of what has been described as the
‘instrumentalisation of political disorder’14 in most
African countries. Thus they assumed that economic
restructuring could successfully take place outside the
framework of political restructuring. The imposition of
economic responsibilities on an already disempowered
people was the regrettable consequence of these
programmes. The market, which was to replace the
corrupt state, was underdeveloped and riddled with
distortions.
Thus the international re-awakening to the desirability of
democratic and accountable governance after the fall of
the Soviet Union was not accompanied by a commitment
to fundamental restructuring of imperialist institutions.
Globalisation is taking place within this context. Policies
of control and access to land can only continue to
strengthen the position of those that are already
powerful. The demand for Third World economies to
open up their markets for foreign investment also means
that land must be allocated for such investment.
In Kenya, for example, large expanses of land have been
set aside for export processing zones to facilitate the
investment needs of foreign multinational corporations.
Such policies are seriously threatening the rights of the
urban poor to decent shelter. The government, desperate
to secure foreign financing for its recurrent and
development budget, usually has little to say on behalf of
the marginalised. The situation is further complicated by
demands for the government to pull out of the economy
through divestiture from the public enterprises,
commonly known as parastatals. This entails selling the
public stake in these institutions to private investors. The
foreign corporations that are buying these state
enterprises often ensure that they get long-term
guarantees of security, including land tenure security.
Such guaranteed security has the effect of tying up land
resources at the expense of the local poor.
While there is nothing intrinsically wrong with the state’s
withdrawal from participating in the economy, it is
important that divestiture be informed by long-term
policies and principles that protect the public good, in
this case the rights of the poor to land resources. Yet,
Kenya does not have a framework law to guide the
process of divestiture. To date, the sale of state
enterprises has been taking place in a haphazard manner
and the process has not been transparent. The real effect
of divestiture on the security of tenure for the poor may
not be known until it is too late.
Rethinking customary
tenure
Comprehensive land reform cannot be undertaken
without a deliberate effort to recontextualise African
customary tenure. This is because customary tenure has
been the subject of much intellectual confusion and
distortion, resulting from scholars’ simplistic reliance on
English concepts of property in trying to understand the
nature and institutions of African land relations. Three
fundamental misconceptions have arisen from this over-
reliance upon foreign notions of land ownership. One,
that Africans did not own land; two, that land belonged
to the community as a whole; and three, that as a result,
land could not be transferred. These misconceptions led
to the relegation of customary land law to an inferior
status in the colonial legal systems – a status from which
it has never recovered. Fortunately, a large body of
literature written by more recent scholars has helped to
rescue African land tenure from the conceptual
confusion into which it had been thrown.15
It is instructive to emphasise that interest holders under
customary tenure are determined by their status in a rural
community. One of the main criteria for differentiating
status is, in fact, the right of access to land and the power
to control that access. The content of the interest is the
most complex area of inquiry. A distinction must always
be made between access and control. Benefit would
include any entitlement to exploit the land whereas
control entails only the power to decide who may benefit
from the land and in what circumstances (Bennet
1995:3). Land, in an African setting is always the subject
of many interests and derivative rights. Such rights are
vested in individuals and groups. The rights and interests
frequently coexist with each other. For example, the
rights of the members of a family do not necessarily
derive from the corporate rights of the family as such, but
by operation of law. Besides, their enjoyment is de-
pendent on certain conditions unique to the group.
Several rights of the members could be inferior to, or
coterminous with, or indeed superior to the sum total of
rights of a group. Customary law does not vest
ownership in the English sense in the family, but ascribes
to the family the aggregate of the rights that could be
described as ‘ownership’ (Coker 1966:30–3).
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Sometimes the rights of access to land are described as
ownership rights, but only in the manner peculiar to this
system of land law – while the powers of control are
described as sovereign rights. (See, for example, Lloyd
1962:66.) The rights of the members of a family are more
often confused with the rights of the family as a
corporate entity; and worse still, with those of the
political sovereign – such as a chief or head of the family
– as a caretaker in this very comprehensive and complex
structure. In this scheme of things, the concept of
security of tenure becomes difficult to fathom. Attempts
to ensure security of tenure through legislation have not
always been successful. Security of tenure is in practice
achieved through open-ended and continuous processes
of negotiation and political manoeuvring. Some writers
have creatively argued that secure rights in land range
along a continuum from the most temporary to the most
permanent, and can swing backwards and forwards along
the continuum (Okoth Ogendo 1993). As to the issue of
land alienability, it is no longer tenable to argue that there
never was a transfer of land to a stranger, for example.
Customary law does not prohibit land alienation. Instead,
it imposes a condition precedent to the effect that what is
transferred is not the physical entity, but specific user
rights necessary for the needs of a stranger.
Such is the complex system of customary tenure that it
continues to maintain resilience in the face of legislative
assault in the guise of land tenure reform. It is high time
that this type of tenure was accorded its rightful place in
the legal order. Creativity and innovation are needed to
harmonise the inherent rigidities and fluidities in this
system of tenure with the needs of a modern society.
This issue assumes added urgency given the fact that
most countries in sub-Saharan Africa are undergoing a
political transition towards democratic governance. In
most African countries, a discourse about democracy is
underway.
Conclusion
After many years of one-party authoritarianism, there are
ongoing processes of state-sponsored constitutional
reform in parts of Africa. What is taking place is not just
a rewriting of a document of governance. Rather, it is a
fundamental rethinking of the social contract. Earlier
presumptions of the state and citizen relations are being
questioned. Traditional models of governance are
increasingly coming under scrutiny. The need for public
participation in the decision-making processes is no
longer a privilege granted by the state, but the very
essence of legitimate government. New institutions for
the implementation of democratic principles are being
considered.
The discourse on land reform cannot therefore take
place in isolation. It should be anchored within the wider
debate on democracy. The land issue must therefore be
viewed within the context of the nation’s natural
resources. How these are utilised for present and future
generations is an important aspect of that debate.
Likewise, the property rights attached to these resources
on a short and long-term basis and the people in whom
such rights are vested are crucial issues. It becomes clear
that long-held assumptions about tenure and title to land
may no longer be tenable.
In addressing the land question, there is need to discard
many misconceptions and myths about tenure, access,
control and use of this vital resource. Policy makers must
boldly confront the often neglected but persistent
concerns for social equity, historical justice, democratic
decision making, and the rational balancing of competing
uses of land. At the end of the day, it must be
acknowledged that land, by its very nature, belongs not to
a class or a few, but to present and future generations.
Rights and responsibilities must therefore be allocated
on this basis.
1In Kenya, for example, this was achieved through the
promulgation of the Crown Lands Ordinances of 1902
and 1905 respectively. Through these ordinances, first
the Commissioner and later, the Governor, was em-
powered to make grants of leasehold or freehold to the
settlers on very flexible terms. Similar strategies were
adopted in Tanganyika first, by the German colonialists
and later by the British. In Uganda the situation was
exacerbated by the creation of sub-tenancies through the
Mailoland system.
2Swynnerton argued as follows:
Sound agricultural development is dependent upon a
system of land tenure which will make available to the
African farmer unit of land and a system of farming whose
production will support his family. He must be provided
with such security of tenure through an indefeasible title as
will encourage him to invest his labour and profits into the
development of his farm and as will enable him to offer it
as security such financial credits as he may wish to secure.
3See, for example Obiero v. Opiyo (1972) EA 227; and
Esiroyo v. Esiroyo, (1973) EA 338. The policy of
relegating customary tenure to an inferior status was not
however restricted to the Kenyan colony. Similar laws
and policies were extended to Tanganyika and Uganda.
See for example Shivji 1998:2–7.
4Cattle rustling between mainly pastoralist communities
in Kenya like the Samburu, Borana, Somali, Turkana,
Marakwet and Pokot is related to this.
5However, it is clear from the legislation that govern-
ment did not accept all the commission’s key
recommendations.
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6Most of these housing units are purchased on mortgage
financing schemes which can only be afforded by the
upper middle class.
7The Mama Lishe structures that are being set up in
Tanzania to replace the informal structures are a good
example of innovative ways of accommodating the
urban poor.
8The Kenyan Constitution allows such discrimination.
9The Ugandan constitution rightly outlaws the
application of customary laws to land relations where
such laws discriminate against women.
10For example, Kenya’s Agriculture Act and Land
Control Act.
11An individual could not challenge state action unless he
or she could prove that they had locus standi. This position
has now been changed in Kenya with the enactment of
the Environmental Management and Coordination Act.
The Act confers the right to bring court action against the
government.
12For an extensive analysis of the interface between
property rights, the environment and the Constitution,
see Juma & Ojwang 1996.
13For the various theories on globalisation, see Held et al.
1999.
14See the discussion of the dilemma of the African state
by Chabal & Daloz 1999:1–16.
15See for example, Bentsi-Enchill 1964; Okoth Ogendo
1995, 1996.
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Introduction
The discourse on land and resource rights in southern
Africa is essentially a debate on community livelihoods.
The colonial dispossession of native Africans’ land
compromised their ability to sustain themselves. For
most countries in southern Africa, land reform is a
central rural development strategy that is expected to
provide the base for rural livelihoods. The nature of the
land question depends on the colonial history of a
particular country.
In discussing land and resource rights, I argue that land
reform is much broader than just the settlement of
people alone. Land reform and the accompanying rights
are viewed as the foundation for the development of
local economies. Access to other key resources such as
water, forests and wildlife become relevant issues when
discussing land and resource rights in southern Africa.
Demographic factors have also shaped the debate. This
paper looks at the land issue in the region and how land
has influenced resource rights issues in different
countries. The paper also delves into issues of land
tenure and resource rights, local governance and
resource rights, land tenure and resource conflicts, and
other regional dimensions of the land and resource rights
discourse.
The land problem in the
southern African context
The land debate in southern Africa is shaped by the
colonial land expropriation experiences, the nature of the
decolonisation process and the varied land reform
experiences of individual countries in the post-
independence period (Moyo 1995, 2000a; Van den Brink
2002). Moyo (2000a) argues that the land question in
southern Africa is characterised by imbalances in the
patterns of land ownership in the former settler colonial
countries that include South Africa, Zimbabwe and
Namibia, while in Botswana, Zambia and Malawi, the
debate is centred around tenure rights and utilisation of
land.
The new social and political context in Mozambique
since the 1990s has brought with it several challenges.
For example, the Investment Programme for the
Agrarian Sector (PROAGRI) (1997b as quoted in
Chilundo 1999) states that the country’s land conflicts
centre around tourist developments along the
Mozambican coastline and the non-planned nature of
some foreign investments; lack of transparency in the
procedures concerning foreign investment; lack of clear-
cut and transparent procedures for allocation of land
concessions and recording of land holders; poor
institutional capacity to monitor requests submitted for
concession explorations; and under-utilisation of wildlife
and forest land by foreigners.
The history and nature of the colonial power shaped the
land question in the respective countries. Like elsewhere
in Africa, the legacy of colonial land policy varies
between, for example, the former British and Portuguese
colonies. The period of independence is also important
in analysing the progress and approach to land and tenure
reforms.
Botswana and Zambia have been independent for the
past 38 years, Angola and Mozambique 29 years, Malawi
39 years, Zimbabwe 24 years, Namibia 14 years and
South Africa 10 years. The land reform experiments and
their completeness (or lack of it) are a function of the
length of time over which they have been implemented.
The global environment as determined by the Cold War
era had implications on the type of land and tenure
reforms that were pursued by individual countries. For
example, countries like Angola, Tanzania and Moz-
ambique opted for the socialist model and to date the
land problems faced by these countries are quite
different from those of Namibia, Zimbabwe and South
Africa. Botswana, one of the countries least affected by




Table 1: The land question in Angola and Mozambique
Country Colonial  indepen- Land reform milestone/key
power dence observations
Angola Portugal 1975 At independence, the new government abolished private
property and formed state farms and agricultural co-
operatives on land abandoned by settlers
In 1985, government abolished state farms and started to
allocate land to individual peasant producers
There is evidence of growing individualisation of land rights
while the state has not made any policy position on
community based tenure systems
The protracted civil war stalled democratisation of tenure
Mozambique Portugal 1975 All land was nationalised at independence. A few private
farms whose land rights are guaranteed by the state survived
The government established large smallholder co-
operatives, villagisation schemes and large state farms
By 1983, large state-owned companies and production co-
operatives were divided into smaller units, giving rise to small
state-owned companies, while others were given to rural
families and the private sector – though the impact of this
was minimal because of the war
After agreeing to the IMF and World Bank approved macro-
economic structural adjustment programme, the Frelimo
government acknowledged the need to reform the agri-
cultural sectors and privatise, lease or close parastatal farms
The 1997 land law still states that land is state property and
cannot be sold, alienated or mortgaged
The new law recognises the right to land through occupation
by rural communities, based on oral testimony
There is intense competition for land in localised areas that
include land close to developed infrastructure (transport,
markets, agricultural extension services and irrigation
systems) and coastal areas earmarked for tourist
development
Companies and communities are granted a ‘title for use and
improvement of the land,’ which is effectively a lease. A
foreign investor is granted a lease for 50 years, which can
only be renewed for another 50 years. Communities can
formally seek to register their land rights
Source: Decoded from Bruce et al. 1996
colonialism, stands out for the way in which it has
addressed its land problems – including land tenure,
resource rights and governance issues.
In Malawi, the expansion of estate agriculture –
producing tobacco, tea and sugar for the international
market – occurred at the expense of communal land
(Government of Malawi 2000; Mhone 1987). High
population densities, particularly in the southern and
central regions, have contributed to more intensive
localised pressures on land. For example, the 1992/93
National Sample Survey of Agriculture reported that
78% of households in the small-holder sector owned less
than one hectare of land, a figure that is too small to meet
household livelihoods (Government of Malawi 2000).
Yet at the same time, land under leasehold estate was
prone to ‘abandonment and under-utilisation, especially
since many holders obtained grants that were far in
excess of what they were capable of developing’
(Government of Malawi 2000:22). In response to high
land pressure in certain localities, there has been a steady
encroachment by the smallholder producer onto private
land, gazetted forests, national parks and other protected
areas. This was quite noticeable in the tea growing areas
of Mulanje and Thylo and the tobacco estates in
Kasungu. The perception that such estates are under-
utilised was the prime driver for local communities to be
tempted to encroach onto such land (Government of
Malawi 2000).
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Table 2: The land question in Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe
Country Colonial indepen- Land reform milestone/key
power dence observations
Namibia Germany and 1990 At independence, 45% of total land area (82.4 million ha)
apartheid and 74% of potentially arable land was owned by white
South Africa commercial farmers who were less than 2% of total
population
About 44% of the country is freehold land which is sparsely
populated while another 43% is communal land, and is
allocated and administered by traditional authorities, al-
though there is growing evidence of individualisation of
tenure
Land claims by minority groups in the centre and north of
the country, who are predominantly pastoralists and need
grazing land, have largely been ignored by the South West
Africa People’s Organization (Swapo) government
South Africa The 1994 Extreme inequities in the distribution of land between whites
Netherlands and blacks has seen 17.63 million Africans being crammed
and Britain on 13% of the land while whites solidified control on 87% of
the land that housed 5.2 million whites (on farms and small
towns), 1 million Indians (mostly in urban areas), 3.4 million
coloureds (in townships, on white farms and rural reserves)
and 12.77 million Africans in townships
The government embarked upon market-driven land
reforms and adopted a demand-driven and rights-based
approach to tenure reforms
Through the Communal Land Rights Act, the South African
government sought to transfer title from the state to
communities and establish administration structures to issue
and create registers of land tenure rights to individuals within
communal areas
Zimbabwe Britain 1980 At independence, white farmers owned some 15.5 million ha
(39.1%) of the land, most of which was in the most
productive areas, while the natives were packed in the
communal areas on 16.4 million ha and supported 57% of
the total population, most of which was in the agriculturally
marginal areas
The government, in conformity with the Lancaster House
Agreement which provided for the handover of political
power, implemented a market-driven land reform where
farms were acquired on a willing seller-willing buyer basis
Generally, new farmers were given resettlement permits that
defined their tenure rights to land, a system that has been
criticised as a highly insecure land tenure arrangement
In 2000, the government initiated and supported land
occupations that resulted in the ‘acquisition of land’ without
payment. A series of constitutional amendments, an
amendment to the Land Acquisition Act and the
introduction of the Rural Land Occupation Act were ‘rushed
through’ Parliament in an effort to legitimise the land
occupations
Source: Decoded from Bruce et al. 1996
Soon after gaining political independence, co-operative1
resettlement was adopted by some southern African
countries as part of the socialist transformation
processes, typical examples being Mozambique and
Zimbabwe. Soon after attaining independence, Namibia
also opted for a resettlement policy that catered for both
individual and co-operative land holdings (Ministry of
Agriculture, Water and Rural Development 2000).
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However, co-operatives have largely been a failure for
reasons that are associated with, inter alia, biased or
inappropriate beneficiary selection processes, lack of
group cohesion and lack of tenure security. The failure of
this model in countries where it has been tried is an
indication that co-operative ‘ownership of resources’,
especially land, is largely inappropriate for southern
Africa.
The shift from government-led redistributive land
reform to a market assisted one (El-Ghomery 1999) and
the adoption of structural adjustment programmes as
prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank, have to a large extent shaped the
dynamics of land reform and sustainable livelihoods. For
example, the implementation of structural adjustment
programmes in Zambia and Zimbabwe resulted in the
removal of exchange rate controls, lifting of subsidies
and price controls and a general relaxation of most
regulatory policies (Moyo 2000a; Reed 2001). A major
beneficiary of the programme has been the wildlife
tourism sector form of land-use. Through various
Table 3: The land question in Botswana, Malawi and Zambia
Country Colonial indepen- Land reform milestone/key
power dence observations
Botswana Britain 1966 At independence, tribal land, state land and freehold land
occupied 48.8%, 47.4% and 3.7% of total land area
respectively. In 1998, the ratios had changed to 70.9%,
24.9% and 4.2% respectively
The Tribal Land Act of 1968 transferred the authority over
land from the chief to the Land Board and introduced
certificates for customary grants of individual rights for
wells, borehole drilling, arable lands and individual
residential plots
The Tribal Grazing Land Policy of 1975 provided exclusive
rights to large cattle owners while protecting the communal
interests of small-scale herders
The land rights of minority groups that include the Basarwa
(San) are yet to be recognised by Botswana’s Land Tenure
Policy
Malawi Britain 1965 The development of large estates has been at the expense of
the smallholder agriculturist under customary tenure
systems. For example, estate holding grew in size from
79 000ha in 1970 to 843 000ha in 1990 and 1 million ha in
1994. In the small-holder sector, plot size averages 1.1ha
The Registered Land Act of 1965 provided for the
registration of customary land under private title in
designated areas, but was only partially implemented
The Special Crops Act allowed only licensed estate farmers
to grow certain primary export crops (tea, sugar, barley and
flue-cured tobacco). However, new legislation is gradually
allowing smallholders to produce and market barley tobacco
Encroachment of the estate sector and restriction on land-
use are the major threats to the customary land tenure
systems
Zambia Britain 1966 At independence, all land was vested in the hands of the
President and most freehold title was converted to leasehold
State land constitutes 3.5% of the country, while traditional
land (formerly trust land and reserve land) occupies the
remaining 96.5%
The President has the right to make grants or dispositions of
land to Zambian nationals or foreigners for lease-periods of
up to 99 years
The 1995 Land Act allows local communities in customary
land to obtain title to land, after consultation and consent of
the traditional chiefs
Source: Decoded from Bruce et al. 1996
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means, the livelihoods of some communities showed
greater bias towards the tourism sector while scholars
like Moyo (2000a) even conceptualised wildlife-based
land reform models. At the same time the ability of
market-led land reform to target the poor is also limited.
In this sense, the discussion on land reform and
sustainable livelihoods in the region should make
reference to poverty alleviation as one of the pre-
eminent goals.
The Zimbabwean experience
After attaining independence in 1980, the Zimbabwean
government embarked on a land resettlement programme
aimed at redressing the land distribution imbalances
created by over 100 years of colonial rule. Land
acquisition for resettlement purposes has basically been
through the market. Moyo (2000a:10) comments, ‘the
most dominant land acquisition approach used, between
1980 and 1997, even after the government of Zimbabwe
passed laws allowing it to compulsorily acquire land, can
be referred to as “state centred market-based ap-
proach”’. The greatest strides in land acquisition were
achieved in the first five years of independence, from
1980–84 when over 2 147 855ha of land were acquired
(representing about 60% of the total land acquired over
19 years). Acquisition of land through the market
affected the cost, quality and quantity of land acquired
for redistribution.
For various reasons, the government of Zimbabwe
started implementing a ‘fast-track’ resettlement pro-
gramme in July 2000. The ultimate objective of the
programme was to accelerate both land acquisition and
redistribution. The programme is officially viewed as a
component of the overall national Land Reform
Programme. The failure of the Inception Phase
Framework Plan to come to fruition resulted in the land
reform programme recording its slowest progress ever in
the period between October 1998 and June 2000, and in
the eyes of the government, this became the justification
for the adoption of ‘fast-track’. As at July 2003, over 4
million ha had been redistributed to 127 192 peasant/
smallholder farmers, while over 2 million ha were given
to 7 260 commercial farmers. As at 14 March 2002,
about 14 286 households were informally settled on
some 156 farms with a total area of 416 807ha. The rapid
progress under ‘fast-track’ raised more questions than
answers in relation to the discourse on land rights. Farm
occupations characterised fast-track resettlement and
created an environment of uncertainty with regard to the
land rights of the affected large-scale farmers, while the
rights of the incoming settlers largely remain
unprocessed. The legitimisation of land oc-cupations
under the Rural Land Occupiers Act (2000) made
freehold title for rural land one of the most insecure
forms of land tenure.
At the beginning of fast-track resettlement in 2000, land
occupations were illegal, according to the legal
framework that prevailed at the time. The Constitution
of Zimbabwe, the Land Acquisition Act (1992) and the
official government policy recognised the supremacy of
private property rights. For reasons of political
expediency, the government embarked upon a total
revamp of the legal and judiciary framework in an effort
meant to ‘normalise’ the situation created by farm
occupations and fast-track resettlement which had
thrown the concept of security into disarray, particularly
as it relates to freehold land. First was the 2002
amendment of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, which
placed the responsibility for compensating large-scale
commercial farmers whose land was acquired for
resettlement, onto the former colonial power, Britain.
New procedures for paying compensation were also
outlined.
Thus, the legal and policy changes that were effected by
the fast-track resettlement programme raised questions
relating to the legitimacy of the process and how
governance issues would be addressed. This is based on
the premise that land tenure is intricately linked to the
theory of democracy and good governance. For
example, the rushed enactment of the Rural Land
Occupiers’ Act cannot be viewed as good governance.
The controversial nature of the legislation and its impact
on tenure security, as well as its repercussions on the
national, regional and international levels, remain issues
of concern to the general citizenry. Consequently, the
concept of security of tenure, particularly as it relates to
agricultural land, was severely eroded under the current
environment. As a result of the Rural Land Occupiers’
Act, management of natural resources on the occupied
lands is unclear. The question, for land that is under
occupation, is: who has the authority to manage the
natural resources on the defined properties? Practically,
large-scale commercial farm owners have no jurisdiction
over the state of natural resources on the occupied
portions of their farms. If the new settlers are expected to
take care of natural resources on the occupied land, what
rights do they have over the land? This scenario leads to
another possible situation where fast-track resettlement
mimics an open access land tenure system.
Fast-track resettlement brings several challenges.
Perhaps the most important one relates to the capacity of
government to assist the newly settled farmers with all
the infrastructural and social services required in the face
of increasing international isolation by major donor
countries. Addressing the tenure rights of new settlers is
equally important if the financial sector is expected to
provide support with much-needed credit services to
finance input supply. Historically, the resettlement
programme has done badly with respect to developing
appropriate institutional structures for improved natural
resource management. It is a bigger challenge for the
fast-track programme to put in place measures and
systems required for the sustainable utilisation of natural
resources in the newly-settled areas. Also important is
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the need to improve the dented international image of
the country to attract foreign investment so as to
stimulate the ailing economy. The fast-track resettlement
programme has created a highly explosive situation that
is contributing to the escalation of land-based conflicts.
Management of the emerging conflicts is largely no one’s
domain, yet it is an essential requirement to sustain the
fast-track resettlement outcome.
Land tenure and resource
rights
The predominant tenure systems in southern Africa are
private/freehold property, state property, communal
property and open access systems. The notion of private
property rights has been and continues to be viewed as
the ideal tenure system. As a result, land tenure ar-
rangements have remained fixed and have not been
adapting to the increasing and changing socio-economic
demands. It can be argued that private property has
remained too exclusive and insensitive to the changing
social environment of southern Africa. The same can be
said of state property. This has negatively affected the
livelihood opportunities available to rural communities.
Munzer (1990, in Fourie 1998) argues that the concept of
ownership is not finite and should therefore change with
history. Experiences from other countries, particularly
Kenya, have indicated how land title registration can
increase insecurity and risk of vulnerable groups.
Katerere and Guvheya (1998) observed that emerging
issues in environmental management – namely water
management, biological diversity and ecological diversity
– transcend individual property boundaries, a situation
they describe as challenging the supremacy of individual
rights for land and natural resource decision making.
As a result of the rigidity of both private and state tenure
systems, resource-sharing arrangements, particularly
among the state, private property and communal
farmers, have not been exploited. This compromises the
livelihood opportunities available to the communal land
dwellers. The point is that private and state land tenure
systems cannot continue to operate as closed systems
that are completely independent of one another if they
are to survive. Some of the options to be considered
include: the lease of unused agricultural land for crop
production or grazing purposes by freehold large-scale
farms; dead wood collection from both private and state
land for use as firewood; wild fruit collection from state
and private land; direct exploitation of other forestry
products (for example, honey collection, harvesting of
mopani worm, cutting and collection of thatch grass and
mushrooms, and sustainable exploitation of wildlife and
fish); and collection of traditional medicines from state
and private forests (Marongwe 1999). Such initiatives
have the potential to enhance livelihood opportunities of
rural communities. In working out such arrangements,
parameters for consideration should include develop-
ment of constitutions and written agreements between
the concerned parties; stipulating and agreeing on rules
and regulations that guide the exploitation of natural
resources; and developing incentives and disincentives
that promote the sustainable utilisation of resources.
In most cases, access to land determines access to other
key natural resources such as water, forests, wildlife and
other biological resources. In several countries, this is not
the case with mineral resources. For example, in
Zimbabwe, mineral resources belong to the state and any
revenue (mining royalties) that accrues from mineral
exploitation belongs to the state. An important question
that derives from this scenario is the extent of land rights
by individuals and communities. Should they extend to
include mineral rights over the land? However, South
Africa defines land rights as inclusive of rights over
minerals (see Box 1).
Different countries in the region have tried land
registration in communal areas, with various levels of
success. For example, Quadros (2000) refers to the
registration of land by villages as a pilot project in
northern parts of Mozambique that are under customary
management. Further, legal provision has been made for
identification and registering of community rights over
access to water and the passage of cattle through
traditional grazing areas. (See Box 2 on Malawi.)
What seems to be emerging is that freehold or private
land rights are the dominant land tenure system being
adopted for the region. In some countries, notably
Mozambique, Malawi and Botswana, measures designed
Box 1: Communities and
mining rights: An example
from South Africa
South Africa’s Minerals and Petroleum Develop-
ment Bill was amended by Parliament following
appeals by three influential ‘tribes’ of the North
West province that the law would strip them of
their existing rights. The Bafokeng, the Bakwena
Ba Magopo and the Bakgatla Ba Kgafela, who
own vast tracts of land in platinum-mining areas,
had made submissions to Parliament opposing the
Bill, their main argument being that it expropriates
their mineral rights without making proper
provision for compensation. Over the years, the
tribes have been receiving royalty income from
Anglo Platinum Corporation Ltd. According to
the amended Bill, the tribes will continue to
receive royalties but are required to account to the
government every five years about how they have
used the royalties for community development.
Source: Mail&Guardian website, 28 June 2002
LAND AND RESOURCE RIGHTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
24
SECURING LAND AND RESOURCE RIGHTS IN AFRICA: pAN-AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES
Box 3: Land tenure and forestry
resources in Zambia
Unlike its predecessor (the Forest Act of 1973),
the Forest Act of 1999 provides an integrated
approach to the conservation, management and
utilisation of forests and woodland resources and
the participation of local communities, traditional
institutions and the private sector in Zambia.
However, the 1999 Act still places forests under
government control, through the Forestry De-
partment. This sets the basis for the contradiction
between land tenure and tree ownership.
Simuunza 1999 says that 69% of the forests fall on
what was previously trust land and 18% on reserve
land (now customary land), while 13% is on state
land. According to the National Environmental
Action Plan of 1994, this means 87% of protected
forests are enmeshed within land rights of
customary law, a situation that could lead to
conflict between the traditional authority, local
communities, and the Forestry Department. In
terms of the Land Act, although planted trees
belong to the one who planted them, cutting for
sale of any trees is allowed only under licence from
the Foresty Department. In reality, the govern-
ment has no capacity to monitor the process, and
cutting down of trees without licences has
continued.
Source: Simuunza 1999
to secure customary land rights are being implemented –
a move that is likely to improve the resource rights of
communities. However, ideas vary on how far land rights
should go. The bottom line seems to be that
communities rely on access to natural resources for their
livelihoods and hence resource rights that include the
‘total package’ of natural resources (land, water and
fisheries, wildlife, forests and minerals) is most welcome.
At the same time, there is scope for more positive
interaction between customary land tenure and other
tenure systems that include freehold, state-owned and
leasehold. An interesting scenario that derives from the
Zimbabwean situation is that freehold property rights, in
an environment characterised by political and social
instability, are also highly insecure.
Local governance and
resource rights
Local-level institutions and organisations are at the
centre of the land governance and resource rights
discourse. Whiteside (1998) says that local organisations
often define a household’s use rights to resources;
influence norms of behaviour that can be a crucial factor
in sustainability; and that they are also responsible for
managing common pool resources. Decentralisation and
democratisation of resource rights becomes meaningful
when local-level institutions take centre stage in
community participation. Having effective local-level
institutions in charge of land and resource rights issues is
a major challenge that confronts most, if not all, of the
southern African countries. The typology and taxonomy
of these varies from country to country.
In several cases, governments have not decentralised
resource rights to local communities and other local
organisations that represent such communities. For
example, Chilundo (1999:11) reports that in Mozambique,
the state ‘is the entity in charge of supervision of the
process of wood cutting (by timber concessionaires),
including the verification of occurrence of damages to
forestry and wildlife resources’. Owing to problems
associated with insufficient capacity (human, financial
and material), the state has failed to perform the function,
and illegal and unsustainable forestry utilisation has
continued unchecked. Kloeck-Jenson (1996) also
observes the lack of consultation between the local chief
(nhakwawa or fumo) and communities in Mozambique. In
these instances, woodcutters spoke only to the local chief
after which they would begin cutting trees on community
members’ plots without consulting or involving them in
the process.
There is functional linkage between good governance at
the local level and the desire for tenure reforms that seek
to improve the management of common property
resources. Thus the practice of good governance is
located within the framework of sustainable natural
resource management debates. Efforts geared at
facilitating good governance must of necessity focus on,
inter alia, the dissemination of information on rights,
facilitation of local processes, improving access to law,
capacity building and the development of appropriate
conflict resolution mechanisms (Cousins 2000).
Traditional authorities in southern Africa have been
challenged for failing to meet the demands of the new
socio-economic order where the call for improved
governance has taken centre stage. Generally, chiefs are
not democratically elected and are often accused of
Box 2: Policy on traditional
land rights in Malawi
Land rights derived from the traditional system of
land tenure are reducible to the ownership of
specific rights by individuals, families and
communities…previous policies deliberately failed
to recognise the pattern of individual usage and
rights in customary [arrangements] to be free
ownership. Therefore, provision will be made to
rationalise and accord full statutory recognition to
customary land rights.
Source: Malawi National Land Policy 2000
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fomenting conflicts over land through favouring clan
members in the allocation of land or getting involved in
the illegal sale of land (Moyo 2000a). The ability of the
traditional authority to embrace democratic principles
that lead to good governance, transparency, accountabil-
ity and equal gender representation in their structures is
a subject that is increasingly being questioned. Based on
the South African experience, Ntsebeza (1999) questions
the ability of chiefs to embrace principles of democratic
local government and gender equality. He even argues
that, in South Africa, the institution of chiefs is at
variance with that country’s Constitution which
stipulates that ‘elected local government structures be
established for the whole of the territory of the Republic,
including rural areas’ (Ntsebeza 1999:2). Given such a
situation, one is obliged to ask whether traditional
institutions are prepared to change, among other things,
the way they are constituted and or make decisions. More
importantly, are they prepared to incorporate women in
their decision-making structures? Another important
area of concern is the capacity of traditional institutions
to perform modern day land administration functions
and understand and implement natural resource
management policies.
In Zambia, customary land occupies about 96.5% of the
country and traditional chiefs and their village headmen
administer it. Once an individual has been allocated a
parcel of land, ownership is perpetual through cultivation
(including fallow periods) and can be inherited upon the
death of the owner. Thus, the institution of the chiefs is
central to local-level land administration in Zambia. In an
effort to improve security of tenure in customary land,
the 1995 land law has permitted the issuing of freehold
title in customary land. This is supposedly leading to a
fusion of (or is it superseding?) modern tenure and
customary land tenure systems – although indications are
that traditional authorities interpret this arrangement as
an erosion of their power base (Marongwe 2002a).
Land disputes in Zambia are ultimately subject to the
authority of a magistrate, but rarely get this far in
traditional areas. A headman’s area of control is generally
understood in the local community. Chiefs adjudicate
disputes between headmen, although the exact formula
varies between tribes. Circumventing tradition by appeal
to the magistrate is legal but not very effective since in
most traditional areas local authority is stronger and
preferred. Magistrates, however, are handling an
increasing number of cases involving boundary disputes
between chieftainships (Simuunza 1999). The role of
chiefs in conflict resolution is not only important in
Zambia but in Mozambique and other countries as well.
In South Africa, land reform is demand-driven and is
therefore being implemented through a more
decentralised approach, compared with Zimbabwe.
Through relevant pieces of legislation, a new set of
national institutions on land have been established since
1994. They serve as implementation structures for that
country’s land reform programme. For example, the
Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994 provided for the
Commission on Restitution of Land Rights and the Land
Claims Court, which are primarily responsible for
implementing the restitution programme.
At the local level, legislation has provided a framework
for the formation of trusts and communal property
associations (CPAs) to take care of the community’s land
affairs. The KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Trust Act of
1994 gave birth to the Ingonyama Trust, which is
supposed to be administered for the benefit, material
welfare and social well-being of the members of the Zulu
tribes and communities. The KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama
Trust has wide ranging powers that include making
decisions and implementing them; pledging, leasing,
alienation or other disposal of any trust land or of any
interest or real right to such land. On the face of it, local
land institutions in South Africa have comprehensive
control over what happens to their land.
South Africa has established a legislative framework for
the development of communal property associations,
whose main functions are to acquire, hold and manage
property on a basis agreed to by members of a
community in terms of a written constitution. CPAs are
legal entities capable of acquiring rights and incurring
obligations in their name. They also have a perpetual
succession, regardless of changes in leadership. These
are all interesting institutional development scenarios
still to be understood in their broader perspective.
Women’s representation in the emerging structures is of
particular interest to various sections of society.
Although most of these institutions are still in their
infancy in terms of their growth cycle, Gutto (2001:8)
observes that:
the formal constitution and election-based approach to the
creation of, and leadership in, the communal property
associations is shamefully deficient for reasons that lie in
gender and age differentiation within communities, the lack
of proper involvement of existing leadership institutions at
the grassroots [level] and lack of developmental capital.
The extent to which such institutions are contributing to
the development of good governance is yet to be
evaluated.
Botswana’s land boards have been hailed the best
approach to local-level land allocation and administra-
tion (Quan 2000). The main strengths of the land boards
are that they provide space for the fusion of customary
and formal tenure systems while at the same time
representing a strategy for decentralising land policy
implementation. Other countries, such as Namibia,  have
replicated the land boards model.
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Among other things, the land boards approach has been
criticised for not being sufficiently democratic and being
dominated by local elites at the expense of the wider local
community (White 1999). Their ability to solve problems
relating to overlapping land rights, claims and the
multiple needs of different ethnic groups has also been
questioned. Quan (2000:205) concludes by calling the
government to ‘clarify the place of Land Boards within a
wider system of devolved local government, the
development planning process, and mechanisms for
dispute resolution’. The idea of land boards as piloted by
Botswana seems to be one of the approaches that could
be replicated in other parts of southern Africa.
The socialist dispensation of the Mozambican go-
vernment gave rise to a new set of institutions known as
the secretaries, a term used to refer to heads of zones and
a construct of the ruling Frente de Libertação de
Moçambique (Frelimo) party. The secretaries are pivotal
in implementing the land law and have vast knowledge
about occupied and unallocated land holdings in the
country. Furthermore, the 1997 Land Law stresses the
importance of defining representatives of communities.
The 1998 regulations that supported the land law left it to
the communities to self-select representatives, using
their own methodology in the selection process.
As part of the strategy for improving community
livelihoods and enhancing their resource rights, several
countries have implemented various forms of commu-
nity-based natural resource management (CBNRM)
programmes. Perhaps the most publicised CBNRM
approaches include Zambia’s Administrative Design for
Game Management Areas (Admade), Zimbabwe’s
Communal Area Management Programme for Indig-
enous Resources (Campfire), Mozambique’s Tchuma
Tchato and Botswana’s controlled hunting areas. A key
feature for these is that they are centered on the wildlife
resource.
Other countries like Namibia, Malawi and South Africa
have developed their own CBNRM programmes. In
Namibia, conservancies that are controlled and managed
by a group of villagers have been established. In
Botswana a community can organise itself and form a
representative quota management committee to be
granted the right to wildlife. Given that the intended
main beneficiaries of CBNRM programmes are the rural
poor who are the least educated, the process through
which communities gain rights to their resources is
complicated and requires the intervention of external
agencies. For example in Botswana, a community needs
to form a legally recognised trust that develops a land-use
plan, while in Namibia a community is required to
demonstrate commitment and capacity to run a
conservancy. In South Africa, the market-driven land
reforms require communities to enter into various forms
of partnerships and contractual agreements with the
private sector where collaborative arrangements are
desired. It is this relationship between communities and
external agencies that purport to be assisting
communities (including NGOs and community-based
organisations) that is a subject of controversy and
contradictions.
In some situations, CBNRM programmes do not allow
communities to own and control the land, as is the case
in Zimbabwe and Namibia. In Namibia, for example, the
establishment of conservancies does not transfer land
ownership to the communities. Instead the state still has
privilege to expropriate any piece of communal land
including that under conservancies.
In Angola, neither the colonial Portuguese nor the post-
independence government made an attempt to protect
customary tenure systems. The community-based tenure
systems that prevailed in the Central Highlands of
Angola have since collapsed and Williams (1996) argues
that the land tenure systems have become individualised
while other household members either sold or leased the
land. The Dimba and Khumbi, who are both
agriculturalists and pastoralists, and have relatively
recently adopted a permanent settlement system, settled
in the southern parts of the country. Generally, the
Angolan government has not made policy concerning
community-based tenure systems.
Land and resource conflicts
Conflicts over land and other natural resources are a
major threat to rural livelihoods. The history of liberation
struggles in southern Africa is rooted in the unsettled
land question. Historically-based land/restitution claims
are prevalent in Malawi, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.
For example, Marongwe (2002b) observes that the
occupation of Gonarezhou National Park in 2000 was
largely a result of historically-based land claims by
villagers and war veterans from Chitsa communal lands
displaced in the 1960s to make way for the park. For the
same reasons, Malawi’s Nyika, Kasungu, Lengwe and
Liwonde national parks are under constant threat from
encroachment by surrounding communities.
War-induced movement of people within countries and
across borders has negatively affected the livelihoods of
communities. The landmine problem, which has its roots
in the wars of liberation in various countries and in post-
independence civil wars, has destroyed the livelihoods of
some rural communities. It is estimated that between
eight and 20 million landmines are buried in Angolan soil,
while there are more than one million in Mozambique.
Zimbabwe is still clearing some of the land mines planted
during the liberation war which ended in 1980. As Louse
(1997:18) notes:
Civil wars and protracted social conflicts throughout
southern Africa, including Namibia, Angola, Mozambique
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and Zimbabwe, have left a legacy of landmine
contamination. The denial of land and an agrarian
livelihood, vital to the normalisation of social relations,
perpetuates socio-economic tensions…
The absence of resources and political will to de-mine
thousands of square kilometres of agricultural land may
mean permanent loss of productive land. Areas affected
by landmines are basically unavailable for use by
communal people (as arable or grazing land). The
landmine problem is, therefore, contributing to
‘starvation in an area of plenty’. The return of refugees
and internally displaced people to their original homes
has implications for access to land and other resources by
this section of the population. Conflicts have arisen as
returning populations seek to reclaim their lands
(Quadros 2000).
Box 4 suggests that the struggle for sustaining com-
munity livelihoods is basically an issue about resource
rights. Such an example also shows the need for tenure
arrangements that will allow the flow of natural
resources, in a regulated manner, from freehold property
rights to communities located in customary land tenure
systems.
Other dimensions
Various studies on trans-border areas have confirmed
historical, socio-economic and local governance-related
linkages among trans-boundary communities. Such
movements across the borders are explained in cultural,
historical and livelihood based expositions. For example,
Marongwe (2002b) observed that some Zambian
nationals access land in Mozambique for agricultural
production. On the eastern border of Zimbabwe,
citizens in Chipinge and Chimanimani cross into
neighbouring Mozambique to access grazing and
cropping land and other natural resources. This is,
however, in direct contravention of various policies and
legislative provisions, typical examples being veterinary
regulations and immigration laws. However, the informal
arrangements that govern access to farming and grazing
land across international borders are yet to be properly
understood.
The Malawian Land Policy of 2000 notes that nationals
from Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique have en-
croached into various districts in Malawi, including
Ruphtii, Mzimba, Kasungu, Mchinji and Ntcheu. It has
also been observed that Malawians from the border
district of Mulanje have crossed to the Mozambican side
and established gardens there. Of particular interest are
the type of land rights given to immigrants, how the
process of negotiating access to land is initiated, levels of
investment made on the land, types of disputes that arise
as a result of such arrangements, and how such conflicts
are resolved. The major bottleneck encountered in the
search for solutions to this problem is that governments
pretend nothing is happening and researchers have not
done enough to highlight the nature of these activities
and the types of conflicts associated with them.
The history of labour migration in southern Africa is
basically a land and resource rights issue. In the first
instance, it is the lack of resources, particularly minerals,
that resulted in the colonialists having low interest in the
development of a country like Malawi and turning it into
a major exporter of labour to countries such as South
Africa and Zimbabwe (Mhone 1987). A large portion of
Zimbabwean commercial farm workers are of Malawian
and Zambian origin. Many of South Africa’s farm
labourers are of foreign origin, mostly Zimbabwean or
Box 4: A case of resource
conflict in Zimbabwe
On 30 January 1983, Mr JJ Henderson, a large-
scale commercial farmer, was patrolling his farm
on a motorcycle. His intention was to inspect his
cattle camps and visit a dam on the farm where he
half expected to find poaching fishers. After
inspecting the cattle, the farmer left his motor-
cycle a distance away and walked the rest of the
way to the dam. The motive was not to alert any
potential poacher of his approach.
On arriving at the dam, he found nine men fishing
in his dam. The men were scattered around the
dam and Henderson strategically waited for more
than two hours until the men came together,
thereby minimising their ability to escape. When
he approached the poachers, they fled. He fired a
shot to indicate that he was armed and all the men
stopped. The farmer ordered them to stand in a
line and confiscated their fishing rods and the fish.
Henderson ordered them to take off their clothes,
firing another shot to force them to do so.
The shot hit one of the poachers who screamed,
and all the others undressed in fear. The farmer
noticed that the injured man was bleeding. The
shots had also attracted one of the farm workers.
Henderson ordered his employee to carry the
clothing and belongings of the poachers to the
farmer’s homestead. All the poachers were made
to walk naked to the homestead, a distance of
about 6km, where their clothes were returned.
Henderson rode home and reported that there
had been an accident. He was charged with
attempted murder and was sentenced to three
years’ imprisonment with labour. The Supreme
Court of Zimbabwe refused an appeal against
both conviction and sentence.
Source: Supreme Court Records, Judge No. SC 17/84
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Mozambican. Thus, the question of displacement of
farm workers under the current land resettlement
programme has regional ramifications. The discourse on
land rights in relation to farm workers therefore spans
national boundaries.
Concluding remarks
This paper illustrates an increasing trend of communities
trying to encroach on various forms of freehold and state
lands. This is partly explained by the failure of market-
driven land reforms to deliver land to those who need it
most, and partly due to increasing pressures brought
about by increasing population. In the Zimbabwean
situation, land has been used for political expediency  and
the ‘sanctity’ of private property rights has been
destroyed.
The debate on land and resource rights has historical,
political, economic, as well as environmental dimensions.
The approaches that have been used to correct the legacy
of colonial land policies have to date not demonstrated
progressive and best practice examples that can be used
to solve the region’s land and resource rights challenges.
Lack of serious co-operation in discussing resource
rights issues that affect the region has huge implications
for development. The absence of effective mechanisms
for co-operation and sharing of information on land and
resource rights across the region hampers efforts to
resolve this legacy. The social linkages between trans-
border communities and the land and resource rights
implications of these communities have not been given
due consideration.
An interesting and emerging trend highlighted in this
paper is that selected countries have implemented or are
in the process of implementing measures to strengthen
customary land rights. Such measures are, however,
constrained by a lack of capacity and financial resources.
1UNIN 1986 defines co-operatives as ‘higher forms of
political and economic organisation in which the means
of production are owned collectively and are used for the
benefit of the community as a whole’.
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Introduction
At the advent of the 21st century, Africa is still lagging
behind in economic development. Economic indicators
show that foreign debts exceed US$350 billion while the
continent’s share of the world’s gross domestic product
and foreign investments represent only 1.6% and 2%
respectively. To reverse these figures and place the
continent on the path of sustainable growth and
development, the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (Nepad) was initiated. After the failure of
18 recovery plans, Nepad seems to give a glimpse of
hope for resolving Africa’s development challenges.
After the drafting of the Nepad document, discussions
among non-governmental organisation (NGO) activists,
research centres and intellectuals evolved around the
initiative’s theoretical underpinning and prospects. A
number of civil society organisations, especially in
southern Africa, attempted a comprehensive assessment
of the initiative. Nepad is was a product of the merger
between the Millennium Partnership for African
Recovery Plan (MAP) elaborated by South Africa with
the support of Algeria and Nigeria; the Omega plan
elaborated by Senegal, with French backing; and the New
Global Compact with Africa, designed by the Economic
Commission for Africa (ECA) (Nabudere 2002:5–9).
At least two important points deserve emphasis in the
historical inception of Nepad. First, although all African
countries were briefed about the initiative – which was
finally adopted by the Organisation of African Unity
(now the African Union – the AU) summit in Lusaka,
Zambia on 11 July 2001 – one can argue that the design
of Nepad was mainly a South African-Senegalese affair.
The involvement of other countries like Algeria and
Egypt came at a later stage in an attempt to involve other
strategic African leaders to support the initiative.
Second, there was no popular participation of African
civil society in the process of developing the initiative.
Leading critics of Nepad remain NGOs from sub-
Saharan Africa in general, and the southern region of the
continent in particular.1 North African NGOs and civil
society do not currently feature in the main protestations
of the initiative. This can be partly explained by the
limited awareness and knowledge about the initiative
among the north African countries, in comparison to
other regions.2
This is not to say, however, that the north African region
did not criticise the provisions, theoretical assumptions
and basis of Nepad. Nepad requires popular marketing
in the region and critical assessment of its implications is
necessary.
The main focus of this paper is to investigate to what
extent Nepad addresses the African agricultural crisis in
general and the north African land and agricultural
predicament in particular. This implies the need for a
review of the provisions of Nepad, the planned projects,
and the extent to which these provisions and projects will
meet the needs of the north African countries.
The first part of the paper reviews Nepad provisions in
the area of land and agriculture as declared in its main
document issued in Abuja, Nigeria in October 2001, as
well as its Comprehensive African Agriculture Dev-
elopment Programme (CAADP). The second part
presents an overview of the status of land and agriculture
in north Africa and the main problems hindering north
African agricultural development. The third part
discusses how CAADP deals with these problems and
addresses the main causes of agricultural crisis in Africa
in general and north Africa in particular.
Land and agriculture in
Nepad
According to the Nepad document (2001), Africa’s
natural resources are the leading means to alleviate
poverty. The emphasis on Africa’s indispensable
resource base (water, land, forests and protected areas),
heritage sites and agriculture, all prove that Africa’s
resources are crucial in the eradication of poverty and
reversal of the marginalisation of the continent
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(paragraph 10). Within the context of sectoral priorities
in the Nepad programme of action, agriculture is
identified as a key area of intervention. The initiative
refers to Africa’s major challenges in the agricultural
sector. Most Africans are rural-based and rely on natural
resources and subsistence agriculture (paragraphs 129–
31).
For Nepad, reversing the current poverty situation in
Africa requires tremendous development strategies and
programmes; improvement of rural infrastructure;
support of research on agriculture and empowerment of
local communities; and increased donor support for
community natural resource management and agriculture
(paragraphs 132–4).
Nepad’s agriculture, trade and market access initiative
aims to achieve six main objectives (paragraph 154):
to improve the productivity of agriculture, with
particular attention to small-scale and women
farmers
to ensure food security for all people and increase
the access of the poor to adequate food and
nutrition
to promote measures against natural resource
degradation and encourage production methods
that are environmentally sustainable
to integrate the rural poor into the market economy
and provide them with better access to export
markets
to develop Africa into a net exporter of agricultural
products
to become a strategic player in the development of
agricultural science and technology.
For achieving these objectives a number of actions have
been specified at the continental, as well as international
levels (paragraph 155).
At the African level:
Increasing the security of water supply for
agriculture by establishing small-scale irrigation
facilities, improving local water management, and
increasing the exchange of information and
technical know-how with the international commu-
nity.
Improving land tenure security under traditional and
modern forms of tenure, and promoting the
necessary land reform.
Fostering regional, sub-regional, national and
household food security through the development
and management of increased production, trans-
port, storage and marketing of food crops, livestock
and fisheries. Particular attention to be given to the
needs of the poor, as well as the establishment of
early warning systems to monitor droughts and crop
production.
Enhancing agricultural credit and financing schemes,
and improving access to credit for small-scale and
women farmers.
Reducing the heavy urban bias of public spending in
Africa by transferring resources from urban to rural
activities.
At the international level:
Creating new partnership schemes to address donor
fatigue for individual, high-profile agricultural
projects.
Developing countries to assist Africa in carrying out
and building up its research and development
capabilities in agriculture.
Promoting access to international markets by
improving the quality of African produce and
agricultural products, particularly processed prod-
ucts, to meet the standards required by those
markets.
Supporting African networking with external
partners in agricultural technology and know-how,
extension services and rural infrastructure.
Supporting investment in research in the areas of
high-yield crops and durable preservation and
storage methods.
Providing support for building national and regional
capacity for multilateral trade negotiations, includ-
ing food sanitation and other agricultural trade
regulations.
On the surface, the initiative to address the structural
constraints facing the development of land and
agriculture on the continent appears to be comprehen-
sive. But the reality is not as simple as the general
provisions of the initiative seem to assume. When the
general provisions of Nepad’s main document were
translated into specific targets and actions in the
CAADP, only four pillars were selected:
Extending the area under sustainable land
management and reliable water control systems.
Improving rural infrastructure and trade-related
capacities for market access.
Increasing food supply and reducing hunger.
Agricultural research, technology dissemination and
adoption.
The programme considered that the first three pillars
could make an immediate difference to Africa’s
agricultural crisis, while research and technology is a
long-term pillar. It is worth noting that a comparison of
the general actions in the Nepad document with the four
pillars of the CAADP shows that certain areas have been
neglected or given less emphasis. This raises the
question: can the ‘comprehensive programme’ be
considered as such in addressing the problems of land
and agriculture in Africa in general and the north African
region in particular?
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Land and agriculture in
north Africa
An objective assessment of Nepad should be based on a
review of the current problems related to land and
agriculture in the north African region. About 70% of
Africa’s people live on rural land and are predominantly
dependent on agriculture. The continent’s agriculture
remains rudimentary, with a limited technological
development that has failed to adequately meet the needs
of a growing population.
The continent has changed from a leading exporter of
agricultural produce to become a net importer. African
agriculture remains vulnerable to natural hazards of
climate, and is frequently plagued by droughts and
flooding. About 200 million Africans are chronically
hungry, and nearly 30 million are in dire need of 2.8
million tons of emergency food every year. The largest
share of food aid in the world comes to the continent
(Nepad/FAO 2003:1).
One of the main reasons for this state of affairs across the
continent is that the land and resource rights of the rural
poor are threatened in many ways. This is attributed to
unequal and inappropriate policies and neo-liberal
reform programmes promoted by Northern donor
countries and international financial institutions that do
not favour an active role of the state in land matters. As
Moyo (2003:1) has noted:
The land question and persistent rural poverty in Africa
highlight the neglect of social justice and equity issues which
underlie the unequal control and use of land and natural
resources prescribed by neo-liberal development policy
agendas and which represent external dominance of
African governance reforms.
The situation in north Africa is not drastically different
from that of other regions. Agriculture accounts for 40–
60% of aggregate employment. This means that the
welfare of the largest segment of the population in north
Africa is entirely dependent on agriculture. However, the
rights of these people are not secure (Desora 1997:2).
A historical review of land and agricultural policies in the
region shows that strategies aimed at reforming defective
agrarian systems were adopted during the initial stages of
African independence in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as
after the 1952 revolution in Egypt. In several countries, a
ceiling on private land ownership was fixed, while
redistributing the expropriated balance and expropriat-
ing foreign-owned farms with compensation.
After Algeria’s independence, the government na-
tionalised farms owned and managed by the French
settlers and began a process of transforming the rural
economy along socialist lines. Nearly 0.8 million ha of
state-owned land were redistributed to tenants and a
section of landless agricultural workers. The revolution-
ary reform was extended to benefit the pastoral nomads
and the semi-nomadic people. The agrarian reform
process of the 1965–82 period took place within a
context of a centrally-planned economy.
In Tunisia, similar processes of restructuring the agrarian
system for rural development started soon after
independence in 1956. A new agricultural land property
law was issued and implemented in 1964, resulting in
about 16% of the total arable land being taken over by the
government. The acquired land was the best in the
country, purchased at market prices and partially
nationalised, with a small portion allocated to landless
people.3 In Egypt and Libya, public land was reclaimed
and mostly allocated to landowners and tenants (Rihan &
Nasr 2001:10–2; El Ghonemy 1993:3–4.)
However, the anti-poverty and egalitarian strategies of
the 1950s–70s were disrupted by economic liberalisation
policies imposed by foreign creditors in the form of the
World Bank’s structural adjustment programme (SAP)
and the International Monetary Fund’s stabilisation
programme.
Agriculture, which was the main focus of these reforms,
was one of the most affected sectors. Small farmers and
pastoral populations experienced reduced institutional
agricultural support. Rural unemployment, although
generally lower than in urban areas, increased in several
countries. In Egypt, for example, unemployment rea-
ched between 5.6 and 7.6% between 1987 and 1995. This
occurred despite a significant out-migration of rural
people to major urban centres and richer oil-producing
neighbouring countries. When male members of a family
emigrate, it is frequently the women, elderly people and
children who grow food on the family plot or work as
seasonal agricultural workers.4 In north Africa, these
social groups have been especially negatively affected.
Although some north African countries, namely Egypt,
Algeria and Tunisia, witnessed urban working class riots
which delayed implementation of SAPs, the mounting
pressure exerted on their economies by high annual debt
servicing payments and the negative effects of prolonged
economic recession in the West accelerated the adoption
of the prescribed economic reforms, despite their
negative impacts on wealth distribution.
The imposition and subsequent adoption of this
paradigm in north Africa has limited government
intervention in land and credit markets and ended
redistributive agrarian reform. SAPs are based on the
conviction that the efficacy of market and economic
liberalisation would solve issues of agriculture produc-
tivity. The new policies ignored the fact that access to
productive land is a fundamental insurance against
the risks of poverty and malnutrition (El Ghonemy
1993:6–9).
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In some countries, a legal framework of liberalisation
provided space for imposing these reforms. In Egypt, for
instance, the reforms in the agricultural sector which
began in the mid-1980s were eventually matched in 1991
by economic reform and an SAP, with a renewed
programme in 1996. The reforms included measures like
gradual removal of government intervention in input and
output prices, crop areas and procurement quotas; the
removal of farm input subsidies; the removal of
government constraints on private sector import, export
and distribution of farm inputs and agricultural crops;
gradual diversion of the role of the principal bank for
development and credit from distributing agricultural
inputs to acting as a bank and financing agricultural
development projects; adjusting the land tenancy system;
and adjusting the interest rate to reveal the real value of
local currency.
This new policy was confirmed by Law 96 of 1992,
known as ‘the law for regulating the relationship between
owners and tenants of agricultural land’. This reversed
President Gamal Abdul Nasser’s land reform measures
adopted under Law 178 of 1952, ‘the first agrarian
reform law’. The new law ended security of tenure for
farmers as landowners were given the right to evict
tenants after a five-year transitional period which ended
in October 1997. The new tenancy contracts were
subject to market forces and regulation of civil law. This
stipulated a compulsory increase in land rent, more than
threefold. The law also allowed contracts to last for only
12 months and cancelled the inheritability of land rental
contracts.
Law 96 led to widespread dispossessions and increased
levels of poverty and rural indebtedness. It increased the
desire of younger family members of ex-tenants to
migrate to seek work. Repressive means were used to
suppress any opposition challenging the new law. It was
clear that economic reform in Egypt’s countryside was
used as a vehicle to promote and entrench landed
interests (Bush 2000:235–9; Aal 1998).
The international financial institutions (IFIs) had failed
to come up with an alternative strategy for Egypt,
embracing unquestionably the Washington consensus of
liberalisation and deregulation. In addition, government
policies failed to promote an alternative to structural
adjustment. Both led to the current land and agricultural
crisis in Egypt, with its main symptoms of higher levels of
rural poverty, insignificant increases in production, and
poor export performance.
This was not too different from the situation in other
countries of the region. Agrarian reforms led by Algerian
President Houari Boumediene in the 1970s divided up
large state-owned farms and distributed them among
landless peasants. However, this was completely
reversed by a new system of private-sector management
led by President Benjedid in the 1980s.
In Morocco, the most agricultural country in the
Maghreb region, the reorganisation of the agricultural
sector was one of the principal areas of intervention of
the SAPs introduced in the 1980s. These included
privatisation of agricultural holdings (fertiliser, seeds and
sugar factories) and institutions, and reductions in
government expenditure on the agricultural sector. In
1986, public prices for water, transportation and
electricity increased. In the meantime, taxes on
agricultural resources and equipment were cancelled.
Some lands owned by the state, as public projects, were
turned over to the private sector. In addition, societies
for water irrigation were established. Foreign enterprises
were encouraged to invest in the agricultural sector by
making the national currency convertible and providing
various economic incentives.
The impacts of these structural adjustment programmes
were especially severe on the lower and low-middle
peasantry. Agricultural co-operatives have become weak.
Small farmers now entirely rely on the market, from the
purchase of seeds to the sale of their products, frequently
lacking any reliable intermediaries to help them in the
process. For many, making a decent living from their
land has become an increasingly difficult task and
understandably, those who have no land are even more
exposed to the market forces and local oppressive
systems (Rihan & Nasr 2001:120–2).
Another factor contributing to the agricultural crisis of
the north African countries is a lack of market access.
Although three of the countries signed free trade
agreements with the EU under the umbrella of the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership, many constraints are still
hindering their access to the EU market, especially in the
field of agricultural products. In Egypt, for instance, after
six years of extensive negotiations, the EU is still sticking
to its agriculture protection policy. This explains why the
Egyptian agricultural sector, which benefits only from
reduced tariffs and increased export quotas, opposes the
agreement because it treats agricultural products and
processed agricultural goods differently to industrial
goods (Ghoneim 1999).
In addition to the malfunctioning governmental policies
and constraints of market access, natural causes are also
affecting the state of agriculture in the region. Drought is
a critical problem, especially in Tunisia and Morocco. It
is a structural and historical impediment to agricultural
development. Historical evidence from north Africa
suggests that drought is a structurally recurrent phe-
nomenon in this part of the Mediterranean region.
The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation’s
2002 State of food and agriculture report (FAO 2003) says all
countries of the region rely heavily on surface and
ground water, with 60–90% of water being used for
agriculture. All over the region, water demand is steadily
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increasing while water supply is steadily decreasing. The
question of how to balance the water supply-demand
equation remains a big challenge for decision makers.5
Available data confirms that Libya has been experiencing
severe water shortages since 1995, as it has less than
200m3 per person per year to meet its domestic
requirements. Projections show that Algeria and Tunisia
will face the same kind of problems by 2025, while Egypt
and Morocco are expected to experience severe water
shortages by 2050 (FAO 2003:9–10).
The problems of drought and water scarcity represent a
heavy burden affecting economic performance and
growth. The Moroccan government, for example,
earmarked around $650 million – one-third of the
country’s entire annual investment budget – for drought
relief and mitigation activities for the period April 2000 –
July 2001 (FAO 2003:13).
As a result of urban-biased policies, natural disasters and
other reasons, agriculture in the north African countries
is not promising. According to FAO (2003), agricultural
production in the region increased only 0.7% in 2000
after an output increase of 7.1% and 2% in 1998 and 1999
respectively. Crop production fell by 0.7%, with cereal
output down by 9.7% for the second consecutive year.
In Morocco, agricultural output fell by 3.7% in 2000 after
a decline of 10.5% in the previous year. Drought
conditions severely hampered cereal production, which
experienced a further 51.8% decline after dropping by
46.7% in 1999. Agricultural production stagnated in the
1990s largely because of the dominance of drought-
sensitive crops such as cereals and the increased
incidence of drought. The country experienced six
droughts in the 1990–2000 period.
In Algeria, agricultural production fell by 4.7% in 2000.
Cereal production decreased by 61% following a 36%
drop in 1999. Also in Tunisia, the agriculture sector was
adversely affected by relatively severe drought condi-
tions in 2000, and overall agricultural output declined by
4.9%. Cereal production fell by 42%.
Agricultural production in Egypt grew by 4.4% in 2000,
after expanding by 6.5% in 1999. Cereal production rose
by 3.7% after expanding by 10.3% in 1999. Nearly 100%
of food production depends on the Nile River and
groundwater; hence it is more insulated from the effects
of drought (FAO 2003:2–5).
Is Nepad the answer?
Given the north African problems with land, agriculture
and natural resources, can Nepad reverse this situation?
Nepad has come under severe criticism from civil society
organisations, intellectuals and analysts. Critics of Nepad
have noted that although it alludes to infrastructural
development and access to resources like water, it is
vague on the distribution of these resources.
Moreover, the land question is not adequately addressed.
The role of the state in land ownership and distribution
remains undefined, as well as how existing conflicts
around access to land will be resolved. Accordingly,
Nepad may not be able to address the issue of negligible
investment of resources in African states.
Some critics of Nepad say that the initiative does not
mobilise Africa’s abundant natural resources wealth for
the continent’s development, but seeks to open the
continent for further foreign exploitation and plunder.
The initiative is silent on mobilisation, redistribution and
utilisation of Africa’s land for development, particularly
for women (Moyo 2002).
Other critics note that although Nepad recognises the
central role of agriculture, its tilt towards increasing
productivity through enhancement of infrastructure and
inputs; export-led growth through opening regional and
international markets; and improving backward and
forward linkages through agro-processing leaves the
impression that there are still weaknesses in its
conception of the overall picture of agriculture (Fakir
2003:2).
These arguments have their own logically accepted basis.
It is true that African heads of states and governments
agreed at the AU Summit in Maputo, Mozambique in
July 2003 to make agriculture the top priority and to raise
budget allocation for agriculture to a minimum of 10% of
total public spending within five years (AU declaration 7,
Maputo Summit 2003). However, even these steps
cannot adequately address the root causes of the African
agriculture predicament if there is a weakness in the
comprehensive overall picture of agriculture.
One can reasonably doubt that a development plan,
designed on the principles promoted by IFIs and
Western donors, will address the real needs of the
African rural poor or deal with the core issues which
hinder Africa’s development. Although Nepad is
referred to as an initiative that emerged from Africa, the
level of ownership of Nepad among Africans is
questionable. The theoretical basis of Nepad is inspired
by the same neo-liberal orthodoxy that has failed in
Africa since the 1980s.
A review of the CAADP, prepared by the FAO in
collaboration with Nepad’s steering committee, sheds
light on the potential challenges. It is significant that the
document mentions land tenure as an institutional
impediment to African agricultural renewal only once,
and then not even as a central pillar of the programme
(Nepad/FAO 2003:10).
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Besides, in accordance with the Western view, the
programme makes a clear separation between sub-
Saharan Africa and the north African region – although
the problems faced by the two regions in the field of land
and agriculture are similar, as previously illustrated. The
CAADP considers the north African region as more
advanced, given that 40% of Africa's irrigated land is in
that region (Nepad/FAO 2003:12). Besides, north
Africa is reasonably well endowed with respect to
investments in rural infrastructure and is more advanced
in the use of agricultural mechanisation (Nepad/FAO
2003:34). However, this may not justify the sentiment
that ‘no situation in north Africa seems to call for
significant external food and agriculture intervention’
(Nepad/FAO 2003:48). It is unclear too, why the
responsibility of ensuring market access and diversifica-
tion of products was assigned to Egypt, a country from a
region that is not seen to be the same as the rest of Africa.
Furthermore, the CAADP adopts the IFI diagnosis of
the African agricultural crisis. The main challenges are
assumed to be attributable to internal factors. Even
where external factors are mentioned, these are largely
defined as physical or environmental factors, unstable
international market prices, or the inability of African
countries to meet quality and quantity requirements for
securing market access. The programme hardly
mentions that the economic policies of the North and the
multilateral rules of the particular operations of private
multinational actors in the global agrarian system as main
challenges to agriculture and market access (Nepad/
FAO 2003:8-10).
For the CAADP, reversing the agricultural situation in
Africa is mainly the responsibility of the African
countries themselves. These countries are required to
provide the enabling environment for agricultural
development – including trade-related capacity building,
appropriate knowledge and human capacities, support-
ive laws, policies and institutions and, above all,
establishing and maintaining an open economy based on
continued and enhanced economic reforms and
liberalised exchange and trade systems (Nepad/FAO
2003:11). The CAADP introduces the neo-liberal model
as a kind of magic solution for the African economic
crisis in general and the agricultural predicament in
particular. Change is required in Africa, as it is required
elsewhere, but one may want to ask how different the
situation would be if the African countries met the
targets required of them while the main constraints
imposed by the West remained the same.
Financing agriculture under the CAADP is based on the
dual assumption that Africa itself will increase its level of
investment and that its external partners will come
forward with support. Such wishful thinking is likely to
be dispelled by the absence of any serious action in this
regard. President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal has
expressed frustration about a plethora of Nepad
meetings which have no follow up or implementation
(Afrol News, 27 March 2002). During the G8 Summit in
Evian, France in June 2003) France proposed a
moratorium on agricultural export subsidies to Africa
(excluding general-purpose farm subsidies), but this was
opposed by the US. The G8’s water plan for Africa has
been criticised as being ill-defined and pushing for the
privatisation of water services (e-Africa, June 2003).
The experience of the past two years has proved that the
initiative needs more emphasis on South-South co-
operation, something that has not been given any
attention in the CAADP document which only
emphasises partnerships with the donor community. The
Indian interest in supporting African centres of
excellence for agriculture and bio-technology and its
offer of a $200 million line of credit to finance Nepad is
a clear example – raising the necessity of sharing best
practices with other developing countries and diversify-
ing financing resources (Nepad Dialogue, January 2004).
Finally, land and agriculture are used to raise issues of
political and economic governance needed to provide
the enabling environment for African agricultural
renewal (Nepad/FAO 2003:7, 10). This may provoke
debate about ‘good governance’ (a concept extracted
from the language of the IFIs) and how it can be
implemented in the African context.
The CAADP cannot be considered to be a suitable
approach to addressing the roots of the African land and
agriculture predicament in general, and north African
problems in particular.
Conclusion
In spite of the many controversial issues related to the
Nepad initiative, it cannot be dismissed outright as a non-
event. It is noteworthy that Nepad is a continuous
partnership process by African governments on three
levels: the international level with Western countries,
IFIs and international specialised organisations; the
regional level among regional economic communities;
and the local level with private sector and civil society
organisations.
Being a continuous partnership process means that other
elements could be added and discussed with the
international and internal partners in future. Relevant
meetings and conferences may bring the serious
problems of African land and agriculture to the fore and
present solutions to the structural constraints of the
development of African agriculture, thus:
A programme on agriculture must remain living and open
to continuing improvement and also be open to
interpretation for each of Africa’s sub-regions in order to
best address that continent’s diversity (Nepad/FAO
2003:1).
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Adding agricultural research and technology dissemina-
tion as one of the main pillars of the CAADP and the
explicit reference to gender are clear examples of the
possibility for change. At least the partnership provides a
collective forum in which African governments can
negotiate with their partners and seek funding from the
IFIs, which are increasingly showing a preference for
directing funds to collective bodies, rather than indi-
vidual states.
Although there was no participation from civil society
organisations in the design of Nepad, hope remains that
these entities could play an effective role in promoting
land redistribution and other related issues in the absence
of large-scale state support. Although the role of these
organisations in Africa in general and north Africa in
particular has been less than successful, they assist in
engaging with social formations and help meet minimal
requirements for participation and good governance.
The role of community-based organisations in the
mobilisation of tenants against the freeing of land rents in
Egypt in the 1990s is a good example of this (Rihan &
Nasr 2001:126).
It is a positive sign that the role of civil society
organisations is mentioned more than once in the
CAADP document. Recognising that there was no clear
definition of the roles of public, private and civil society
institutions in agricultural development, the meeting of
the African ministers of agriculture held to consider the
CAADP in June 2002 recommended ‘a proactive plan of
action for enhancing the role of the private sector and
civil society institutions in the implementation of Nepad
agricultural programmes’ be prepared (Nepad/FAO
2003: Annex 1).
The document also emphasises the aspect of partnership
between governments and civil society: ‘Nepad needs to
encourage partnership within Africa… governments,
commercial private sector and civil society need to find
effective cooperation modalities that are mutually
beneficial’ (Nepad/FAO 2003:58). Time will tell if these
commitments will move from rhetoric to action.
As for north Africa, the region has a good share of the
planned projects, although the agricultural projects in the
Short Term Action Plan remain too limited (Nepad
2003:90–6) North African projects include a plan to
combat drought and desertification in the Maghreb and
support to the Nile Basin Initiative. This is significant,
especially given recent tensions between countries on
this river.
1For reviews of some of these protestations see Bond
2002. (Note the absence of any commentary or contri-
bution from the north African region.)
2In a survey conducted by the Centre for International
and Comparative Politics (CICP) at the University of
Stellenbosch, South Africa, about knowledge of Nepad
in seven countries (South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal,
Algeria, Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe), the least
knowledge was found in Algeria. It is worth mentioning
that this survey took only the views of opinion leaders
into account – those who hold the most authoritative
positions in the private sector, NGOs, civic organisations,
the public sector, academics and analysts, trade unions,
politicians and the media. One can imagine what the
result of such a survey would have been if the general
public was included.
3For more information about the development of land
tenure system in Tunisia see Mars et al. 1998.
4For a detailed analysis of the economic, political and
social impacts of SAPs in Egypt in the field of agriculture
see Alsayyid 2001.
5The water crisis in the region was so serious in 2000 that
FAO issued a special alert on 5 April of that year (FAO
2000). Recurring droughts have caused widespread
fluctuations in north African crop production. Since the
beginning of the 1990s, aggregate cereal production has
ranged from 4–8 million tons in five drought years, and
10–18 million tons in five good years.
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Foreword
In a forthcoming publication, I have written on the
changing tendency of the tenure relationship in
Francophone west Africa.1 Some of the arguments
presented in that piece are also discussed in this chapter.
My collaboration, as a civil society member, with several
research programmes based on the west African corpus
led to my gaining experience from the particularities of
the Anglophone sub-region. The Franco-British re-
search programme on land tenure and resource access in
west Africa also generated an interesting book (Toulmin
et al. 2002) from which this contribution benefits.
I am grateful to Jean-Pierre Chauveau whose tenure
regulations research unit at IRD (Institut de recherche
pour le développement) Montpellier, hosts a part of my
PhD investigations. The unit has jointly developed new
qualitative approaches to land issues with what could be
called the ‘Marseille school’.
Introduction
Africa’s rural masses comprise the largest section of
national populations in virtually all the continent’s
countries and yet they are frequently ignored and
neglected in national and international policy-making
processes. The majority of these people are directly
dependent on agriculture and natural resources and yet
do not enjoy legal protection or other entitlement to such
resources.
The lack of an enabling operational legal framework is
considered in this paper as a consequence, not of a
juridical or institutional vacuum, but an overcharged
legal order, which leads to insecurity of stakeholders who
are in turn obliged to navigate between various norms in
an unstable context that threatens individual investments
in rural activities. Rural people are unlikely to make long-
term investments in measures to improve productivity of
their soils without secure rights over the land. This partly
explains why land tenure is central to the ongoing efforts
to address issues of sustainable development in Africa
today.
In many national contexts across Africa, there are
various contradictory legal measures that do not secure
the local poor people’s access to land. This ambiguous
situation is often a source of social conflict between
community members. It is difficult to meaningfully
involve such communities in the development process
under these circumstances. Legal pluralism in tenure
regimes is a consequence of historical evolution, and
efforts to harmonise these regimes are necessary for
development processes to proceed.
Differences often occur in the practical way in which
west African Anglophone countries2 manage the
prevalence of indigenous practices in formal land
administration and the rigidity of the legal tenure
framework of Francophone countries.3 New develop-
ments over the last decade provide objective and
qualitative insights that help us appreciate the
differences. In this paper, I discuss the strategies
undertaken by each country to manage the legal
pluralism in the landholding system as a pillar of the
current land policy. I largely comment on this aspect of
pluralism, including references to its historical con-
struction and some doctrinal approaches.
I also briefly examine other challenges of the influences
of globalisation on property rights, natural resources
management and regional integration.
Legal pluralism in the west
African context
Landholding systems in the bulk of both French- and
English-speaking countries in sub-Saharan Africa have
undergone changes that have undermined the original
forms of communal tenure by introducing state or
individual private property, followed by so-called
modern tenure reform. A rapid review of tenure
practices reveals the following common features:
1. The existence of prior community rules governing
access to land and other resources as an integral part
of the social structure, with tenure being non-
separable from social relationships, land-use and
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rights. Individual rights were a result of negotiation
in which the local land authorities acted as arbiters.
2. Colonisation added a radically new development to
this institutional arrangement. The over-centralisation
in French-speaking regions served to break the
power of customary authorities and impose new
mechanisms (like public registration) derived from
the civil code.4
3. Independent states nationalised land and tried to
redefine tenure rights in order to bring about
development of rural areas.
'legal dualism'
The notion of legal dualism dominated debate among
scholars during the years 1950–70. The legal and
institutional rules governing access to land in the
colonised African countries, or newly independent ones,
are characterised by two major ‘legal systems’ (the
modern and the customary) which co-exist in a
conflicting manner. The so-called ‘modern law’ and
‘customary law’ are separate and exclusive of one
another. The modern legal system is considered the best
way to manage state affairs and the continuing
prevalence of traditional or customary laws is perceived
a threat to development. Alliot (1964) expressed this
conception by evoking the traditional ‘resistance’ to
modern law.
In many societies, colonisation has provoked a division
between the state-established universal legal principle
and the one anchored in customs. Political regimes often
have the ambition of establishing a unique and definitive
system of law, and a single legislation in order to ‘build
the nation’ and ‘modernise society’. In former French-
colonised African countries, the public legal practice has
remained rigid and inflexible, seeking to anticipate every
juridical situation with extremely detailed texts.
Opposing modern law in preference of customary law
only offers a partial explanation to this phenomenon and
institutional dynamics must be seen as results of ‘piling
up’ effects.
The 'empilement' theory
Recent social scientists have tried to go beyond the
apparent division between modern and traditional laws
(Chauveau & Lavigne Delville 1999). They demon-
strated that the so-called modern state law is not as
unique as its makers thought it to be. In their attempt to
impose the state’s conception (in land tenure issues),
legislators have not used the sole channel of formal law.
They have largely used an ‘informal land policy’ which
ignores, and many times breaks, official law principles
(Chauveau & Lavigne Delville 1999:4). For example,
encouraging some targeted social agents to resettle in less
populated areas led to disregard of the principle of citizen
equality. By doing so, informal policy has followed
similar political codes prevailing in local social ‘arena’ (in
the sense of Moore 1978), then reinforced with common
characteristics of African political culture, violence,
clientelism and negotiation (Chauveau & Lavigne
Delville 1999:5).
Experiences show that stakeholders pick and choose
opportunistically between the different systems to
further their own interests. Thus, farmers did not find the
new reforms to their liking, which is why some ‘deviation
from the script’ or ‘slippage’ can be seen (Olivier De
Sardan et al. 1985). The authorities responsible for en-
forcing the law may also have a strategic interest in using
the law to claim rights to which local rules do not entitle
them.
The state action in this case has contributed to amplify
the legal pluralism because new norms and institutions
were enacted and encroach on prior norms, reorganising
them and generating new ones afterwards – they seem
‘superimposed’. It turned out that public intervention
rendered the landholding system unclear and insecure as
a result of the ‘empilement’ (or piling up) impression on
the legal order. French colonial laws and the British
indirect rule system impacted on land policy in Africa by
adding a layer to the regulation and governing of natural
resources in their colonies.
Conducting land policy in this pluralistic atmosphere
seems to be a perpetual attempt in ‘managing the
confusion’ (Le Bris et al. 1991). I now examine how west
African legislators reacted to this situation.
WEST AFRICAN solutions
Since colonialism, followed by African independence,
did not succeed in instituting modern law, the solutions
of the 1980s–1990s shifted from the idea of replacing
one tenure norm with another. The fact that various
norms co-exist must be taken as an inescapable reality. So
one important step is not to consider legal pluralism as a
pathological element which must be eliminated, but as a
result of social and political dynamics.
Both colonial and post-colonial strategies tried to
associate traditional rules and official law by recognising
local practices. Le Roy (1998) identified three tendencies
in conducting these strategies: codification, registration
and subsidiarity. I add two other options, which are
radically opposite to one another, namely nationalisation
and privatisation.
Codification
The logic of codification seeks juridical definitions for
tenure rules which are practised ‘in the field’, that means
integrating customary systems into a positive legal order,
which clearly defines and enforces them.
In Burkina Faso, land reform began in 1984 with a total
nationalisation under the revolutionary regime of the late
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President Thomas Sankara. In a revolutionary sense, the
reforms tried to weaken traditional chiefs’ power in land
management, but to no avail. This was then followed by
a complete review of the reforms in 1991 and later in
1996 by another land administration law called
‘réorganisation agraire et foncière’ (Law No. 014/96/ADP).
The 1996 law returned virtual control of natural
resources to local communities through the constitution
of the customary rural domain (domaine rural
coutumier), which represents 90% of the country’s lands
(Lund 1999). Beyond this recognition, the problem
stakeholders are now facing is that official land dispute
management procedures are so complicated that many
of the conflicts and land speculations are resolved
outside the legal system.
Although the Togolese land reform process (‘Reforme
agro-foncière’) was established in 1974, it continues to
offer a case of codification. Contrary to the land reform
in Burkina Faso, the Togolese legislators did not
nationalise land en masse. Customary access to land is
recognised at the same level as modern acquisition. Law
No. 12 (Article 2) of 6 February 1974 states that,
The State guarantees the ownership rights of individuals
and communities who hold land title issued in accordance
with the law. The State also guarantees the ownership
rights of any person or community who can claim to exercise
customary rights over the land they use.5
While the text is perfect, its application is problematic
because it emphasises effectiveness of land-use as a
condition of official recognition (Rouveroy 1995). The
consequence is that since the reforms were adopted, little
traditional ownership has been officially registered
(Alinon 2000:7).
In Nigeria, regulatory measures are embodied in the
Land Use Decree of 1978 (now the Land Use Act).
Kolawole (2002) states that the decree has
sought to reform the system of land tenure with a view to
enhancing agricultural productivity, residential construc-
tion and the development of social infrastructure in order to
check land speculation and excessive rents.
The author mentions five types of property rights, which
the decree drew, namely:
user-rights with or without the right to dispose of or
transform the resource
rights to the land surface (excluding mineral rights)
part-time collective rights (for example, pastoralists)
part-time rights to trees
non-material rights (for example, the right of
passage).
One of the most problematic aspects of codification is
the diversity of local practices. Even in the same society,
with an agro-ecological or a cultural homogeneity, saving
and formalising customs would only be a simplification
of rules. Which one of them will be taken as the model
and will recover legitimacy for stakeholders? Further-
more codification generates many complicated legal
texts that are hardly understood by the general populace.
Registration
Generally, land registration methods intend first to
capture all the scope of land distribution by a systematic
survey. In a second phase titles will be given to people
who effectively own portions that are not subject to
conflict. So, according to this method, only the field
reality counts and the law comes later. It is a pragmatic
logic, which starts from land possession as observed in
situ. So such pretensions must be identified and
registered in a first phase, then the land law must
officialise them afterwards. Rural tenure plans (plans
fonciers ruraux) in Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea-Conakry
are typical cases of registration attempts.
The Ivorian experience started with a great objective:
to record the current tenure situation by taking note of the
land rights (without modifying them) as they result from
agreements between villages, families and eventually
neighboring individuals. These land rights will be
contradictory expressed before an official survey body
(Guyon 1989:19).
Serious threats were made during the registration
process, especially because stakeholders feared the
finalisation of rights on a cadastral map. Despite this
problem, certainly due to a failure to inform people and
involve them in the process, Côte d’Ivoire can be
considered to have the best cadastre among African
Francophone countries. Observers are yet to be dis-
appointed with the conservative aspect of the ultimate
law that has resulted from the registration process. In
fact, the law on land tenure adopted in 1998 officially
denied access to non-Ivorians even though such people
own land.
Guinea has also engaged the same registration method by
launching the pilot operation of rural tenure plan
(opération pilote de plan foncier rural – OPPFR) as part
of the application of Law No. 0/92/019 issued on 30
March 1992. The objective of this operation is to
establish a less expensive process for OPPFR, which
must take customs as a basis for recognition of property
rights. According to Camara (2000),
the OPPFR method of intervention permits a rapid and
less expensive registration of land possession. It also offers
the advantage of avoiding the main problem of conflict with
the absolute private propriety right.
The rural tenure plan formula is also in use in Benin. The
Natural Resources Management Project (Projet de
Gestion des Ressources Naturelles – PGRN) was
launched in 1990, and followed in 2000 by the Natural
Resources and Soil Management Project (Projet de
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Gestion des Terroirs et des Ressources Naturelles –
PGTRN). These are nation-wide natural resources
management programmes whose activities include local
land rights recording. The two successive projects
combined cartography and valuation survey methods to
recognise existing local access rights through a public,
participative (and contradictory) process.
The reformative caution inherent in these rural tenure
plans could bring clarification in tenure relationship and
better communication between stakeholders and the
state. However, putting them into place is expensive.
Furthermore, I must emphasis that the tenure plans are
not by themselves a real land policy. They are only a
partial means for categorising rights within a temporal
legal framework.
Subsidiarity
The subsidiarity method is based on a firm process of
delegating land management power to local institutional
structures. The local systems and their mediation modes
are recognised. Procedure, not the formal law, is most
important.
For example, in Niger, land reform that aimed to
facilitate a smooth transition from a customary tenure
regime to modern property was launched in the 1990s
without provoking much conflict. Through Law No. 93/
015 (of 12 March 1993), tenure commissions (com-
missions foncières) were established with responsibility
for controlling the use of natural resources and recording
families’ rights over those resources. Members of the
tenure commissions were elected from local administra-
tive agents, traditional land chiefs and peasant
associations. The commissions could be considered as
micro-cadastral structures at local level. The initiative
was welcomed by the public and was used in zoning
communal properties.
Lund (2000) argues that the model of Niger has shown
the difficulty of demarcating lines of authority between
decentralised public servants and responsibilities of
chiefs. So, cases which were decided under the aegis of
one institution but disputed could be reintroduced for
consideration through the other. Lund predicted that the
primary goal of the reform (reducing land conflicts) was
not attainable.
Taking into account all the local tenure systems,
subsidiarity or a patrimonial approach offers a credible
way to resolve current tenure issues in sub-Saharan
Africa. It presents a new perspective for decentralised
management of property rights and securing stakehold-
ers. However, a necessary condition for such a strategy to
work is political will on the part of the state to transfer
decision making and financial powers to local-level
institutions. This remains a weakness of the Francophone
decentralisation system, with Madagascar’s autonomous
provinces being a notable exception.
For Kassanga (2002), customary land law in Ghana has
not been abolished (that is beyond the power of any
government, military or civilian). However, the state land
machinery effectively monopolises all important land
management functions in the customary sector. So,
under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, no formal
transfer or development of ‘stool’ land (a category of land
belonging to traditional chieftaincies) is permitted, unless
the Regional Lands Commission certifies its consistency
with the development plan. All revenue, income, and
royalties emanating from the land are paid into a Stool
Lands Account. Ten percent of this account is paid in tax
to cover administrative expenses. The remaining reve-
nue is disbursed to the ‘stool’ through the traditional
council, to the traditional authority and to the district
assembly. This appears to be a means of taking power
from the customary traditional authorities, whether by
accident or design. In practice, however, customary
landholders continue to dispose of their lands as they
wish, despite the high opportunity cost to the en-
vironment and local communities in general.
Privatisation vs nationalisation
Under the pressure of structural adjustment programmes
(SAPs), reforms encouraging land privatisation were
adopted from the 1980s. Liberal theorists assumed that
when the continent was integrated into the world
capitalist economy, the state, in response to the in-
digenous farmers’ demands, would enforce a system of
private property rights.
Some scholars asserted that the state, controlled by
capitalist forces, would destroy indigenous systems,
thereby creating a landless proletariat, or uphold
indigenous systems of land tenure and exploit them to
their own advantage. Although privatisation cannot be
considered an option to solve pluralism of norms, the
reforms conducted with this objective were not
successful. Indeed, they have not made a qualitative
departure from the past. Difficult procedures and
repressive legislation on natural resources still exist.
Furthermore, what came with privatisation policy was
the amplification of the continuing grip of urban elites on
productive lands.
I observe that the pro-communist movement, which
occurred within Africa in the early 1950s–60s, brought
about nationalisation of land in many west African
countries after independence. Guinea and Burkina Faso
experienced nationalisation for some years. Although the
Senegalese land tenure system is a hybrid one, that
country chose the option of nationalisation with the
adoption of Law No. 64–46 (of May 1964), which
established the national domain (Domaine National).6
The late President Leopold Senghor affirmed that
Senegal wanted to go
from the Roman law to the Negro-African law, from the
bourgeois conception of land to the socialist one, which was
the prior system of traditional black Africa (Sidibe
1997).
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Sidibe (1997:56) considers the national domain to be
about 99% of the Senegalese territory, and is pro-
nationalisation, referring to the ‘ambiguity and the
anarchy of the land tenure situation in Senegal before the
1964 law’. The legislators argued that the law would ‘free
peasants from ancestral servitudes and ensure them the
greatest security’.7 However, nationalisation has been
proved not to work in weak and non-accountable states.
The new challenges8
The west African sub-region, as well as the rest of the
continent, is faced with new challenges and issues
including the following:
The west African countries have, in general, all
subscribed to new commitments at the international
level and developed new initiatives at the national,
sub-regional and regional levels, namely
decentralisation policies; revision of land tenure and
natural resource management laws; the Sahel 21
process and the food security strategy paper;
national and sub-regional action programmes to
combat desertification; preparation of poverty
reduction strategy papers; the process of regional
integration; and the New Partnership for Africa's
Development (Nepad).
Civil society has been consolidated and confirmed
its legitimacy and capacity to take part in the search
for suitable solutions to land tenure problems and
decentralisation.
All these changes show the importance of defining new
policy guidelines for the land tenure and natural
resources sector, in keeping with the progress made in
sub-regional integration; renewed awareness of acute
shared resource management problems; and the ag-
gravation of potential or latent conflict situations at the
national or inter-state levels. The situation in the
Francophone west African sub-region is volatile, posing
many threats to peace.
The current challenges include globalisation; growing
scarcity of resources; recurrent droughts and desertifica-
tion; fierce economic competition and the spectrum of
murderous conflicts shaking up the continent. This is a
clarion call for west African countries to work even
harder towards the establishment of viable economic and
ecological areas, and to anticipate the surfacing of latent
conflicts connected with the management of national
common and transboundary resources. In this context,
an ambition for the next decade should be to strengthen
a process that guarantees secure and equitable access to
and sustainable management of natural resources. This
process could result in the development of a regional
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Table 1: An attempted synthesis of west African land tenure systems
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The issue of women’s access to land is a crucial one that
is suffering lack of genuine and progressive approaches.
The impact of HIV/Aids on agrarian labour is yet
another challenge facing west Africa.
Conclusion
One of the interesting contributions of legal an-
thropology and sociology is that legislative and
institutional instruments should no longer be seen as a
sum of technical proposals, but as social phenomenon, as
shown by the way that groups seize upon the
development options made to them, while trying to bend
them to suit their own interests. Griffiths (1986,
following Moore 1978), has shown that the behaviour of
those to whom a legislative provision is addressed is not
solely determined by national legal rules, but also by rules
deriving from so-called ‘semi-autonomous social fields’.
This baseline stage is an appropriate field of analysis on
effective modes of tenure regulation.
It is important to lobby for official recognition of local
land regulation modes. Legal and institutional pluralism
makes the tenure framework complex, provokes
ambiguity on ownership rights and pushes people to
adopt opportunistic strategies that lead to conflicts.
Arguing that land tenure systems need clarification is
saying everything and saying nothing. Clarification
cannot be the sole result of legal action, it supposes the
involvement of many socio-political aspects like in-
formal local arrangements, which currently constitute
effective modes of regulation. I agree with Chauveau and
Lavigne Delville when they say that ‘those informal
organisations with a strong political dimension appear
surely like means of adaptation’ (1999:19).
The pluralism of arbitration institutions and authorities
must be managed because it leaves many conflicts
perpetually unresolved. Local ruling systems must be
taken into account, but with progressive introduction of
formal items, namely written contracts, flexible local
administrative institutions of landholding, for example
Niger’s tenure commissions, can be created.
Clarification of tenure systems must not be a top-down
affair, there should be continuous research for
compromise and consensus between the different
systems – a crucial matter of reflection that requires
innovative initiatives such as the Pan-African Programme
on Land and Resource Rights.
1Alinon, K. Managing the legal pluralism by finding intermediary
land policy for the west Francophone Africa: A comparative
approach of national strategies. Address to the Conference on
Indigenous Political Structures and Governance in
Africa, Ibadan, Nigeria, New York University at Stony
Brook/Ford Foundation, 21 July 2001. (Forthcoming
collective book to be published by Sefer Press, Nigeria).
2The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ghana and Nigeria.
However, my remarks concern the last two countries.
3I mostly refer to the situation in Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal,
Burkina Faso, Togo, Guinea, Niger and Benin. Mali and
Mauritania are the other two countries which make up
Francophone west Africa.
4The civil code is also known as the Napoleonic code.
The famous French emperor generated a unified code
containing the set of rules governing social relationship
between citizens.
5Legal provisions in this section were translated by the
author from the original French.
6The national domain concerned all lands that were not
formally registered at this period (1964) and those that
were out of the public domain of the state.
7Statement in the preamble of Law No. 64–46 of May
1964.
8A process towards the Praia+9 conference is ongoing in
the sub-region; the remarks evoked in this section
embrace many of the ideas developed by the civil society
sub-committee in which I am involved. For the main
report, see CILSS 2003.
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Introduction
International agreements have implications for land and
resource tenure at local, national and international levels.
Issues of land and resource rights should be addressed in
the broader context of international treaties. The
multilateral environmental agreements concluded in the
last two decades seek to establish a legal framework for
environmental resources management and also create
favourable conditions for sustainable and equitable
development.
To a greater or lesser degree, most of the agreements deal
with or affect land and resource rights vis-à-vis national
and regional processes. The agreements are of parti-
cularly central importance as regards resource rights –
namely access, control and ownership of land and other
resources.
The subject is of great importance, as it touches on
secure and affordable access to and enjoyment of land
and resource rights, a significant matter in the pursuit of
poverty reduction and food security at the national,
regional and international level. Access to land and
natural resources is important in ensuring that citizenry
contributes to and benefits from economic growth.
Poverty reduction in Africa, for example, is largely
predicated on land productivity in addition to access to
basic services, markets, education and health care.
Furthermore, secure rights to land and other resources
underpin secure livelihoods and shelter by reducing
vulnerability to shocks, guaranteeing a level of self-
provisioning and supplementary incomes from basic
foodstuffs and enabling easier access to basic infra-
structure, employment, markets and financial services.
Moreover, insecure land and resource rights may result
in societal unrest, which would greatly impinge on both
long- and short-term development prospects.
Direct access to environmental resources by poor people
is critical in ensuring economic growth that is
environmentally sustainable. Therefore, national land
policies, as affected by international agreements, un-
derpin development. Furthermore, globalisation, as
epitomised by the inter-connectedness of the interna-
tional community and given effect through international
agreements, also impacts on land and resource rights.
More specifically, economic liberalisation and subscrip-
tion to international treaties without political liberalisation
intra-state affects the enjoyment of land and resource
rights at national levels.
Land and resource rights in the international legal
framework can be broadly categorised as being vested in
three different entities: the state, the individual, and the
community of states. International law, being state-
centric, holds the state to be the locus for granting
property rights. Consequently, in areas under national
sovereignty, including all terrestrial ecosystems, states
have full rights over their land resources. However,
international agreements also provide for ownership,
control and access to resources by private entities and
individuals. In areas that are not subject to sovereign
appropriation, common ownership regimes govern
access to, control and ownership of, land and other
resources.
It is important to point out that in international treaty-
making, the equality of states is assumed. In instances
where a particular state is unable to engage in the debates
but proceeds to subscribe to the international regime for
any number of reasons, the state will in essence be bound
to abide by the treaty's rules. In many cases, African
countries are unable to access international legal
provisions, due to lack of capacity, even where these
would benefit them. This paper sets out to inquire
into the implications of international agreements on land
and resources rights as regards access, control and
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ownership. While these agreements represent consensus
on issues, they can both enable as well as disable
enjoyment of land and resource rights at different levels.
I explore the link between these instruments and national
and regional processes, paying particular attention to the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD); the Interna-
tional Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture (ITPGRFA); the United Nations Conven-
tion to Combat Desertification (UNCCD); the In-
ternational Union for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants (UPOV) Convention; and the Organisation of
African Unity (now the African Union) African Model
Law for the Protection of the Rights of Local Com-
munities, Farmers and Breeders, and for the Regulation
of Access to Biological Resources (African Model Law).
Other agreements referred to include the African
Convention, the Lusaka Agreement and the World
Trade Organisation’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement. All these
international treaties have implications for land and
resource rights with some underscoring the importance
of common schemes for ownership, control and access
to resources and others emphasising the role of states
and private entities as the loci for the grant of property
rights.
The paper examines the North-South dynamics of
treaty-making to provide the context for discussing
specific agreements. It concludes by pointing out that the
wider economic contexts and engagements are critical to
any exploration of the issue of land and resource rights
and that it is important to identify those aspects of
international treaties that enable the enjoyment of rights
and their utilisation, while at the same time minimising
the effect of the disabling provisions. In my view, the
Pan-African Programme on Land and Resource Rights
(PAPLRR) can contribute to enhancing the capacity of
African countries to meaningfully engage and thus
optimise the benefits of international agreements in the
realisation of land and resource rights for the poor.
Conceptualisation
Property rights
Property is a claim to a benefit or income stream while
property rights constitute claims to a benefit stream
protected through institutionalised regimes from
interference by other potential users (Bromley 1992).
Property rights refer to rights, relationships, responsibili-
ties and duties (Messerschmidt 1993). They constitute a
social relationship defining the property holder with
respect to something of value (Bromley 1992). There are
different kinds of property rights for which different
rationales are given.
The existence of property rights depends upon a limited
supply of resources for which different users compete.
In this situation, law reacts by assigning property rights to
regulate access to resources that was previously
unregulated (Biblowit 1991). In the realm of land and
resource rights, property rights can be broadly cate-
gorised into real and intellectual property rights.
Real and intellectual property
rights
Real property comprises tangible commodities capable
of exclusive possession and clear delineation (Swanson
1995:141).1 Land and the accompanying rights that flow
with it exemplify this kind of property. Ownership of
land has historically constituted one of the main
categories of property rights conveying an array of rights
upon the owner (Megarry 1984).2 Land is important in
resource tenure because it hosts diverse species and also
encompasses a variety of ecosystems. In this regard land
tenure arrangements are crucial to the interaction be-
tween natural resources and property rights holding.
Intellectual property on the other hand deals with
informational services, ‘which are intangible and
amorphous… not readily susceptible to either pos-
session or delineation’ (Swanson 1995:163). While real
property is relatively scarce and therefore expensive to
protect and capture, the value of intellectual property is
associated with the creation of a shortage of information,
by limiting the capacity of non-owners to capture it. This
genus of rights also distinguishes between the treatment
given to human creations as opposed to nature’s
creations (Walden 1995).
Intellectual property rights (IPR) generally fall into four
categories: copyright, trademark, trade secrets and
patents. While copyright protects the creative expression
of ideas in tangible form, trademarks protect symbols,
words and marks that are designed to distinguish services
and goods in the market (Palmer 1989).
For an invention to be patentable, it must satisfy the
requirements of novelty, non-obviousness and utility
(Goldstein 1990). Patents can be granted for either
products or processes.3 Trade secrets also protect ideas
but rely on private enforcement measures such as
employment contracts. A notable characteristic of IPR
protection generally is the aspect of public good, which
makes it available for use without necessarily having to
pay for it. While production of a work of intellect
involves time, effort and money on the part of the creator
of the work, the person who accesses it through copying
spends much less time and resources but has the same
information as the person buying the original. This
makes copying of the work more attractive than buying
the original (Landes & Posner 1989). Allocating property
rights to the creator of a work balances the private
interests of the creator, by ensuring that he or she still has
an incentive to create, against those of society at large
having the information available for use.
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Even though intellectual property does not diminish
once it is shared, the role of IPR is to ensure that
information providers do not lose rights to the
information by disclosing it, since such information can
be used by an infinite number of persons simultaneously
(Baer 1995). Indeed one of the perceived philosophical
underpinnings of IPR is to ensure disclosure of the
information, the assumption being that lack of such right
would discourage information holders from sharing their
information for fear of losing it. The fear of losing
exclusive rights to the information once shared is real
because another person can use the same idea without
having recourse to the originator of the idea.
Another major distinguishing factor of intellectual
property from real or material property is the time
limitation of the rights also known as the ‘sunset clause’
(Baer 1995). The effect of this clause is to limit the
duration for which property rights can be held. The
expiration of the duration entails a freeing of the rights
from protection and consequently their unrestricted
availability to the public.
Relevant IPR in the field of natural resources are patents
and plant breeders rights (PBR). Traditionally, plants and
animals were excluded from patentability and were
governed by PBR.4 The gradual move towards patenting
of life forms in the United States first affected plants, but
patenting has also been extended to animals.5
Ascribing value
Recognising property rights over land and natural
resources requires valuation. This has proved to be quite
a complicated and controversial task because of con-
flicting interests and value judgment systems. Natural
resources, for instance, are in many cases both a public
good from which it is difficult to exclude others and a
private good whose consumption is subtractable
(Gibson 1996). In the majority of cases, the ecosystem
services that they provide are consumed directly and never
get to the market place. This results in undervaluation of
these services (which are in the public domain) and
overstatement of private rights that are transacted in the
market place (WRI/ IUCN/ UNEP 1992).
An anthropocentric and utilitarian view of natural
resources tends to emphasise potential economic
returns. In this view, raw materials only acquire
significance when they reach the market place and can be
assigned a monetary value. Thus the value of forest
resources is broadly limited to the value of the timber
that can be harvested and all other products whose
market value is not known are disregarded. This
overlooks other direct economic benefits that can be
derived from the forest such as fuel wood, recreation or
hunting and environmental services such as preventing
the siltation of downstream areas.6
With regard to genetic resources and raw germ plasm,
despite the recognised potential utility, assignment of
value presents insurmountable difficulties because of the
very low probability of any given sample yielding
commercial returns. It is also argued that the taking of
germ plasm is different from extraction of timber
because only a small part of the whole is taken while the
rest is left on the ground.7 This reflects the incapacity of
the market to ascribe value to products that may be
useful to humankind but are not currently commercially
exchanged (Radin 1996).
The dominance of the market precludes the search for
non-market mechanisms of valuing such products
(Radin 1996). The fact that the market is unable to
ascribe value to something does not mean that the thing
is valueless. It may point to the need for other kinds of
valuation that fall outside the purview of the market.
There are also social concerns that are relevant in natural
resource management and are not commodified.8
Existing property rights regimes make it easier to ascribe
value to genetic resources that have been transformed
through biotechnology. This is not the case with land
races.9 While the latter are designated as primitive
cultivars, the former are characterised as elite varieties.
This characterisation reflects value judgments that
translate into potential monetary gains. The skewed
valuation scale does not indicate a continuum from the
raw material to a transformed product. There is a marked
dichotomy between the valueless raw germ plasm and
the commodified varieties that are processed in
laboratories (Shiva 1993).10
The value of natural resources is also lowered by the
standardisation of systems of production, knowledge
and institutions across the world. While such stan-
dardisation has its benefits, it tends to disregard the need
to preserve diversity and take into account the
contribution of local knowledge and institutions.
Recognised property rights
systems
The way in which people vested with property rights deal
with those rights determines to a significant extent the
efficacy of those rights in promoting resource man-
agement objectives. Since property rights provide an
incentive to conserve and sustainably use resources, it is
important to assign the rights to those interacting closely
with the resources. Open access situations are prevalent
where there are no property rights and the resources are
accessed on a first-come, first-served basis (Gowdy
1994). There has been a tendency to view common
property regimes as synonymous with open access
regimes (Bromley & Cernea 1989).
The major property rights regimes relevant in the realm
of land and natural resources are individual/ private
property, communal property and government control.11
For this purpose I divide the property rights systems
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broadly into two, namely common and individual
property rights.
Common property
Common property resources are those resources not
controlled by a single entity. Access to these resources is
limited to an identifiable community that has set rules on
the way those resources are to be managed – and can
exclude others. There are separate entitlements to the
commons for each user and no one user has the right to
abuse or dispose of the property. Any dealing with the
property has to take into account the entitlements of
others and is subject to approval by the community.
Users of common property share rights to the resource
and are subject to rules and restrictions, embedded in
cultural or religious customs, governing the use of those
resources.
Common property resources provide a basis for non-
monetary and non-market economic relations (Singh
1986). Common property users do not usually perceive
themselves as owners of the resources. They consider
themselves as being merely in possession of their habitat.
In the words of Singh (1986),
forest dwellers have traditionally not cognised their habitat
as their property, common or private, since such a legal title
did not exist in their world view.
Bromley and Cernea (1989) posit that common property
is akin to private property and differs only because of the
number of people who own it and can exclude outsiders.
They also argue that common property is like corporate
property, the members of the group having a relationship
different from that of corporate property holders.
Further, all members of the group are assured of access
even when they do not actively participate in the activities
of the community.
In the context of natural resources, the existence of
global problems has led to the development of new
regimes for regulating access to them. One example of
these is the concept of common heritage of humankind
that was first discussed within the purview of the Law of
the Sea Convention.12 A common heritage regime was
developed in the context of deep seabed resources that
do not fall under the jurisdiction of any state. Common
heritage resources belong to all, but can only be exploited
in a way that benefits all, even those that do not partake
in the exploitation. The benefits derived from the
exploitation should also be redistributed, so that coun-
tries that usually do not have the technological or
financial capacity to undertake activities of their own can
also gain from the resources. This implies that all
potential users must receive a portion of any benefits and
share the duties.13
State ownership
State ownership constitutes another major form of
property holding.14 This refers to situations where the
state has ownership and control over a resource. The
state may directly control and utilise the resource
through one of its administrative arms or it could grant
user rights to communities and individuals (Bromley &
Cernea 1989:27). States are in a peculiar position as
grantors and guarantors of property rights, both at the
local and international level, as well as holders in their
own right. International law grants them permanent
sovereignty over their natural resources.15 At the
international level, a distinction exists between areas
subject to ab initio appropriation on a first-come, first-
served basis and common areas whose access is regulated
and restricted by international law (Weiss 1995:17)16
States today still represent the most important property
rights holders. In post-colonial societies, for instance, the
destabilisation occasioned by colonial rule contributed to
the breakdown of social, political and economic com-
munal structures. States moved in to replace the centres
of power in all areas, including property holding. In this
process, they took over most of the properties previously
held by communities.17 States thus have come to
monopolise common property resources. This does not
imply that such ‘privatisation’ makes resources com-
monly available to many people. In most cases, it is used
as an avenue for channelling common property re-
sources to individuals or companies for economic or
political reasons (Singh 1986:29).
Communities
The increasing trend of subsuming the discussion of
common property rights within open access has led to
community rights being ignored. As noted above, there is
a marked difference between common property and
open access. In the context of natural resource
management, the traditional knowledge of communities
in the preservation and enhancement of diversity has not
been taken into consideration. This is due to the fact that
raw genetic resources are not given a high commercial
value because no IPRs can be ascribed at that stage.
Private property
Private property rights denote ‘a bundle of entitlements
defining the owner’s rights, privileges and limitations for
use of a resource’ (Tietenberg 1992). Other attributes of
property rights are exclusivity, universality, transferabil-
ity and enforceability.18 The recognition and enforce-
ment of these rights depend on the machinery put in
place by the state. The holders of these rights are either
corporations or individuals who can exclude others from
the benefits of their property and regulate its use in so far
as they comply with the laws of the state granting the
rights.
Changes in property rights are generally towards
individualisation and away from communal property
rights. Patents in life forms and biotechnology patents
are symptomatic of this general trend. The role of
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corporations and transnational corporations (TNCs) is
significant, originating mainly in developed countries.
These have made their mark in property ownership,
especially in the area of intellectual property. This trend
has been facilitated by the globalisation of international
trade. In biotechnology, the entry of TNCs to the fray has
brought with it a culture of commodification. The
biotechnology sector seeks to make seeds merely a raw
material by replacing their regenerative biological
processes. Through IPRs, the freedom of farmers to
reproduce seeds is being circumscribed (Shiva
1994:128).
Tragedy of the commons vs
tragedy of the enclosure
One of the most widely debated ideas in the area of
resource use is that of ‘the tragedy of the commons’,
which postulates that when property rights are not
assigned in situations of open access, there is an incentive
to over-exploit renewable resources (Hardin & Baden
1977). The flip side of this argument is that when
property rights are assigned in these situations, the
market will act to properly balance competing uses and
force the participants to use such property in the most
efficient way. Guided by the erroneous notion that
common property is synonymous with property held in
open access, the theory of the tragedy of the commons
has been used to justify the grant of private property
rights to resources held in common.
However, over-exploitation can also occur when
common property resources are privatised. This is the
so-called ‘tragedy of the enclosure’.19 The transfer of
authority over common resources from the realm of
communal rules to the individual creates conditions for
over-exploitation due to the sweeping aside of traditional
structures that regulate use. If the mechanisms put in
place for policing the use of this individualised property
are not fully accepted as binding by the people upon
whom they are to operate, or if they are not as far-
reaching as the norms they seek to replace, the result is a
tragedy of the enclosure. This may not necessarily mean
that there is anything wrong with the property rights
themselves, but it raises the question of whether the
property rights are framed at the right level.20
International treaties
The international legal framework alternates between
two extreme positions, namely common heritage,
broadly defined, and private rights, narrowly defined.
There have been a number of international agreements
on these issues. There are those that emphasise common
heritage principles, such as the International Treaty on
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture and
others such as the UPOV Convention21 and TRIPS,22
that provide for private/ individual rights. In between
these two groups, are agreements such as the Convention
on Biological Diversity, which provide for state,
community and individual/private property rights.
The African Convention on the Conservation of Nature
and Natural Resources,23 the Lusaka Agreement on Co-
operative Enforcement Operations Directed at Illegal
Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora,24 the World Heritage
Convention25 and the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES)26 all have implications for land and resource
rights. The state is responsible for granting property
rights and access to areas that host wildlife resources is
severely curtailed.
The African Convention
The African Convention on the Conservation of Nature
and Natural Resources is meant to help harness the
natural and human resources of the continent for the
total advancement of Africans in all spheres of human
endeavour. The instrument holds that the utilisation of
natural resources must aim to satisfy the needs of
humans according to the carrying capacity of the
environment. The convention creates ‘conservation
areas’, defined as all protected natural resource areas,
whether they be natural reserves, national parks or
special reserves. These are, by definition, areas under
state control, and access to them is therefore controlled
by the state. Their boundaries may neither be altered, nor
any portion alienated except by the competent legislative
authority. They are, by implication and legislation, owned
by the state, with the aim of conservation and protection
of soil, water, flora and faunal resources. Under the
convention, state parties assume legislative obligations to
adopt adequate legislation aimed at the protection of
these resources. It can be seen as having been in-
strumental in shaping the state policies of the parties as
regards enhancing the conservation of nature and natural
resources.
However, it cannot escape notice that, in many cases, the
creation of conservation areas has limited access to the
land and the natural resources on it. In some cases,
communities have lost what they had always regarded as
ancestral or communal land from which they had always
eked out a livelihood. Article XI tries to remedy this
problem by providing that the contracting states shall
take all necessary legislative measures to reconcile
customary rights with the provisions of the convention.
The World Heritage Convention
The Convention concerning the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage affirms respect for the
principle of sovereignty of the states on whose territory
the cultural and natural heritage is situated. Without
prejudice to property rights provided by national
legislation, the states that are party to the convention
recognise that such heritage constitutes a world heritage,
and it is the duty of the international community to co-
operate in its protection. It further requires states to set
up a framework for national protection of cultural and
natural heritage. This convention, unlike most of the
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other international agreements, unequivocally recognises
the sovereignty of the states on whose territory such
resources are situated, and expressly confirms that it
does not in any way prejudice any property rights
provided by national legislation. While promoting the
protection of the world cultural and natural heritage, the
convention also ensures that its implementation does not
involve national programmes/ policies that encroach on
natural resource rights as conferred by national legis-
lation.
Though this convention does not deal specifically with
wildlife, it has potential to protect unique wildlife
habitats. It was adopted within the general conference of
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (Unesco) in 1972 and constituted the first
international environmental agreement recognising the
overriding interest of the global community in the
management of domestic resources (Swanson 1992:65).
It is noteworthy that state sovereignty is not infringed
upon at all because the procedure, though internationally
devised, is voluntary (Article 3). The incentives are the
international recognition gained from recording the sites
on the world list and the financial assistance accorded to
members. This approach has been extremely successful
in enlisting state support for conservation measures for
sites of recognised international importance. It can,
however, impinge on the rights of people to land and
resources where designated sites enclose areas that are
vital for a community, thus curtailing the community’s
access to the resources.
CITES
CITES was signed in March 1972 and came into force in
1975. It provides the primary international control
structure for trade in wildlife products. It focuses on the
identification of endangered species and their withdrawal
from the world market through a listing process. CITES
appendices list the species that currently are threatened
with extinction and those for which there is some
indication that they face the threat of extinction in the
future. The conference of parties determines what
species should be listed.
Any species listed in Appendix 1 may not be shipped
without an export permit being issued by the exporting
state. Such a permit may only be issued if the exporting
state certifies that the export will not be detrimental to
the survival of the species. The importing state on its part
has to certify that the import will not be used for
commercial purposes. Further, a ‘re-export certificate’
certifying that the specimen was imported into the re-
exporting country in accordance with the provisions of
CITES is required for all Appendix I species. An
Appendix I listing thus acts as an effective ban on trade
of a species, because even if the exporting state wishes to
continue trading in the listed species, the importing state
is under an obligation to bar all imports other than
scientific ones (Swanson 1992; Glennon 1990). An
Appendix II listing allows for trade in the listed species at
the discretion of the exporting state. The importing state
has an obligation to ensure that the export certificate has
been issued. Appendix III of CITES provides the least
protection and it includes species that are subject to
regulation under the jurisdiction of any member state for
the purposes of preventing or restricting exploitation.
Appendix III listings are intended to assist countries with
domestic regulations to enforce those regulations
internationally. Restrictions on trade are limited to
specimens from the state that has listed the species.
The permit system under CITES provides the
mechanisms for trade regulation. Member states are
required to provide annual reports to the CITES
secretariat on the volumes of trade being carried out in
the listed species. The secretariat acts as the intermediary
between the exporting and importing states and confirms
the authenticity of the trade documents. The man-
agement and scientific authorities set up at the national
level by member states limit the number of permits
issued and thus effectively establish quotas for the
species concerned. The permits also facilitate the mo-
nitoring of international trade in wildlife.
One of the major weaknesses of CITES is its provision
for exceptions for countries that have a reservation with
respect to particular species, provided that the member
notifies other countries of its intention not to comply
with trade restrictions on the species. The insistence on
reservations exemplifies the parties’ increasing disen-
chantment with the fact that CITES is based on a
protective rather than a management approach to
wildlife conservation. As early as 1979, developing
countries argued that wildlife conservation should not be
at the expense of national economic development and
that there ought to be economic benefits emanating from
controlled species if the protection of their habitat from
human encroachment was to be justified.27
Conference Resolution 3.15 of the Conference of Parties
meeting held in New Delhi in 1981 actually implied that
a species listed in Appendix 1 could be removed from the
list for purposes of sustainable resource management
within the country in which the species resides.28 While
the inability of a country taking reservations to trade with
other members of the convention may water down the
value of such a reservation, trade with non-members of
the convention who are not bound by its obligations may
significantly hamper the protection of a species
(Munyakho 1986).
CITES has, for instance, remained at the centre of the
divergence between eastern and southern African
countries with respect to the African elephant. The latter
support wildlife management strategies and have put in
place community-based programmes encouraging such
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management while the former support preservationist
strategies.29 Most southern African countries have
communal wildlife management projects where local
communities participate in management activities and
derive benefits from them. By contrast, eastern African
countries maintain state control of wildlife management
activities with minimal community involvement and
consequently, local communities are opposed to wildlife
presence on their land. All in all, the convention remains
state-centred as opposed to people-centred, which could
adversely affect its effectiveness if the needs of people to
access land and resources are not taken care of by the
states.
The Lusaka Agreement
The Agreement on Co-operative Enforcement Opera-
tions Directed at Illegal Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora
aims to reduce and ultimately eliminate illegal trade in
wild fauna and flora. It arose from the realisation among
African states that there exists a wide scope for illegal
trade in fauna and flora, and that this situation has given
rise to large-scale poaching and depletion of the
continent’s biodiversity. The agreement promotes
enforcement measures applicable under both CITES
and CBD and is in fact a regional instrument for the
implementation of the provisions of CITES. States that
are party to the agreement assume the basic obligation to
individually and/or jointly investigate and prosecute
cases of illegal trade in wild fauna and flora (Article 4). In
so doing, most states have adopted policies and
legislations that are meant to protect flora and fauna, but
which have the practical effect of severely restricting the
access, control and, in some cases ownership, of
environmental resources such as forests and water –
even to the in-digenous communities. Contrary to the
desired effect, such restriction sometimes causes tension
between institutional mechanisms that implement the
policies and legislation and the local indigenous
communities. The Wildlife Act of Kenya is a case in
point. In implementing it, some local communities (for
instance the Maasai) feel that they are wrongfully being
denied access and control of natural resources.
Such tension serves only to cause conflicts, more so
when such national policies are not ‘home grown’, but are
rather put in place by a state in an attempt to conform to
an international treaty obligation. This is more so where,
without any intervention, there is perfect co-existence of
the local communities and other natural resources/
wildlife.
The Convention on Biological
Diversity
This convention represents, as pointed out above, the
middle ground in the debate on property rights and
biodiversity conservation. The main concerns of the
CBD are the conservation of biodiversity, the deve-
lopment of biotechnology, access to both biodiversity
and biotechnology, and international equity. The
convention negotiators faced indomitable challenges
trying to balance the interests of the key players (Barton
1992). The discussions leading to the conclusion of the
convention were characterised by major ideological
differences between the developing countries and the
developed countries over the question of intellectual
property rights, almost threatening the outcome of the
negotiations.30
While developed countries pushed for the consideration
of biodiversity as common heritage of humankind that
should be exploited and conserved for the benefit of all
humankind, they were unwilling to concede to sharing its
benefits. Developing countries demanded that biotech-
nology innovations arising out of biodiversity resources
extracted from their territories be made available to them
free of charge. Some developed countries attempted to
have intellectual property rights to biotechnology
innovations dealt with exclusively in the context of the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)
negotiations because the purpose of the CBD should be
primarily to conserve biodiversity.31
The resulting agreement is riddled with contradictions as
it tries to accommodate the differences between the two
sides. It affirms the rights of states to natural resources
within their jurisdictions and effectively debunks the
common heritage concept, introducing the notion of
common concern. Common concern implies recogni-
tion of the global importance of biological diversity but
does not diminish the ambit of the principle of
permanent sovereignty over natural resources.32 It seeks
to facilitate and promote global co-operation for the
conservation of biodiversity without forcing any given
state to participate in this process.33 The central idea is
that the benefits of access to the resource must be shared
equitably. Like in human rights, reference to common
concern is an acknowledgment that management of a
state’s own environment and resources is a matter in
respect of which all states have standing (Boyle 1993).
The CBD recognises different potentially conflicting
rights over resources. It recognises, for instance, the
need to ensure equitable allocation of ownership rights
and IPRs to biotechnology. The provisions on tech-
nology transfer may thus conflict with existing IPRs. The
convention is silent on which rights should prevail in the
event of a conflict (Sands 1995:748). Like other
international agreements, the CBD does not specifically
address the rights of communities apart from a cursory
mention of indigenous and local communities in one
article (Article 8j).
The UNCCD
In countries experiencing serious drought and/or
desertification, particularly in Africa, the United Nations
Convention to Combat Desertification may have
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implications on land and resource rights. The UNCCD
recognises that national governments play a critical role
in combating desertification and mitigating the effects of
drought. The central role of local implementation of
action programmes in this respect, and hence the impact
of national processes on such programmes, is also noted.
The convention calls for improvement of the ef-
fectiveness and co-ordination of international co-
operation to facilitate the implementation of national
plans and priorities. Under article 4(2) of the agreement,
parties undertake to promote co-operation among
affected parties in the fields of environmental protection
and the conservation of land and water resources, as they
relate to desertification and drought. Further, they
undertake to strengthen sub-regional, regional and
international co-operation in this regard.
The UNCCD requires that parties prepare national
action programmes to achieve the objective of the
convention, and requires that such programmes be
closely inter-linked with other efforts to formulate
national policies for sustainable development (Article
9(1)). Such programmes would include the re-settlement
of communities where activities which threaten to cause
desertification are carried out and regulation of access
and control of other natural resources, especially water
and forests. This has a direct impact on land and other
natural resource rights, as it involves a re-definition of
these rights through the national processes of legislation
and implementation of other national policies aimed at
the fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the
convention. It is augmented by Article 10(2) which
provides that the national action programmes shall
specify the respective roles of government, local
communities and land users, and the necessary and
available resources. In essence, the article recognises that
the programmes contemplated have direct relevance to
the local communities whose access, control and
ownership of land and other resources may be adversely
affected.
Under the UNCCD, national action programmes may
include, inter alia, the establishment of alternative live-
lihood projects that could provide incomes in drought-
prone areas, and the development of sustainable
irrigation programmes for both crops and livestock.
Such projects involve the change and re-organisation of
land use. Being national programmes, they may involve
changes of land tenure. It is for this reason that local
communities must be actively involved in the design of
such projects, lest they view them as disruptive of their
rights to land and other natural resources.
The UPOV Convention
The International Union for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants Convention seeks to protect new
varieties of plants, both in the interest of agricultural
development and of plant breeders. Member states
undertake to create a system for granting plant breeders’
rights within their domestic laws. The rights granted in
each member state are effective only within that territory,
not internationally. The 1978 and 1991 revisions set out
the minimum scope of protection that states must grant.
The 1978 revision expanded the number of criteria that
a plant variety must meet in order to qualify for PBRs.
These include an element of distinctness, homogeneity,
stability, commercial novelty and the submission of an
acceptable denomination.
The 1991 revision provides that parties are free to
protect plant varieties by PBRs or other types of IPRs
such as patents. States may also grant simultaneous
protection to the same plant variety by more than one
type of IPR (Greengrass 1991). Further, it extends
breeders’ rights to all production and reproduction of
their varieties, and to species as well as general and
specific plant varieties. The remaining exceptions to
commodification include acts done privately and for
non-commercial purposes, experiments, and breeding
and exploitation of other varieties. The effect of the 1991
revision is to bring the UPOV Convention in line with
the trend towards patenting of plant varieties. Breeders
are now granted exclusive rights to harvested materials
and the distinction between discovery and development
of varieties has been eliminated.34
It is important to note that the latest revisions emphasise
the increasing importance of patents in a world that sees
PBRs as unnecessarily restrictive even after redefining
the concepts of farmers’ rights and breeders’ rights. This
regime’s membership was mainly drawn from the pool of
countries that are at the forefront of biotechnology
developments. It now includes some developing coun-
tries including Kenya and South Africa. The link between
ownership of plant varieties and enjoyment of land rights
cannot be overemphasised. Monopoly rights over seeds
and plant varieties as provided for under the 1991
version of the UPOV Convention will impact on the
capacity of resource-poor farmers to reap benefits from
their land
TRIPS
Other developments occurred during the Uruguay
round of negotiations of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade.35 GATT was originally conceived of as
a mechanism to promote free trade. Its mandate has
widened as international trade has grown to eventually
include services and IPRs. The new World Trade
Organisation now appears to be the chief multilateral
institution addressing global uniformity of intellectual
property standards and seems to be taking over part of
the role played by the World Intellectual Property
Organisation, whose mandate is to harmonise inter-
national IPR standards.
The United States led the initiative by developed
countries to introduce more stringent IPR rules in trade
because of complaints by American firms about
counterfeiting and piracy, which necessitated the
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protection of domestic biotechnology and other indus-
tries. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights agreement was initially meant to deal with trade
distortions but later its scope was expanded to cover
IPRs. Its main objective is to protect and enforce
intellectual property rights and ensure that they
contribute to the promotion of technological informa-
tion, transfer and dissemination of technology. TRIPS
only takes into account resource tenure in so far as it
relates to patents.
Patents are dealt with in Section 5 of TRIPS, Article 27 of
which addresses the question of patentable subject
matter. The latter article allows member states to exclude
from patentability plants, animals, medical processes for
the treatment of humans or animals. They may also
restrict the commercial exploitation of patentable
innovations to protect public order or morality, including
averting serious harm to the environment. Governments
still retain the right to restrict research, development or
use of technology for protecting the environment.
On another level, the CBD is seen as a possible solution
to the difficulties in property rights to innovations
derived from natural resources. However, the issues
regarding knowledge, innovations and practices of
indigenous and local communities as captured under
Article 8(j) are problematic and can limit the access,
control and ownership of natural resources to these
communities. The protection of such knowledge,
innovations and practices is problematic within the
recognised IPR regimes, firstly because the rights
involved are collective and intergenerational in character,
and secondly, because such rights may not satisfy the
criteria for patentability as novelty, inventiveness and
capability of industrial application that are required for
IPR protection under current regimes.
Such rights are mainly preserved through oral traditions,
and this means that resource rights and land rights
drawing from them will not be readily protected under
the schemes of modern property regimes. As a result,
underdeveloped countries run the risk of losing the
ownership of these genetic and other natural resources to
the industrialised countries, which are in a position to tap
these resources industrially and protect them as their
own.
Conclusion
This paper highlights the plethora of international
treaties affecting the promulgation, enforcement and
enjoyment of land and resource rights. It is critical in any
exploration of land and resource rights to bear in mind
the broader context of globalisation and international
treaties. Most of the international agreements that affect
land and resource rights tend to weaken the international
law principle of state sovereignty over natural resources
of the states in which such resources are situated.
Moreover, the conventions do not ensure that, in their
implementation, the national programmes to be adopted
do not encroach on the land and other resource rights of
the local communities. The consequence is that a lack of
goodwill develops between the local communities and
overseers of the national policies/ programmes in place
as a framework for the implementation of the provisions
of the agreements. It should also be noted that where
people have weak, temporary or unclear rights to land or
other natural resources, they lack the incentive to invest
or use such resources in a meaningfully productive way.
International agreements should, in accord with the
above observation, take into account the land and other
resource rights of local communities if such resources
are to be used sustainably. This is in recognition of the
fact that implementation frameworks of such agree-
ments are critical to the achievement of their objectives.
Moreover, there is need to ensure compensated
restriction of access, control and ownership of resources
in any national programme or process meant to be in
accordance with international agreements’ participatory
approaches to land and resource-use planning. These can
be adopted through national processes implementing the
international obligations and should aim at matching land
allocation and management imperatives to social needs
and addressing potential conflicts among land users.
The rights of land users should be recognised, while
simultaneously taking steps to ensure that land and other
environmental resources are well-protected. The general
ownership of land and other resources should not
prejudice the interests of local communities. This would
be counterproductive, as the communities would gen-
erally be averse to the objectives for which restrictions
were imposed.
1It is also referred to as immovable property. See, for
example, Swanson 1995:141.
2It confers the right to extract minerals from the land, to
use and abuse and dispose of it as the property holder
wills. See Megarry 1984.
3Doc WIP/ACAD/E/93/22. Process patents are given
less economic value because of the difficulty of
monitoring them.
4See, for example, Eisenberg 1987:177.
5See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) and
Walden 1995:184.
6See, for example, Principle 2.b of the Non-Legally
Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a
Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation
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and Sustainable Development of all Types of Forests, in
Report of the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, United Nations, Rio de
Janeiro, 3–14 June 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26/
Rev.1 (Vol. 1), Annex III (known as the 1992 Forest
Statement). See also Weiss 1989.
7See, for example, Kloppenberg & Kleinman 1988.
8Lujan v. Defender of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
See also Goulder & Kennedy 2000.
9Land races are defined as actively cultivated crop
varieties that have been developed in traditional
agricultural systems through both natural and human
selection. See, for example, Witt 1988.
10See also Barton & Christensen 1988.
11The importance of common property management
systems should not be underestimated. It was, for
instance, estimated that in India 64% of all land is in
private hands whereas 36% is common land – see Beck
1994. In Uganda, about 70% of total arable land was held
under customary tenure in 1971 – see Richardson 1993.
12UN General Assembly Resolution 2749 (XXV),
Declaration of principles governing the sea-bed and the
ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction, 17 December 1970; Resolutions
Adopted by the General Assembly During its 25th
Session, 15 September–17 December 1970; General
Assembly Official Records 25th Session Supplement 28
(A/8028) and Article 136 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10
December 1982.
13Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention, and United
Nations: Agreement Relating to the Implementation of
Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea of 10 December 1982 (done at New York 28 July
1994). See also Boyle 1991:7.
14See, for example, Allot 1990, who notes that
sovereignty entails the idea of excluding anyone not
authorised by the property owner from enjoyment of
thing owned.
15See, for example, UN General Assembly Resolution
1803 (XVII), Permanent sovereignty over natural
resources, 14 December 1962 and Sands 1995.
16See, for example, Weiss 1995:17.
17See, for example, Odhiambo 1996.
18Property rights have also been referred to as monopoly
rights. See Swanson 1995:164.
19See, for example, Martinez-Alier 1991.
20In situations where the best level at which to frame the
property rights is the community, framing them at the
level of the individual is likely to result in a tragedy of the
enclosure.
21International Convention for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants (done at Paris 2 December 1961).
22Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, in General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade
Negotiations, Annex 1C (done at Marrakesh 15 April
1994).
23Adopted in Algiers on 15 September 1968.
24Adopted on 8 September 1994.
25UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage – adopted 16 November
1972.
26www.cites.org
27Official Documents, Second Meeting of the Confer-
ence of the Parties San José (Costa Rica), 19–30 March
1979.
28Official Documents, Third Meeting of the Conference
of the Parties, New Delhi (India), 25 February– 8 March
1981.
29See, for example, Murphree, no date.
30The debate on intellectual property rights and the
transfer of technology from developed to developing
countries first appeared in the 1960s and 1970s within
the broad framework of proposals to establish a ‘new
international economic order’ with developing countries
seeking to obtain a better balance between private and
public interests.
31These attempts were defeated, leading to the Bush
administration refusing to sign the convention. See, for
example, Goldman 1994.
32The compromise exemplified in the notion of common
concern is also apparent in the 1992 Forest Statement.
See also Barber & Dickson 1995:121 (see endnote 6).
33Since the convention does not mandate exclusive
multilateral co-operation, bilateral and regional agree-
ments have been concluded. See, for example, the
establishment within the World Bank of the Pilot
Program to Protect the Brazilian Rain Forest between a
small number of donor countries and Brazil.
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34See, for example, Nijar & Ling 1994.
35The results of which appear in General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Trade Negotiations (done at Marrakesh, 15 April 1994).
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Introduction
The ‘land question’ in southern Africa has yielded
substantially similar problems, themes and issues in a
variety of spatial, political, economic and social settings.
The most prominent problems are reclamation of
‘freehold’ agricultural land from settler or alien control
and indigenisation or localisation of ‘ownership’ of land;
re-discovery and assertion of historical or aboriginal land
claims and titles; reform or modernisation of tribal or
customary forms of land tenure and administrative
arrangements; accommodation of equity and gender
concerns in land allocation and distribution; and
regulation of squatting or ‘self-provisioning of land’. This
paper examines the extent to which the search for
solutions to some of these problems is affected by
constitutional protection of ‘the right to property’. The
emphasis is on the search for solutions to squatting and
other problems related to landlessness.
The argument is often made that land problems must be
addressed in a manner compatible with ‘the rule of law’.
AV Dicey, a famous English constitutional lawyer said,
more than a century ago, that the purpose of the rule of
law was to protect individual rights by requiring
government to act in accordance with pre-announced,
clear and general rules that are enforced by impartial
courts in accordance with fair procedure.1 The rule of law
is now firmly embedded in constitutionalism, which
means that government should derive its powers from,
and be guided and restrained in its conduct by, a written
constitution (De Waal et al. 2001:7). The rule of law and
constitutionalism in southern Africa probably have
firmer foundations in the countries in which
constitutional instruments were overhauled in the 1990s
to accommodate modern, extensive human rights
clauses, and a legal culture that permits ready application
of international and comparative law, as well as
international human rights standards and norms.
These countries, in the order of adoption of their
constitutions, are Namibia (1990), South Africa (1993
and 1996), and Malawi (1994 and 1995).2 The rule of law
and constitutionalism are also, not without justification,
reputed to be strong in Botswana. This is one country
that has not seen fit to tamper with human rights clauses
introduced in its independence constitution. Botswana
has also sustained a multiparty, liberal democratic
political tradition longer than any other country in the
region.3 The issue to be determined from these ‘case
studies’ is whether popular, political vilification and
mystification of property guarantee clauses, as
obstructive legal devices in the search for progressive
solutions to contemporary land problems, is entirely




Functions and underlying values
Protection of property clauses in most constitutions
employ obscure, legal concepts that give rise to
complicated legal disputes and copious, inaccessible
academic commentaries.4 It is not that difficult, however,
to decipher what the core issues are for purposes of
addressing land problems. Property guarantee clauses
such as those annexed to this discussion generally have
three main functions (De Waal et al. 2001:411).
Firstly, they may contain an affirmation of the right to
have or hold property as a ‘fundamental’ right of the
same stature as the so-called first-generation civic and
political rights – such as the rights to life and liberty, or
freedoms of expression, conscience, religious belief,
assembly or association. In this respect, constitutional
property clauses may echo Article 17 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which, in part, states that
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‘everyone has the right to own property, alone as well as
in association with others’. Secondly, property guarantee
clauses will almost invariably attempt to regulate loss of
property rights at the behest of government, even if there
is no affirmation of the right to hold or have property. In
most constitutions, the main guarantee of property is
restrictions on the possibilities and circumstances of loss.
Thirdly, for those who have no property to lose, the
constitution may try to provide the assurance that certain
basic needs will be provided. This type of assurance may
also be incorporated in constitutional clauses on second-
generation socio-economic rights such as rights to
health, education, water, a safe and healthy environment
and housing.
Two sets of competing values or theories underlie and
influence the structuring of property guarantee clauses.
The dominant set of values would appear to be
libertarian in outlook. According to Allen (2000:143),
Liberal theorists regard the constitution’s purpose as the
preservation of an area of individual choice in the face of
governmental coercion. Property is part of this protected
area of individual choice.
The description of the right to property in terms of rights
of the individual in constitutions is a reflection of the
influence of liberal theory. The countering set of values
and theory are communitarian in outlook. The
contention here is that the wider interests of the
community may justify attenuation of the rights and
liberty of an individual.5 It may be in the interests of
justice, or for purposes of maintaining social order, that
a person should not be allowed to retain even the fruits of
his or her own labour. Some communitarian theories also
regard rights to property as twinned with obligations, to
serve the wider interests of the society or community in
which individual rights are enjoyed.
In some political and academic circles, the mere
inclusion in a constitution of a property guarantee clause,
or the part of the clause that affirms the right to property,
are regarded as affirmation of the pre-eminence of
libertarian values, and as obstructive of social projects
requiring attenuation of property rights in the public
interest. On the other side, libertarians have been known
to be sceptical, hostile even, to the inclusion of
guarantees of socio-economic rights in constitutions,
including assurances of land or housing for the landless.
It is, however, the articulation of key defining terms in
that part of the clause dealing with loss of land rights that
is more relevant in the tilting of the scales in favour of
one or the other set of competing values.
From the clauses quoted at the end of this paper, the key
concepts are ‘property’, ‘deprivation’, ‘expropriation’ or
‘acquisition’, ‘public purposes’ and ‘compensation’. An
analysis of these terms and a few land cases in which they
were interpreted suggests that claims about the extent to
which the clauses have obstructed land reform or
redistribution programmes might have been exagger-
ated. It is also necessary to recall that human rights
clauses with strong property guarantees were introduced
into constitutional instruments for the independence of
countries like Malawi and Botswana, partly for their
psychological impact. There was no doubt in Britain that
‘a bill of rights would stop a government determined to
abandon democratic courses’ (Allen 2000:58–9). But it
was necessary to reassure European minorities and
create the confidence that there would be economic and
political stability in the new nations.
The concept of property
This is a rarely defined concept in property guarantee
clauses. It is also the most technical of the key defining
terms. In ordinary everyday language it probably is
understood as referring to the ‘ownership’ of an object or
a thing that has physical shape. It could be something that
can be moved about and kept with the person claiming
ownership, or it could be an immovable object such as
land. The legal understanding goes beyond the reference
to the object, and focuses on the rights that can be
claimed in reference to the object. The law of property
can broadly be described as the law regulating competing
claims of persons over or in reference to objects. In the
system of legal thought prevailing in southern Africa,6
the focus in the law of property is on so-called ‘real
rights’. These are rights that can, if necessary, be
enforced over the object of the claims. Claims en-
forceable against a person and not related to an object are
personal rights, and are regarded as more appropriate in
the law of obligations.
The complications of this understanding of property are,
first, that other real rights less than ownership, such as
tenancy rights, are equally deserving of protection in a
constitutional clause. The right of ownership itself can
also be unbundled into a number of incidences or
entitlements of the owner – such as the right to possess,
use, consume, or dispose of the object. Complications
for constitutional protection of property arise where only
one of these incidences, such as the right to dispose of
the object, is taken away or restricted. For some, a
constitution that protects all types of real rights and
incidences of ownership may be overly protective of
property interests. But, as was appreciated (or feared)
during the making of the ‘interim’ (1993) South African
Constitution, a clause that only guarantees property –
understood as referring to ‘ownership’ – may be
perceived to be ignoring other important property claims
(Van der Walt 1995:478–88). In the context of this
discussion, such a clause might be misconstrued as
offering no protection to, for example, long-established
squatters.
The second problem is that legal conceptions do not
consider only real rights in corporeal objects as being
worthy of protection. There is not much disagreement
over the treatment of incorporeal ‘objects’, such as
shares or intellectual property rights, as property being
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worthy of protection under a property guarantee clause.
The difficulty is with the extension of protection to some
purely personal rights, such as the right to receive
compensation, a pension, or some social welfare benefit.
Some of these could be rights of economic value and
worthy of protection by this yardstick. But there is no
agreement in law as to how to apply such a test and where
to draw the line. Admitting all such rights as property
could also impose unbearable financial responsibilities
on governments and other expropriating authorities.
One legal device employed in some jurisdictions to limit
the potential liability of expropriating authorities in-
cludes the exclusion of some of these rights from the
concept of property (which may be unjust in some cases).
Another device is to restrict in a property guarantee
clause the types of losses for which compensation is
payable.7
Deprivation or expropriation of
property
Some of the property guarantee clauses, including the
South African clause, distinguish between deprivation
and expropriation, acquisition or taking possession of
property. The purpose of such a distinction is to
empower the state or other expropriating authorities to
interfere with and regulate property without facing
compensation claims (Allen 2000:162–200). Some
property clauses provide for the payment of com-
pensation only for interferences resulting in the transfer
of the property to the state or expropriating authority. In
such instances the word ‘deprivation’ does not carry its
full connotation in ordinary parlance of denying a person
the use of his or her property, even by taking it away.
Expropriation or compulsory acquisition is the taking
away of property without the agreement of the owner or
affected person. This partially artificial distinction
between deprivation and expropriation may be regarded
as supportive of communitarian interests. Deprivations
in some instances may, however, cause as much loss or
harm as acquisitions or takings. Some property guarantee
clauses may therefore provide for payment of
compensation even for deprivations. Constitutions or
jurisdictions that permit recovery of compensation for
deprivations may be regarded as more sympathetic to
libertarian interests.
Public purposes
Property guarantee clauses often require that depriva-
tions and/or acquisitions should not be arbitrary; they
should be effected under some law of general ap-
plication, and for a public interest or purpose. Some
clauses provide an indication of the public purposes or
interests that should be served. As in the Botswana
clause, the delineation can be effusive, covering a wide
range of interests, including land reform and land
resettlement programmes. Even where examples of
public purposes are not indicated, the interpretation of
this requirement by the courts can be generous.
It has been held in some jurisdictions in the British
Commonwealth that the requirement would be satisfied
if ‘the general interest of the community’ were likely to be
served (Allen 2000:205–12). The requirement has been
met even in cases where the expropriated property was
destined for private use or commercial exploitation.8 As
will be confirmed below, courts are also not inclined to
interrogate assessment by public officers of the suita-
bility of property for a perceived public need or interest.
It is, therefore, not likely that an expropriation of private
land for resettlement distribution to the landless would
fail the public purpose requirement anywhere in the
Commonwealth or in southern Africa. This is one
element of a property guarantee clause on which com-
munitarian interests are too generously served.
Compensation
The requirement for payment of compensation for
acquisitions, (and deprivations in some cases), is the most
controversial of all the core elements of a property
guarantee clause. The requirement is variously described
as for payment of ‘full, adequate, just, fair, or equitable
compensation’, or simply for payment of ‘compensa-
tion’. Where the measure or method of computing
compensation is not carefully indicated, the traditional
legal assumption is that the deprived or dispossessed
person must be indemnified for the loss suffered, and
that the market value of the property is the fairest way of
measuring the loss. This is widely regarded as one aspect
that most reflects the dominance of libertarian and
property interests in property guarantee clauses. The
employment of market value can lead to generous
awards for property owners. The assessment of market
value in land cases can involve taking into account
speculative and subjective elements, and its value at the
time of expropriation may bear little resemblance to the
cost at which it was acquired and amounts expended on
improvements (Ng’ong’ola 1989).
It should, however, be appreciated that there is no
sacrosanct principle of constitutional law requiring that
loss of property must invariably be indemnified in this
manner. Under the European Convention of Human
Rights, for example, it is acknowledged that it would be
legitimate, in appropriate cases, to attempt to strike a fair
balance between the demands of the general interests of
the community and the requirement for the protection of
individual fundamental rights.9 This might entail a depar-
ture from a full market value assessment. The challenge
for African countries is to construct property guarantee
clauses that allow departures from market value
assessment in appropriate cases, but without permitting
departures from adherence to the rule of law.
The Botswana case
The Botswana Bill of Rights in Chapter II of the
Constitution was mostly a replication of the Bill in the
Uganda Independence Constitution of 1962 (Fawcus &
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Tilbury 2002:134). This, like other African independence
constitutions devised at that time, was derived from the
Bill prepared for the Nigerian Constitution, which, in
turn, was inspired by the European Convention on
Human Rights of 1950 (Allen 2000:54–69).
Botswana has dual or combined property guarantee
clauses (Van der Walt 1999:509). The first guarantee in
Section 3(c)10 offers protection ‘from deprivation of
property without compensation’ alongside other gua-
rantees of first generation civic and political rights,
including ‘privacy of the home and other property’.
Whether Section 3 is a mere preamble without in-
dependent effect, such that it could be interpreted as
imposing no firm requirement for compensation for
deprivations, was once a moot point in other parts of the
British Commonwealth (Allen 2000:99–101). In Bot-
swana, the issue was conclusively settled in the landmark
case of Attorney General v Dow,11 in reference to
discrimination or differentiation under the law on the
basis of sex or gender. The Court of Appeal said that the
provision was not a mere preamble. It was the leading
provision in the Bill with reference to which all
allegations of human rights violations must first be
tested. The court suggested that all other guarantees in
the Bill should not be interpreted as restricting any of the
guarantees offered in Section 3.12 The Botswana pro-
vision cannot be read as suggesting that compensation is
not payable for deprivations. This pro-libertarian
position is, however, tempered by the limitations added
to Section 3. The guarantees offered by the section are
subject to limitations ‘designed to ensure that the
enjoyment of the said rights and freedoms by any
individual does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of
others or the public interest’. It is, therefore, possible to
argue for moderation of compensation payable for
deprivations in the interests of other individuals or the
public, but the opportunity to test this contention has not
yet arisen. There is as yet no case on deprivation of
property in Botswana.
The second property guarantee is Section 8 of the
Constitution. Although the side note refers to ‘protection
from deprivation of property’, the clause offers ‘pro-
tection from expropriation or compulsory acquisition’.
The first paragraph suggests that protection is extended
to property in whatever manner it may legally be
conceived, whether as things or objects, or as rights or
entitlements in reference to objects or other persons.
The provision protects property by imposing at least
three sets of conditions or prerequisites for a valid
expropriation. The expropriation, first, must be ‘expe-
dient or necessary’ for certain specified public purposes
and interests. It must, secondly, be effected under a law
that provides for ‘prompt payment of adequate
compensation’, and for reference to the High Court,
directly or on appeal, for resolution of disputes
pertaining to the legality of the acquisition and the
adequacy and promptness of the payment of com-
pensation. The third requirement is that the person
entitled to compensation should not be prevented from
remitting the whole amount, (free of deductions), within
a reasonable period, to any country of his or her choice.
The law authorising expropriations was already in place
by the time the Constitution was passed.13 It was revised
several times to accommodate constitutional develop-
ments in the country and, ultimately, the above re-
quirements on expropriation of property.14 Section 16 of
the revised Act15 prescribed the market value of the
property on the date of the expropriation as the principal
measure of adequate compensation, discounting factors
such as the reason for the acquisition and the reluctance
of the affected person to part with the property or his
rights. In the only case so far to reach the High Court on
this issue,16 the concept of market value was interpreted
as referring to ‘market price’ or the price that the
property would have realised if sold in an open market by
a willing seller to a willing buyer. The court further held
that the assessment should take into account potential
uses to which the property could be put, for this is what
a willing seller would take into account. The court
suggested that market price or market value would not
otherwise amount to ‘adequate compensation’ as re-
quired by the Constitution. The result in this case was an
award that was slightly more than 100% of what the
government had offered, on the basis of prices of
comparable land.
The High Court was arguably wrong in its interpretation
of ‘adequate compensation’ and ‘market value’, and in
the computation of the compensation that was awarded.
This notwithstanding, it is evident that the law in
Botswana is exceedingly pro-libertarian, and can lead to
over-generous compensation to property owners. This is
compounded by the fact that the law authorising
expropriations applies only to ‘real property’ or im-
movable property. It does not cover movables or other
forms of property. In the absence of an enabling law,
expropriation of other forms of property, but not
deprivation, is arguably contrary to Section 8(1)(b) of the
Constitution.17
Although the law in Botswana is ex facie exceedingly pro-
libertarian, there is no evidence or suggestion from the
Botswana government that this has impeded execution
of its land reform and other economic development
programmes. The solvency of the Botswana govern-
ment, attributable mainly to revenues from diamond
mining, places it in the enviable position of not having to
resort to expropriations or deprivations to implement its
programmes. But the government has also been assisted
by other elements of the property guarantees that have
not attracted as much attention. It is notable, first, that
the description of the public purposes in Section 81(a) is
typically expansive. It crucially also specifically au-
thorises expropriations for ‘securing the development or
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utilisation of the mineral resources of Botswana’. Section
8(3), secondly, indicates that the requirement on prompt
payment of adequate compensation will be deemed
satisfied if mineral rights are expropriated under a law
that provides for payment of adequate royalties at
reasonable intervals. The effect of these provisions is to
shield expropriation disputes in an area critical to the
economy of the country from excessive or intrusive
scrutiny by liberal judges.
The Botswana clause, like its Nigerian antecedent, also
has a long list in paragraph 5 of takings that do not
amount to expropriation and do not therefore require
payment of compensation. When compared to the South
African clause, for example, it would not be necessary to
debate in Botswana whether the transfer of the property
of a solvent spouse to a trustee in insolvency is ex-
propriation.18 Section 5(b)(iii) pre-empts the consider-
ation of such takings as unconstitutional expropria-
tions.19
Paragraph 6 exonerates takings that, in the Botswana
context, are critical to land reform programmes. It states
that there is no expropriation contrary to the Consti-
tution where property is taken from a body corporate
established by law for public purposes, which is wholly
supported by moneys allocated by Parliament. In 1970
the government established land boards as such body
corporates and transferred to them rights and titles to
tribal land, as well as responsibilities for administration of
tribal land in designated tribal areas or territories.20 The
exercise was surprisingly completed without contesta-
tion in the courts by chiefs and other tribal authorities
who were at the same time deprived of their
administrative functions over tribal land in their
territories. A case could still be made that this aspect of
tribal land reform amounted to deprivation of property
rights without compensation at least. Tribal land con-
stitutes about 70% of the total land area of the country
(Republic of Botswana 1997:229; 326).21 The govern-
ment can requisition as much land as it wants for its
programmes, without paying compensation to the
nominal legal owners, the land boards. Compensation is
offered to persons deprived of subsisting ‘customary
rights of user’,22 but the amounts do not compare
favourably with compensation for rights in private or
freehold land, since it is intrinsically difficult to assess
market value for land that traditionally is not supposed to
be for sale.
As for expropriation of freehold or private land, in the
rare cases on the issue, government has been greatly
assisted by benevolent interpretation and application of
the public purposes requirement by the courts. In the
fairly recent Molopo Ranch case,23 the Court of Appeal
maintained the position under colonial rule that courts
should as far as possible avoid interrogating decisions of
public officers.24 The case involved a huge 121 613ha
freehold farm, originally allocated to the Commonwealth
Development Corporation (CDC) during the colonial
era. The CDC entered into negotiations in 1996 to
dispose of its shareholding in the company registered as
the owner of the ranch to two Batswana citizens of Boer
(Afrikaner) extraction. This was after the government
appeared to show no interest in acquiring the property.
When negotiations for the sale and transfer of the shares
were about to conclude, the government hurriedly
published an expropriation notice for the farm, as well as
the cattle on it, claiming that the ranch and the animals
were required for holding cattle destined for restocking
in another part of the country where all cattle had been
exterminated to contain an outbreak of cattle lung
disease. The Botswana government acted with such
haste that the Attorney General’s office failed to notice
that the Acquisition of Property Act, as noted above,
only authorised expropriation of the land. The Court of
Appeal quickly confirmed that this was a legitimate
public purpose. It rejected the contention, accepted in
the High Court, that relevant government officers had
acted in bad faith, or with the ulterior or improper motive
of pre-empting the transfer of shares to the applicants
and thereby depriving them of a legitimate bargain. As it
turned out, the ranch was put to commercial use not long
after conclusion of the litigation. It was never used for
the purpose for which it was expropriated.25
The Land Control Act of 197526 is another law that is
relevant to the expropriation of private land in Botswana.
The Act attempts to create, for citizens of Botswana, an
opportunity to intervene in a proposed transfer of an
interest in agricultural land to a non-citizen. It imposes a
requirement for prior ministerial approval of every
‘controlled transaction’. This includes the sale, transfer,
lease capable of running for a period of five years or
more, exchange, partition or other disposal or dealing
with agricultural land in the freehold sector, where the
party acquiring the interest is not a citizen. It also covers
the disposal of shares in a private company owning any
agricultural land to a non-citizen. The citizenship of a
company is, for these purposes, determined by reference
to incorporation in Botswana as well as the nationality of
individuals beneficially holding the majority of all classes
of shares in the company. Before ministerial consent is
sought, the proposed transaction must be advertised in a
prescribed manner, to give citizens interested in the
property sufficient time to intercede. It is suggested that
citizens who express interest must be given priority, but
the Minister’s decision to grant or refuse consent is also
final and may not be challenged in any court.
This Act was carefully and cleverly structured to avoid
infringing the property guarantees in the Constitution.
There is no expropriation of the property by the state,
and the interposition of a different purchaser willing to
purchase at the advertised transaction price cannot be a
deprivation. The Act does not regulate the price and
other terms upon which the property may be transferred
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to an interested citizen. This may also be its main
weakness. The land can be priced out of the range of
most potential citizen purchasers. There is no evidence
to suggest that the Act has significantly contributed to the
localisation or indigenisation of agricultural land in the
freehold pool during the 25 years that it has been in
operation. The Act, however, assuages nationalistic
sentiments by giving the impression that the problem has
been addressed.
The Namibian case
The Namibian Constitution was probably the first
‘internally’ developed independence constitution in
southern Africa. Article 16, the property guarantee
clause, was not assembled through cutting and pasting of
models developed in London for the independence of
other colonial territories. It resembles the First Protocol
of the European Convention on Human Rights in its
brevity, and it was also apparently constructed in the
positive manner of German law (Allen 2000:71–3). It
offers rights instead of protecting against violations of
rights. Article 22 on limitations applicable to all consti-
tutional rights is the other noted borrowing from
German law.
Although spanning only two paragraphs, all but one of
the main elements of a property guarantee clause can be
located in Article 16. Paragraph 1 is an assurance or
affirmation of the right to property in Namibia. It
provides a positive assurance that ‘all persons’ may have
or hold property ‘in any part of Namibia’, but promptly
qualifies this with the indication that legislation may
qualify the entitlement of non-citizens to the enjoyment
of this right. Thus, legislation providing for localisation
or indigenisation of land in Namibia, as in Botswana,
would be difficult to assail on constitutional grounds.
The conception of ‘property’ in Article 16(1) is the typical
‘thing-ownership’ approach of Roman-Dutch common
law. The assurance is for rights ‘to own, dispose of and
bequeath ... all forms of movable or immovable provable
property’. This is, first, a specification of a limited range
of ‘real rights’. Rights to dispose of or bequeath property
are also only a few of the incidences of ownership. As
such, it may not have been necessary to specify them
alongside ownership. The concept of ownership is also
jurisprudentially troublesome, and probably should have
been avoided. The specification of the right of ownership
in this clause might be very reassuring to libertarian
interests seeking constitutional guarantees over freehold
land in constitutional negotiations, but the danger is that
other, more personal, rights could have been written out
of the property guarantee. The moot point is whether the
Namibian clause recognises, as property, new types of
wealth which cannot be readily understood in terms of
movable and immovable things – such as the right to
performance under a contract, or to a pension or a
welfare benefit. It is also notable that property rights are
assured for both individuals and associations. This was,
strictly speaking, an unnecessary detail. If the intentions
were to ensure recognition and protection of communal
pro-perty rights under customary law, the description of
property in terms of rights of ownership would have
compounded the understanding and protection of such
rights.
Article 16(2) is, again, a positively constructed ex-
propriation clause. The state, or a competent organ, is
authorised to expropriate, subject to compliance with
prescribed conditions, instead of property being
protected from certain types of expropriations. The
requirements for the exercise of power are standard. The
expropriation must be effected under a law; it must be in
the public interest, and subject to the payment of ‘just
compensation’. There is no elaboration of the public
interest requirement, but this is not likely to lead to a
more restrictive interpretation of the concept in the
courts. The compensation element reads like an in-
vitation to Parliament to legislate on computation
methods that in appropriate cases may deviate from
market value assessment. If this has not been done,
courts are not likely to interpret ‘just compensation’
differently from ‘adequate’, ‘equitable’, ‘fair’, or just plain
‘compensation’.
There is no deprivation paragraph in the Namibian
clause. Since the clause is constructed in a positive
manner, the courts are not likely to interpret it as
authorising expropriations as well as deprivations. What
is not stated may be deemed as having been purposely
excluded. This could seriously handicap the Namibian
government in its efforts to regulate land affairs and
generally exercise ‘police powers’ over property. The
omission of a deprivation clause can be regarded as
deference to libertarian and property interests.
Article 22, lastly, requires that any law abridging any of
the fundamental rights as suggested by the Constitution
shall be of general application, shall not target a particular
individual, shall not negate the essential content of the
right, and shall be more specifically drawn.27 One moot
point arising from this in reference to Article 16(1) is
whether the law regulating property rights of aliens in
Namibia can abolish their ‘right to own’ land without
negating the essential content of the guaranteed right.
The tentative conclusion to be drawn from this purely
textual analysis of the Namibian clause is that it leans
towards over-protection of libertarian values and
property interests. If the intention was to provide a
property clause that would assist in the transformation of
land ownership in Namibia, perhaps a brief clause was
not what was required, and different language should
have been employed in the conception of property. A
clause such as this one leaves critical issues for
interpretation by the judiciary, which in the early years of
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decolonisation may be dominated by those more
sympathetic to libertarian interests.
The South African case
South Africa has one clause, Section 25, combining
guarantees relating to deprivation and expropriation of
property. Section 26 on rights to housing can also be
regarded as a guarantee of rights to a specific type of
property. The third clause in the South African
constitution meriting consideration is Section 36, the
general limitation clause, which, like Article 22 of the
Namibian Constitution, was a borrowing from German
law.
The protection from deprivation of property in Section
25(1) is negatively couched. There are two prohibitions:
deprivations not authorised by law, and laws permitting
arbitrary deprivations. No provision is made for payment
of compensation for deprivations that satisfy the
requirements of the provision. This gives the South
African government considerable latitude in regulating
property matters without imposing a liability on the
fiscus.
Section 25 employs the more general concept of
‘property’ and not the more specific references to ‘rights
in property’ encountered in the Namibian Constitution.
It thus offers protection to a wider range of rights and
interests. It has been suggested that the South African
clause would readily protect even performance rights or
claims, if they are a source of wealth, and are ‘vested’ and
not merely contingent (De Waal et al. 2001:415–6). With
this expansive notion of property, it was probably
unnecessary for paragraph 4(b) to confirm that ‘property
is not limited to land’ for purposes of Section 25.
Whereas the expansive notion of property gives the
South African clause a pro-libertarian outlook, the
expropriation aspects are heavily underlined by public
interest or communitarian concerns. Section 25(2) is cast
positively. It authorises expropriation, in terms of a law
of general application, for public purposes or interests,
and subject to payment of compensation, which may be
agreed upon or determined by a court. As if there would
have been any doubt, Section 25(4)(a) confirms that
public interest for these purposes includes the nation’s
commitment to land reform, and reforms proposed for
redressing the iniquities of apartheid. One may venture
to suggest that, anywhere in the region, regardless of the
structuring of the property guarantee, land reform,
equitable land re-distribution, land restitution, and the
types of transformations required by paragraphs 5 to 8 of
Section 25, would qualify as public interests (or pur-
poses) for purposes of expropriation or deprivation of
property. The contest would be over-compensation for
the loss of the property.
The greatest innovation of the South African clause is in
the manner that Section 25(3) attempts to guide the
assessment of compensation to balance property rights
and public interest. It requires that the ‘amount, timing
and manner of payment’ must be ‘just and equitable’, and
the required balancing must take into account ‘all
relevant factors’ including current use; history of
acquisition and use of the property; the market value;
state investment and subsidies in the acquisition or
improvement of the property; and the purpose of the
expropriation.
South African courts have had more than one occasion
to apply these guidelines. In possibly the leading
authority to date on the matter, the Land Claims Court
(LCC) decided that striking the balance required involves
establishing the market value first, and thereafter
subtracting from or adding to the amount as the facts of
the case may require. Compensation awarded under
Section 25(3) may thus be lower or higher than the
market value of the property.28 Taking into account
international standards and comparative law, as South
African courts must, the LCC also held that the market
value, established by taking note of prices in comparable
transactions, discounting the effect on the property of
the reason for the expropriation,29 would otherwise be
the best measure of just and equitable compensation.
The LCC is inclined to rely on market value as the only
factor in the list indicated in Section 25(3) that can be
more objectively assessed.
As some of the cases from the LCC confirm, the
assessment of market value is in fact far from an exact
science. There is much conjecture, and the amount of the
award often turns on impressions left on the court by
particular valuers. It can be contended that reliance on
market value as interpreted and applied in international
and comparative law puts a libertarian spin on the
application of Section 25(3) not intended by the framers
of the South African Constitution. But the libertarian
approach is not totally indefensible, if account is taken of
the differing situations calling for determination of just
and equitable compensation. A libertarian approach and
generous compensation would probably be welcome
when the award is in lieu of restitution as envisaged by
Section 25(7), but not when it is for purposes of making
land available to the landless, as envisaged by Sections
25(5) and 25(8). The difficulty for the courts is that the
new legal and constitutional order in South Africa abhors
arbitrariness and requires them to act consistently. They
would probably be failing in their duties if the application
of market value assessment were not consistent with
these varying situations.
Sections 25(6) and 26 can be regarded as the provisions
of the South African Bill of Rights that seek to assure
property rights for those who have no existing rights to
lose. Section 26, as noted above, is more specifically
concerned with housing. It has both positive and
negative attributes. Section 26(1) provides a positive
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assurance that everyone shall have ‘access’ to ‘adequate
housing’ while Section 26(2) delineates the obligations of
the state in respect of this right. It ‘must take reasonable
legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to acheive progressive realisation of this right’.
Section 26(3) is a negatively couched protection from
eviction from a home. It is structured like the deprivation
clause, Section 25(1). It also imposes two sets of pro-
hibitions: eviction from, or demolition of, a home
without a court order; and legislation permitting arbitrary
evictions.
Section 26(3) arguably marginally improves the position
of the landless under the law, through the requirement
that eviction and demolition orders should be issued by
courts only after all the relevant circumstances have been
taken into account. Sections 26(1) and (2), on the other
hand, can be regarded as a significant advancement of
legal theory in support of the landless. The South African
Constitutional Court in the certification case30 held that
socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights are justiciable,
notwithstanding the financial burdens this could impose
on the government. At least for South Africa, this settled
the debate still raging elsewhere as to whether such rights
should be regarded only as benchmarks for government
policy. In the Grootboom case,31 the Court provided a
real assessment of government performance in reference
to ensuring access to housing under Section 26 and
shelter for children under Section 28. Mrs Grootboom
was one of 390 adults and 510 children forcibly evicted
from a piece of land on which they were squatting. They
relocated in desperation to a sports field and a nearby
community hall where they were living in appalling
conditions.
The provincial (Cape) High Court ordered the au-
thorities to provide them with amenities as part of the
children’s entitlement to shelter under Section 28 of the
Constitution. On appeal, the Constitutional Court held
that although Section 26 did not provide every person
with the right to demand access to housing, government
programmes could be assessed for compliance with
duties expected of it under the provision and Section 28.
The court concluded that government performance in
this case failed to comply with these provisions because
no provision was made for the temporary relief of those
in desperate need such as the respondents. The court
perhaps demanded more from the responsible au-
thorities in this case than was generally feasible in the
light of the acknowledged scale of the squatting problem
in the area and the country. But the salutary aspect of the
case, from which other jurisdictions could pick, is in the
eagerness of the court to subject government policy to
critical legal assessment.
It may be noted, lastly, that unlike its Namibian
counterpart, Section 36 – the South African limitation
clause – does not explicitly state that derogation from a
fundamental right shall not negate the essential content
of the right. It instead requires that limitations must also
be assessed as ‘reasonable and justified in an open
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom’, taking into account all relevant factors
including those indicated. When considered in reference
to the property guarantee clause, because of the
conditions attached to constitutional deprivations and
expropriations, the point arises as to whether Section 36
could indeed be useful. A law that provides for de-
privations or expropriations in the manner suggested in
Section 25 is not likely to fail to satisfy the prerequisites
for an acceptable derogation of a fundamental right in
Section 36.
The Malawian case
A brief background to the Malawi property clauses is
necessary. Malawi inherited a Bill of Rights and property
guarantees similar to Botswana’s in its independence
Constitution of 1964. In 1966, Malawi adopted the status
of a Republic under a Constitution, which replaced the
Bill of Rights with a brief statement of fundamental prin-
ciples. Article 2(1)(iv) of the statement held that ‘No
person shall be deprived of his property without payment
of fair compensation, and only where the public interest
so requires’. But Article 2(2) of the statement also stated
that nothing done ‘under the authority of any law shall be
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of the
[fundamental principles] to the extent that the law in
question is reasonably required in the interests of
defence, public safety, public order or the national
economy’.
This provided the justification for draconian legislation
that trampled upon property as well as civil and political
rights during the long period of single-party rule under
Life President Kamuzu Banda from 1964 to 1994. One
of the notorious pieces of legislation was the Forfeiture
Act of 1966, which provided for seizure, without com-
pensation, of property of perceived political foes of the
regime.32 The other, more measured, property-related
legislation was the Land Acquisition Act of 1970.33 This
provided for compulsory acquisition of land whenever it
was deemed ‘desirable or expedient in the public
interest’, and subject to payment of ‘fair compensation’.
It also provided for calculation of compensation in
reference to the price paid by the expropriatee, or the
price for comparable land, the value of unexhausted
improvements effected by the expropriatee and, in
appropriate cases, the appreciation in value of the land.
The Act emphasised that under no circumstances should
compensation exceed the current market value of the
land. In keeping with the trend of legislation at the time,
the Act also emphasised that an award determined by the
Minister shall be final and shall not be subject to appeal or
review in the courts.
Given this background, one would have expected
property guarantees as strong as the guarantees of the
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other civic and political rights in the Constitution for the
Second Republic, finalised in 1995. But the structuring of
the property clauses suggests that not much attention
was given to this subject. The framers of the Constitution
were more preoccupied with the other fundamental
rights and mechanisms for governance in the new
political environment. Section 28 is comparable to the
Namibian clause in its brevity. It also begins with a
positive assertion of the right to property, for persons or
associations. But it only assures ‘the right to acquire’, and
it does not anticipate that it might be necessary to restrict
the enjoyment of this right by non-citizens. Section 28
also provides only for protection from arbitrary
deprivation of property,34 without any reference to
payment of compensation.
Protection against expropriations is strangely covered in
Section 44(4), in the limitation clause of the Bill of Rights.
Expropriation ‘is permissible only when done for a
public utility’, and for payment of ‘appropriate com-
pensation’. There must also be ‘adequate notification’
and a ‘right of appeal to a court of law’. The first moot
point is whether the reference to ‘public utility’ was a
deliberate attempt to restrict the powers of the state and
accord greater protection than was hitherto the case
under the one-party regime. The Malawi Supreme Court
of Appeal overlooked this point in the Press Trust case,35
and proceeded to assess the justification for an alleged
expropriation as if the Constitution provided for ex-
propriation in the ‘public interest’ or for a ‘public
purpose’.36 The second moot point is whether the
reference to ‘appropriate compensation’ was also a
deliberate attempt to continue with the frugal, pro-
communitarian approach developed during the harsh
dictatorial rule of Dr Banda. A further consideration of
the limitation clause suggests otherwise.
Under Malawi’s new constitutional jurisprudence, Sec-
tion 44 is more notable for the listing in paragraph 1 of
fundamental rights in respect of which ‘there shall be no
derogation, restrictions or limitations’. Property rights
are not among the ‘non-derogable’ rights. They can be
restricted under laws of general application that do not
negate the essential content of the right,37 and if the
restrictions can be said to be ‘reasonable, recognised by
international human rights standards, and necessary in an
open and democratic society’.38 It can be argued that if
international and comparative law standards are taken
into account, appropriate compensation would not be
less than the market value of the property expropriated.
The question whether non-arbitrary deprivations should
attract appropriate compensation would be difficult to
resolve, even if international law and standards were
taken into account. The differing approaches under the
Botswana and South Africa clauses indicate the un-
certainty of the law on this issue.
The National Assembly of Malawi initiated consulta-
tions and debate on a new land policy prior to the framing
of a new, comprehensive and consolidated land law. One
of the issues, in the land policy, that has attracted some
international attention is the right of non-citizens to
retain or acquire freehold land, amounting to about 15%
of the total land area of the country at independence. The
policy proposes prohibiting non-citizens from acquiring
freehold rights, or from transferring such rights to other
non-citizens after 1 September 2001. The policy also
proposes that non-citizens in possession of freehold land
should be given seven years within which to acquire
Malawian citizenship in order to retain their freehold
titles. Failure to naturalise will, in the language of the
policy, ‘automatically trigger expropriation procedures,
which will cause title to the land… to be converted to a
renewable leasehold contract with reversion to the
state’.39
Although the policy uses the word ‘expropriation’ to
describe the legal effect of the proposal to convert
freeholds into leaseholds, it is a moot point whether this
is indeed expropriation or deprivation. Since the Malawi
property clause is silent on compensation for depri-
vations, it would be in the interest of the state to contend
that the policy only affects deprivations, for which
compensation is not payable. It may be noted in this
regard that policy does not actually advocate transfer to
or taking over of freehold land by the state. But it should
also be noted that freehold land in Malawi generally
attracts a higher price than state leasehold land, even
where the lease is for as long as 99 years, and upon
payment of a very nominal ground rent. The conversion
of freehold rights into leasehold rights is likely to cause
significant devaluation of land in some cases, and a court
inclined to uphold libertarian values may conclude that
this is ‘constructive’ taking or expropriation for which
appropriate compensation should be paid, calculated, as
suggested above, in reference to the market value of each
property. The cost implications of the policy would be
considerable and probably unaffordable in a country
perennially grappling with its own financial viability.
The new land policy is, in this and other respects, difficult
to reconcile with the property guarantee clauses, partly
because of what has been described elsewhere as the
hapless construction of the constitution for the Second
Republic (Englund 2002:21). The Constitution was
drafted, debated, passed as interim document, revised
and finally adopted within a period of less than two years,
between late 1993 and May 1995. The preoccupation
with ridding the country of the ills of single-party
dictatorship was such that other issues received in-
adequate attention, and the language of the Constitution
was not scrutinised and revised to ensure that the will of
the framers was properly reflected. It is striking that the
property guarantees did not anticipate regulation of land
holding by non-citizens, and did not consciously adopt or
reject the land expropriation and compensation policies
of the previous political order.
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Conclusion
One observation that can be drawn from the textual
analysis of the constitutional property guarantees in
southern Africa is that all the clauses are sensitive to the
need to balance protection of private property with
public interest requirements. In various ways, all the
constitutions provide governments with considerable
latitude to extinguish property rights, especially for
purposes of implementing land reform programmes and
controlling ‘foreign ownership’ of land. The older
(inherited) Botswana Constitution reflects very strong
pro-libertarian values in the provisions for payment of
compensation for deprivations as well as expropriations,
and in the provisions for calculation of adequate
compensation on the basis of the market value of the
property. But public interest imperatives permeate the
description of the purposes for which property may be
expropriated, and in the long list of activities which
government may take without triggering the require-
ments for expropriations.
Public interest imperatives under the brief Namibian
clause are reflected in provisions restricting the right to
property for non-citizens and prescribing payment of
just compensation for expropriations. The dominance of
public interest concerns over property rights is strongest
under the South African Constitution. No provision is
made for payment of compensation for deprivations,
and the expropriation clauses contain the clearest
indication that compensation need not be assessed on
the basis of market value where the imperatives of land
reform, distribution and restitution so dictate. The
treatment of land and other socio-economic rights for
the landless, under the South African Constitution, can
also be recommended for emulation in other southern
African countries. The Malawi clauses, consciously or
otherwise, also reflect the dominance of public interest
concerns in the provisions relating to deprivations and
compensation for expropriations.
Thus, at least as far as the law reflected in texts is
concerned, all the home-grown constitutions attempt to
address the problem of over-compensating property
rights that are expropriated, especially where the
property is required for ameliorating land problems. The
analysis presented here suggests, however, that these
provisions could be interpreted and applied differently
by courts that are dominated by personnel more
sympathetic to pro-libertarian values. The irony does not
escape notice that the rule of law embraced by the new
home-grown constitutions dictates that these issues must
ultimately be referred to the courts of law for resolution.
1Dicey, AV. 1959. Introduction to the study of the laws of the
Constitution, 10th ed. Basingstoke: Macmillan Edu-
cation:xcvi–cli, as quoted in De Waal et al. 2001:9–10.
2Zambia (1991) and Lesotho (1992) also adopted revised
constitutions suitable for political pluralism or multi-
party democracy during this period, but their in-
struments retained or revived human rights chapters of
the old type, similar to the Botswana Bill of Rights.
3In sub-Saharan Africa, Botswana shares this distinction
only with Senegal.
4For excellent surveys on this subject see Van der Walt
1999 and Allen 2000.
5For an accessible discussion of theories underlying the
property debate see Van der Walt 1995:445–501,
especially 455–61.
6Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland
and Zimbabwe apply Roman Dutch common law.
7The leading case in the region on this is the Zimbabwean
case of Hewlett vs Minister of Finance and Another,
1982 (1) SA 490 which concerned the cancellation by the
Zimbabwe government of compensation paid to ‘victims
of terrorism’ under an old Rhodesian law. The Supreme
Court held that the award of compensation was property,
but it refused to award compensation on the ground that
the cancellation of the award was not a taking of the
property. It was a deprivation for which compensation
was not payable under the Constitution of Zimbabwe at
that time. For a critical assessment of the case see Roux
1996.
8One such case from Botswana is President of the
Republic of Botswana and Others vs Bruwer and
Strumpher, Misca 478/96 and 357/97 (Court of Appeal),
discussed below. The Botswana government did not take
long to put to commercial use a ranch that was ex-
propriated for a different public purpose.
9Allen 2000:242–3, referring to the interpretation of
Article 1 of the First Protocol of the Convention in
Sporrong and Lonnoroth vs Sweden A 52 (1982), para.
69; 5 EHRR 35.
10Provisions of the Botswana Constitution are referred to
as sections, not articles.
111992 Botswana Law Reports, 119.
12However, in Kamanakao I and Others v Attorney
General and Others, Misca 377/1999, (not yet reported),
the High Court refused to declare as unconstitutional
other parts of the Constitution that were inconsistent
with Section 3.
13Bechuanaland Protectorate Acquisition of Property
Proclamation 80 of 1954.
14HMC Order No 1 of 1963; LN 28 of 1965; Law 26 of
1966 and LN 84 of 1966.
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15Acquisition of Property Act.
16Attorney General v Western Trust (Pty) Ltd, Civil
Appeal No 12 of 1981, High Court, (unreported). For a
more detailed discussion see Ng’ong’ola 1989:298–319.
17It is perhaps fortunate for the Botswana government
that this came to light fairly recently, in 1996, in the
Molopo Ranch case.
18In Harksen vs Lane NO 1998(1) SA 300, the South
African Constitutional Court was invited to consider
whether the vesting of property of a solvent spouse in a
trustee in insolvency in terms of section 21 of the
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 amounted to expropriation.
The court was constrained to conclude, not very con-
vincingly, partly because of the compensation implica-
tions of expropriation under South African law, that
there was no expropriation because the property did
not vest permanently in the trustee.
19The moot point still remains whether this and all other
takings and police powers exonerated under Section 8(5)
are deprivations, which in Botswana must arguably be
compensated for.
20This was done under the Tribal Land Act 54 of 1968.
21The surface land area of Botswana is 579 276km2. State
land comprises 25% of this area and 5% is private or
freehold land.
22Section 33 of the Tribal Land Act.
23President of Botswana and Others v Bruwer and
Strumpher, Misca 478/96 and 357/97. For a more
detailed discussion of the case see Ng’ong’ola 1998.
24In Tati Company Ltd v The High Commissioner for the
Bechuanaland Protectorate (1959), High Commission
Territories Law Reports (HCTLR), 32–53, the court
refused to consider whether an expropriation decision
was in fact wrong, inequitable or taken in ignorance of a
relevant fact.
25Another technical issue not properly considered in the
case was whether there was expropriation or deprivation
of ‘personal property’ represented by the expectation to
receive transfer of the shares. The courts only found that
the expectation was sufficient to establish the locus standi
of the applicants.
26Act 23 of 1975.
27In British-made bills of rights, the comparable
provisions would be the curious statements splattered in
various clauses, including Section 8(5)(a) of the Bot-
swana Constitution, suggesting that derogations from
specified rights shall be ‘reasonably justifiable in a
democratic society’.
28Former Highlands Residents, in re Ash v Department
of Land Affairs, 2002 2 All SA 26, LCC Case No. 116/
198:12–21. Another authority is MJ Khumalo and
Others v HW Potgieter and Others, LCC Case No. 34/
99, 17 December 1999 (not reported).
29In Commonwealth expropriation law this is called the
Pointe Gourde rule, from the Privy Council decision in
Pointe Gourde Quarrying & Transport C. Ltd vs Sub-
intendent of Crown Lands (Trinidad), 1947 AC 565.
30Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly:
In Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa, 1996, 4 SA 744.
31Government of the Republic of South Africa and
Others v Irene Grootboom and Others, Case CCT 11/
00, 4 October 2002, Constitutional Court.
32Act 1 of 1966. See Roberts 1966.
33Act 21 of 1970. See Ng’ong’ola 1992, especially 127–32.
34 For an interpretation of this phrase see endnote 36 on
the Press Trust case.
35Attorney General v The Malawi Congress Party and
Others, MSCA, Civil Appeal No. 22 of 1996.
36One of the several constitutional issues in this case was
whether an Act aimed at the reconstruction of the
management mechanism of a trust effected arbitrary
deprivation of property contrary to Section 28. The High
Court concluded that it did, and it was arbitrary because
the settler, the opposition party in the National
Assembly, and other stakeholders were not consulted
and given sufficient time to debate the measures in the
Act. The Court of Appeal held that ‘to act arbitrarily is to
act without reasonable cause’. There was reasonable
cause for the Act. Its sole purpose was to ensure that the
trust was properly managed, in the interest of the
beneficiaries of the trust, the people of Malawi. The
Court added that if the Act effected an expropriation, it
would have for a ‘public utility’ and valid in terms of the
other requirements of section 44(4)
37Section 44(3). This is comparable to Article 22(a) of the
Namibian Constitution.
38Section 44(2). This is in part comparable to Section
36(1) of the South African Constitution.
39Republic of Malawi 2001:30, paragraph 4.12.
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[Fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual]
Whereas every person in Botswana is entitled to the
fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, that is
to say, the right, whatever his race, place of origin,
political opinions, colour, creed or sex, but subject to
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the
public interest to each and all of the following, namely—
(a) life, liberty, security of the person and the protection
of the law;
(b) freedom of conscience, of expression and of
assembly and association; and
(c) protection for the privacy of his home and other
property and from deprivation of property without
compensation, the provisions of this Chapter shall
have effect for the purpose of affording protection
to those rights and freedoms subject to such
limitations of that protection as are contained in
those provisions, being limitations designed to
ensure that the enjoyment of the said rights and
freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the
rights and freedoms of others or the public interest.
Section 8
[Protection from deprivation of property]
(1) No property of any description shall be
compulsorily taken possession of, and no interest in
or right over property of any description shall be
compulsorily acquired, except where the following
conditions are satisfied, that is to say
(a) the taking of possession or acquisition is
necessary or expedient—
(i) in the interests of defence, public safety,
public order, public morality, public health,
town and country planning or land
settlement;
(ii) in order to secure the development or
utilization of that, or other, property for a
purpose beneficial to the community; or
(iii) in order to secure the development or
utilization of the mineral resources of
Botswana; and
(b) provision is made by a law applicable to that
taking of possession or acquisition—
(i) for the prompt payment of adequate
compensation; and
(ii) securing to any person having an interest in
or right over the property a right of access
to the High Court, either direct or on
appeal from any other authority, for the
determination of his interest or right, the
legality of the taking of possession or
acquisition of the property, interest or
right, and the amount of any compensation
to which he is entitled, and for the purpose
of obtaining prompt payment of that
compensation.
(2) No person who is entitled to compensation under
this section shall be prevented from remitting,
within a reasonable time after he has received any
amount of that compensation, the whole of that
amount (free from any deduction, charge or tax
made or levied in respect of its remission) to any
country of his choice outside Botswana.
(3) Subsection (1)(b)(i) of this section shall be deemed
to be satisfied in relation to any law applicable to the
taking of possession of minerals or the acquisition of
rights to minerals if that law makes provision for
the payment at reasonable intervals of adequate
royalties.
(4) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of
any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in
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contravention of subsection (2) of this section to the
extent that the law in question authorizes—
(a) the attachment, by order of a court, of any
amount of compensation to which a person is
entitled in satisfaction of the judgment of a
court or pending the determination of civil
proceedings to which he is a party; or
(b) the imposition of reasonable restrictions on the
manner in which any amount of compensation
is to be remitted.
(5) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of
any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in
contravention of subsection (1) of this section—
(a) to the extent that the law in question makes
provision for the taking of possession or
acquisition of any property—
(i) in satisfaction of any tax, rate or due;
(ii) by way of penalty for breach of the law
whether under civil process or after
conviction of a criminal offence under the
law in force in Botswana;
(iii) as an incident of a lease, tenancy, mortgage,
charge, bill of sale, pledge or contract;
(iv) in the execution of judgments or orders of
a court in proceedings for the determina-
tion of civil rights or obligations;
(v) in circumstances where it is reasonably
necessary so to do because the property is
in a dangerous state or injurious to the
health of human beings, animals or plants;
(vi) in consequence of any law with respect to
the limitation of actions; or
(vii) for so long only as may be necessary for the
purposes of any examination, investigation,
trial or inquiry or, in the case of land, for the
purposes of the carrying out thereon of
work of soil conservation or the conserva-
tion of other natural resources or work
relating to agricultural development or
improvement (being work relating to such
development or improvement that the
owner or occupier of the land has been
required, and has without reasonable
excuse refused or failed, to carry out), and
except so far as that provision or, as the
case may be, the thing done under the
authority thereof is shown not to be
reasonably justifiable in a democratic
society; or
(b) to the extent that the law in question makes
provision for the taking of possession or
acquisition of—
(i) enemy property;
(ii) property of a deceased person, a person of
unsound mind, a person who has not
attained the age of twenty one years, a
prodigal, or a person who is absent from
Botswana, for the purpose of its adminis-
tration for the benefit of the persons
entitled to the beneficial interest therein;
(iii) property of a person declared to be
insolvent or a body corporate in liquida-
tion, for the purpose of its administration
for the benefit of the creditors of the
insolvent or body corporate and, subject
thereto, for the benefit of other persons
entitled to the beneficial interest in the
property; or
(iv) property subject to a trust, for the purpose
of vesting the property in persons
appointed as trustees under the instrument
creating the trust or by a court, or by order
of a court, for the purpose of giving effect
to the trust.
(6) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of
any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in
contravention of subsection (1) of this section to the
extent that the law in question makes provision for
the compulsory taking of possession in the public
interest of any property, or the compulsory ac-
quisition in the public interest in or right over
property, where that property, interest or right is
held by a body corporate established by law for
public purposes in which no moneys have been





(1) All persons shall have the right in any part of
Namibia to acquire, own and dispose of all forms of
immovable and movable property individually or in
association with others and to bequeath their
property to their heirs or legatees: provided that
Parliament may by legislation prohibit or regulate as
it deems expedient the right to acquire property by
persons who are not Namibian citizens.
(2) The State or a competent body or organ authorised
by law may expropriate property in the public
interest subject to the payment of just compensa-
tion, in accordance with requirements and
procedures to be determined by Act of Parliament.
Article 22
[Limitation upon fundamental rights and freedoms]
Whenever or wherever in terms of this Constitution the
limitation of any fundamental rights or freedoms
contemplated by this chapter is authorised, any law
providing for such limitation shall:
a) be of general application, shall not negate the
essential content, and shall not be aimed at a
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particular individual;
b) specify the ascertainable extent of such limitation
and identify the article or articles on which authority
to enact such limitation is claimed to rest.




(1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms
of law of general application, and no law may permit
arbitrary deprivation of property.
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of
general application—
(a) for a public purpose or in the public interest;
and
(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which
and the time and manner of payment of which
have either been agreed to by those affected or
decided or approved by a court.
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and
manner of payment must be just and equitable,
reflecting an equitable balance between the public
interest and the interests of those affected, having
regard to all relevant circumstances, including—
(a) the current use of the property;
(b) the history of the acquisition and use of the
property;
(c) the market value of the property;
(d) the extent of direct state investment and
subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital
improvement of the property; and
(e) the purpose of the expropriation.
(4) For the purposes of this section—
(a) the public interest includes the nation’s
commitment to land reform, and to reforms to
bring about equitable access to all South
Africa’s natural resources; and
(b) property is not limited to land.
(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to foster
conditions which enable citizens to gain access to
land on an equitable basis.
(6) A person or community whose tenure of land is
legally insecure as a result of past racially
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the
extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to
tenure which is legally secure or to comparable
redress.
(7) A person or community dispossessed of property
after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the
extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to
restitution of that property or to equitable redress.
(8) No provision of this section may impede the state
from taking legislative and other measures to
achieve land, water and related reform, in order to
redress the results of past racial discrimination,
provided that any departure from the provisions of
this section is in accordance with the provisions of
section 36(1).




(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate
housing.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve
the progressive realisation of this right.
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have
their home demolished, without an order of court
made after considering all the relevant circum-




(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in
terms of law of general application to the extent that
the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open
and democratic society based on human dignity,
equality and freedom, taking into account all
relevant factors, including—
(a) the nature of the right;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its
purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other
provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any





(1) Every person shall be able to acquire property alone
or in association with others.
(2) No person shall be arbitrarily deprived of property.
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Section 30
[Right to development]
(1) All persons and peoples have a right to development
and therefore to the enjoyment of economic, social,
cultural and political development and women,
children and the disabled in particular shall be given
special consideration in the application of this right.
(2) The State shall take all necessary measures for the
realization of the right to development. Such
measures shall include, amongst other things,
equality of opportunity for all in their access to basic




(2) Without prejudice to subsection (1) [describing
rights not capable of derogation], no restrictions or
limitations may be placed on the exercise of any
rights and freedoms provided for in this
Constitution other than those prescribed by law,
which are reasonable, recognized by international
human rights standards and necessary in an open
and democratic society.
(3) Laws prescribing restrictions or limitations shall not
negate the essential content of the right or freedom
in question, shall be of general application.
(4) Expropriation of property shall be permissible only
when done for public utility and only when there has
been adequate notification and appropriate com-
pensation, provided that there shall always be a right








A review of the work done on the management of
hydraulic resources in Egypt reflects the complexity of
the topic and the level of interest that the issue bears for
researchers, observers, activists and political decision
makers. However, given the critical relationship between
poverty and the management of water, it is surprising
that little research has been done in this particular area.
How should water resources in the areas most affected
by poverty best be managed? How does poverty
aggravate the management of hydraulic resources? These
are some of the critical questions which must be asked.
Although there is a threat of a grave water crisis in the
next 20 years, Egypt does not currently have a chronic
shortage. With approximately 850m3 of water per person
per year, the country has not yet reached extreme water
stress. By contrast, half of the country’s four million
farmers live below the poverty datum line and
approximately a quarter of these live in absolute
poverty.1 Countering the threat of a future water crisis in
Egypt requires better management of the waters of the
Nile – the ‘natural’ capital of the country.
Since the end of the 1970s, the government’s policy of
liberalisation and structural adjustment has radically
changed the agricultural sector. It has put in place a
‘modern’ and mechanised agriculture sector which has
caused the progressive disappearance of poor and
subsistence smallholding. It has privatised water
resource management, and fixed a price scale for water.
The choice to eliminate the poor peasantry rather than
eradicate poverty is a serious failure of resource
management. This is, in turn, causing a host of other
problems inherent in liberal reforms, as witnessed in the
former socialist countries. During negotiations on
Poland’s entry to the EU, officials from that country said
that reforming the farming sector would remove more
than 70% of the peasantry from their land.
In this chapter, I discuss the link between the poverty of
the Egyptian peasantry and the management of water
resources.
The threat of a water crisis
Egypt is one of the richest African countries in terms of
water. The Nile supplies 55.5 billion m3 of the country’s
water,2 catering adequately for the population of about
70 million people. However, what appears at first reading
of the figures and hydraulic map of the country to be
‘hydraulic comfort’ hides a real urgency – the need to
increase available water resources in order to keep the
average availability over the hydraulic poverty line.
Indeed, the threat of a grave hydraulic crisis is becoming
more and more imminent. Although the current supply is
about 850m3 per person per year, the availability of water
is expected to decrease drastically with population
growth and changes in modes of consumption.
Situated in the centre of a big desert band, extending
from the north banks of the river Senegal to the Arab-
Persian Gulf, Egypt hardly receives any rain. The
maximum 100mm of precipitation a year evaporates
almost immediately when it reaches the ground. Egypt’s
arable land is limited to the Valley and Delta of the Nile,
and does not exceed 4% of the national territory. About
96% percent of the population lives on the habitable land
around the Nile and almost all economic activities
depend directly on river water.3 Egypt, it seems to me, is
the only country in the world in which all life and human
activity depend completely on a river as the only
hydraulic resource.
The problem for Egypt is that it cannot artificially
increase the water supplied by the great river. Although
there are ancient water tables in the Libyan desert, their
exploitation raises a double challenge. The costs of
exploitation would be too high and the yield too short-
lived – hardly a few decades. There is also a theoretical
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Table 1: Availability of agricultural land per person
between 1960 and 1996
Cultivated Harvested
feddans  feddans




Source: al-Sayyid 1995:175 and various other sources
possibility of artificially raising the contribution of the
Egyptian Nile by increasing, with the aid of big hydraulic
investments, the storage capacity upstream, particularly
in Uganda, south Sudan and Ethiopia. A study of the
geopolitical map of these countries and more generally of
the high basin of the river hardly allows consideration of
such an enterprise in the short term. The question for
Egypt is thus finding a solution to avoid the hydraulic
crisis without counting on a direct increase in the volume
of water supplied by the Nile.
Possible alternatives would include reducing consump-
tion, reuse of ‘waste’ domestic and agricultural water,
desalination of sea water and finally, exploitation (with
much discretion) of the ancient water tables of the
Libyan desert.
The lack of water, which threatens to affect the whole
country, will affect the farming sector more than any
other. Farming is totally dependent on the contribution
of the Nile, with approximately 70% of the total volume
supplied by the river. Any reduction of irrigation water
will inevitably be accompanied by a reduction of the
cultivated surface, a collapse of production and a
dangerous increase in poverty, which already affects
more than 50% of the peasants. At the same time the
growing population requires more agricultural land and
production to satisfy food needs without aggravating the
economic, and thus political, independence of the
country. In other words, there is a double imperative:
widen the arable land and increase agricultural
production to match the population increase. This will
require a sensitive augmentation of Egypt’s hydraulic
resources. The technological difficulties would be
worsened by a serious and disturbing social situation.
It is the responsibility of the state to find a good
compromise and an alternative to avoid the hydraulic
crisis, while at the same time avoiding a social and
economic crisis. It is upon this that the efficiency and fit
of the political choices which have already been adopted
will be judged. Economic liberalism, of which one of the
aspects is the progressive pricing of irrigation water,
seems a likely option.
People, land and water
There has been a relative reduction of the available
agricultural surface, despite efforts to colonise part of the
desert by reclamation. Physical urban expansion due to
population growth took place largely on the agricultural
space of the Nile valley and around the city of Cairo in
particular. Urbanisation has covered, according to
various estimates, a total surface of about 700 000
feddans4 of agricultural land: that is 12.8% of farmland in
Egypt in 1976 and approximately 10% of the total
surface cultivated today. Furthermore, during the period
1960–1970 (the decade which saw the construction of
the High Dam and the formation of Lake Nasser),
150 000 feddans of agricultural land in upper Egypt were
lost to urban expansion. The 1980s saw the trend
reversed, with a gain of 250 000 feddans, which brought
the total agricultural surface of upper Egypt to 2.57
million feddans in 1990. The Nile Delta’s high
demographic density has led to a relative decrease in
cultivated land by an annual average of –0.21% between
1960 and 1981 and similar proportions during the years
1980 and 1990 (Ayeb 2002:93).
Today, the main obstacles to agricultural development in
Egypt are the reduction of cultivable surface per capita
due to population growth, the decline of farms, a
paradoxical lack of labour, the risk of water shortage, and
the relative decline of investment in the old lands.5 The
proportion of harvested and cultivated land6 per capita in
the country as a whole fell as per Table 1. Furthermore,
the relative reduction of agricultural land due to
population growth has been accompanied by a relative
decline of agricultural production.
Table 2 shows the correlation between population and
agricultural production. The construction of the Aswan
High Dam mitigated the decrease in agricultural
production for four decades after it was constructed in
the late 1960s, but the positive impact of the increased
supply of water now seems to have been exhausted.
Even though it requires expensive irrigation, the
establishment of new agricultural land by desert
reclamation is necessary to meet the increasing needs of
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Table 3: Water availability per person per year between 1972 and 2015*
Year Population (millions) Available water m3/year m3/day
1972 34.56 1 604 4.4
1976 38.00 1 460 4.0
1986 50.21 1 105 3.03
1996 60.00 925 2.5
2015 85.00 653 1.8
* Population size divided by the 55 million m3 of water supplied by the Nile per year
Table 4: The hydraulic situation in 2015 (in billions of m3)
Traditional Weak hypothesis  Strong hypothesis Availability
sources in 2015 (m3 /
inhabitant
/year)
Nile 57.5 57.5 *
Rains 1.4 1.4
Sources 0.3 0.3
Total traditional sources 59.2 59.2
Non traditional sources
Deep water tables 2.5 3.2
Reused waste water 1.8 2.0 **
Reused drain water 3 7.0 ***
Delta+Valley water table 3 3.1
Total non traditional sources 10.3 15.3
TOTAL 69.5 74.5 786 or 843
Source: Ayeb 2002:78.
* Egypt’s share of Nile water plus that amount captured during the first phase of the canal of Jonglai  ** The reusable total
of waste water in 2015  *** The reusable total of waste water in 2015
Table 5: Water in Egypt in 2015: Consumption, available funds and deficits (forecasts in billion m3 per year)
Consumption Available Available Deficit Deficit




Total 77.3 69.5 74.5 7.8 2.8
Source: CAPMAS (Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics) and Ministry of Hydraulic Resources and
Public Works, Cairo
the population and export markets on the one hand, and
to compensate for the loss of agricultural land due to
urban expansion in the Nile Valley and Delta on the
other. This is a challenge for Egypt as it struggles under
the pressure of its own demographic weight and the
difficulty in accessing sufficient water.
Diminishing water
resources
Egypt’s population increased by 2.3% per year between
the early 1980s and the mid-1990s, while the volume of
available water remained the same. Forecasts of
population growth are placed around 1.9% per year for
the next 20 years (Ayeb 2002:77). Having had a
population of around 30 million people in the 1960s,
Egypt’s population is almost 70 million today. De-
mographic increase has almost absorbed the additional
capacity provided by the Aswan Dam. In 1972, available
supply ensured that each Egyptian had 1.604m3 of water
per year, almost 4.40m3 a day.7 Since then, the amount of
water per person has fallen, as per Table 3, and a sharp
increase in demand is expected over the next decade.
The challenge is how to increase the amount of available




How does Egypt increase its hydraulic resources in order
to meet immediate needs and respond to the future
increase in demand? There are only two possible courses
of action: to improve the management of existing
resources or to return to the river as a source.
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The first option is not infinitely extendable; management
of water is not a simple quantitative prescription between
availability and demand. It is about long-term politics
that involves combining the massive introduction of new
technologies, which limit water loss by modernising the
entire water system, as well as the rationalisation of
demand and modes of consumption. Such politics has to
take into account the real financial, technological and
political means of the country, which are limited at
present. How will Egypt manage to do this when the
whole transport system of irrigation water, covering
seven million feddans, is almost completely open
(uncovered)? How can consumption be limited when
more than 60% of the rural population does not have
access to piped drinking water?
There is another particularly inescapable constraint: how
can the first consumers of water, the irrigation farmers,
be subjected to cutbacks in water supply when
approximately half of them already live in poverty?
Herein lies the real challenge for the Egyptian planners
and decision makers. No public policy will succeed
without the massive and committed support from the
majority of the country’s four million peasants. Securing
their support will require convincing them that at the
same time as saving water, the state also aims to
substantially improve their individual and collective
quality of life by eradicating poverty. Currently, the
peasants generally believe that they constitute the
forgotten people. The last free-market programme
adopted by the authorities – in particular the agrarian
counter-reform inaugurated by the agrarian law of 1992
– is indisputable proof that politicians will marginalise the
peasants yet again for the benefit of big landowners and
investors. In one survey, more than 80% of Egyptian
farmers interviewed felt they were badly treated by
engineers and representatives of the water services.
Modernising the hydraulic system
At the same time as technically modernising Egypt’s
water system, several political actors in the water sector
have engaged in questionable behaviour aimed at limiting
consumption. Proceeding from the erroneous assump-
tion that the farmers are the biggest wasters of water, the
actors think that if farmers are obliged to pay for water,
they will limit their consumption and protect the
resource against pollution. In fact, the biggest wasters are
primarily in cities and the sources of pollution are
unmistakably the factories, a large proportion of which
continue to expel wastewater directly into the Nile.
Is it really necessary to charge for irrigation water in
Egypt? In addition to being falsely identified as the
culprits, farmers do not have the means to pay for their
water consumption. How will the consumption of the
farmers be accurately metred even if they could afford to
pay? What is the true commercial value or price of water?
The international financiers of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommend putting
a price on water in order to avoid waste; to reduce the
actual or supposed scarcity; and to increase or restore the
profitability of the hydraulic system by privileging access
to the most powerful actors. This view has been parroted
by politicians and other powerful actors. However, such
an approach seems improper in the eyes of those for
whom water, as a natural element indispensable to life,
cannot be considered a simple consumer good. The issue
stimulates discourse on the culture of water, on the
representations of water and its identity. Water comes
from a geographically situated and symbolically ap-
propriate source – the river. Once it becomes a com-
modity it is no longer a bearer of identity and may be
monopolised by the highest bidder, whether ‘national’ or
foreign.
One of the challenges that charging for irrigation water
poses is of a technical nature. A policy of price scale
fixing would require the construction of a new dis-
tribution network and, most importantly, an effective,
reliable and precise system of metering. The distributive
network of open canals, which spreads out over
approximately 120 000km, covering seven million
feddans comprising four million farms, cannot be
renewed, in its current state, within the framework of
market-orientated policy. Losses, thefts and diversions
would limit technical efficiency. Huge investment would
be required to replace the current system with a new
network of subterranean transport and distribution pipes
with supply terminals and meters.
In any case, a policy of liberalisation of the water market,
aiming at limiting consumption, wastage and losses,
would inevitably produce unintended results. The
introduction of charges risks provoking social instability
or even a revolt among the four million peasants. This
would threaten the very foundations of the political
system and reduce all the political legitimacy of the
authorities. Finally, agriculture would lose out because
there are not sufficient investors interested in replacing
the old agricultural lands with a modern and highly
mechanised system of agriculture.
Imposing water tariffs
Research conducted among the Egyptian peasantry
shows that they reject paying for irrigation water because
they consider it inequitable and contrary to their un-
derstanding of their rights. For them, water comes from
God and is a common good. Its usage and consumption
should therefore be according to need and not the laws of
the market or the singular will of political and technical
decision makers. In their opinion, technocrats and other
public officials should limit themselves to ensuring the
equal distribution of this ‘gift of God’, according to the
single criterion of producer and consumer need. About
45% of the rural population live below the poverty line,
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Table 6: Wages of farm labourers (piastres)
NOMINAL WAGE REAL WAGE DIFFERENCE
1970 25.0 21.4 3.6
1975 46.5 27.7 18.8
1980 137.0 44.1 92.9
1981-82 389.0 103.0 286.0
1984-85 484.0 182.6 302.6
Source: From information in Keshk 1996:68
* Nominal wage is the daily wage and real wage takes the cost of rural living into account
so the refusal to pay for water is not only a political
matter, poor farmers can simply not afford to pay
anything.
To charge peasants for irrigation water would deprive
them of their livelihood. Such a policy would push them
out, leaving only those who have the means to invest in
new technologies to participate in the capitalist mode of
production. This would only aggravate social unrest, at a
time when the new structural adjustment policies are
causing social strife in several countries of the south
Mediterranean. The law of 1992 which liberalised
agricultural land rents provoked violence among the
peasants, resulting in numerous deaths, several hundreds
wounded and many arrested. It was unmistakably a
struggle for survival by the most deprived and excluded
of Egyptian society. Any attempt to charge them for
irrigation water would risk setting off a dreadful chain
reaction with dire social and political consequences.
Quantifying peasant
poverty
In spite of the development of agriculture during the last
50 years and the accompanying agrarian reforms, the
number of rural inhabitants living below the poverty
datum line keeps on growing. Between 1964 and 1975,
the number of people in poverty increased from 3 million
to 5.8 million. In 1981–82, 39.7% of all rural families
were living below the poverty line (Keshk 1996:17).
Today, this percentage is slightly over 40%. At the
beginning of the 1990s, the spending of the poorest rural
people fell to 17% of total rural consumption, while the
spending of the richest 20% of the rural population was
approximately 46% of total consumption.
The primary cause of poverty is related to the availability
of farmland. About 70% of owners possess less than one
feddan. The property of 90% of landowners averages
less than four feddans. Half of the total farmland belongs
to this category and the other half is in the hands of 10%
of the land owners. Only 2% of owners own a third of all
farmland (INP 1997:4).
Declining production means a large part of Egyptian
peasants do not realise sufficient income from farming to
meet their needs. Their agricultural production income
(animal and vegetable) is less than 35% of the amount
that would bring them up to the poverty line (Keshk
1996:17). A lack of experience in commerce helps to
explain the low incomes of the peasants, especially the
poorest. The poverty which results from low farming
incomes is all the more difficult to overcome as it is
compounded by generalised poverty in Egyptian villages.
Almost all villages lack the most basic services for
education and health, as well as public utilities,
agricultural infrastructure and assistance.
A 1992 inquiry showed that farms of less than two
feddans cannot meet the needs of the families which
farm them. Consequently, many farmers regularly take
on other work, to the detriment of their own farms.
Agricultural incomes
In an investigation of agricultural labourers, the Egyptian
sociologist and economist, Hassanein Keshk (1996)
sums up the particularly difficult situation of the
Egyptian population:
The (deprived) agricultural wage-workers constituted, in
1976, 49.4% of farmers, almost 2 million. And the
population of poor producers (wage-earning farmers) in
1981/82 reached 1.3 million, from 12 to 64 years old.
In 1986, the number of labourers broke the 2 million
mark, with more people sinking into poverty as a result of
a policy introduced by government in the 1970s under
the name of the economic infitah: economic reform or
structural adjustment policies.
Income data reveals that continuous impoverishment of
the rural population has obliged them to opt for waged
farm work to meet their needs. The entire landless
peasantry and those farming a surface of no more than
two feddans were forced into wage labour. Between 1970
and 1980, the nominal wage went up from 25 to 137
piastres a day, but if we take into account the rise in the
cost of living in rural areas, real income has scarcely
doubled in 10 years (Keshk 1996:68). Table 6 details the
evolution of the nominal and actual wages between 1970
and 1985.
According to Abu Mandour (1995:185), between 1985
and 1991 the real salaries of farm labourers dropped by
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Table 7: Distribution of incomes and poverty in Egypt
national URBAN RURAL
GDP/capita (lower Egypt) 1994/95 3 461.3 4 565.3 2 617.7
The lowest 40% by income (1995/96) 21.9 20.4 25.7
Poor population (% of the total)
Total (1995/96) 22.9 22.5 23.3
Extremely poor (1995/96) 7.4 7.7 7.1
Source: Bishay 1998:39
60%. Official sources indicate a decline in actual salaries of
about 50.8% between 1986 and 1992 (Keshk 1996:68–9).
The extent of poverty
In 1990–91, more than a third (34.1%) of the rural
population was considered to be below the poverty
datum line. According to the Egypt human development report
(INP 1997), in 1995–96 23.3% of the rural population
were poor. Taking the ‘moderately poor’ into account,
poverty in the rural areas stood at 50.2%. INP estimates
that the rural zones accommodate approximately 58% of
the poor (1997:26–7). The International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI) gives appreciably different
figures, with 63% of the poor and 74% of the extremely
poor living in rural areas (Datt et al. 1998:68).
The incidence of poverty is significantly higher among
non-farmers than among farmers. In the rural zones,
39% of households are engaged in some form of
agricultural activity. Approximately 35% of non-farmers
live below the poverty datum line, while only 22.88% of
farmers form part of this category (Datt et al. 1998:62).
There is a negative correlation between the head-count
index and the size of the farmland, from 35.28% for the
small farmers (those with less than 0.07 feddan per
capita) to 23.82% for the medium farmers (between 0.07
and 0.24 feddans) and 7.08% for the big farmers (more
than 0.25 feddans). The difference of the head-count
indications between the big and small farmers is
statistically significant (Datt et al. 1998:62–3). If the
calculation is done by counting the total land cultivated at
the household level rather than per capita, the results are
as follows: 32.63% of the small farmers (per household),
22.81% of the medium and 13.97% of the big farmers are
poor (Datt et al. 1998:64).
As is the case with the head-count index, the poverty gap
index also reveals a concentration of moderate rural
poverty. The poverty gap index works out between 2.4%
in rural low Egypt and 6.9% in rural upper Egypt (INP
1997:27). In other words, in the countryside of low
Egypt, the average household has 97.6% of its basic
needs met as against 93.1% for their counterparts in rural
upper Egypt.
Implications of free market
solutions
Although rural Egypt has always suffered from poverty,
the situation seems to have worsened over recent years,
notably because of the new economic policy’s
agricultural content, which constituted an agrarian
counter-reform. With the implementation of the last
phase of the agrarian counter-reform (the law of 1992),
the situation deteriorated once more. Indeed, when the
new law, which governs the relations between tenants
and agricultural landowners, came into force in 1997,
more than 800 000 fellahins lost their farmers’ titles arising
from the permanent rent contracts set up by the agrarian
reform laws of the 1950s and 1960s (Müller-Mahn
1998:256).
The costs of liberalisation
Faced with various agricultural problems and the
increasingly urgent threat of a water crisis, the
government – encouraged by big international financial
and economic institutions – suggests that only modern
and reliable farmers would be capable of dealing with the
problems. They claim this would be achieved by
investing heavily in a policy of technical and
technological modernisation for highly mechanised
agriculture, exporting and producing surplus value. In
brief, they propose that a capitalist agriculture that is
totally integrated into the international agricultural
market is the solution.
The government’s problem lies in not knowing what to
do with the four million Egyptian peasants and the
approximately 20 million people who directly depend on
the sector. To brutally expropriate and dislodge them
from their lands for the benefit of big investors is out of
the question. Another constraint is of a hydraulic nature.
The country does not have a water surplus that would
allow it to infinitely widen its cultivated land.
The government’s preferred option is an irreversible
process that will play out over several decades – a process
which will slowly but surely eliminate the weakest, and
massively reduce the overall number of peasants. The
small and medium farmers are now having to group
together on big and heavily mechanised farms. It is clear
that the choice has been made to treat the problem on a
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macro scale – a choice in keeping with the currently
dominant neo-liberal ‘globalising’ discourse.
The big agricultural investors are already in place. All the
new projects involving reclamation of desert lands are
formulated to the advantage of these investors – whether
they be the irrigated perimeters of the Peace Canal in the
north of the Sinai; the Tushka project in the southwest
extreme of the country; or other reclamation projects
along the Valley and on the margins of the Delta. Besides
the very low price of the reclaimed land, the new
investors benefit from vast quantities of aid, subsidies
and tax-breaks and, above all, the total absence of any
ceiling to the appropriable surface. The only limit is the
minimum acquisition of 500 feddans per investor.
In the opinion of numerous Egyptian investors, agri-
culture in the new lands is, today, one of the best
investments in the whole country. While installing
themselves on the desert margins, will the new and eager
entrepreneurs wait for the eviction of the peasantry
before taking their place? A progressive grouping of
orchards in the southern part of the Delta is already
underway, though at a slow pace. Today a feddan sells for
between 80 000 and 150 000 Egyptian pounds
(€17 000–32 000).
Neo-liberal modernisation
The modernisation and liberalisation of the Egyptian
hydro-agricultural sector has been a long and gradual
process since the 1970s when the Egyptian government
abandoned the socialist experiment adopted by
President Gamal Abdel-Nasser after the 1952
‘revolution of the free officers’. This phase corresponded
with the implementation of new global economic stan-
dards dominated by the free market and was called the
infitah, which means (economic) opening or liberalisation,
as opposed to the closure and separation associated with
the socialist model. In reality, the term means opening to
the Western world and more specifically to the capitalist
models led by major capitalist powers. It is important to
note that the Cold War was not yet over so the ideological
significance of the decision to adopt this model was very
different to what it would be today.
The next phase was the progressive liberalisation of the
agricultural market and particularly the end of state
monopolies, notably commercialisation of agricultural
materials, inputs and harvests. These major reforms were
accompanied by the end of the compulsory crop rotation
system and the ‘collectivist’ form of agricultural co-
operatives.
At the same time as it adopted these policies, Egypt was
affected by a sharp increase in petroleum prices. It was
also affected by the economic expansion of the Gulf
monarchies following the first oil crisis of 1973. The oil
crisis arose from these countries imposing an oil
embargo on the West for aiding Israel during the war of
the same year.
Indeed, when the infitah policy was adopted in the mid-
1970s, the farming sector was already suffering from a
deep crisis. It showed all the symptoms of structural
decay, namely an extremely poor farming community; a
weak agricultural market disconnected from the mass of
producers; increasingly smaller farms; and real
agricultural wages that did not satisfy the minimum needs
of those who could no longer survive off their lands.
The sudden and unexpected wealth of the Arab oil-
producing states stimulated a very strong demand for
immigrant workers, qualified or not, and in almost all
domains. In a few months, several hundreds of
thousands of migrants left their countries for the Gulf
States. Over three million Egyptians joined this mi-
gration. A large portion of them came from rural areas,
including many peasants – smallholders, landless farm
labourers and the sons of poor and wage-earning
farmers.
Some of the peasants found agricultural employment
elsewhere, particularly in Iraq and in the Jordan valley.
Even Jordan, not a country very rich in petroleum,
offered an attractive income to the Egyptian migrants
compared with their low incomes at home. Iraq, which
received more than two million Egyptians, offered the
best agricultural employment market in the Persian Gulf
region owing to land and hydraulic resources matched
only, ironically, by Egypt. The oil wealth of Iraq
promised ‘unhoped-for fortunes’ for poor peasants
newly-arrived from the Nile valley. This ‘receptive Eden’
would remain open until the war that followed Iraq’s
occupation of Kuwait and the United Nations embargo,
to which Iraq was subjected in 1990. This development
turned formerly rich Iraqi employers into poor people in
the Middle East. The Egyptian immigrants became
‘excess’ population and were forced to return home, only
to find that the situation had deteriorated during their
absence. This strong wave of emigration incited and
encouraged by the policy of the infitah provided the
Egyptian state with a piece of the oil prize in the form of
migrant worker remittances.
The effect of migration on the Egyptian countryside was
considerable. It resulted in urban expansion, which was
generally to the detriment of agricultural land. There was
also a surge in the development of services and other
formal and informal commercial activities. The other
visible change resulting from the expatriation was the
rapid mechanisation of agriculture and especially that of
irrigation, which provoked one of the fastest and most
profound social and economic transformations of rural
Egypt. In progressing from the sakieh8 to the diesel pump
for irrigation water, Egyptian peasant society moved
from a social system organised locally in autonomous
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users’ associations around indispensible resources to an
individualised system, where the (small or average size)
individual investor and the engineer occupy central
positions. At the same time, the status of water changed
from an inalienable collective good to that of a raw
material for sale. Metering to determine the cost of water
used was no longer taboo – although, for political and
symbolic reasons, it was done in a disguised way. Access
to water, which was determined strictly according to the
needs of peasant producers, henceforth depended on the
means of those who wished to procure it.
As if dissolved in the very water it regulates, this change
seems invisible, but it prefigures deep structural changes
that will eventually radically modify the social, agrarian
and agricultural landscape of rural Egypt and its
hydraulic space. In the medium to long term, only those
able to pay for water and for land will be able to continue
to engage in agricultural activity.
The Egyptian countryside has known mechanisation
since the beginning of the 20th century. At first there were
steam pumps introduced around the 1880s, then diesel
pumps in the 1930s and modernisation and mechanisation
of the big Egyptian farmlands. The crisis of the 1940s and
the agrarian reform of the 1950s slowed down the
adaptation of pumps to the benefit of the traditional
sakieh. It was necessary to wait for the 1960s and 1970s to
witness the victory of the diesel pump. Today it is
increasingly difficult to find a working sakieh in Egypt.
The direct reasons are evident. A pump can irrigate a
feddan in two to six hours. The output of pumps is two
to three times more than that of the sakiehs and they can
cover surfaces seven times as large. The majority of these
pumps – which are relatively handy and transportable if
mounted on wheels – are owned by individuals. Al-
though no systematic research has been done, it is likely
that an expatriate in the Gulf States was the source of
funds for almost every pump bought after the beginning
of 1980s.
As mentioned earlier, the first consequence of the spread
of the diesel pump (and the end of the sakieh) was the
disappearance of water users’ associations. This laun-
ched a process of profound social upheaval, engendering
a progressive individualisation of peasant society and
consequent disappearance of the forms of domestic and
rustic solidarity.
This cannot be seen as social progress, and even less as
local development. The mechanisation of irrigation is not
due to the growth of the farming sector. Instead, as I
observed earlier, it resulted from the transfer of large
sums of money from the Gulf States (emigration), which
permitted the introduction of pumps along the canals of
the Delta and the Nile valley. The paradox is that there is
a massive mechanisation of irrigation in the countryside
where the majority of farmers, who are dependent on
irrigation, live below the poverty datum line. These poor
farmers cannot slow down the process, nor resist its
consequences. The process imposes a new agro-social
model that excludes the most deprived, particularly those
who cannot bear the cost of this technical development.
At the same time, they can no longer count on the rustic
solidarity which used to protect them from the
consequences of such developments.
The disappearance of the sakieh, far from being an
unfortunate outmoding of an exotic object on the
Egyptian landscape, demonstrates the end of a social
system that allowed the land of the Nile to continue to
feed its poor. The poor farmers of yesterday will be the
outcasts of tomorrow. If the reforms of the agrarian and
agricultural sector of the country are recreating a class of
landless peasants, the end of the sakieh has created a class
of peasants without water. Without land and water, this
peasant class is condemned to disappear and will become
part of the poorest class of Egyptian society.
The last phase of reform put in place by the government
was the promulgation and execution of the agrarian law
of 1992 which freed the market from the burden of land
rental and the relationship between land owner and
tenant. Since 1997 when the law was applied, the price of
land (rent and sale-price) has been left entirely to market
forces. The relationship between tenants and owners has
favoured the latter: the period of lease is limited; the
renewal is no longer automatic and is left to the discretion
of the owner; and the lease is no longer automatically
inherited.
The new law governing the sale of land has already begun
to show its first consequences – the gradual, but
inevitable return of large properties. This process is not
likely to succeed in the very short term. On the contrary,
the acceleration of the process could endanger social and
political stability, so the authorities are not in favour of it.
The real objective is the agglomeration of land, the
inevitable outcome of the disappearance of small farmers
who, as a result of the new law, are not allowed to pass
their land on to their children. Thus, the first phase of the
process, launched in 1997, was the beginning of the
apparently irreversible process which caused the crum-
bling of farms, the impoverishment of peasants and the
paralysis of agriculture. The risk now is a move towards
a process of capitalist consolidation of the agricultural
land around a small number of peasant-entrepreneurs –
a change that would be accompanied by a definitive
exclusion of the greater part of the contemporary
peasantry.
The capitalist development of Egyptian agriculture
would ruin millions of poor farmers who do not have the
means to adapt to the new conditions, constraints and
requirements of modern agriculture. Too poor to
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withstand the rise in the cost of land and metering of
water, and much too disconnected from the national and
international market system to benefit from it, today’s
peasants may well adopt other strategies not necessarily
more protected against misery, poverty and violence. It is
often said that economic development must be paid for
with the ‘sacrifice’ of current generations, especially the
poorest. The ex-communist Eastern Bloc presently
undergoing neo-liberal economic transition is often
quoted as an example. It is important to point out the role
that the West, and particularly Europe, plays in ‘relieving’
the damage of economic liberalisation of Eastern
Europe. But, as we can easily imagine, Egypt, like other
Arabic and African countries, will not benefit from such
compassion and massive assistance.
Economic development discourse holds an important
yet simple principle: water is a common good that must
be accessible to all. Setting a price on it is a profoundly
inequitable choice, one that will exclude all those who
have no means to pay for it. In Egypt, the state is not
capable of providing an alternative or a safety net for the
poor farmers. But fixing a price scale for water is a
political choice, made with the full knowledge of the
likely consequences.
Conclusion
The Egyptian water problem can be elaborated in terms
of an increasing gap since the 1970s, between the
diagnosis of the hydraulic, agricultural and social
situation and the political choices adopted to mitigate it.
It would indeed be difficult for any observer not to arrive
at the same conclusion: an agriculture sector in a grave
structural crisis;9 a large farming community deeply
impoverished and disconnected from the national and
international market and above all, limited hydraulic
resources dwindling in relation to population increase;
the intensification of agriculture and extension of the
agricultural surface by occupation of the desert and
creation of new irrigation perimeters.
Egyptian decision makers chose economic liberalisation
as a solution to the problems of the country. In so doing,
they provoked a deep upheaval and started a process for
which the country was not fully prepared. The passage
from a state-controlled economy to a market economy,
without the political will and financial resources to
ameliorate the shocks, victimised the most fragile fringe
of society – smallholders and landless peasants. The
strongest expression of the shocks of economic
transition was indisputably the political violence that
shook the country during the 1990s. The violence also
revealed other dysfunctional factors in Egyptian society,
but the situation of extreme poverty in the countryside,
exacerbated by the politics of neo-liberal reforms, was a
determining factor.
For years, the authorities have unleashed an assault on
the last defences of the peasants. In a bid to end the
fragmentation of agricultural land, entice investment and
consolidate agricultural space in the national market,
they have aggravated the economic and social difficulties
of the majority of peasants, forcing them into poverty,
exclusion and dependence. But the development of large
properties and the arrival of new investors in the
agriculture sector have not yet realised the returns they
hoped for.
On the one hand, to avoid a hydraulic crisis (which looks
more and more inevitable), the Egyptian authorities
seem to be opting for the gradual introduction of major
reforms – the liberalisation of water services (infra-
structure and consumer water supply) and the pro-
gressive setting up of a water pricing system. The former
has been in the public domain for some time now, and
the authorities refer to it as a fundamental political choice
within the framework of the neo-liberal politics of
structural adjustment. On the other hand, politicians
rarely speak of the option of progressive water metering,
which breaks a profound taboo anchored in social
tradition.
In this context of economic liberalisation and market
dominion, the fixing of a price scale for water is no longer
taboo; the exclusion of poor peasants is seen as a happy
disappearance of a constraint to the development of the
farming sector; and the eradication of rural poverty is
viewed as the necessary disappearance of the poor from
the rural to urban zones.
Is there any guarantee that the liberal policies will bear
fruit? Will the farming sector be able to climb out of its
current crisis and will the expected profits benefit the
national economy? Nothing is guaranteed. Agrarian
counter-reform – the return of big landholdings and
investment in Egyptian agriculture – will not produce
real economic growth without the elimination of other
constraints; notably those of the national and in-
ternational markets. Most importantly, it is crucial to
note that the policies of liberalisation and the metering of
hydraulic resources cannot eternally deal with the
hydraulic crisis. The population will continue to grow at
a minimum rate of about 1.8% a year. In other words, it
will increase by some 20 to 25 million people over the
next 15 to 20 years. At present, at 850m3 per person per
year and without any hope of augmentation, the average
availability of water will decline with population growth.
The farming sector will be seriously handicapped and
investors are likely to find other sectors to invest their
money in case of drought.
Today, the hydraulic crisis is taking place at two different
levels. The first one, of an organisational order, has
already begun. It consists of a crisis of decision making
and political choices concerning the emergency. How
can the consumption be reduced while everything that
could achieve this has either already been done or is in
the process of being realised? How does Egypt integrate
FREE-MARKET WATER MANAGEMENT: THE EGYPTIAN HYDRAULIC CRISIS
84
SECURING LAND AND RESOURCE RIGHTS IN AFRICA: pAN-AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES
free market rules into the management of water without
provoking social and political crises?
The second level, in the medium term, concerns a simple
fact: Egypt cannot avoid a grave hydraulic crisis if
nothing is done to increase the availability of water. A
return to the river source for a collective management of
the Nile, engaging all the riparian states, would first have
to pass through Ethiopia – which since 1959, has been
asking for a new sharing mechanism for the river’s water.
Egypt, which already consumes the biggest portion of
available water, cannot contemplate a reduction in its
share of the Nile. In this it confronts a real hydropolitical
crisis (see Ayeb 1998).
1The data concerning poverty in Egypt are drawn and
sometimes calculated from the following references:
INP 1997, Datt et al. 1998, Bishay 1998 and Müller-
Mahn 1998.
2In terms of a 1959 agreement, Egypt may take 55.5
billion m3 of water per year from the Nile and Sudan may
take 18.5 billion cubic meters. The annual average
contribution of the river is 84 billion m3 of water a year.
The remaining 10 billion m3 is the annual average volume
of evaporation from the surface of Lake Nasser, formed
by the construction of the High Dam of Aswan in 1964.
3This excludes resources such as petroleum.
4One feddan = 1 acre = 0.42 hectares
5By ‘old lands’ I refer to the agricultural lands situated in
the valley and the delta and which were already under
cultivation before the 1950s. More recent extensions,
made possible by desert reclamation, are known as ‘new
lands’.
6On average every plot of land receives approximately 2
harvests a year (1.9 to be exact). This means the
harvested surface is almost twice the cultivated
agricultural surface of the country.
7This is water for the entire range of consumption,
including drinking water, industry, irrigation, electrical
production and navigation.
8 Noria, bucket waterwheel.
9‘Agriculture, according to the last census of 1991–92,
supplies 19.5% of the GDP and employs 4.5 million
people, that is 32.7% of Egypt’s working population. The
principal source of food, it assures 20.3% of export
receipts and produces an important part of the industrial
input (al-Sayyid 1995:174).
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Most people in Cameroon, particularly the indigenous
Bagyeli/Bakola2 still live in rural areas and derive their
livelihoods from land and natural resources. In the
circumstances of globalisation where the inter-
connectedness of nations is increasing, the accountability
of different actors with diverse perspectives, priorities
and interests at the national and international levels is
imperative in the quest for the realisation of meaningful
land and resource rights.
From a conventional perspective of biodiversity con-
servation, protected areas are refuges of tranquillity and
peace. This model or organisational style is distinctively
top-down and authoritarian. In the perception of
resident people in the vicinity of protected areas, such
projects are not considered to be theirs and the
designation of the sites do not necessarily share local
interests and concerns (Harkes 1995:6).
Over the past 20 years there has been a shift from the
defensive posture that protects nature from the impacts
of development, to an offensive effort seeking to secure
people’s resource rights and to meet their needs from the
natural heritage, while ensuring its sustainability.
Increasingly, there is recognition of the crucial role of
people-oriented conservation initiatives in the manage-
ment of protected areas (Munashinghe & Wells 1992;
Jeanrenaud 1999). This implies balancing local livelihood
strategies and welfare; biodiversity protection; and
sustainable management of natural resources for the
benefits of current and future generations (Mope Simo
2001:vi).
There are several recurrent and unstable processes
linked with inefficient and ineffective biodiversity
protection in general, and with protected areas in
particular. Some of the challenges include: government’s
slow administrative procedures; absence of an enabling
policy environment; inadequate personnel and equip-
ment for monitoring and enforcement; market forces
(commercial logging, land legislation and domestic/
export agriculture); the ‘plan de zonage’ (zoning plan); low
awareness of the local people; the knowledge of the staff
of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry and related
ministries on the new forestry law; and poverty and
inequality in resource distribution. All these factors have
a bearing on understanding sustainability issues in
protected areas. But the crux of the matter lies in the
reform or regularisation of property rights, including
land tenure, access to communal resources, and re-
solution of land-use conflicts.
Protected areas are increasingly becoming battlefields of
resource conflicts. As discussed later, the frequent
conflicts observed in the Campo Ma’an National Park
(CMNP) area result from multiple stakeholders who
have different perspectives, goals, values and interests.3
More powerful social actors, including the government,
violate these. This is the case of the indigenous peoples –
the Bagyeli/Bakola pygmy communities – who have
historically inhabited or utilised the rich biodiversity
within and outside the park.
Other important stakeholders are Bantu language-
speaking villagers, migrants or settlers, and economic
operators or agro-industrial complexes whose interests
are focused on the conservation values of the park – such
as tourists and hunters; as well as local, national and
international NGOs which value the protected area for
its flora, fauna, beautiful scenery, and wilderness
characteristics. The variety of stakeholders and the
interplay among local, national and international
interests present challenges to anyone attempting to
understand, manage, or resolve these conflicts (Lewis
1996:12).
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The main assumption of this paper is that the security of
land and resource rights access both inside and around
the protected area can be a motivation for local
populations – who are principal users of the forest,
wildlife and water – to alter their behaviour from de-
structive and wasteful practices, to sustainable man-
agement. This policy option can also be an incentive for
them to appreciate the relationship between their
benefits (economic prosperity, welfare, cultural continu-
ity, and empowerment) and the conservation of bio-
diversity. Another hypothesis is that good management
requires the adoption of land uses that take into account the
attributes of three dimensions: ecological sustainability,
economic feasibility, and social and political acceptability.
This paper focuses attention on the scramble, by dif-
ferent stakeholders, for the diverse biodiversity around
them, especially the Bagyeli and Bakola pygmy
communities, who can be described as the poorest
citizens, the most powerless and vulnerable interest
group in Cameroon today. Following the presentation of
the problem, the next section consists of a descriptive
analysis of the study site. The third section examines land
and resource rights issues in the CMNP area based on the
argument that there can be no sustainable development
without real land rights. It also dwells on the underlying
conflicts that occur, with emphasis on the interests of
local people because their lives and livelihoods are
vulnerable. The fourth section poses the question
whether the introduction of community forestry
programmes in Cameroon can bring meaningful benefits
to the local communities. In the final section, some
concluding remarks and recommendations relating to
people-oriented conservation initiatives in protected
areas are made.
Background
The Campo Ma’an intervention area has a surface area of
7 772km² and consists of several land use types (LUTs),
of which the most important are: the CMNP (2 640km²
or 34% of the area), four logging concessions (31%), an
agro-forestry zone (26.5%), two rubber and oil palm
plantations (7%), and collection of non-timber forest
products (NTFPs). More than 60 000 people live in the
Campo Ma’an area, of which 24 000 occupy the
industrial rubber and oil palm concessions (Tropenbos
International 2002:2). The people who have no work in
the plantations or the forest concessions are subsistence
hunters, fishermen and farmers who, in certain cases,
obtain more than 75% of their protein needs from
bushmeat. Bushmeat is increasingly commercialised,
threatening its sustained harvest and pushing some
animal species to near extinction.4
Policy and legal context
The government of Cameroon’s policy on the
management of protected areas centres on the
maximisation of that portion of national territory set
aside for the conservation of biological diversity. The
policy is given legal effect in Law No. 94/01 of January
1994, which lays down forestry, wildlife and fisheries
regulations and provides that permanent forests shall
cover at least 30% of the total area of the national
territory and reflect Cameroon’s ecological diversity.
This policy and legislative strategy has since been
extended and magnified at the sub-regional level,
following Cameroon’s initiating and hosting of the first
Summit of Heads of State of the Central Sub-region on
Sustainable Management of the Forest Block of the
Congo Basin. The summit culminated in the signing of
the Yaoundé Declaration. Inter alia, it obliges signatory
countries to accelerate the process of setting up
protected trans-border zones, and to strengthen the
sustainable management of existing protected areas
(WWF Cameroon 2002).
The government has since designed and is implementing
a national blueprint for the implementation of ob-
ligations undertaken during the Summit (the Emergency
Action Plan for the implementation of the Yaoundé
Declaration, Prime Ministerial Order No. 089/CAB/
PM, 19 November 1999) which includes a strong
protected area component. The dawn of the summit also
witnessed the creation of the 264 064ha Campo Ma’an
National Park in 2000, as one of the three newly
established developments with such status in the
country. This policy came to light with the adoption of
the Technical Operation Unit (TOU) in 1999, an
approach through which national parks are managed
within a complex of other categories of management
recognised by law (Hazeu et al. 2000). Thus the TOU for
the protected area under discussion was created in 1999.
On the one hand, its conservator and manager is the
Divisional Delegate of the Ocean Division, and on the
other, it is governed by the Provincial Delegate of the
Environment. Both of these local administrative au-
thorities are in the South Province (Tropenbos In-
ternational 2002).
Ecological context
The Campo-Ma’an TOU is located in the extreme
southwest corner of the South Province. It is bounded by
Equatorial Guinea to the south, the Atlantic Ocean to the
west and the Kribi-Akom-Ebolowa highway to the
north. It lies between latitude 2°09    and 2°53°N and the
longitude 9°48º and 10°54ºE. Undulating plains towards
the coast give way to broken and hilly terrain in the east,
reaching a maximum elevation of 1 020m. Significant
physical features include the Ntem Canyon, a deep and
remarkably straight canyon in the southeast, and an
unusual feature of elevated swampland settled on very
hard substrates along the Ntem River. It has a humid
equatorial climate, with a mean annual temperature of
26°C and average rainfall of 2 000mm that has two peaks,
in May and October (Hazeu et al. 2000).
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Although its biological integrity has been compromised
over extensive areas by logging and hunting, the CMNP
is considered important for conservation primarily due
to its highly biologically diverse Congolese coastal forest.
Its importance as a protected area is enhanced by its
extensive area of forested seashore, which is virtually the
only protected area of unspoilt sand/rocky shoreline in
Cameroon, with reasonably high tourist value. It begins
with a dense humid forest at sea level, then transforms
into legumes at higher altitudes. It is rich in a wide range
of species, and a refuge for various taxonomic endemics
(Tropenbos International 2002)
Campo-Ma’an is most important for its rich diversity of
plants, (some of which include Lophira alata, Afzelia sp.,
Khaya ivorensis, Pterocarpus and Aframaomum). The addition
of the Ma’an Forest reserve to the overall conservation
area has enormously increased the biological value of the
Campo Ma’an site. In the local and regional context, its
role is primordial as a sanctuary for the protection of the
elephant, the lowland gorilla, the chimpanzee, hippo,
giant pangolin, black colobus, mandrill and leopard.
Research opportunities are consequently high. The
avifauna is also rich and diverse. The grey-necked
rockfowl (Pithacartes oreas) is found in the park, and it is an
important migration site for hornbills (Bucerotidae
family, Tockus sp.) from Dja. The coastal portion provides
an important habitat for sea turtle nesting.
Socio-economic and
cultural context
The CMNP falls within a complex of resource use
management categories managed within a central
structure (the TOU of Campo Ma’an) set up by the
government of Cameroon. This supervises the ma-
nagement of the park and implements sustainable use of
natural resources within the buffer zones. The multiple
of local peoples include the Bulu and Ntumu (mainly
farmers and hunters respectively), Batanga and Iyassa
(fishers), Mabea and Mvae (farmers, hunters, and
freshwater fishers), and the Bagyeli/Bakola or pygmy
communities (traditionally hunters and gatherers). Most
members of this marginalised group are peasants,
hunters and gatherers. As a result of the sedentarisation
process initiated by the state years back, proximity to
Bantu villages has motivated some of them to attempt
farming. The heterogeneous populations comprising
people from different social structures and cultures can
and has often led to abuse and neglect of the land
rights of the powerless and minority Bagyeli/Bakola
communities.
Today, as always, the pygmy communities have a
marginal socio-political and economic position (Loung
et al. 1990; van de Sandt 1997:48). Between pygmy
groups and Bantu villagers there is a clientelistic de-
pendency relation in which the latter act as patrons.5 The
different Bantu tribes seem to hold ambivalent and
ambiguous views about the Bagyeli/Bakola people.
Inter-racial marriages have been contracted between the
different ethnic groups, and this goes a long way to lesson
the tensions as the people exploit and manage common
natural resources derived from their rich, dense, humid
forest. An acculturation process has permitted the
minority pygmy communities to borrow and integrate
into their culture ‘foreign’ cultural values such as the
export crop, cocoa, enrolment in the formal education
system, Christianity, and so on. At the same time they
have successfully maintained their cultural identity and
independence.
Though perceptions vary among the different Bantu
groups, the Bagyeli/Bakola seem to be perceived as
deprived, marginalised, ‘uncivilized’ and perhaps ‘sub-
human tribes’ (van de Berg 1994:4) The fact that Bagyeli/
Bakola men are seen to be unfit for marriage with Bantu
women is illustrative of this negative perception. On the
other hand, pygmy people are feared by their Bantu
neighbours because many of them are believed to be
endowed with exceptional magical powers which can be
used to cause destruction and dangerous illnesses to their
enemies.
The total population of the TOU is estimated at 59 199
inhabitants (ERE-Développement 2001) distributed in
119 towns, villages and labourers’ encampments. This
complex of resource use management categories (four
logging concessions and an agro-industrial zone) has
attracted thousands of people from outside the area in
search of jobs. The influx has been overwhelming, owing
to the fact that the resources on the periphery of the park
were already under serious pressure from the riparian
communities. As the pressure on the area has increased,
the resources on the periphery of the CMNP have
dwindled, and illegal activities were transferred to the
park itself. An important part of the population is made
of immigrant workers employed by the logging company
Société Forestière de Campo, the Hevecam (rubber) and
the Société Camerounaise des Palmeraies (Socapalm)
(palm oil) companies.
The ERE-Développement study (2001) notes that
60.5% of the population in the TOU are engaged in
agriculture, 12% depend on salaries from various
institutions present in the area, 11.5% depend on fishing,
6% depend on official hunting (have hunting permits or
are legally recognised as hunters), and 10% live off small
business and trade. Agriculture is for subsistence, with
surplus produce sold on local markets. Hunting is the
predominant occupation of some communities, and
most animals (mammals, reptiles and birds) are killed by
guns or trapped. There is a vast influx of hunters from
communities outside the TOU.
Observations of the way of life of the indigenous people
have revealed that they are almost totally dependent on
forestry products for subsistence and, increasingly,
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income. All their economic activities are directly linked
to the extensive exploitation of the forest in which they
live and which is subject to many demands from others.
It is also the basis of their socialisation (Mope Simo
1998a, 2001; Hazeu et al. 2000).
Permanent dwellings have since sprung up in areas of
rich biodiversity in the park, and the roads constructed
by logging companies to ferry timber out of the
concessions are so close to the park that they serve as
access routes for poachers. Anti-poaching activities are
inconsistent and impromptu due to a lack of park
personnel and inadequate equipment for monitoring and
enforcement.
According to Fines et al. (2001), the fauna has a
substantial social, economic and cultural influence on the
livelihoods of the forest dwellers. Almost all animals
mentioned above are seriously threatened due to
commercial hunting practices. Several hunting tech-
niques are used, mostly short guns and traps. In the past,
animals were killed for subsistence and local con-
sumption. Both the Bantu and Bagyeli/Bakola com-
munities consider bushmeat to be their main source of
protein and, with the fluctuations in the prices of cocoa
in the world market over the years, the demand has
increased. Bushmeat has, therefore, become one of the
main sources of income to many hunters. Trade in
bushmeat has increased tremendously. Hunting activi-
ties are of major concern because many of the hunted
animals are endangered and the hunters submit that the
incidence of many species has declined rapidly over
recent years.
In this alarming context, and considering the
disadvantages inherent in the particular socio-economic
status of the indigenous people, the Cameroon Oil
Transport Company (COTCO) has taken action to
promote and develop the communities stretched out
along the pipeline. This was done through a specific plan
being implemented by the Foundation for Environment
and Development in Cameroon (FEDEC).
Socio-economic development in the face of increasing
and changing needs has direct and indirect deleterious
effects on the rich biodiversity in and around the CMNP.
This is because conservation and development are not
recognised by all interested parties as inseparable
strategies for the achievement of sustainable resource
management and local livelihood systems. Any exclusion
of local communities from the planning and ma-
nagement of the large areas of forest ecosystems has a
negative effect on their land and resource rights.
Land tenure, use and
conflict
It is the excesses of human beings that most threaten the
resources of the CMNP and its buffer zones on which
the local communities live. Be they excesses of greed or
excesses caused by deprivation, they are both
destructive. Where guarantees of intergenerational land
tenure systems are weak or absent, local communities are
less likely to pay attention to the management of natural
resources. The lack of outright title or long-term lease
increases the likelihood that cultivators will abandon land
after a while to search for more fertile land elsewhere.
Such farming practices contribute to unsustainable use
of the permanent and non-permanent forest estates.
Do other stakeholders in need of forests and cultivable
lands operating in areas adjacent to the park (mainly
timber companies and agricultural plantations) have
secure property rights and control over their lands? If the
answer to this crucial question is yes, then the local
populations living in the vicinity of the CMNP, most of
whom are poor, will not lodge complaints about the
expropriation of their land, and/or loss of the rights and
benefits embedded in their cultures. There is ample
evidence that prior to the establishment of the park, the
local people had such rights and freely enjoyed the
numerous benefits from their resources (Tropenbos
International 2002; WWF Cameroon 2002). Such is the
crux of the dilemma of land and resource rights in the
study area.
Protected areas and their surroundings are refuges of
tranquillity and peace, yet they are also places where
various types of conflicts occur. The CMNP rainforest is
among the most species-rich ecosystems in Africa and
provides a habitat for humans and wildlife, as well as a
source of livelihood for indigenous people. However,
vast areas are disappearing annually because of demands
for timber and new farmlands. Conservation of
biodiversity, shifting cultivation, collection of non-
timber forest products, production of timber in natural
forests, plantation agriculture, village and home-
gardening/animal husbandry, and sacred places are
some of the land-use types in the study site (Hazeu et al.
2000:21–31). However, timber companies realise that,
though renewable, the forest’s resources are finite, and
that harvesting methods and management plans should
be sustainable.
Land tenure systems
Land tenure institutions determine the rights and
obligations of individuals, local communities, corporate
bodies and the state with regard to access to land, forests,
water, and other natural resources; as well as the
distribution of benefits. Land tenure relationships are a
good indicator of social relationships in the wider society.
Traditional land tenure arrangements still prevail among
the original inhabitants of the study site. Although
encouraged by state policies, these are rapidly being
replaced by freehold land rights held by individuals or
corporations. A typical farm operated by an indigenous
or migrant farmer comprises a small perennial
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homegarden and a perennial tree-crop area of cocoa,
under the forest canopy. This is interspersed with fruit
trees and bananas, and a food crop area involving the
rotation of cropland with second growth forest cover.
Food production activities take place mainly within the
CMNP, where there is fertile soil. In any event, much of
the land was already used by the local populations before
the creation of the park in 2000.
The greatest confusion lies with land tenure arrange-
ments. The 1974 national tenure reform, favouring a free
holding system of individual and corporate private
property rights, has caused disruption of traditional
communal land tenure practices, but has not been able to
replace them.6 Local communities frequently contest the
state’s control over customary common property
resources, such as land and forest ecosystems. This
generates little interest in the local communities’
protection of forests and soils – even those that have
been classified as parks. The state agencies do not have
the capacity to do this by themselves (Mope Simo
2000:120–2).
Sustainable management of the CMNP and its buffer
zones cannot be achieved in the present circumstance of
an inappropriate land-tenure system or without the
security of common property regimes. This is a complex
bundle of overlapping and hierarchical rights, claims and
obligations in law.
Land use types
There is a diverse set of arrangements and laws by which
different users gain access to land and other forest
products. The relatively intense pressure on land and the
constant recourse to different access procedures are
linked to local social and economic systems.
Although some new areas are cleared in an attempt to
grow plantains and other food crops for the market,
peasants continue to clear fallows that they have farmed
in the past. This is because land clearance is easier in
secondary forest areas than in dense virgin forests. Local
level pressure on large-scale deforestation in the area
seems to be relatively low. An exhaustive and systematic
description of each LUT – including objectives; output;
markets; labour and capital input; the technology
involved; infrastructure needs; and scale of operations –
is not possible here but an outline of the different types
will suffice.
biodiversity Conservation
Up until 2002, when the Tropenbos-Cameroon Pro-
gramme wound up its activities in the country, the
CMNP was the core of the intervention zone. It has rich
and varied biodiversity, with many endemic plant species
and rare or endangered animals. This is the main reason
the park was proclaimed as one of the compensation
areas for the environmental damage related to the
implementation of the ‘Chad Export Project’ – which
included the construction of a 1000km-long oil duct
from Chad to Cameroon, ending 5km north of the
Campo-Ma’an area. Human actions had a severe ne-
gative impact on the enormous biodiversity. Conserva-
tion of diversity within species, between species and of
ecosystems is internationally recognised as a priority for
management and nature conservation. Conservation of
biodiversity in protected areas can and should be
complemented by efforts in other areas. Ecologically
sustainable production of timber and NTFPs provides
suitable habitats for many forest species (Fines et al.
2001:44).
Non-timber forest products
Two population groups living in the study area depend
on forest products for their livelihood. The first group,
with about 98% of the inhabitants in the area, consists of
Bantu villagers belonging to the Bulu, Fang, Bassa and
Ngoumba tribes. For them, the extraction of NTFPs is
complementary to agriculture. The second population
group consists of forest dwelling Bagyeli/Bakola pygmy
groups that have been rather mobile and marginalised,
despite the process of sedentarisation that they have
experienced (Biesbrouck 1999).
Notwithstanding the inducements of the Catholic
mission in Bipindi to modernisation and especially the
government’s sedentarisation policy, most pygmy
groups have not completely abandoned their traditional
way of life – dependence on the forest for physical,
social, material and spiritual survival (van de Sandt
1997:50). Most families have only settled for a limited
period, creating villages and their agricultural fields in the
forest at a considerable distance from the roads. Others
skilfully combine their former tradition with a more
sedentary lifestyle. For example, after the harvest period,
the families move back into the forest to practice hunting
for a short period of up to a few months. Even the
relatively permanently settled groups maintain close
relationships with their more nomadic family members.
These contacts provide them with an ‘exit’ option when
the sedentary living pattern becomes less attractive for
them (van de Berg 1994:3) Although some of the pygmy
communities are beginning to feel the effects of change
on their way of life, the vast majority of them are still
much more dependent on the forest ecosystem for
survival than the other, relatively more ‘developed’
ethnic groups described earlier.
It is clear that much of the vegetation structure and plant
species composition have not been changed as a result of
the opening of patches of land and the felling of selected
trees. Despite the presence of many logging concessions
in the study site, numerous culturally valuable trees can
still be identified. The sustainable extraction of NTFPs
by local people for subsistence and the local market
ensures the continued presence of forests near human
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settlements. A few highly valued products such as the
Irvingia gabonensis (bush mango) and Gnetum africanum
(eru), are commonly sold in the national and international
markets. For the latter, intermediates are involved in the
trade.
NTFP activities are relatively labour-intensive. Local
knowledge of species and ecology are required for good
selection and harvesting. The traditional division in tasks,
by gender and age, ensures that almost the whole
household participates in the collection of these forest
products. Because of the low intensity of extraction and
the wide array of species involved, this LUT contributes
to the conservation of genetic variation and habitat
protection of endangered species; erosion control and
watershed protection; as well as the regulation and
maintenance of ecological, physical and chemical
processes and cycles (Hazeu et al. 2000:22–4).
Production of timber in natural
forest
Timber is an important product in Cameroon.
Production in the park area covers harvesting as well as
the regeneration period of the forests. Resource
management is aimed at both presently traded timber
species and species that provide timber with good
technical properties but are less well-known on the
national and international markets.
According to Fines et al. (2001:45) the permanent forest
cover of the production forest contributes to regulation
and maintenance of many ecological, physical and
chemical processes and cycles (for example, microcli-
mate; hydrological and nutrient cycles; oxygen-carbon
dioxide balance; and protection against erosion). Timber
harvest and extraction should be based upon reduced
impact logging methods, and integrated into the sil-
vicultural management of the stands.
Shifting cultivation
Shifting cultivation is the most widespread agricultural
land-use in the CMNP area. Land is left fallow after a
maximum of three years, allowing the forest to re-
establish. Today, the traditional shifting cultivation cycle
is, however, gradually changing due to the use of chain
saws, limited available labour, and the scarcity of new
land in the vicinity of villages. More farmers are clearing
young fallows where they plant groundnut with macabo,
cassava, maize, potatoes, and yams, depending on the
capacity of the individual. The system of shifting
cultivation is adapted to the local environment and can
be a sustainable land use option, especially with a low
population density, such as in the study area. Problems
may however arise when changes occur in the socio-
economic environment. This is the case with more and
more logging companies asking for licences to exploit the
variety of woods, on the one hand, and the establishment
of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project on the other.
It has been observed that attempts to offer farmers
alternatives to shifting cultivation have failed, because of
inadequate understanding of the decision-making
processes involved. Certain factors determine the role of
shifting cultivation in the livelihood patterns of rural
people. Some researchers suggest that these factors be
identified and proposals made to the government,
instead of blaming the peasant farmers.
Plantation agriculture
The requirements for shifting cultivation are also
important for plantation agriculture. The types of
plantation agriculture considered here are cocoa, oil
palm, pineapple, and rubber (Hevea). These include large-
scale production of marketable agricultural goods. All
commercially-oriented plantations have a high require-
ment for hired labour. Cocoa produces dried beans sold
to local traders. The oil palm plantations produce palm
nuts for processing factories and the local market.
Rubber trees are tapped and the dried products sold to
local traders, while pineapples are sold fresh on the local
markets (Fines et al. 2000:30–1).
The government has many contradictory agricultural
policies. On the one hand, it is actively promoting
agricultural expansion for cash crop production and
export. On the other hand, it has sought to protect forest
and water resources by creating parks and reserves and
restricting access by customary peasant users. At the
same time, production in the peasant sector is
increasingly directed towards markets over which the
producers have no control. At the local level, agricultural
intensification; improved social services; clear and
equitable land tenure and resource rights; as well as
greater local participation in the protection and use of
natural resources are crucial.
The level of dependence of the local populations on the
land and natural resources – and its cultural significance
to them – remains high. Where access to land and forest
resources is relatively unrestricted, income generated
from the sale of other resources is important for poorer
groups and households within the different communities
(Mope Simo 2001:39–54). It is inconceivable, therefore
to plan for conservation of the natural resources without
putting the local people first.
Emerging conflicts
There is growing recognition that the successful
management of protected areas ultimately depends on
the inclusion of local people, who by virtue of the
numerous benefits they reap from the forest ecosystems
are rightly the principal stakeholders. Wanzie (1992:353)
concurs:
In areas where new protected areas are being developed,
local residents must not be cut off from access to resources
upon which they have depended for their livelihood. If they
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do not receive some benefits… there will certainly be
conflicts with the officials of the said protected areas.
Prior to the creation of the CMNP, the numerous Bantu
villages and most particularly the transhumant7 Bagyeli
pygmy communities had enjoyed virtually ‘unlimited’
rights and access to the natural resources in the present-
day park and its buffer zones. Evidence suggests that the
establishment of the park incurred restrictions on locals’
rights, without compensatory actions on the part of the
government (Tropenbos International 2002:5). The in-
digenous people still perceive the abundant forest
ecosystems and the buffer zones as belonging to them.
Legal exploitation is being carried out in the surrounding
area, which still has a considerable volume of commercial
timber.
Conservation of the highly diversified plants and animal
species found in the park and its environs is not effective
because of hunting/poaching, illegal occupation of land,
and habitat destruction and fragmentation through the
construction of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline. Recently,
the indigenous people are lodging complaints about their
deprivation and expropriation by wealthy and powerful
social actors (particularly the state) and the loss of vital
and rare medicinal plants.
By virtue of the exceptional biodiversity of the CMNP
and the adjacent areas, suitability for numerous land-use
types, the fact that it attracts different stakeholders, and
the setting up of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline project,
conflicts over land and resource rights are inevitable.
Moreover, unclear boundaries to demarcate the park
have become a frequent source of conflict with local
communities. It is, therefore, important to work with the
communities concerned, to agree and clearly mark the
limits of this newly-created protected area. Failure to take
concrete action will exacerbate horizontal and vertical
conflicts.
It is important to make a distinction between the
phenomena of horizontal and vertical conflicts in the
study area today. Some observers have described
‘horizontal’ conflicts – either between the same, or
sometimes between different social categories of actors
(Yobol et al. 1995:15–26). From my observations in the
study area, vertical conflicts occur between the state
apparatus (government) and more powerful stakehold-
ers such as the logging companies and agro-industrial
complexes.
Community forestry
The study revealed that the indigenous people living in
and around the CMNP do not have the institutional
means nor the capacity building skills to get involved in
the effective management of natural resources. Both
government and the local communities want economic
development in order to boost political stability and
improvement in the standards of living. Local
populations perceive conventional conservation ap-
proaches as holding them back, retaining huge portions
of the best natural resources and human beings in a sort
of primitive state. The social and economic values of
protected areas should be rationally used so that the
biodiversity is not destroyed by resident people (Mope
Simo 1998b:4).
The issue is which participatory approach will be most
beneficial and inclusive of the indigenous people who are
most vulnerable and powerless stakeholders,8 yet depend
heavily on the resources of the CMNP and its environs
for their livelihood and survival? There can be no
sustainable development without real land and resource
rights, especially for poor people. Community forestry is
an alternative approach to mitigate the loss of security of
tenure, rights and benefits by linking protected area
management with social and economic development in
local communities.
The lifestyle and cultures of local people are symbiotic
with nature. Their survival is directly at stake due to the
unregulated uses and destruction of the natural resource
base. It is therefore imperative that they participate in the
management of the resources around them, especially
within the protected area, because of the scope and
validity of their indigenous knowledge. Recognition of
the utility of people’s knowledge and its use are powerful
tools for enhancing communication and collaboration
between local communities and other forest managers,
for the empowerment of the communities.
In order to evaluate the sustainability of forest
management in a given environment, one of the first
steps is to find out who has the right and power to use/
manage any forest ecosystem. What local people know,
and how what is known is used in the context of natural
resource management, can be described as ‘authoritative
knowledge’ (Mope Simo 1997:60).
The methodology outlined above falls in line with a new
approach to forestry management in Cameroon – that is
community forestry. Community forestry seeks to:
involve all local people in the control, use and
management of natural resources
improve their living standards through various
social and economic activities
create awareness among local people
ensure that the local people have equitable access to
forest resources, which does not rule out a gender
dimension.
Community forestry initiatives therefore would consti-
tute all activities geared towards achieving any of the
abovementioned aspects of management forestry.
Community forestry does not only concentrate on the
management of forests and trees or the establishment of
community forests, but also focuses on the management
of wildlife. However, to ensure the sustainability of
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community forestry in Cameroon, it is necessary to
critically review some issues that could hamper the
progress and smooth running of community forestry
activities.
Almost all the projects and related organisations have
embraced community forestry as a participatory
approach that leads to the empowerment of local
communities; capacity building; as well as the equitable
and sustainable management of their lands and forest
resources in Cameroon. However, there are some
recurrent issues that need to be urgently addressed. If not
critically reviewed, these issues can hamper the progress
of community forestry activities. The most important of
these difficulties are: the ‘plan de zonage’; tenure rights
(in trees and land); alternatives to shifting cultivation; and
slow government administrative procedures (Mope
Simo 1998b:2–5).
THE ‘PLAN DE ZONAGE’
This is a macro-level planning exercise, which experience
to date shows is in conflict with local-level perceptions
and planning initiatives. Some organisations have
proposed a re-zoning exercise be conducted – this time
increasing the land available for community forest
establishment (Mope Simo 1998b:11–6).
TENURE RIGHTS
As discussed earlier, the national land law conflicts with
customary perceptions of rights and resources, and this is
often an obstacle to long-term and community
involvement in the planning of resource use. To resolve
this problem, government should review the national
land law and recognise traditional land rights (Mope
Simo 2001).
SHIFTING CULTIVATION
Some people hold that shifting cultivation is one of the
major causes of deforestation, but rural people have no
problems with this practice. In fact, the long fallow
rotation periods allow diverse and rapid growth of
secondary forests. This kind of cultivation by the local
population favours a rapid recovery of the natural forest
cover. Other views hold that because less than 20% of
primary forest is cleared for cultivation and very little is
converted into treeless plots, it has very little impact on
the forest. It is still not clear whether shifting cultivation
can directly be blamed for the high levels of deforestation
in Cameroon.
Conclusion
There are indications of a strong political commitment
by the government to conserve Cameroon’s biodiversity.
However, capacity, effective conservation and imple-
mentation strategies, with the necessary law enforce-
ment, are weak. This is in part due to lack of funds for
logistical support and the hiring and training of staff.
Limited government resources sacrifice ‘biodiversity
conservation’ in the face of other politically strategic
demands and national priorities. But the issue –
especially as it concerns the marginalised and minority
pygmy communities in the CMNP area – lies in the
reform or regularisation of property rights, including
land tenure, access to common resources and resolution
of land-use conflicts.
Sound policy is required for the preservation of
biodiversity, sustainable production of forest products,
secure land and resource rights, as well as subsistence for
indigenous people. It is important to develop long-term
solutions to the currently insecure land tenure rights of
the Bagyeli through extensive community consultations,
capacity building initiatives, and strengthening of
institutions. Over the years the plight of the Bagyeli has
been worsened by the domination of the different Bantu
ethnic groups and, in the recent past, by the Chad-
Cameroon Pipeline Project. Apart from the confiscation
of land, with rare species of medicinal plants and NTFPs,
the unusual noise from the sophisticated machines used
in the plantations has not only scared away some
endemic species of wildlife, but also polluted their
environment.
Any attempt to plan for the management of land and
forests in the CMNP and the adjacent areas that does not
involve the local communities directly and meaningfully
is bound to fail. Expressed differently, in order to involve
local people in long-term conservation and develop-
ment, the different interest groups will have to enjoy
greater use-rights and reap higher benefits than before.
The creation of the CMNP and construction of the
pipeline across the south Cameroon moist tropical forest
has further complicated the land and resources rights
claims of the forest people. On the one hand, they have
lodged complaints that the CMNP has drastically
reduced the land and forest from which they had been
deriving their livelihoods. On the other, construction of
the pipeline has destroyed the habitats for wildlife and
plant cover and is a threat to biodiversity.
The future of biodiversity conservation in the CMNP
area is inextricably linked to the welfare and livelihood
security of the local communities. Policy makers,
development practitioners and the scientific community
have given insufficient attention to the important social,
cultural, economic and political role that local people can
play in the protection and sustainable management of
protected areas, and the achievement of long-term sus-
tainable development.
To meet its responsibility for productive resources, the
government should undertake a comprehensive reform
of current land legislation. One way of doing this is by
developing a partnership system consisting of all
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stakeholders, including all social classes of rural people.
Local communities should be afforded the opportunity
to live according to their traditions in keeping with
sustainable management and conservation. In the face of
the ambiguities identified in the current land law, the
customary land tenure systems in which most local
communities have confidence must be adapted to suit
the changing social and economic circumstances.
1The author undertook the collection of primary data in
the study area between February and March 2001,
funded by the WWF Programme Office in Cameroon.
Unless otherwise noted, the other materials used resulted
from a review of secondary data in the literature on
management of biodiversity in protected areas estab-
lished in the country’s humid forest areas.
2The terms Bagyeli/Bakola are used in this paper in the
plural when referring to the pygmy communities that live
in the villages and camps adjacent to the study site.
3The term ‘interests’ is used throughout this paper to
mean people’s fundamental needs and concerns. Most
often such interests are violated or sidelined by more
powerful stakeholders, including the state apparatus.
4If hunting around the park is not well controlled, over-
harvesting of animal species will take place and have an
immediate negative effect on the animal populations
within the park, as hunters will hunt indiscriminately
inside the park if the animal densities are low outside the
protected area. (Tropenbos International 2002:8).
5In their dependent position the Bagyeli/Bakola peoples
suffer from injustice and discrimination. They are
frequently accused of theft and punished without fair
trial. For example, when a case is presented to a village
tribunal, the pygmies concerned are treated with
prejudice from the outset. Besides, various sanctions
such as fines, have disproportionate effect on them
because, apart from the quick money they can earn from
the sale of bushmeat, they have relatively little cash
income.
6The national land law conflicts with local traditional
perceptions of land and resources rights, and this is often
an obstacle to long-term and community involvement in
resource use planning. To achieve a solution to this
problem the government should review the 1974
national land law and make it possible for the different
customary land tenure arrangements to be recognised
(Mope Simo 2000, 2001).
7According to Professor Loung, a Cameroonian expert
in pygmy studies, many observers often mistakenly
describe the life style of the Bagyeli pygmies as nomadic
instead of transhumant (see Dyson 1992:220).
8As Mary Dyson (1992:215) rightly argues, the vul-
nerability of indigenous people can be described and
predicted most simply as a consequence of the loss of
natural forest, which is their social, economic, and
cultural environment.
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This paper examines the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (Nepad) in the context of its strategy for
dealing with the rights of the rural and urban poor to land
and other resources, taking note of institutions created to
tackle these issues, their strengths and limitations. In
doing so, it describes and analyses the origin, context and
structure of the regional initiative. Furthermore, the
chapter examines how the strategy deals with food
security issues in the context of the concern of the
African poor. It also discusses the roles of civil society
organisations (CSOs) and the challenges they face in
actualising the rights of the poor to land and natural
resources under the regional framework. Finally, the
paper charts a land initiative for the regional agenda.
The Nepad initiative represents a bold step by African
leaders to design an alternative path for Africa’s
sustainable development. Premised on good governance
and democracy, and Africa’s ownership of the de-
velopment process, the initiative is a remarkable
departure from previous efforts. Yet, the projects and
strategies for actualising its objectives remain general. In
particular, the initiative has no clear-cut measures and
institutions for tackling the land and resource crisis that
lies at the root of numerous wars in Africa. Prolonged
droughts across sub-Saharan Africa are drying up most
sources of water like oases, shallow wells and ponds on
which the majority of African poor depend for drinking,
irrigation/agriculture and livestock. As a result, women
and children trek long distances in search of clean water,
while food production continues to decline. In the urban
slums where the poor live, the prevalence of pit latrines
is polluting shallow wells and underground water,
causing outbreaks of water-borne diseases like cholera
and diarrhoea. Urbanisation has also forced most of the
urban poor to the fringes, where the development of
satellite estates accentuates their landlessness.
Furthermore, increasing urban-rural migration is
exerting pressure on land and other natural resources. In
turn, this breeds new conflicts over land, as individuals,
families and communities reclaim lands previously
loaned or sold. Externally-driven economic reform
polices are precipitating land privatisation and spe-
culation, setting the state on a collision course with
indigenous people over their resource rights. The re-
sultant landlessness particularly hits the rural poor who
subsist on land. Reclaiming of wetlands for farming, as a
survival strategy among the rural poor, has also extended
the frontiers and caused more ecological crisis. All this
casts doubt on the commitment of the architects of
Nepad to the land question in Africa.
However, after the Group of 8 (G8) Summit in Kanaskis,
Canada in June 2002, the Nepad process entered a new
phase. The G8 reiterated the Nepad message; that Africa
should finance its development, and that the initiative is
about partnership, not aid per se. This has posed severe
challenges to the Implementation Committee of the
Heads of State, forcing it to begin to engage professional
bodies, civil society groups, national governments, and
international donor agencies, to formulate projects and
modalities for implementation. The committee has
created various task forces to tackle specific projects
under Nepad, using existing relevant continental, sub-
regional and national institutions, civil society groups,
and international organisations.
As the discussions on the regional agenda move from the
general to specifics, one of the challenges before the Pan-
African Programme on Land and Resource Rights
(PAPLRR) Network, among other land and resource
rights-based civil society groups, is how to take
advantage of the lacuna in the strategy document to
advance resource rights of the rural and urban poor. The
second section of this paper examines the origin,
DOES NEPAD ADDRESS THE LAND AND
RESOURCE RIGHTS OF THE POOR?
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structure and content of Nepad. The rest undertakes a
preliminary evaluation of the Nepad framework and
strategies for dealing with land and resource rights of the
rural and urban poor; the role of civil society and
advocacy for land and resource rights under Nepad; and
concluding remarks.
The Nepad Initiative
At the end of the 1990s, Africa’s economy was at a critical
juncture between total disintegration and reconfiguration.
For four decades, Africa’s efforts at development have
yielded marginal positive returns, with the majority of
Africans worse off than they were at independence. With
decaying infrastructure, health and the HIV/Aids
pandemic, nutritional problems and a worsening general
trend of food insecurity, Africa’s economic growth rate
was 1.5% in 1999. This was even worse than the 1980s
when an annual growth rate of only 1.8% was recorded.
Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in Africa fell to
US$716 in 1993 from $806 in the 1980s (World Bank
2000). Africa’s agricultural production declined from an
annual growth rate of 2.9% in the 1960s and 1970s to
–2.4% in the 1990s. Africa, which exported food in the
1960s with a food self-sufficiency ratio of 102 that
declined to 75, has become a net recipient of food aid.
Arable land per capita declined from about 2.5ha in the
1960s to less than one hectare in the 1980s with no sign
of recovery, and with negative consequences for food
security (see Omoweh, forthcoming). The quantum of
official development assistance to Africa was $17.2
billion in 1990, which fell to $12.3 billion in 2001.1
While several studies trace the causes of Africa’s
economic malaise to colonialism, corruption, inadequate
technical assistance, unfavourable trade regimes, lack of
skilled management, among others, there are few studies
that have demonstrated that the greatest impediment to
Africa’s development is politics. As Claude Ake (1996:1)
rightly remarks, ‘the problem is not so much that
development has failed as it was never really on the
agenda in the first place’. If Africa is to matter in the
international community, there is a need to reconceptualise
the African crisis as less than purely economic, re-
cognising the political dimension, while emphasising a
holistic approach.
This partly informs the ‘African Renaissance’ vision of
the South African President, Thabo Mbeki. In a
profound speech he gave in 1998, Mbeki declared that
the African Renaissance project was key to Africa’s
success in the 21st century. From that point, post-
apartheid South Africa seeks to play a major political role
in southern Africa and Africa, and indeed, the world.
Mbeki’s speech, however, triggered off mixed feelings
among scholars, political leaders and activists across
Africa and the international community. While Taylor
and Nel (2002) saw the project as almost transforming
Mbeki into a philosopher-king, Melber (2002) submitted
that it provided a new basis for policy formulation. At the
same time, President Abdulahi Wade of Senegal
launched his own initiative, the ‘Omega Plan for Africa’.
By the time President Mbeki briefed the World Eco-
nomic Forum on the ‘Millennium Partnership for the
African Recovery Programme’ (MAP) on 28 January
2001 in Davos, Switzerland, there was a gradual de-
emphasis of the concept as it entered into international
discourses on African development. The MAP
document was the product of a process that started in
1999, when the presidents of South Africa, Nigeria and
Algeria were empanelled by the extraordinary Org-
anisation of African Unity (OAU) Summit in Sirte, Libya
to seek the total cancellation of the continent’s debt. At
the South Summit in Havana, Cuba, in April 2000, the
three African presidents were authorised to convey
Africa’s debt cancellation pleas to the G8 Summit in
Okinawa, Japan, in July of that year. At the OAU Summit
in Lomé, Togo, in July 2000, the ‘trio’ was mandated to
prepare MAP.
The draft MAP was presented by the South African
government at the May 2001 Conference of Ministers of
the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
(Uneca) held in Algiers. It was at the same meeting, that
President Wade of Senegal presented his Omega Plan.
According to Wade, the Omega Plan was ‘a practical
initiative for overcoming Africa’s economic difficulties,
while MAP was more of a manifesto’. While the Omega
plan was largely a technical reduction of the challenges
facing Africa, MAP was a much more comprehensive
attempt to bring the developmental challenges into a
historical, cultural and economic framework. Idiosyn-
cratic factors among African political leaders have always
undermined the feasibility of a continental development
strategy. As Taylor and Nel (2002) rightly noted, it took
hard bargaining to prevent Wade’s insistence on his
Omega Plan from sabotaging African unity before it
even began.
At the Algiers meeting, it was agreed that since the
documents were similar they should be merged and
submitted to the next OAU Summit in Lusaka, Zambia.
At the Lusaka Summit of 12 July 2001, the MAP and
Omega Plan were fused into the New African Initiative
(NAI), which the Heads of States meeting adopted. An
Implementation Committee of Heads of States was
constituted at that meeting, with President Olusegun
Obasanjo (Nigeria) appointed as chairman, and
President Thabo Mbeki (South Africa) and President
Wade Abdulahi (Senegal) as members. The inaugural
meeting of the Implementation Committee was held on
23 October 2001 in Abuja, Nigeria, where it was agreed
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development would
replace the NAI. The Nepad document drawn up at that
time is the original text which embodies the philosophy;
objectives; priorities and implementation modalities of
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the initiative – pending the conclusion of ongoing
consultations with individuals; national governments;
civil society groups; regional organisations and de-
velopment agencies – in the hope of improving the
regional agenda and possibly arriving at a revised version.
The initial ambiguity about the relationship between the
OAU (now African Union, AU) and the Nepad initiative
was slightly redressed by Jacob Zuma, Vice President
of South Africa, in a speech delivered at the Third
African Development Forum on 2 March 2002 in which
he endorsed the new regional agenda as an OAU/AU
document. The thrust of the document is that Africa’s
developmental strategy must not be im-posed. Nepad
seems to be the final appellate of the initiative as there has
been no opposition to this term since the Implementa-
tion Committee met in Abuja on 30 October 2002.
At the G8 Summit (Genoa, Italy, 2001), the member
states endorsed the NAI, renamed Nepad. The G8
appointed partner representatives, known as the Action
Group Plan for Africa (AGPA) charged with fashioning
programmes flowing from the Nepad agenda, which
each member country would support. This was further
discussed at the G8 Summit in June 2002, in Kanaskis,
Canada. To date, the G8 has identified five project areas
for support under the Nepad initiative. These are:
education and health (United States of America); trade
and investment (Germany and France); conflict
resolution and good governance (Britain); good
governance (Canada); and foreign aid (Japan). Not only
were Belgium and Russia yet to identify project areas, but
none of the pledges made at the summit had been
honoured by December 2003. The European Union,
however, is opposed to the request by the Africa Group
to adjust its Common Agricultural Policy, because its
priority is to sustain the policy and projects of the
member states in the agricultural area. This partly
explains the absence of agriculture in the G8 project
areas.
Nepad’s long-term objectives, as contained in the
document (Articles 174–88) are to eradicate poverty in
Africa; place the continent on the path of sustainable
development; and promote the role of women in all
activities. Its short- and medium-term objectives are to
strengthen mechanisms for conflict prevention, resolu-
tion and management; promote and protect democracy
and human rights; restore and maintain macro-economic
stability; institute transparent legal and regulatory
frameworks for financial markets; revitalise and extend
the provision of education and health – especially HIV/
Aids, malaria and communicable diseases; promote the
development of infrastructure; and give impetus to
Africa’s development so it can catch up with developed
parts of the world.
These objectives are intended to enable Nepad to
achieve its set goals of recording and sustaining an
average GDP growth rate of 7% yearly for a period of 15
years, as enshrined in the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) (see Article 68). Other goals of the plan
are to reduce the number of people living in extreme
poverty by half between 1990 and 2015; to enrol all
children of school-going age by 2015; to reverse the loss
of environmental resources by 2015; to provide re-
productive health services for all who need them by
2015; and to reduce infant and child mortality by two-
thirds between 1990 and 2015. The association of
Africa’s goals with those of the MDGs is welcome.
However, the greatest obstacles to achieving these goals
are: the time frame – as evidenced in Nepad having just
three years to implement strategies for sustainable de-
velopment expected to end in 2005; and how to generate
the US$64 billion needed annually to implement the
projects.
Regarding management of the Nepad process, the Heads
of States and Government Implementation Committee
(HSGIC), chaired by President Obasanjo, with Pre-
sidents Buteflika of Algeria and Wade of Senegal as vice-
chairpersons, is tasked with directing the initiative’s
affairs. The committee, composed of membership
drawn from all the sub-regions of the continent, meets
once every four months. Its basic functions include
marketing of the regional initiative, aimed at generating
support for its projects within and outside of Africa; and
mobilising financial resources for implementing their
objectives. The HSGIC was initially composed of
representatives of Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and
South Africa. To allay fears of domination by a few
countries, 10 other African countries were appointed to
the committee on the basis of regional representation.
They are Botswana, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gabon, Mali,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sao Tome and
Principe, and Tunisia.
Though the Peer Review Mechanism was not originally
on the agenda, the concern raised by the G8 about the
crisis of leadership in Africa compelled Presidents
Obasanjo, Mbeki and Wade to consider creating a
modality for African leaders to censure each other where
necessary. This was the origin of the African Peer Review
Mechanism (APRM). It is about a voluntary accession of
members of the African Union (23 members at the time
of writing) to offer themselves for political peer review.
All indications are it is still government-led – raising
questions as to why people and civil society were
excluded from the process leading to its formation, given
that African political leaders are at the root of the African
crisis.
The Nepad’s temporary secretariat is located at the
Development Bank of Southern Africa, headed by an
interim chief executive. The HSGIC created task forces
to deal with specific issues under the Nepad agenda. For
this purpose, sub-committees were established to deal
with the following priorities: Peace and Security, chaired
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by South Africa with Algeria, Gabon, Mali and Mauritius
as members; Capacity Building for Peace and Security
with the AU as the lead institution; Economic and
Corporate Governance under the leadership of the
Economic Commission for Africa; and Infrastructures,
led by the African Development Bank. Africa’s central
banks are charged with maintaining financial standards.
The task force on Agriculture and Market Access is to be
led by the AU. There is no task force on land.
The African ‘Strategy for Achieving Sustainable De-
velopment in the Twenty-first century’ is contained in
Chapter V of the Nepad document (2001) as follows:
1) Conditions for Promoting Sustainable Develop-
ment. These include the Peace, Security, Democ-
racy and Political Governance Initiative; the
Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative;
and the Sub-regional and Regional Initiative, but all
are discussed in general terms. The Peace, Security,
Democracy and Political Governance initiatives
(Articles 71–8) have had African political leaders
pledge to work, both individually and collectively, in
promoting these principles in their countries, sub-
regions and the continent (Article 71). In particular,
they agreed to promote long-term conditions for
development and security, building the capacity of
African institutions for early warning, and the
capacity to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in
Africa.
2) Democracy and Political Governance Initiative.
This is contained in Articles 79–84. African political
leaders have undertaken to respect global standards
of democracy. The core components of democracy
include political pluralism; multi-political parties;
workers’ unions; and fair, open and periodic free
democratic elections (Article 79). This initiative is
aimed at strengthening the political and administra-
tive framework for upholding the principles of
democracy, transparency, accountability, integrity,
respect for human rights and promotion of rule of
law (Article 80). These initiatives are supported by
the Economic Governance Initiative (Articles 85–
98) to eradicate poverty and build capacity for
development. The initiative will rely on a task team
from the ministries of finance and central banks,
charged with reviewing economic and corporate
governance practices in the various countries and
regions. It will make appropriate recommendations
on standards and codes of good practice for
consideration by the Heads of States and
Government Implementation Committee. It will
also sustain the commitment of participating
countries to create and consolidate governance
processes and practices, and foster good governance
and institutional reforms. The institutional reforms
will focus on administrative and civil services;
strengthening parliamentary oversight; promoting
participatory decision making; adopting effective
measures to combat corruption and embezzlement;
and undertaking judicial reforms.
3) Sectoral priorities. These include Infrastructure
Gap, Human Resource Development, Agriculture,
Environment, Culture, and Science and Technology
initiatives (Articles 99–146). African governments
have been unable to reverse the objective of the
colonial powers of building infrastructure to foster
exportation of African raw materials and importa-
tion of industrial goods into Africa (Article 102).
Therefore, the intention of bridging gaps in in-
frastructure under the Nepad process is to construct
roads, highways, seaports, railways, waterways and
telecommunication facilities that are sub-regional
and continental in focus (Article 99). This will
enhance the transportation of agricultural products
between sub-regions in Africa, thereby helping to
reduce food insecurity.
4) Agriculture Initiative. This notes the setbacks
facing the industry – such as climatic uncertainty;
instability in world commodity prices; institutional
weakness; and inadequate support for rural
development from national and bilateral/multilat-
eral donor agencies (Articles 132, 134–7) – and
recognises the need to overcome these constraints
in order to achieve food security [Article132]. In
June 2002, the HSGIC requested the United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)
in Rome, Italy, together with ministries of agri-
culture in Africa and other relevant agencies, to
fashion detailed projects for Nepad. The product of
this effort is Nepad’s Comprehensive African
Agricultural Development Programme (Nepad-
CAADP) (Nepad-FAO 2002). The major objective
of this programme is to increase agricultural
production, bring more land under cultivation
through irrigation, and ensure food security in
Africa. This is discussed in more detail below.
5) Environment Initiative. This recognises the need
for a healthy and productive environment as a
critical condition for the success of Nepad,
especially in boosting agricultural production and
food security, thereby helping to reduce poverty
(Article138). In particular, the eight sub-themes of
the initiative emphasise arresting desertification
(rehabilitating degraded land), conservation of
wetlands and cross-border areas, preservation of the
ecosystem, management of the coastline, global
warming, environmental governance, and the
financing of all these (Article 141). Under the
Culture Initiative is a concern to protect and
effectively utilise indigenous knowledge that
represents a major dimension of the continent’s
culture, and to share this knowledge for the benefit
of humankind (Article 143). This implies sustaining
traditional ways of managing the environment
(inclusive of rights over resources in Africa, though
not explicit in the document). The Science and
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Technology Initiative is aimed, among other things,
at generating a critical mass of technological ex-
pertise in targeted areas that offer high potential,
especially in biotechnology and natural sciences
(Article 145). Part of the action plan to accomplish
this objective is to work in concert with the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or-
ganisation (Unesco), the FAO and other interna-
tional organisations that will help conserve Africa’s
biodiversity and indigenous knowledge by improv-
ing agricultural productivity and developing phar-
maceutical products (Article 146).
6) Mobilising Resources Initiative. This is aimed
particularly at capital flow and market access
(Articles 147–73). The Capital Flow Initiative (Ar-
ticles 147–55) is aimed at achieving the 7% annual
growth rate needed to meet the MDGs and, to
accomplish this task, Africa needs US$64 billion.
Some of this is to come from domestic savings and
public revenue collection, but a greater proportion
has to be sourced externally. Part of the external
funding for Nepad is expected to come from debt
reduction (which should reduce poverty) and
official development assistance; the rest will come
through capital flows from the hope that good
governance will create the right environment for
more foreign investment in Africa.
The Market Access Initiative, especially the sub-section
on the diversification of production (Articles 156–8),
notes the vulnerability of Africa’s primary production
and narrow export base and recognises the urgent need
to diversify its economy and promote linkages between
the agricultural, manufacturing and service sectors. Its
objectives are: to improve agricultural production,
paying attention to small-scale and women farmers; to
ensure food security for all people; to ensure en-
vironmental sustainability; to integrate the rural poor into
the market economy; to make Africa a net exporter of
agricultural products; and to become a strategic player in
agricultural science and technology (Article 157).
The action plan to realise these objectives at the
continental level includes: increasing the security of
water supply for agriculture by establishing small-scale
irrigation facilities; improving local water management
and exchanging expertise in this area with the
international community; improving land tenure security
under traditional and modern forms of tenure and
promoting necessary land reform; and establishing early
warning systems for monitoring droughts and
anticipating failure in crop production. At the
international level, new partnership schemes are to be
developed to address donor fatigue for individual, high
profile agricultural projects; promote access for African
food and agricultural products (especially processed
products); to meet international standards; and to
support investment in the research of high-yield crops,
among others (Article 158).
For the sub-section on tourism, its objectives include,
but are not limited to, the identification and development
of key projects at the national and sub-regional levels
with capacity to generate spin-offs that could deepen
integration schemes in Africa (Article 163). As part of the
strategy to actualise this and other objectives, African
countries are encouraged to enter into joint tourist-
related activities. The basis for the new global
partnership is contained in Articles 174–88, with the
implementation strategies being spelt out in Articles
189–203.
An initial reading of the document conveys a bright
future for Africa, as Africans are expected to own and
fund the development with little support coming from
the developed countries and donor agencies. This,
perhaps, endeared the document to the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
the EU and the G8 countries. However, with the
increasing role that the Bretton Woods institutions have
come to play on the continent, through their economic
reform projects that have seen ‘adjusting’ economies
worse off, Nepad may not be the last strategy. Many
more will follow with the same result. Nepad’s obsession
with neo-liberal economic reform heightens the
pessimism of the policy framework. The major driver of
the initiative, the African state, has been indicted for
working in tandem with foreign capital to sustain the
underdevelopment of Africa in the past. Is Nepad not
another false start? (See Omoweh 2003.) An evaluative
analysis of the regional initiative’s attempt to address the
quest of the rural and urban poor for land and resource
rights is necessary.
Nepad and land and
resource rights
Across Africa, the land question – including the agitation
by the poor for rights to land and other natural resources
– was too glaring not to be addressed in the Nepad
document. By 2000, the Zimbabwean government
renewed its forceful seizure of land from the minority
commercial white farmers, although its land reform
policy and redistribution did not favour the poor peasant
farmers, but the elite, as had been described in earlier
literature (Moyo 1995). In Ghana, the reform of the
forest did not redress the rural farmers’ rights to timber
in their farmlands (Amanor 2002). In Nigeria, the
Mineral Act of 1914, refurbished as the Land Use Act of
1978, still vested land and its content in the state. In
Niger, the lack of clean water resulted in the multiple use
of the 40ha pond at Allimboule (by people and animals),
and the filth generated in the process has constituted a
health hazard to the people (Haroun 2003). Primary
water was already commercialised in Africa as evidenced
in the sale of a bucket of well water at 5 CFA2 (less than
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US$1) in Niger3 and 25 CFA in Central African
Republic.4 In Uganda, the national rural water coverage is
about 55% and the urban coverage 6%, and yet less than
10% of the urban population is linked with sewers and
the rest use pit latrines (Museveni 2003:28). Studies have
shown that – contrary to expectations of the state that
land registration and titling will enhance security of
tenure, increase collateral and generate investment in
agro-business in Africa – the rural poor lost more lands
to the urban elite and their rights over land were
appropriated.5
Furthermore, the African state is itself at the root of the
land crisis on the continent. In the 1960s and 1970s,
agitation for land and resource rights was minimal
because of the authoritarian nature of the African state.
Like its predecessor, the state exercised absolute
ownership of land and other natural resources because it
furthered the process of surplus extraction in the African
agrarian economy. With agriculture as the mainstay of
the African economy, the continent was relatively self-
sufficient and a net exporter of food.
The changing global context, especially since the 1980s
and through to the 1990s, moved rural and agricultural
development in Africa into a new phase. Rural and
agricultural development was increasingly commercialised
partly because of externally-driven economics. With the
reforms came privatisation of lands and natural re-
sources, leaving the rural and urban poor particularly
vulnerable. The growing population also heightened the
pressure on land, resulting in declining hectares of
farmland per capita. New cases of land disputes emerged
and old ones were renewed: over village boundaries and
trans-border natural resources; individual claims and
counter-claims of titles over land; between families and
clan members over rights of inheritance; rural and urban
dwellers over multiple sale of the same plots of land;
between rural dwellers and governments over rights to
minerals, forests and water; and between communities,
governments and foreign investors over forceful
acquisition of lands for real estate, commercial
agriculture and tourism; between peasants and
pastoralists over rights to grazing lands; between the state
and indigenous people over natural resources/protected
areas; and between men and women over the right of
inheritance. The economic crisis closed off many
livelihood options for the majority of Africans, and the
emergence of the structural adjustment programme of
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund
further weakened the state.
The clamour for a return to traditional methods of land
and resource management, because they held a greater
prospect for the security of tenure for the rural poor,
began to gain ground. The land question and possible
ways of resolving it were integrated into the initial
development projects of countries that gained political
independence in the 1980s, such as Zimbabwe. But, the
‘willing buyer-willing seller’ clause in the Lancaster
Agreement largely halted the land redistribution process
in that country until 1990 (Moyo 1995). After the civil
war, the Ethiopian state began to show concern for the
teeming landless rural poor, which explained its efforts to
incorporate equity into its land reform and redistribution
projects. All this was aimed at incorporating the land
matter into its democratisation projects, though with
limited success. In Tanzania, the Land Bill passed by
Parliament in 1997, which sought to redress security of
tenure and resettlement schemes among others, was
initially well received, but was later opposed by growing
smallholder resentment because of political patronage.
There were female gender-biased land reforms in
countries like Uganda in the 1990s, where the diminished
rights of women to own land and their rights to transfer
the same were gradually redressed. Customary land law
still denies women rights to land and resources in most
African countries. Tenure security for smallholder plots
is key to increasing agricultural production, food security
and sustainable livelihoods in rural areas, yet the
discussions for optimal tenure arrangements still revolve
around land registration. Land and resource rights are
not tackled from the perspective of social, political and
economic relationships and as outcomes of the processes
of negotiations, but unfortunately as rules, regulations
and movement. This was the context of the land crisis in
Africa when the regional initiative, Nepad, was launched
– a context that called for the need to broaden the
perspective on the land question, especially land and
resource rights of the African poor.
Yet, Nepad has no specific strategies for tackling the land
and resource rights among the rural and urban poor to
resolve the broader land question in Africa. Rather than
treat land as one of the pillars of the regional agenda, it is
either mentioned in passing or implied in the initiatives
on agriculture, environment, culture, energy, mining,
tourism, market access, water and sanitation, and
diversification of Africa’s productive base.
As noted, the agriculture initiative recognises the need to
overcome constraints of the sector in order to achieve
food security in Africa, but only discusses land in the
context of arresting the trend of decreasing farmland due
to man and technology. To avoid the current situation of
relying on rainfall in order to bring more lands into
cultivation, the strategy is emphatic about government’s
support for private investment in irrigation (Article 135).
Furthermore, the Nepad-CAADP is aimed, among other
things, at tackling food security and increasing agri-
cultural production with long-term positive implications
for poverty reduction. Planned for the period 2002–
2015, the programme is based on four pillars. These are:
1. Extending the area under sustainable land
management and reliable water control (new and
rehabilitated) to 20 million ha, with an estimated
investment of US$37 billion.
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2. Improving rural infrastructure and trade-related
capacities for market access, for which an estimated
US$92 billion will be required.
3. Increasing food supply and reducing hunger by
increasing the productivity of 15 million small farms,
at an estimated cost of US$49.5 billion.
4. Agricultural research, technology dissemination and
adoption totalling US$4.6 billion.
An annual investment estimated at US$17.8 billion will
be needed for the major activities under the four pillars,
with a significant part coming from Africa, and the
remainder as official development assistance (Nepad-
FAO 2002).
The authors of the Nepad-CAADP seem more
concerned with safety nets and emergency-related food
and agriculture than a long-term approach to collective
self-reliance in Africa’s agricultural development. It is
not clear how the rural and urban poor will benefit from
the programme, in spite of the central role of the rural
farmer to food production and food security on the
continent. As its authors rightly noted, the CAADP is not
a blueprint, but only a proposal, awaiting further
refinement to suit the African situation. Irrigation
schemes are not new to traditional agricultural practices
in Africa, particularly in the water-stressed belt where
rural farmers apply their indigenous knowledge as a
coping strategy.
However, what is new about the kind of irrigation
schemes driven by external forces and in whose mould
the CAADP is cast, is yet another collaboration between
the state, FAO and foreign agro-capital to engage in
mechanised farming of export crops, not food crops. In
the process, the majority of the rural farmers will be
dispossessed of their already declining farmlands. For
instance, the Geriza irrigation project was aimed at
boosting cotton production, funded by the World Bank,
IMF and African Development Bank. To execute the
project, the state first dispossessed the majority of rural
Sudanese farmers of their farmlands before the forces of
state-transnational capitalism turned them into daily paid
workers in the plantations, deepening their misery in the
process.
All this has cast doubt on the real intentions of the
CAADP, rooted as it is in the neo-liberal approach of the
FAO to food and agricultural production. Hence, the
programme’s strategy for making more land available for
agriculture is not pro-peasant farmers. For a programme
that needs an annual investment of US$17.9 billion and
with a larger part being sourced externally, it is doubtful
if the rural poor farmers will be part of the 15 million
small farms expected to help reduce hunger in Africa. It
is little wonder that land and resource rights of the
African poor are not addressed under the comprehen-
sive agricultural framework of Nepad.
As environmental resources, land and other natural
resources like water, forests and wetlands ought to have
been expressly dealt with under the Environment
Initiative, but this is not the case. In spite of the fact that
the success of the eight priority areas of this initiative are
intricately tied to the question of land and resource
rights, this is profoundly lacking in the initiative
document. The basic problem with the degradation of
the environment in Africa centres on the state. As
landlord, the state believes it cannot be sanctioned for
polluting the environment. Because it colludes with
foreign capital in exploiting land and minerals with
reckless abandon, it shields capital. Shell and other oil
companies’ pollution of the environment of the Niger
Delta of Nigeria is a good example.
All this explains, in part, why Nepad has no clear strategy,
nor a framework for enforcing environmental go-
vernance in Africa. Good governance would require
democratising the process and structure of governing
environmental resources, entailing having to deal with
the various locales of power and authority (individuals,
families, clans, communities, council, state and national
governments) and the redistribution of power over high-
value environmental resources. It would mean adopting
the ground-up approach to the governance of en-
vironmental resources in Africa as opposed to the
current top-down way of doing things. Environmental
governance, especially in the context of land, forest and
water rights, might require a constitutional approach, in
which case the rights of the poor to these resources will
be enshrined in national constitutions. In a situation
where the state leads constitutional reforms on its own,
rather than in co-operation with civil society, it is unlikely
that the rights of poor people over environmental
resources will be ensured constitutionally. For example,
in Nigeria, people overwhelmed members of the
Presidential Constitutional Review Committee with
demands to repeal the Land Use Decree of 1978, but the
state has kept the law in place on the grounds that it is in
the national interest to maintain the status quo.6 The
existing undemocratic structure and repressive politics
of African states will suffocate ground-up environmental
governance, posing serious challenges for CSOs.
The Culture Initiative of the Nepad document is
emphatic about the need to protect and effectively use
indigenous knowledge, implying its concern for the
involvement of people in the process. This is significant,
given the agitation for a return to traditional land tenure
systems and resource management. But there is nothing
in the document that expressly deals with the rights of the
poor, especially at a time when the power of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is gaining
ground. If the architects of the regional strategy were
concerned with furthering the cause of the rural and
urban poor over land and resource rights, they would at
least refer to the instrumentality of WIPO.
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Increasing pressure from externally-driven economic
reforms to commercialise water is making water one of
the most contested economic resources between people,
the state and foreign capital. One of the basic concerns of
the rural and urban poor is secure access to potable
water. But this cannot be achieved, partly because of the
state’s collaboration with powerful local and foreign
interests to commercialise water. This reduces the access
of the poor to water, and makes it unaffordable. Not
surprisingly, the Water and Sanitation Initiative, as
contained in Article 116 of the Nepad document, merely
mentions the rights of the poor to clean and safe water.
It is only in the initiative on diversification of Africa’s
narrow production base that Nepad comes close to
addressing the needs of the rural poor. The document
recognises the need to integrate the rural poor into the
world economy. It also shows concern for improving
land tenure security under traditional and modern
systems. At issue is not just the recognition of the need to
enhance traditional land tenure systems, but the absence
of a carefully designed framework in the document to
achieve such a goal. The rural poor have long been
incorporated into the world economy through ruthless
exploitation, first under colonialism and now under
globalisation, that the concern now is whether further
integration into the global capitalist system will improve
their well-being. Nepad lacks a clearly defined frame-
work to deal with this issue.
Civil society advocacy
What kind of advocacy initiatives should civil society
organisations engage in to further the concerns of the
African poor for their rights to land and resources under
Nepad? Nepad is a land initiative, because the African
economy is land-based. However, the state remains
suspicious of CSOs, as evidenced by the exclusion of the
CSO sector from the initial processes leading to the
formulation of Nepad. This is all the more so with regard
to volatile issues like land and resource rights.
However, recognising criticisms of Nepad, coupled with
the challenges the G8 posed to African political leaders in
June 2002, the Implementation Committee decided to
engage CSOs, such as the African Business Group, to
help initiate new projects and modalities for their
implementation. The state is not breaking new ground,
unlike NGOs which opposed economic reform policies
and projects of the Bretton Woods institutions, and
which provided input for alternative development
approaches. Nor is the state democratising, as it still
stifles NGOs critical of its policy, while supporting the
friendly ones.
Previous efforts by Africa’s civil society groups and sub-
regional land networks to help redress the diminishing
access and rights of the poor to land and other natural
resources were not very successful. This was because of
the resistance of various governments to collective land
reform and redistribution. Other constraints are the
irreconcilable interests of the domestic and external
forces over the land and natural resource question, lack
of funding, and varying levels of awareness among land
NGOs. The proposed Land Initiative, described below,
deserves the support of all concerned organisations and
individuals.
A pro-poor land initiative
PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK
The state’s appropriation of the people’s rights to
develop themselves amounts to a negation of those who
are the means, agents and end of development itself – the
very principle of all forms of development. The path the
African states took to exploit land and other natural
resources reinforces alienation rather than promoting
self-reliance among the people. African leaders have
preferred keeping people dependent rather than making
them self-reliant in the way natural resources are
governed, because promoting self-reliance involves
sacrificing control. Self-reliance in the context of
resource exploitation is about equity and the production
of resources to sustain the development process, taking
cognisance of the poor as well as concerns at the
household, community, federal, national, sub-regional
and continental level. Destroying or not inculcating a
sense of self-realisation in the exploitation of natural
resources disempowers people. The proposed Land
Initiative therefore has to be people-driven so as to cater
for the interests of the rural and urban poor, recognising
that the elite will oppose it.
CONTEXT
Land and natural resources are too central to the African
development process to be treated lightly or ignored in
the Nepad initiative. Africa’s huge resource endowment
accounted in part for its colonisation by the imperial
powers. The struggle between domestic and external
forces to retain or regain access to these resources
continues after independence. About 75% of Africa’s
population is rural-bound and lives off land, com-
plemented by fishing, crafts, logging and exploitation of
other natural resources.
Unfortunately, land and other natural resources have
come under stress, largely as a result of a combination of
domestic and external forces. The inability of the African
state to reproduce itself has compelled it to rely on
foreign financial assistance. The state’s neo-liberal
approach to the crisis of landlessness among the rural
and urban poor has reduced its ability to arrest the
decline in rural and agricultural development. The
reckless exploitation of natural resources by the state and
foreign capital is crippling the capacity of the
environment to regenerate itself. With the exception of a
few countries like Uganda, where pressure by women’s
groups to have title to land has gained ground, most
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women have no title to land in most African countries.
The search for fuel wood among the rural poor has,
together with prolonged drought, deepened desertifica-
tion. Access among the urban poor to safe and clean
water is deteriorating, while in the rural areas people
continue to walk long distances in search of water. Lack
of rain in Africa’s water-stressed regions is retarding food
production, thereby increasing the number of food-
insecure people across the continent.
Incessant agitations by the rural and urban poor,
including the indigenous people, for rights to land, water,
forests and wetlands have – rather than precipitate pro-
poor land reforms and redistribution – seen elitist land
policy remain in place. The rural poor have had their
lands appropriated by the urban elite, the state and
foreign capital. The legislative and institutional
frameworks for managing land and natural resources are
still controlled by the state, with little or no input from
civil society. Plural legal systems governing land and
natural resources still impede efforts to improve security
of tenure. Advocacy to have the rights of people
entrenched in national constitutions has been rebuffed
by the political class. Even then, there are no assurances
that ‘constitutionalising’ the rights of people over land
and resources will benefit them.
Strategies and stakeholders
Democratising governance of land and natural
resources. This is aimed at promoting equitable
redistribution of land, and the security of tenure for lands
and other environmental resources in favour of the
people. It provides a rigorous basis for dealing with
resource wars. The stakeholders include the govern-
ment, environmental CSOs, community leaders, peasant
farmers’ associations, livestock producers, traditional
loggers, local hunters, youth farmers, sand diggers, and
community-based organisations. They should debate
and dialogue over land and resource rights from the
grassroots to national, sub-regional and continental
levels.
Sustaining indigenous knowledge-based land and
resource management and conservation. The objective
here should be to protect indigenous knowledge of land,
resource and environmental management, community-
based farming systems in which the rural farmers have
competence, while accepting the role of appropriate
technology. Stakeholders include indigenous people,
civil society groups, community-based organisations,
peasant farmers, local herders, and the various age
groups involved in natural resource management who
should enforce compliance with traditional resource
conservation measures.
Upholding traditional land tenure and security. This
strategy should aim to empower the rural poor to resist
appropriation of their right and access to land and
resources by the state, the elite and capital. It ought to
conceive of the peoples’ rights to land and resources in
the context of social and cultural relationships and as a
result of negotiations, not administratively, through rules
and laws. The strategy should uphold the customary rules
and norms, and institutions governing land and other
natural resources. Stakeholders include indigenous
people, settlers, families, communal leaders, peasant
farmers, civil society groups, government, capital,
lawyers, traditional institutions and sociologists who
should discuss land and resource issues at proposed
‘community land forums’.
People-oriented land policy. The aim of this should be to
support the rural and urban poor by redistributing land in
their favour; protect vulnerable groups like women at the
household level, thereby promoting gender equity; and
check the scope of urban development to empower the
urban poor through rights and access to land and basic
amenities. Stakeholders include poor people, govern-
ment, foreign capital, civil society groups, women,
youths, traditional rulers, and community-based
organisations.
Concluding remarks
In spite of the initial criticisms levelled against Nepad, the
initiative is gradually being internalised across Africa and
emerging as the continent’s blueprint for development.
This poses a major challenge to the stakeholders – a
challenge of helping to formulate new projects and
modalities for implementation to facilitate the regional
development agenda.
Regarding the rights of the rural and urban poor to land
and other natural resources, the document is deficient in
terms of practical steps, modalities and an enabling
policy framework or relevant institutions. In particular, it
has no land initiative, despite the agrarian nature of the
African economy. Part of the strategy for redressing the
concern of the African poor to land and resources could
be a mass-driven Land Initiative, premised on the full
engagement of relevant civil society organisations, the
state and the poor people. This is very important, given
the existing undemocratic nature of the African state and
its anti-people stance on land and resources. Hopefully
that the wave of democratisation blowing across Africa
will impact positively on this. Herein lies hope for the
right of the African poor to land and resources.
1 Abstracted from World Bank 2000.
2 Communauté fiancière africaine franc.
3 Haroun 2003:9.
4 Ekomo-Ikoli 2003:26.
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5 See, for instance, Platteau 1995.
6 See, The Report of the Presidential Constitutional
Review Committee, Abuja, 2001.
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Across its length and breadth, Africa is undergoing a
process of unprecedented and fundamental change. The
West African Long-term Perspective Study (WALPS –
published as Brunner et al. 1995) was conducted in the
mid-1990s and led by the Club du Sahel documents the
important changes affecting this part of the continent.
According to the study, the dynamism of the informal
economy sector is leading west Africa towards sub-
regional integration. This is expected to lead to
tremendous social and economic change. The study
concluded that, by 2020, millions of west Africans from
the poorest regions of the Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and
Niger), will leave their countries and settle in the
wealthier regions (mainly Ivory Coast, Ghana and
Cameroon); and the informal sector will continue to be
the main employer in African economies, a trend
observed since the 1960s. An emerging class of urban
and rural informal sector entrepreneurs will change the
face of west Africa forever.
One of the main findings of  WALPS, of interest for land
researchers, was that west Africa will become in-
creasingly urbanised over the coming decades (Table 1).
Table 1: WALPS projections
1960 2020







Urban population 14% 40%
Rural population 85% 15%
Source: Elaborated from WALPS data.
This raises the role of land in west Africa’s development.
African land researchers seem to focus on the
commodification and scarcity of rural land. These
phenomena have been linked on the one hand to
increasing population in most countries in spite of HIV/
Aids, and to the degradation of the environment in
traditionally poor regions on the other. Another factor
contributing to land scarcity is free migration – within a
country (from the north to the south); outside a country
(from inland countries to countries on the coast); as well
as forced migration (war refugees). This makes land a
major social, political and economic issue. A last field of
interest for west African land researchers is the
accelerating pace of urban development, accompanied
by a continuous conversion of rural farming land into
urban land.
West African land researchers also focus on signs of a
serious land crisis linked to national policies; support of
large-scale farms; and the development of new rural
businesses to the detriment of traditional family farming;
and increasing land conflicts. Moving from local and
national issues to inter-state and even sub-regional
issues,1 the emerging and newly structured movements
of popular resistance towards governmental land policies
– and in particular urban policies – is giving a new
political dimension and significance to most land
conflicts in the subregion.2 It is a real challenge for
African researchers to understand and explain the social
changes and to formulate development alternatives.
Unfortunately, one can note that land research in west
Africa is weak and has poor links with national policies.
There is a clear need to strengthen locally-driven
research and to build new and innovative approaches for
land security, based on national land policy dialogue
processes and involving all key land stakeholders
Based on the outcomes of the Comité permanent Inter
États de lutte contre la sécheresse dans le Sahel (CILSS)
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Praia conference in 1994 on land and decentralisation,
researchers from the Sahel formulated new approaches
to land policies and legislation based on:
the promotion of principles of justice, peace and
equitable access
the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity;3
responsibilities on land issues are shared between
the state and other institutions
the promotion of framework laws on land instead of
long, technical and detailed regulations.
In order to take on the challenge, African research and
training on land issues must play an important role in the
design of a realistic, efficient and appropriate approach
of securing the land rights of rural people. What role can
African land research play in assuring efficient land
policies and in promoting land management based on
principles of justice, equity and fair governance on the
continent?
In this paper I attempt to answer this question through a
discussion on the state of research and training on land
issues in Francophone West Africa; the link between land
research and public policies of development; and the role
of different parties in the issue of land.
Research and training on
land
Francophone West Africa has only a small number of
academic institutions and research projects involved
specifically in training and researching land issues. The St
Louis conference (Senegal 1995) on training and re-
search on land issues in the Sahel region demonstrated
that the most dynamic research centres on land issues in
Africa are situated in the North, in institutions known as
‘Africanist’ (France, The Netherlands, Great Britain and
the United States). The findings of the few research and
teaching institutions that show an interest in land issues
in Francophone Africa have not been widely publicised.
As a result, academic production is scarce and generally
limited to supervision of masters’ theses, and as an
exception, to doctoral theses in Senegal.
A 1999 survey by the author on research on land issues in
Francophone West Africa showed that there is no
consistent academic bulletin dedicated to land policies
and legislation. As a result, the African land issue has
almost no influence on the ongoing national and
international debates on land policies for developing
countries. The survey demonstrated that training options
on land matters were also very limited. West African
universities do not offer courses on land issues. Major
constraints on the development of indigenous land
policy research are management challenges in university
research programmes, and the lack of development of
local private research institutions.
And last but not least, one should not underestimate the
fact that the situation of poverty in which researchers
find themselves heavily handicaps research itself. It is
time to challenge the increasing tendency of the African
research community to succumb to the financial lure of
consultancy projects.
Recent progress has been seen with the development of
action-research and the setting up of African land
networks such as LandNet West Africa. Action-research
was initiated mainly by NGOs involved in practical
activities in the communities. The action-research
process is based on a good understanding of local
dynamics. An interactive process allows NGOs to
improve their reflections on field experience and thereby
learn to improve their practice on the basis of better
knowledge generated from their own experience. NGOs
are increasingly able to analyse local management ex-
periences of natural resources and to report on good
local practices, as well as find appropriate solutions for
sustainable and participative management of these
resources.
It is through action-research that new options on
securing land have emerged – for example, promoting
local conventions and taking pastoral land rights into
account. However, action-research not conducted by
professional researchers has its limitations, particularly in
terms of the methodology used and the relevance of
some analyses. Some NGOs drift into practices that are
neo-missionary when they decide for local communities
or impose on communities by making their assistance
conditional.
The professional or occasional researchers of the south,
taking the opportunities offered by short-term con-
sultancies, have often been able to contribute to re-
vitalising reflections on land policies.4 However, in spite
of the quality of data collected and the relevance of the
preliminary analyses, there is seldom any possibility of
developing this work into research programmes.
Collaborative research projects involving research teams
from the North and the South make an important
contribution to the development of research in Fran-
cophone Africa. These collaborative research projects,
funded by Northern-based donors, have helped in
formulating new understanding of African land issues at
various levels. For example, they have questioned co-
lonial references to land and assisted the understanding
of the conflict between the illusion of modern state law
and the mirage of ‘customary’ law. Collaborative re-
search projects showed, for instance, that instead of so-
called customary land rights being presented as static,
they are dynamic and progressive local land practices that
can adapt to the fast-changing social and economic
context.5
However, researchers of the South should critically judge
their participation in collaborative research projects,
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since they are sometimes not used as real scientific
partners but as front partners for fundraising purposes.
Southern researchers are only occasionally involved in
the formulation of research topics. They may be involved
in the data-gathering phase, but are often marginalised
during analysis of the results.
Research and development
policies
West African land research activities are not really link-
ed to national and sub-regional development policies.
Budgets allocated to research are trivial and do not allow
for independent research projects to be conducted. As a
result, local research institutions depend only on outside
funding for their programmes. The field of social
sciences and the tradition of joint research are not well
developed in Francophone West Africa and, as a result,
the meagre funds that are available are not used to their
full potential. The small amount of research funding
allocated by states and the African sub-regional
institutions reflects the low priority these institutions give
to local research.
The marginalisation of west African research can partly
be explained by the constant tension felt by African
decision makers between, on the one hand, the urgent
need for the implementation of development policies
and, on the other, the need for researchers to establish
the role of research as necessary for sound medium- to
long-term development planning. African decision
makers do not seem to fully realise the role research has
to play as a driving force for development. Few decision
makers at the national level or at the sub-regional level
refer to local research to understand constraints on
policy implementation. African decision makers usually
prefer co-operating only with national or international
consultants, whose proposals are not always based on
deep knowledge of local situations and the social and
political stakes. The lack of publication of African
research also contributes to its marginalisation. Very few
academic journals are published on a regular basis and
some journals are no longer being published. At the same
time, publishing in international journals is not easy for
budding researchers who are not yet known.
Because they do not encourage local research, decision
makers find themselves unable to formulate policies
based on up-to-date, qualitative and sound knowledge.
They have to rely on research initiated and done by
researchers from the North or accept, without challenge,
key policies imposed by international institutions.
Foreign funding may influence the outcome of research.
The role of African research is therefore diminished and
it does not assist politicians to understand issues and
make better decisions.
Finally, one should not forget to mention the crucial
issues of academic freedom and independence of
African researchers. Deprived of national funding, local
research has to adapt to the agendas of big international
institutions in order to survive. Many African researchers
have become professional consultants to make a decent
living. Paradoxically, despite the democratisation pro-
cess, there is suspicion and even hostility from politicians
towards the academic community and researchers.
Independent work, usually critical, is mostly viewed as
hostile towards political authority and is interpreted as a
lack of trust in official policies. The researcher would
then have to face political repression. Others prefer to be
silent or leave for research centres in the North (France,
but increasingly, Canada and the United States).
The role of the different
parties
It is not an over-statement, but is nonetheless pro-
vocative, to argue that land issues in Africa are too
important to be left to researchers only. This is not meant
to under-estimate the contribution of research in the
definition of land policy options, but only to reposition
the issues.
Research on land has made progress in understanding
local land issues and the analysis of customary rights to
land. Unfortunately these findings do not result in
enhanced research capacity, nor proffer solutions for
secure land tenure for rural communities. The answers
do not come from decision makers and international
development institutions either. Interesting operational
approaches have been initiated by NGOs, but their pilot
projects have been limited by poor links with official
policies and legislation. Defining appropriate and
efficient approaches to securing land remains a challenge
to African researchers. African civil society has to focus
on creating new space at local and national level for
policy dialogue on land issues. It is a matter of urgency to
promote the synergy between the knowledge of
researchers, the political will of decision makers, and the
abilities of local NGOs. In particular, the research
community is challenged in its capacity to communicate
efficiently with the other actors of social change. How
then can researchers promote their findings in a com-
prehensible form in order to empower civil society with
sharp lobbying arguments?
Substantial progress can be achieved by the promotion
of participative democracy in the process of designing
land policies and laws. The practice of participative
democracy is essential for African development, in
particular the formulation and implementation of
efficient land policies. The land systems in specific
countries are a converging result of social dynamics,
power struggles and compromise negotiations between
the different land stakeholders. In the rural societies of
west Africa, several forces are acting at the same time –
namely very powerful local authorities; internal and
external migration dynamics; and active young people.
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State land legislation has not been effective in ensuring
enhanced security on the ground – clearly legislation is
not enough in itself.
There cannot be a single ideal land reform model ap-
plicable to every country. The ideal land reform in each
African country is a search for a balance between the
different specific interests of the various stakeholders.
Today, three main social bodies are dealing with land
issues with specific strategies: the state, local rural
communities and the private sector. However, local
communities may have divergent interests, as case
studies on local land conflicts demonstrate.
In many countries of Francophone West Africa, the state
inherited colonial legal principles, which claim the
monopoly for ownership of land through the es-
tablishment of a ‘national land estate’. The Francophone
West Africa state aims at controlling the use of land in
order to guide beneficiaries towards rational land de-
velopment as well as an increase in agricultural
production.
In its development ambitions, the state is confronted by
rural communities who claim ancestral ownership of
land. Claiming the legitimacy of their presence on the
land, the communities contest the state’s monopoly on
the land. The communities and their traditional leaders
want to keep their traditional power over land and want
to get the social (tutorial system),6 political (electorate for
traditional leaders) and economic (control of part rent)
benefits.
However, the local communities are affected by internal
conflicts related to the appearance of new rural land
stakes, such as the saturation of the rural areas; rights
being claimed by women, young people and pastoralists;
and the surge of migrant farmers and refugees.
The private sector is a new major party, which has played
an important role for the last few years. This sector is
made up of business people who want to make profit by
investing in land speculation or farming. The private
sector has formed an alliance with the state and has
caused conflicts with local communities by also forging
alliances with traditional leaders.
All these dynamics could lead the west African sub-
region to a serious land crisis. Such a crisis could have
enormous social and political consequences. These
dynamics have to be managed, renegotiated and
channelled towards an elaborate consensus on an
appropriate land policy for each country.
What role can research play in the construction of such a
national consensus on land policy? It is the duty of
research to establish what the dynamics are. Land
research must demonstrate the specificity and legitimacy
of the interests on land claimed by all parties involved –
the state, rural communities and the private sector.
Research should also be able to verify whether claims are
legitimate.
Can research go further than formulating issues and
proposing solutions? Research should not take on a
different role. The results of qualitative research on land
issues have power to influence policies. If research is to
keep its traditional role of knowledge generation and
understanding, it must avoid the false claim that it can be,
or is, neutral. Research fulfils its duties when it chooses to
work with hypotheses that are compatible with values
like equity, justice, peace and citizenship, and which con-
tribute to the fight against poverty. It is up to research to
clarify the ongoing dynamics and trends, to analyse them,
and to identify the appropriate assumptions to face the
current challenges. It is also the role of research to
critically review land laws and regulations and to question
their relevance and effectiveness.
One should also question the validity of participative
institutions that are supposed to ensure that all parties,
mainly local communities and peasant organisations, are
involved in the formulation process of land policies and
legislation. Today, it is politically correct in Francophone
West Africa to state that all local communities should
participate in the land debate, as well as the imple-
mentation and follow-up of policies and legislation on
land and natural resources. In practice, what is really
done to ensure participation at these levels?
In west Africa, participation is supposedly achieved
through so-called ‘validation’ workshops – where pro-
jects are presented, discussed and amended before they
are sent to the relevant authorities for approval. The idea
of these workshops is to hand projects that have already
been approved by the parties to decision makers. This is
a real change in practice. A decade ago, decision makers
considered the concept of a participative democracy to
be heretic. This change would be perfect if it implied that
all parties were involved efficiently in the discussions.
Indeed, the representatives for local communities are
generally designated by the local administration. Farmers
who are invited to these national workshops are not well
informed. The lack of information, as well as the fact that
the workshops are in an official language (French),
deprives the local communities of actively participating,
given that most farmers do not have a good command of
French.
The participation of rural community representatives in
national debates on land policies is effective and
productive only if they have access to independent,
representative and functional institutions. The strength-
ening of these organisations must not aim at getting them
to agree with the opinions formulated by researchers or
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at supporting NGOs. It should aim at giving the local
communities tools to appreciate the issues in a critical
manner. The strengthening of local community organi-
sations must also allow these communities to formulate
their own views, based on their specific interests.
In order to strengthen the capacity of local communities
for efficient participation in national debates on land
policy, there is need to build national land alliances
composed of researchers, civil society and representa-
tives of local communities.
The twenty-first century is a time when ideas are the main
strength of societies. African land research must meet
the standards of international land research and promote
African views on how land policies should be formulated
and implemented.
1The land crisis in the Ivory Coast is only the tip of the
iceberg in the west African sub-region.
2In Burkina Faso, for example, the 2001 and 2002 riots
were against the non-transparent process of housing
estates (protest march to the Moroh Naba Palace,
traditional emperor of the Mossi people) or against the
urban restructuring of the city centre (riots in the areas
cleared for restructuring).
3This means certain issues are only dealt with by local
authorities who are competent to do so.
4One can quote, for example, the work done in Burkina
Faso or Mali on land securitisation.
5Numerous studies have been done on land transactions
and local conventions.
6With the tutorial system, the beneficiary of a customary
settlement has to comply with the legal obligations of the
transaction as well as social obligations that recognise
and secure the land relations (obligation of acknow-
ledgement, assistance and solidarity). If these obligations
are not respected, the land transaction can be cancelled.
Bibliography
Brunner, J, Henninger, N, Deichmann, U & Ninnin, B.
1995. West Africa Long Term Perspective Study. Washington
DC: World Resources Institute, in collaboration with the
Club du Sahel, Paris.
LAND RESEARCH, POLITICS AND ADVOCACY: THE FRANCOPHONE WEST AFRICAN EXPERIENCE
110




for land and resource rights
112
SECURING LAND AND RESOURCE RIGHTS IN AFRICA: pAN-AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES
113
NATIONAL LIBERATION, LAND




Land reform in post-national liberation southern Africa
has been a failure. Factors both external and internal to
the countries in the region are responsible for this.
Among the external factors are the narrowing of political
and economic choices in a global context where neo-
liberalism has become the dominant force for change,
and of the strength of multilateral institutions (the World
Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and,
increasingly, the World Trade Organization) in dictating
the terms of reform. Internal factors include the
weakness of independent progressive civil society; the
political trajectory and class leadership of the national
liberation movements; and the internal balance of forces
at liberation and beyond. Nevertheless, an organised
response is emerging from the grassroots. While this
remains fragile, it has the potential to instigate a more
radical transfer of land than has been witnessed to date.
These factors will be explored in Mozambique,
Zimbabwe and South Africa to reveal the situation of
land reform in these southern African countries,
emerging responses and implications for change in the
region.
Each of the three countries experienced national
liberation in significantly different contexts. Mozambique
gained political independence in a period when
‘development’ was still associated with heavy state
intervention that was a feature both of the Stalinist
countries and the Western capitalist countries.
Zimbabwe achieved political liberation in the midst of a
growing global economic crisis where the World Bank
and IMF were using their power to impose structural
adjustment programmes (SAPs) on ‘developing’ coun-
tries. The SAPs were designed to restructure the location
of subordinate economies to fit into the newly emerging
global division of labour and trade regime. South Africa,
in turn, experienced national liberation in the era of the
consolidation of neo-liberalism as the hegemonic
political project after the collapse of the Stalinist bloc at
the end of the 1980s.
Mozambique is primarily rural in character, with more
than three-quarters of the population living in the rural
areas at independence, and marginal to the global
economy. In contrast, the Zimbabwean and South
African economies were far stronger with larger
industrial bases. Nevertheless, Zimbabwe also had more
than three-quarters of its population living in the rural
areas (Roussos 1988:59) and land was one of the key
issues for the national liberation movement. Even in
South Africa, nearly half the population continues to live
in the rural areas, although this can be seen as ‘displaced
proletarianisation’ rather than a true reflection of the
economy. Because of the relative strength of their
economies and their greater integration into circuits of
global capital, the post-liberation governments in
Zimbabwe and South Africa had greater international
pressure exerted on them to conform to the require-
ments of global capital.
The agrarian structure
before liberation
In each of the three southern African countries under
discussion, a political and legal dualism was evident in the
agrarian structure, with a complex but unified economic
structure (O’Laughlin 1996:15). White settlers occupied
high quality land out of proportion to their numbers and
the indigenous population was pushed into reserves
managed by tribal authorities subordinated to the
colonial administration. The indigenous tenure system
was distorted in these areas, tended to exacerbate gender
inequality in access to land and resources, and was
subject to numerous transformations aiming to serve the
interests of the white oligarchies at various times. In each
case, the tenure system was established on the basis of
forced dispossession through a series of wars between
the settlers and the indigenous population – a process
that was completed in all three countries by the 1890s.
Subsequent legislation merely legalised the division of
land resulting from these wars. Policies and laws, the
construction of private property rights for the settlers,
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and the restructuring of land tenure systems were in-
terconnected with colonial accumulation strategies
(Tshuma 1997:22). Political and legal dualism served to
integrate the oppressed rural population into a unified
economic system premised on migrant labour. Insecure
access to land performed the function of reducing wage
costs for mines, industry and commercial farmers by
allowing an element of subsistence production to com-
plement artificially low wages.
Unlike in Zimbabwe and South Africa, the peasantry in
Mozambique played a dominant role in agricultural
production prior to independence (Wuyts 2001:3). The
majority of the indigenous population remained on the
land, but with insecure tenure, under conditions of
forced labour and subordinated to the needs of the
extractive colonial economy (Wuyts 2001:2). As such, the
peasantry depended for survival on wage labour,
combined with household agricultural production, and
was thus tied into the capitalist economy as a migrant
labour force (O’Laughlin 1996; Wuyts 2001).
In Zimbabwe and South Africa, land dispossession was
more extreme, with the majority of the indigenous rural
population either living in reserves or working as landless
labourers on white commercial farms. In Zimbabwe,
white farmland constituted 47% of the rural land, while
in South Africa this was in excess of 87%. The
overcrowding and poor quality of the land made it all but
impossible for the African rural population to generate
agricultural surpluses. This was compounded by artificial
constraints imposed on the African peasantry, such as
taxes and lack of access to marketing facilities (Thede
1993:102). Nevertheless, most of the population in the
communal areas relied on the land for at least part of their
subsistence.
In both countries, as a result of heavy state support and
protection from competition, the white commercial
agricultural sector made a significant contribution to the
economy. The direct share of agriculture to gross
domestic product (GDP) was between 13% and 18% in
Zimbabwe in the years leading up to liberation in 1980
(Roussos 1988:52). In South Africa, it stood at only 4–5%
of total GDP. However, in both cases, backward and
forward linkages into manufacturing and other sectors of
the economy made agriculture’s overall economic
contribution far more significant.
Contrary to the tendency to view access to land primarily
as a rural issue, lack of land for residential and even for
small-scale (but not necessarily agricultural) productive
purposes in urban and peri-urban areas was and is a
major issue. In South Africa housing policies at the
height of apartheid (1962–77) curtailed building pro-
grammes in African townships, with the aim of relocating
the ‘surplus’ urban African population to the ‘home-
lands’, with a particularly negative impact on African
women (Hart 1987:3). De facto land occupations led to the
mushrooming of informal settlements, especially with
the loosening of ‘influx controls’ from the 1980s onward,
showing the rapidly escalating demand for residential
land near the urban areas. Land disputes since the end of
the war in Mozambique in 1990 have centred on the
densely populated areas around Maputo (Lahiff &
Schoones 2000:16). In Zimbabwe urban areas have also
seen their share of land occupations in the past two
decades (Marongwe 2002:41–2).
In Mozambique and Zimbabwe, the national liberation
struggles took the form of guerrilla war aimed at
establishing liberated zones in the rural areas. As such,
the peasantry and rural villagers formed the backbone of
support for the liberation movements, and the return of
the land was a key mobilising point in the struggle. In
contrast, South Africa’s national liberation struggle was
rooted in the urban areas, especially among the industrial
proletariat. While the African National Congress (ANC)
and the Congress movement – ANC/Congress of South
African Trade Unions (Cosatu)/South African Commu-
nist Party (SACP) alliance – had mass political support in
the rural areas, this was never converted into an
articulated demand for land or an economic programme
of rural transformation. In the urban areas, there was a
high expectation that the post-apartheid government
would immediately address the housing crisis and pro-
vide access to residential land.
Post-independence land
reform
The changing global context fundamentally shaped the
approaches adopted by the new ruling classes in each of
the three countries.
Mozambique
Mozambique achieved independence in a period when
‘development’ focused on building large-scale infrastruc-
ture with heavy state involvement in the economy. On
coming to power Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
(Frelimo) chose to adopt a statist development model –
centralising planning and capital, and establishing a state
monopoly over the distribution of goods. This included
the nationalisation of the land, made easier because white
landowners abandoned the land (although not without
first stripping the assets) after the collapse of the fascist
regime in Portugal. Frelimo established state farms and
made an effort to set up peasant co-operatives. Both
these strategies failed, for reasons detailed elsewhere (see
O’Laughlin 1996; Lahiff 2000; Wuyts 2001). Changes in
land ownership did little to alter the conditions under
which the majority of peasants laboured. At the same
time, growing international competition and the
increasing inability to contain global capital within na-
tional borders saw the decline of the statist development
model (Binns 1994:64). Internally, military and economic
destabilisation directly and indirectly by Rhodesia (now
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Zimbabwe) and apartheid South Africa brought the rural
economy to a halt in the 1980s (see Davies 1993;
O’Laughlin 1996; Lahiff 2000).
These factors forced Frelimo into making compromises
in order to survive. In 1983, it shifted to a strategy of
‘market socialism’ that saw a rapid increase in support for
private commercial farming, and the distribution of
some state farm land to multinationals, individual
commercial farmers and some peasants (O’Laughlin
1996:3). At the end of 1986, in line with global trends, the
adoption of an IMF-backed SAP extended and
consolidated these developments (O’Laughlin 1996:3;
Davies 1993:82–3). Poorer (mainly women-headed)
peasant households were marginalised in the process (O’
Laughlin 1996:32). Donor support for the richer pea-
santry and private farmers made this worse (Wuyts
2001:11). The overall result of the economic reforms was
the accentuation of social differentiation and a new wave
of peasant dispossession (Lahiff 2000:5).
A process to reform land policy followed the peace
agreement in 1992, culminating in the passing of a new
land law in 1997. Under the new law, land remained the
property of the state, with communities, individuals or
companies only gaining use rights. Use rights could be
transferred but not sold or mortgaged, and were
established on the basis of occupancy or through grant
by the state of a lease of up to 100 years. Formal title
could be provided to communities and groups, and
verbal evidence was to be acceptable in a court as
evidence of community occupation. If communities or
individuals occupied the land for more than 10 years,
they would be entitled to permanent use rights without
requiring title documents. The rights of local com-
munities were to be addressed before any title was given,
and communities were required to participate in the
administration of natural resources. The rights of women
were theoretically recognised, although references to
customary law and customary occupancy remained
(Lahiff 2000:6–7).
Zimbabwe
A ‘politically moderate’ Zimbabwe was seen by the West
as a key to regional stability after the rise of liberation
movements to power in Mozambique and Angola
(Thede 1993; Bond 1998). Pressure from these imperial
powers was combined with that from destabilisation-
weary Frontline States to encourage Zanu-PF (Zimba-
bwe African National Union Patriotic Front) to make
concessions and reach a political resolution with the
white oligarchy (Tshuma 1997:38). The political and class
background and interests of the leadership, lack of
mobilisation of the peasantry during negotiations, and
acceptance of nebulous British offers of support for a
land reform programme also contributed to compromise
(Thede 1993:100). The resultant Lancaster House agree-
ment ensured the sanctity of private property rights for at
least 10 years after independence, with land reform
taking place on a ‘willing buyer-willing seller’ basis with
compensation to be paid in foreign currency.
Despite continually increasing official targets for re-
settlement throughout the early 1980s, less than 3.5% of
rural land had been transferred to the African population
by 1990 (Tshuma 1997:70). This was partly the result of
the adoption of a ‘home-grown’ structural adjustment
policy from 1983 that saw the state devalue the currency
and reduce its budget deficit, resulting in the reduction of
the land reform budget (Roussos 1988:69; Tshuma
1997:55). The state itself engaged to some extent in
productive activities, although nowhere near the levels of
Mozambique. A small number of state farms produced a
range of commodities, and the state controlled markets
and prices for a number of key crops including grain,
cotton, dairy and meat. Subsidies to marketing boards
also increased significantly after 1980, especially for
maize and beef (Roussos 1988:61–7).
Economic growth in the first years of liberation was
steadily reversed from 1982, with the poorest sectors of
the population hardest hit (Thede 1993:104). In the face
of growing balance of payments deficits, the government
adopted a development plan in 1986 that constituted a
major acceptance of IMF objectives. It prioritised deficit
reduction and debt service, cutting state spending in
social services, increasing support for capital-intensive
production, promoting the rapid increase in exports, and
creating more favourable conditions for foreign
investment (Thede 1993:105). There was a related shift in
emphasis in the land reform programme from re-
distribution of commercial land to the reorganisation and
increased productivity of the communal areas (Roussos
1988:68; Thede 1993:102). This incorporated support
for a ‘master farmer’ class of producers (Tshuma
1997:95–6), and a contradictory relationship between the
state and the chieftancy. While formal power was trans-
ferred to elected district councils, chiefs retained an
important role in land administration and management.
This ‘neo-traditionalism’ was used to mobilise political
support and legitimacy in the communal areas (Tshuma
1997:89). While peasants retained rights to use of com-
munal land, these rights were only secure in relation to
other peasants but not in relation to the state, which held
ownership of communal land and had the right to
remove those living on it if it so decided (Tshuma
1997:139). Therefore, tenure insecurity persisted in the
communal areas.
In 1990 the government formally adopted the Economic
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). The
Constitution was amended in 1990 and the Land
Acquisition Act was passed in 1992, finally putting to rest
the Lancaster House limitations on compulsory ac-
quisition of private property by the state. However, this
happened in the context of the neo-liberal shift that
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placed the market at the centre of development. Black
private accumulation, frowned upon in the early days of
socialist rhetoric, received official blessing under the new
dispensation. The new laws therefore established the
conditions for the state to facilitate – ‘hot house fashion’
– black bourgeois and petty bourgeois accumulation in
the agrarian sector and elsewhere (Tshuma 1997:134).
The criteria for access to land shifted from landlessness
to ‘capability’ and ‘productivity’. However, the economic
reforms benefited mainly the white commercial farmers,
offered little new investment to black smallholders, and
did nothing to redistribute land, water and infrastructure
(Moyo 2002:7). This failure set the scene for the re-
emergence of land reform on the agenda of the peasantry
and the government alike, especially as the negative
economic and social impacts of ESAP began to be felt.
South Africa
In South Africa a purely internal settlement saw the
permanent inscription of the sanctity of private property
rights in the Constitution. After just two years the
government formally adopted a neo-liberal macro-
economic stance and more recently a regional and
continent-wide agenda aligned to the global neo-liberal
political project (see Bond 2002).
A number of factors combined to extinguish any attempt
at a radical agrarian or land reform programme. These
included the perceived strength of the commercial
farming sector, the failure of the liberation movement to
develop alternatives to the agricultural restructuring
process already well under way, and the rise of liberal
democracy in the national liberation movement after the
collapse of Stalinism (see Greenberg 2003). Land reform
was to serve the purpose of stabilising the rural areas and
maintaining the integrity of the land market while export-
oriented restructuring of the commercial agricultural
sector, initiated under apartheid, was completed. The
post-apartheid state shut down state-owned agricultural
enterprises, reduced subsidies to almost zero (including
subsidies to new black farmers) and entirely dismantled
monopoly marketing infrastructure.
The result of the government’s orientation was a ‘willing
buyer-willing seller’ model of land redistribution. Less
than 2% of agricultural land was transferred through the
programme five years after liberation, against a stated
target of 30%. In 1999, the redistribution programme
was re-engineered, marking a shift from group-based
projects focusing on poverty alleviation to individual
projects with the primary aim of establishing a black
commercial farming class. In 2001 the new programme
was integrated into a national plan for agriculture drawn
up by commercial farm organisations at President Thabo
Mbeki’s request. The plan identified black economic
empowerment and enhancing the profitability of
agricultural industries as the key strategic thrusts for the
sector (NDA 2001:3).
Restitution of land for those unfairly dispossessed after
1913 was sent down a bureaucratic and legalistic path.
Progress towards resolving the 68 868 lodged claims was
extremely slow, prompting a review in 1998 that
emphasised once-off cash payments to claimants rather
than the return of land. As a result, although the
percentage of settled claims rose to 42.7% at the start of
2002, only 0.33% of the total land area of South Africa
was transferred under the programme (DLA 2002).
Post-apartheid laws to secure tenure in communal and
commercial farming areas alike have maintained the
status quo, rather than transforming social relations. In
the commercial areas, tenure legislation created a legal
framework for evictions rather than preventing them or
enhancing the security of farm workers. Few labour
tenants have gained ownership of the land, despite a law
designed for this purpose – thanks to an excessively
bureaucratic and legalistic process. In the communal
areas, reforms have been bogged down by an uneasy
balance of power between local government and
traditional authorities, limited independent civil society
organisation, and a continuing lack of certainty by
government on which approach to adopt.
The post-apartheid state has been unable to resolve the
growth in informal settlements through an expansive
programme of formal housing delivery. Despite the
construction of more than a million houses since 1994,
delivery has not kept up with demand nor has it wiped
out the backlog of an estimated three million housing
units inherited from apartheid planning. Between 1994
and 1999, formal housing stock only grew by 12%,
compared to the 97% increase in informal dwellings
(rising to 142% in urban areas) (Radebe 2001). There was
an increase from 667 000 to 1.3 million informal




In Mozambique, the liberation movement had not
progressed far beyond the northern provinces when the
Portuguese revolution took place in 1974. As a result, the
society at large was not necessarily mobilised for national
liberation. The consequent statist approach saw the
subordination of civil society organisations as arms of the
party-state. For example, one of the main rural civil
society organisations at present, the National Union of
Peasants (UNAC), was previously a wing of Frelimo. The
civil war that escalated rapidly in the 1980s destroyed the
possibility of sustained civil society organisation and it
was only after the end of the war in the early 1990s that
civil society was able to consolidate itself into more
enduring organisations.
Nationalised land ownership, coupled with the de-
vastating effects of the civil war, had resulted in tenure
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insecurity for the majority of the population. This was
made worse when displaced people began returning to
their homes at the end of the war, often to find that the
land had been redistributed to the private sector (Lahiff
2000:5). The review of land policy and the formation of
an ad hoc land commission by the government at the start
of the 1990s opened up the opportunity for civil society
participation in land debates. In 1995 the commission
merged with a committee set up to manage World Bank
projects in Mozambique, and representatives from civil
society were also invited to participate. The NGO Forum
appointed UNAC and the Association of Mutual
Assistance (ORAM – a membership orga-nisation of
peasant associations) to represent civil society in the
commission (Lahiff & Schoones 2000:18).
On the release of the draft law in early 1996, ORAM
assisted peasants to form associations, contributed to
resolving land conflicts and began the process of
securing land titles (Lahiff & Schoones 2000:18). When
the Bill was passed into law in 1997, organised civil
society was in support of it, because it represented an
advance for the rural population with regard to tenure
security. However, the law’s impact was likely to be
limited if rural families and peasants did not know about
it. As a result, dissemination of the law to the rural
population became a common platform for a civil society
thrust that brought together around 200 NGOs,
churches, associations, co-operatives and other civil
society organisations (Negrao 2002:21).
The Land Campaign emerged out of this. Representa-
tives were sent to each province to get input on the form
of the campaign and the type of materials that should be
produced. Provincial organisational committees were
formed to support the campaign. A national committee
comprising the leading national civil society organisations
and a number of international NGOs/donors was
established to co-ordinate the campaign at central level.
The committee decided that the campaign should be
decentralised and driven by provincial and district-level
organisations (Negrao 2002:21).
The campaign was designed not to speak on behalf of the
peasantry and rural population, but to inform them about
the contents of the law and how it was applicable to them.
It also had the objectives of enforcing the application of
the new law and stimulating discussion between
commercial and family farmers (Negrao 2002:22). The
campaign was designed to exist for a fixed period (6–9
months) only, after which time it was up to the
individuals and organisations to ensure that the pro-
visions of the law were applied to their advantage.
Limited financial resources partially shaped the activities
and strategies that were adopted. In 1999 the campaign
made way for a national Land Forum that intended to
continue the work of consciousness raising, mass
mobilisation and defence of the land rights of the rural
poor (Lahiff & Schoones 2000:18).
Demands that have been articulated through the
campaign have focused on tenure security, gender
equality in access to land, retention of customary rights
(but not necessarily mediated by traditional leaders),
popular participation and improved access to services
(Lahiff & Schoones 2000:20). The campaign served to
bring Frelimo to a better appreciation of the smallholder
sector, traditionally marginalised by the rhetoric of large-
scale production and statist methodology. One of the
central messages of the campaign was on urban land
rights, with a focus on participatory decision making, in
particular in the allocation of plots (Negrao 2002:23).
Zimbabwe
In Zimbabwe, civil society found it difficult to retain
organisational independence from the post-liberation
state. Civil society organisations were either crushed – (as
in the case of Zapu (Zimbabwe African People’s Union)
or the student organisations of the 1980s), bought out (as
with traditional leaders or the war veterans), or
subordinated to the party (as with the Zimbabwe
Congress of Trade Unions, for most of the 1980s). In the
absence of an independent peasant movement at
liberation, land reform was essentially driven by the state.
However, the rural areas were characterised by low-
intensity land occupations, throughout the period since
independence. The state variously supported or to-
lerated, deliberately engineered or ruthlessly suppressed
these activities, depending on the political dynamics of
the moment.
In the first few years, sporadic peasant occupations were
tolerated by the state because they mainly targeted land
abandoned by settler farmers who fled the country
during the war (Dladla & Munnik 2000:7). As such, they
did not threaten commercial agriculture. According to
the state, the political objectives of land reform were to
neutralise the crisis of expectation on the part of those in
need of land, and to stabilise existing social relations
(Zimbabwe government, cited in Tshuma 1997:72). As
long as the demand for land could be channelled into
other tenure regimes that did not threaten freehold land,
self-provisioning was acceptable to the state (Dladla &
Munnik 2000:6). However, once abandoned and
underutilised land started drying up, the state began
clamping down on any independent activity outside the
officially-constituted land reform programme (Tshuma
1997:64).
After a hiatus in independent peasant activity in the mid-
1980s, a second wave of occupations took place around
1990, mainly on state land but also on communal land
cleared by tsetse fly eradication programmes (Dladla &
Munnik 2000:8). Once again the state supported the
activity, to some extent as a populist manoeuvre ahead of
the 1990 general elections. Closely related to this was the
impending expiry of the ten-year limitation on the
entrenched constitutional provisions (Tshuma 1997:124).
These issues created the context that allowed Zanu-PF to
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present itself as the party that would carry out
unrestrained redistribution if re-elected. Nevertheless,
although the state engaged in a successful formal effort
to challenge the imposed rules after 1990, it did not
succeed in using the instruments so created to
redistribute land in the 1990s (Moyo 2002:22). This
failure of the formal programme of redistribution,
combined with a sharp decline in the economic
conditions of the majority of the population and a
growing loss of legitimacy for the ruling Zanu-PF, raised
the levels of popular dissatisfaction to crisis proportions.
This was reflected in another more significant wave of
community-led land occupations that targeted large-
scale commercial farms (Marongwe 2002:22–3), ‘food
riots’ in 1993, 1995 and 1997 (Bond & Manyanya
2002:85) and Zanu-PF’s humiliating loss in the 2000
referendum on a new draft constitution as a result of
mass-based opposition.
The political and economic crisis was made worse when
Zanu-PF took a decision to buy off more than 50 000
war veterans after protest demonstrations in Harare in
1997. The World Bank immediately suspended balance
of payments support. Popular resentment against war
veterans also materialised when sales taxes were imposed
to cover part of the costs (Bond & Manyanya 2002:39). In
November 1997 a generalised collapse of the Zim-
babwean economy began. The war veterans, appeased by
the pay-out, were pushed directly into an alliance with
Zanu-PF with the electorate’s rejection of the draft
constitution. The war veterans had focused primarily on
a clause allowing for compulsory acquisition of land, with
payment only for improvements but not for the soil. The
urban-based opposition had other interests in opposing
the draft constitution, but their call for a ‘no’ vote was
perceived (perhaps opportunistically) as being an
opposition to more radical land reform (Marongwe
2002:43).
The government did not fully support the 1998
community-led land occupations, even using force to
remove villagers from some farms (Marongwe 2002:25).
Use of the war veterans as a paramilitary force to lead
farm occupations allowed Zanu-PF to increase its anti-
imperialist rhetoric, deflect attention from the economic
crisis and absorb the independent land occupations into
a state-directed process. It also shored up Zanu-PF’s
rural support base, given the erosion of urban support in
favour of the Movement for Democratic Change
(MDC). The land occupations in 2000 were therefore a
combination of a top-down state-driven populist
initiative and a bottom-up locally-driven process. Local
actors included peasants and the landless, Zanu-PF and
state district and provincial structures, traditional leaders,
and war veterans and their supporters (Moyo 2002:23;
Marongwe 2002:48–51). Moyo (2002:23) argues that
both Zanu-PF and the state followed behind the land
occupations movement and tried to co-opt and contain it
within the framework of the evolving land acquisition
programme.
South Africa
On coming to power, the ANC had the support of the
vast majority of the population, who were prepared to be
patient for the ANC to carry out its mandate of
transformation of the state and economy. Most NGO
workers and activists were committed ANC supporters,
although there was a left flank both inside and outside the
Congress alliance prepared to raise critical questions
regarding the limits of political democracy without an
overhaul of the state’s economic model. The hegemony
of the Congress alliance ensured that popular parti-
cipation in strategies for change, and even opposition to
policy, were channelled into officially defined processes
in the first years of national liberation.
The marginalisation of rural issues in relation to the well-
articulated demands of the mobilised and powerful
urban core of the liberation movement was reproduced
after 1994, with the result that land reform was not given
prominence. Initial responses were in line with the
generally close relationship between organised civil
society and the post-apartheid state. In 1994 the National
Land Committee (NLC), the leading land NGO net-
work, hosted a Community Land Conference attended
by over 1 000 delegates from 350 rural communities
(Lahiff & Schoones 2000:34). A Land Charter emerged
from the conference but disappeared without a trace.
Although the conference gave NGOs a better insight
into the land demands of rural communities, these
demands were partly a reflection of the framework being
adopted by the NGOs themselves – one of ‘apolitical’
developmentalism. Over the next five years, NGOs
adopted a lobbying approach to convince government to
change policies in various ways. The main outcome was
that government increasingly viewed NGOs as toothless
and without any ability to mobilise a mass base.
In 1999 another attempt was made to influence
government policy via a conference when the Rural
Development Initiative (RDI) was formed. The RDI was
broader than the land conference, focusing on rural
development as a whole, with land and access to natural
resources as components. At the conference itself, more
than 600 delegates from communities and NGOs spent
three glorious days in posh hotels and in the process
finalised a Rural People’s Charter covering 12 focal areas
(see Greenberg 2000). Once again, the charter sank
without a trace.
None of the content or the organisational lessons of the
land conference were carried forward into the RDI.
While there was a process of community consultation at
provincial level, and an attempt to set up provincial
structures that would endure beyond the conference, the
process remained top-down and driven by the
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assumptions and interests of the NGOs (not least to
secure funding). One of the primary failures of both con-
ferences was the lack of post-conference follow up to
develop a systematic strategy to ensure the demands
were met. Provincial community delegates chosen at the
RDI conference were left without any functions
immediately following the conference. Funding had not
been raised for any follow-up work, but this was partly
the character of the NGO-driven process that tended to
be most interested in short-term funding than in
establishing a durable and independent movement of
rural people. A related problem was the failure of the
NGOs leading the process to relate to communities or
groups actively involved in struggles around land or
specific rural development issues like access to water,
opposition to environmental degradation, or account-
ability in local government.
The lack of a meaningful response by organised civil
society to the failure of transformation and delivery has
been coupled with an increasing alienation of the mass of
the population from the discourse of national liberation
and ‘politics’ (defined as active membership of political
organisations) as a whole. The result has been the emer-
gence of sporadic grassroots resistance to the state –
especially around evictions, urban service delivery and
land. While these grassroots movements remain small
and fragile, they potentially signify the revival of a
broader social movement for genuine transformation
beyond formal political democracy.
A recent spate of state-initiated forced removals of
people who are in the way of the state’s ‘rational’ plans –
especially around the major urban centres of Cape Town
(Tafelsig), Durban (Chatsworth) and Johannesburg
(Alexandra and Tembelihle) to name a few – have
sparked sporadic resistance. In addition, land occupa-
tions in urban and peri-urban areas are on the increase in
response to the slow pace of housing delivery and lack of
land for settlement. Cases hitting the headlines in recent
years have been at Bredell farm near Kempton Park and
at Khayelitsha outside Cape Town, both in 2001. The
immediate response of the Department of Housing was
to propose amendments to the Prevention of Illegal
Eviction and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act of 1998
to criminalise instigators and participants involved in
land occupations (Mvoko 2001).
A significant development has been the emergence of the
Landless People’s Movement (LPM) in 2001. Although
heavily supported by the NLC, the formation of the LPM
marks a qualitative shift in the relationship between
independent grassroots activism and the NGOs. The
LPM has its own elected leadership, and has embarked
on independent and co-ordinated actions without the
help of the NGOs. The movement is made up of a
number of rural committees that were built in close
collaboration with the land NGOs over the past decade.
Its core leadership comes from the small but militant
labour tenant and farm worker committees in the east of
the country who have reached the limits of their patience
in the face of lack of land transfer and government
intransigence. Restitution claimants who have been left
too long in the government queue have joined them.
There are also increasing links between these ‘rural’
groups and urban communities resisting eviction and
forced relocation. This connection represents a real ad-
vance in the struggle of the landless.
The LPM made a very successful intervention at the
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in
August 2002. Particular highlights included the mo-
bilisation of thousands of landless people from all over
the country to participate in a march that explicitly
identified the global and national neo-liberal projects as
the focus of attack. The mobilisation was also important
from the point of view of forging urban and rural links,
both within the landless movement – with the emergence
of militant urban landless formations – and between the
landless movement and other urban-based independent
movements.
In the months leading up to the WSSD, civil society in
South Africa was riven with divisions on how to
approach the WSSD. Most of the NGOs chose to engage
with the process, attempting to make inputs in the hope
of swaying the direction of the conference and the
agreements that would be reached there. However, a
small group elected to stand apart from the official
process and mobilise the grassroots in opposition to
another mega-event where the issues of the day were to
be discussed without meaningful participation. It is
interesting to note that, of the NGOs that finally decided
to organise outside of the UN framework, it was the rural
networks – in particular the National Land Committee
and the Rural Development Services Network (RDSN),
with some support from environmental NGOs – that led
the way.
As it turned out, the NGOs that sought to provide some
input to the conference were entirely marginalised. The
WSSD came across as an event where governments and
private corporations sat together to plan how to work
together to carry out an agenda that favoured a neo-
liberal development approach. Although the NGOs
were given a venue and resources to meet and make
submissions, these were basically ignored when it came
to the official meeting. This has been the experience of
NGOs in UN meetings for some time, and the WSSD
was different only in the sense that their inability to
influence anything was far more obvious than in the past.
If anything, the WSSD signified the explicit harnessing of
national government agendas to that of multinational
corporations – based on the agenda carried forward from
the World Trade Organisation ministerial meeting held
at Doha, Qatar, in November 2001 and the International
Conference on Financing for Development in
NATIONAL LIBERATION, LAND REFORM AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
120
SECURING LAND AND RESOURCE RIGHTS IN AFRICA: pAN-AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES
Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002. The WSSD was
merely another in a line of events that sealed the pact
between governments and big business.
As for civil society, those who elected to mobilise against
the WSSD rather than within its fold emerged with
greater power from the event. The LPM, which from the
outset had recognised the incompatibility of working
within the structures of the UN while expecting radical
land reforms, was a significant force outside the official
process. The movement held a week-long gathering with
over 5 000 delegates from around the country, to plan its
activities for the next years and to prepare for a march to
oppose the WSSD.
In the lead-up to the WSSD, the movement was required
to respond to a heightening of evictions and the use of
state force against its membership. Farm workers and
labour tenants marched in the rural town of Ermelo and
were arrested by police for an ‘illegal gathering’. In the
week before the WSSD, residents of informal
settlements around Johannesburg marched to the
provincial premier’s office in the centre of Johannesburg
to demand a moratorium on evictions and to be included
in development planning in their areas. Police forcibly
dispersed them, arresting 72 and detaining them for three
days in John Vorster Square (the notorious police station
in Johannesburg where detainees were pushed to their
deaths by the apartheid police in the 1970s and 1980s). A
march was called by the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF)
– an urban social movement fighting electricity and water
cut-offs and evictions – to march on the police station
and demand the release of the imprisoned LPM
members, as well as their own members also detained
without trial at John Vorster Square. Heavily armed
police used stun grenades to disperse the march, which
included international guests in South Africa to attend
the WSSD, just 200m after it had started.
The LPM members were released just before the start of
the Week of the Landless. Subsequently, the courts threw
the case out on the basis that the police were acting
beyond their powers and the march had been a legal one.
Charges were also dropped against those who had earlier
protested in Ermelo. Despite the illegality of the police
actions against these protests, and rifts within the
movement itself (of which more below), the LPM was
able to turn out a significant number of people on the big
protest march from the township of Alexandra to
Sandton on 31 August 2002. They were joined by a
number of NGOs, the APF and other independent
urban movements from around the country on a march
fairly estimated at 20000-strong. Until the day before the
march, the LPM was planning to march separately on
Sandton. However, on the eve of the march, leadership
of the landless and that of other movements managed to
agree to march together, despite a number of tensions
between them. The movements agreed to march under
the banner of Social Movements United, with the LPM’s
slogan of ‘Land! Food! Jobs!’ as the main slogan. Each of
the movements was to receive a platform to put forward
its ideas.
Symbolically very important was the failure of the ruling
ANC to attract more than 5 000 people to its own march
held on the same day and also from Alexandra, one of its
traditional strongholds. The ANC was joined by its
alliance partners, Cosatu, the SACP as well as the South
African National Civics Organisation (Sanco) – a shell of
the once vibrant civics movement in South Africa. The
aim of the ANC-led march was to highlight the need for
a developmental outcome at the WSSD. As such, it was
not at all in opposition to the WSSD, but was in favour of
a particular agenda there, including support for the New
Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad). It was
literally on the eve of the marches that the South African
NGO Coalition (Sangoco) – the official NGO umbrella
body in South Africa, which had been in an alliance with
the Congress movement throughout the period leading
up to the WSSD – decided to withdraw from the alliance.
Internal divisions meant that some individuals threw
their lot in with the independent movements, although
Sangoco had no organised presence at either of the
marches as a result. Some individual unionists also chose
to align themselves with the independent movements,
with the South African Municipal Workers’ Union
(Samwu) coming out as an organisation. Samwu, a
Cosatu affiliate, has been one of the organisations at the
forefront of struggling against privatisation in the past
few years. A number of international organisations also
aligned with the independent movements, suggesting
that the image of the ANC government as a progressive
leader of the global South is beginning to be exposed as
inaccurate.
It is valuable to know this detail because it reveals a
potential shift in the political terrain in South Africa on
which the LPM operates. It shows the initial growth of an
alternative to the dominant ideology, where under-
resourced but focused grassroots organisations were
able to attract far better resourced organisations to an
alternative vision of the future. It may well be true that
part of the reason for the failure of the ANC’s own march
was that it did not put much effort into mobilisation.
However, this reveals precisely how the ANC and its
alliance partners have chosen to emphasise negotiations
between elites rather than popular pressure and mo-
bilisation. In the process, they have lost ground to the
independent movements.
NGOs, class and popular
movements
The independent mobilisations at the WSSD have been a
milestone in exposing the bankruptcy of the deve-
lopment paradigm with its never-ending meetings, plans
and resolutions that are seldom translated into anything
121
useful to anyone but development experts. The events
reveal a sharpening divide between support for in-
dependent movements and ‘developmentalism’ har-
nessed in the employ of the neo-liberal project.
However, the very success of the mobilisation has ex-
posed and hastened the growth of divisions in the
movement and in the NGOs that have supported it so
far. These divisions have not failed to penetrate the NLC
itself, the strongest supporter of the LPM to date. There
is a political basis to the divisions that has both in-
fluenced, and been influenced by, divisions within the
LPM about which direction to take. On the one side
stand those in favour of developmentalism with, at best,
a mobilisation of the grassroots to access government
programmes. This tendency is generally supported by
NGOs, though within NGOs there are also differences
of opinion. On the other hand, there are those who seek
to encourage and support independent mobilisation
outside the official framework of development.
Mobilisations to date have revealed the limitations of
NGOs as organisational vehicles for supporting the
emergence of independent social movements. First,
NGOs tend to focus narrowly on specific projects
planned long in advance and usually with limited active
and ongoing participation of communities. When
specific and urgent issues arise in communities, NGOs
find it structurally difficult to adapt their plans and
approaches to provide immediate support. Second, and
perhaps partly as a result of the close association with the
state, NGOs have failed to engage in rigorous intellectual
work that situates their activities in a clearly defined
political and social context. Most NGOs carry out
projects with limited regard for the context and without
a vision beyond welfarism/social work or vaguely
defined ‘development’ (which ends up being both
process and outcome without any defined goal)
(Mngxitama 2002:1–2).
The potential revealed by the mobilisations around the
WSSD should not be taken to suggest there is a clearly
defined counter-hegemonic pole in existence. The ANC
and the Congress movement have hegemony over civil
society in South Africa, and are likely to do so for some
time to come. To date, discussion in South Africa on civil
society has tended to see civil society and the state as two
separate spheres that contest with one another for
power. Though it is mainly accepted that the state holds
greater formal power in this relationship (because of its
monopoly of state force, the resources at its disposal and
so on), civil society is cast as the challenger for power.
This debate is limited because it does not look at the
social forces that cut across the divide of the state and
civil society. Therefore, it would be a crude simplification
to suggest that the ANC represents neo-liberalism while
civil society represents its opposite – a progressive or
radical alternative.
Civil society is constructed from a number of different
social forces that do not necessarily have an explicit class
base. This is important since a durable hegemonic (or
counter-hegemonic) pole is necessarily organised around
a particular class that is able to absorb popular de-
mocratic demands into its own project. For a class to
become hegemonic, it must have the ability to direct
popular energies and demands in a manner that allows it
to consolidate its rule and ensures consent to its
leadership among the populace. This requires an element
of compromise on the part of the class seeking
hegemony, because it has to adapt its own project to
absorb popular demands. In South Africa, the working
class both inside and outside the Congress movement
failed to articulate an independent project in the struggle
against apartheid. This meant that other classes were able
to occupy the space created by the crisis of apartheid
hegemony. Thus, restructuring, the reorganisation of
society and transformation came to be formulated
around the interests of traditional and nascent capital.
These classes were able to hegemonise the failure of the
working class to articulate its own programme.
The collapse of a hegemonic project results in the
reorganisation of social forces and the emergence of new
forces and conditions that creates a different basis for
hegemony in the future. The post-apartheid hegemonic
project – led by the ANC and representing the interests
of big capital and emerging (‘petit bourgeois’) capital – is
built on the basis of four key ideologies: developmentalism,
national liberation, neo-liberalism and the rule of law.
These ideological strands are like threads in a rope that
support and strengthen one another rather than like
pillars that stand alone. In the regional context, the power
of South African hegemony means other, weaker,
regional powers are drawn behind this dominant project.
Developmentalism is a globally dominant ideology ema-
nating from the United States in the aftermath of the
Second World War, in response to the political and social
crisis of the time. It sought to absorb the potentially anti-
systemic struggles against colonialism by offering a
framework for decolonisation and economic reconstruc-
tion in the former colonies that did not threaten the
interests of the US as the globally hegemonic force. In
post-apartheid South Africa, developmentalism has
served a similar purpose of absorbing the potentially
threatening anti-systemic movements thrown up in the
struggle against apartheid through channelling their
energies into an apolitical fight against poverty. Although
the historical roots of poverty are highlighted in this
developmental approach, the continuation of economic
and social systems that reproduce poverty and inequality
in South Africa are buried. Developmentalism also
extends markets for the production of social goods.
Where the provision of the infrastructure and services
are not profitable, it is either left to the state or passed to
communities to maintain.
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This shift from ‘resistance to reconstruction’ – as it was
explicitly put in the period of transition to political
democracy in South Africa – was only possible because
of the strength of national liberation ideology on the
populace. In the struggle against apartheid, the unity of
the oppressed was a central organising principle. Given
the racial basis of apartheid it is not surprising that the
oppressed were defined in racial terms. However, this
tended to obscure and relegate other divisions in society
– in particular gender and class – to a subordinate status.
The entirely dominant theoretical approach to national
liberation saw the identity of race and nation. Once the
nation had managed to defeat apartheid, the task was to
undo the legacy of apartheid – the poverty and deliberate
underdevelopment of the nation. By this logic, it remains
essential in post-apartheid South Africa to retain the
unity of the nation and a breaking of ranks of any sort is
characterised as treachery. The conception of the
‘nation’ is presented as ideologically neutral, but disguises
the interests of the hegemonic class forces. The historical
underdevelopment of the nascent black middle classes is
a key target for transformation. Big (white-owned) bu-
siness has an interest in the deracialisation of capitalism,
since the alternative is the delegitimisation, not only of
the capitalist economic system, but also of the ANC as
the political driver of reconstruction in post-apartheid
South Africa.
Reconstruction has taken a particular form in South
Africa. The failure of the working class in South Africa to
impose (or even clearly articulate) its own agenda to
resolve the crisis of apartheid-capitalism allowed other
classes to regroup and assert their own agendas. The
result was a gradual drift away from social democracy
towards neo-liberalism. In the economic sphere, this was
formalised in the Growth Employment and Redistribu-
tion (Gear) macro-economic strategy in 1996. The
characteristics of this strategy resemble in all respects the
structural adjustment programmes imposed by the IMF
on African countries in the 1980s and 1990s. While the
post-apartheid government was able to determine its
own timeframes to some extent, it elected to implement
aspects of structural adjustment at a rapid pace. The main
elements of the strategy are a reorientation to export
production; liberalisation of trade relations; repayment
of the apartheid debt ahead of other priorities; and the
creation and sustenance of a (multiracial) middle class
that could ensure economic expansion through in-
creased domestic consumption. The increasing mar-
ginalisation and poverty of the mass of the population
has paralleled the expansion of conspicuous consump-
tion by the middle and ruling classes. Developmentalism,
unhitched from a transformative project, offers welfare
and social containment to those further marginalised by
reconstruction.
Neo-liberalism is not confined to the economic sphere.
The project aims to reorganise society and the values in
society to meet the requirements of the ruling classes
under new conditions. Rather than balking at the notion
of civil society, the concept has been resurrected under
neo-liberal ideology, which has injected its own content.
In the advanced capitalist countries, civil society takes
over the responsibility for providing services previously
performed by the welfare state and abandoned by the
neo-liberal state. In countries that never had a welfare
system, civil society plugs the leaks and patches over the
damage created by the most recent bout of restructuring.
Not only does an autonomous practice of solidarity get
converted into a social obligation, but social organisation
outside the state is also drained of its political content
(Zehle 2002).
The rule of law underpins the social and political
passivity of the marginalised in the face of the effects of
these ideologies. The law is a component of hegemony
that ensures consent to be ruled. In the struggle against
apartheid, the law was frequently disobeyed because it
was unjust and unfair. However, people experienced the
injustice of the law through racial lenses. The basis of law
in property relations was obscured by the specific way
that laws were constructed to discriminate on the basis of
race. Therefore, post-apartheid laws are generally accep-
ted as legitimate, since the most obvious elements of legal
racial discrimination have been abolished. That race
discrimination served the purpose (though not solely) of
constructing a specific property regime in South Africa
was not always clear. In South Africa, the law was built on
the reality of land dispossession in the 19th century, and
was designed to control the dispossessed population and
drive them into working for white property owners. The
law and its enforcement constructed these relations, only
limited by the struggles that were waged around the
extent to which these laws would be enforced. The law
legitimises and regulates specific relationships between
people and property, while preventing others. It governs
what may or may not be done with or to property, but
acknowledges and legitimises a particular pattern of
property ownership.
In the struggle against apartheid, these links were
occasionally made, and this constituted part of the crisis
for the ruling classes. The ruling class won a very
important ideological battle when it managed to separate
property relations from political and economic trans-
formation in the negotiated compromise. The reco-
gnition of status quo property rights without exception
during the negotiations destroyed opportunities for
radical redistribution in the constitutional democracy.
From the point of view of the creation of alliances
required to cement hegemony, the acceptance of the
status quo of property ownership signified one concrete
instance of the ANC and Congress movement electing to
form alliances with property owners rather than with
those without property.
These, then, are the key elements of the ideologies that
are at the base of consent to be ruled in South Africa. A
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counter-hegemonic pole of attraction will need to
question and present alternatives to each of these areas –
the developmental paradigm; the national interest; the
neo-liberal reorganisation of society and the economy;
and property rights and the rule of law. Alternatives have
to reflect the demands and interests of the range of new
social forces, but from a working class perspective.
The LPM is situated among the new forces that have
emerged since 1994. It is a popular movement without a
clearly defined class base, reflecting a growing demand
for access to and ownership of land. The movement is a
mix of different class and social forces, ranging from
labour tenants and farm workers to chiefs and other local
elites. The struggle over the direction of the LPM has
already started to occur both internally and externally by
an array of forces. At present, the working class does not
appear to be prepared for a struggle for hegemony in the
society as a whole. The key institutions of the class, the
trade unions, are mainly locked in a defence of the
interests of their members conceived of in narrow
workplace terms. There are some indications of attempts
by union leadership to extend alliances to other sectors of
civil society, especially around HIV/Aids with the
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), and on the budget
and various other policy initiatives with Sangoco and the
South African Council of Churches (SACC). At the same
time, they have expressed hostility towards the new
movements that have taken a more overtly antagonistic
stance towards the ANC and the state. It would not be
accurate to suggest that civil society is under the
influence of a dominant tendency that favours socialism
or a radical path of change. Although such tendencies do
exist within civil society, as a whole it is not hegemonic
even within the realm of civil society. This state of affairs
leaves the movement in an extremely vulnerable position
and open to forces that would seek to bind it to the
existing hegemonic project.
Because a radical counter-hegemony at present has
limited power in the broader society, an alternative
political and social vision to the one presented by the
dominant classes has so far failed to emerge with any
clarity in civil society generally, but also within the
landless movement. The LPM is in the phase of a nascent
popular movement, and the issues it raises and the
struggles it is taking up are crucial to placing land more
firmly on the popular agenda than it has been in
movements past. But the movement can be taken in
many different directions, depending on the ways that
classes organise themselves within the movement, and
the way external class forces absorb popular demands
around land and integrate them into their own class
projects.
State responses
As the government, the ANC has responded with a
classic combination of repression and reform. Re-
pression took the form of open force as indicated in the
lead-up to WSSD. The ANC has engaged in a two-
pronged strategy, simultaneously trying to marginalise
the independent movements and seeking to extend the
Congress movement’s hegemony by redefining the
political playing field. An aspect of the hegemonic
framework built by the ANC has been the portrayal of
the Congress movement as the home of all progressive
political activity. Any political formation outside the
Congress alliance is characterised as counter-revolution-
ary – whether subjectively (as in the right wing) or
objectively (as in the left wing). ‘Objectively counter-
revolutionary’ has long been the term used for any left
opposition that threatens to undermine nationalist unity
in the alliance. The new independent movements will not
find a voice in the official discourse until they are located
within the Congress alliance. This is the aim of the ANC’s
attack on the left.
This ideological reorganisation has been accompanied by
a flurry of statements and proposed interventions that
aim to undermine the power of the critique against the
failure of the land reform programme to date. Soon after
the WSSD, the Department of Land Affairs (DLA)
announced its intention to expropriate an abandoned
farm in Limpopo province for redistribution. This is a
clear indication of intent to appropriate one of the
demands of the LPM. But the underlying class basis of
the ANC’s hegemonic project was revealed in the
methodology to be adopted in the threatened
expropriation. Instead of a straightforward expropria-
tion, money owed by the landowner to the agriculture
department was to be paid by DLA in return for the land.
This allows the government to absorb the demands of
the popular movement while simultaneously remaining
within the market-led land reform model.
These and other statements by the state show there is an
attempt to absorb the landless movement into the
hegemonic field of the ruling bloc. But in the absence of
a sustained grassroots campaign for land reform, even
these efforts to absorb some elements of the demands of
the movement are likely to peter out. A continued
mobilisation around land redistribution and an end to
evictions will force the ANC into compromises to retain
its hegemony. How far they are willing and capable of
travelling along this path without resorting to force
depends on many factors. Not least of these factors is the
extent to which the landless can remain mobilised,
extend their movement beyond its current base, and
connect with a working class counter-hegemonic project.
Some of these are outside the control of the movement.
Lessons for grassroots
organisation
One of the most important lessons for building
sustainable grassroots land organisations is the
importance of not only capturing, but also holding onto,
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space in which they and their occupation of land is
recognised – however the latter may have come about.
While formal land programmes and policies may shift in
a radical direction fairly rapidly in response to events on
the ground, these shifts require movements prepared to
act ahead of policy as well as within it. Social movements
have to lead the state rather than tail it. In most cases of
successful land occupation around the world, the context
and balance of forces has been such that the state has
been compelled to recognise and even support oc-
cupations through post hoc legalisation and infrastructure
and service delivery support.
Given the class character of states as they are currently
constituted, sustained organisation will have to withstand
opposition in various forms. The state, landowners and
capital will variously dismiss, oppose, co-opt or phy-
sically attack independent movements – depending on
the strength and the nature of the threat the latter pose.
The questions are: what sort of support is required to
build and maintain independent grassroots organisation,
and how best can this support be provided? In particular,
how can the radical middle class engage fully with
emerging grassroots movements without imposing its
own prejudices and assumptions on the movement?
The first issue is the broad political approach adopted by
those wishing to support the movement of the landless.
There needs to be an identification of interests between
the radical intelligentsia and the landless, based on the
imperative that the majority of the population – all who
want and need it – should have secure access to land. The
reduction of landholdings by current land owners, be
they individuals or companies, is a prerequisite for the
achievement of secure land access to all who need it.
These themes of an equitable distribution of land and
natural resources, and the necessary end of monopoly
ownership, need to be carried forward wherever one is
able to express an opinion.
A related political and organisational matter is the wil-
lingness of the radical middle class to work directly and
consistently with the landless and their organisations, in
order to learn together, make mistakes together and
achieve victories together. This requires an approach to
people’s organisations that avoids the pitfalls of
‘paternalist vanguardism’ (attempting to own and control
the movement on the assumption of superior learning
and knowledge) and ‘romantic idealism’ (the view that
‘the people are perfect’ and an unwillingness to exert
power) (see Mngxitama 2002). The middle classes have
power, and they have resources and skills that, if wielded
correctly, can make a critical contribution in building and
supporting grassroots organisation. What defines the
‘correct’ use of power and resources is a practical and
context-specific question that can only be determined in
practice.
While NGOs may provide valuable assistance in
nurturing and maintaining grassroots independent or-
ganisations, there are limits – especially in the context of
growing NGO professionalism and the pressures
towards individualism encouraged by neo-liberal ideo-
logy. An ‘activist’ (a voluntary, politically and morally-
based) approach is preferable. It allows for individuals to
remain outside circuits of institutional power and
influence that tend to draw them towards adopting
methods that are not driven and directed by the mass-
based movements. While debates on methods and forms
of support should be encouraged in the workplace as well
as outside, the limits of support from inside deve-
lopmental institutions needs to be understood and
transcended.
Conclusion
The shift to neo-liberalism in southern Africa reflects the
subordinate location of the region in the global economy.
While liberation movements in the three countries
discussed here came to power on an agenda of social and
economic transformation in favour of the poor and
marginalised, the adoption of neo-liberal policies has
entrenched the power of large-scale capital. The migrant
labour system and the economic structures inherited
from colonial and apartheid days have not been
dismantled. Indeed the policies adopted, whether under
pressure or by choice, have reproduced these structures
of inequality.
The landless movement in South Africa in particular has
thrown up the possibility of connecting rural and urban
grassroots movements for resources and services in
South Africa in a real way. The definition of the landless
to incorporate both rural and urban people has enabled
the movement to forge creative links between the
struggles of dispossessed rural communities to regain
their land and the struggles of urban and peri-urban
communities to remain on the land without fear of
eviction. A step further will allow these groups, identified
as landless, to forge alliances with other urban grassroots
movements that have focused on access to water and
electricity services, but are increasingly responding to
issues of housing, evictions, and participation in
planning. Opposition to evictions and forced removals,
and access to housing, are the immediate points of
overlap.
However, for the movements to present a more durable
political challenge to the systems that continue to allow
evictions and forced removals, they are going to require
greater political clarity. This brings into focus the
questions of class alignment and which classes are
driving the movements. This does not necessarily mean
formal organisational links with the trade unions,
although it may be fruitful to pursue this path in specific
circumstances. The class needs to act through the
movements, and this is not something that can be willed.
It is part of the structural conditions that have shaped the
responses of the working class to oppression and
exploitation in South Africa, that in turn have shaped the
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responses of ruling elites. The existing conditions include
a working class under pressure from job losses and the
informalisation of large sections of the economy, greater
insecurity of livelihoods, and the hegemony of the
traditional elites under the leadership of the erstwhile
national liberation movement. At present, the working
class does not exhibit its own organic leadership and
consents to be ruled by other classes. Inside the struggles
of the landless, tendencies that seek to promote working
class leadership of the movement should be supported
and encouraged. This involves ideological clarification,
but also methods of struggle.
Given the structural conditions existing in South Africa,
it may be premature to expect leadership of the popular
movements by the working class. However, the very
existence of popular movements (even if fragmented and
weak) suggests the potential to affect the structural
conditions. Political action can contribute to the creation
of different relations between social forces, and open up
new opportunities for the reinvigoration of a grassroots
movement for social justice led by the working class. This
suggests a concrete struggle for political clarification
through practice, and efforts to broaden organisation on
a class basis. It is only then that the theoretical rights won
in the struggle against apartheid will become real for the
dispossessed and marginalised.
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NGO ADVOCACY FOR LAND
POLICY REFORMS IN KENYA, UGANDA
AND TANZANIA: LESSONS AND PROSPECTS
MICHAEL OCHIENG ODHIAMBO
Introduction
This paper is a reflection on the experiences of civil
society in advocating for land policy reforms in east
Africa. It looks at the process and substance of land
policy advocacy; interrogates the ideological underpin-
nings and struggles within the process; considers the
opportunities and constraints on lobbying and advocacy
around land issues; and identifies lessons to be learned
from the experience.
Although Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have distinct
challenges with regard to land and resource rights, this
discussion takes a regional approach. This is because, for
the most part, recent policy initiatives in the area of land
and natural resource management in these countries are
being developed in response to imperatives at the global
level. The challenges faced by the three countries in the
face of economic liberalisation and globalisation are the
same, as are the demands made upon them by global
frameworks of multilateral and bilateral donors. The
constraints they face in addressing these challenges and
engaging these frameworks are also similar (Okoth-
Ogendo 1999, 2000, 2001). One of the factors behind the
revival of the East African Community (EAC) has been
the desire of these countries to consolidate their efforts
in order to better manage these challenges (EAC 1999,
2001)
At the level of government, the need for a regional
approach to these issues within the framework of the
EAC has been acknowledged. Similarly, the private
sector has organised itself within the framework of the
East African Business Council (EABC) to concretely
explore opportunities for a regional approach. However,
the same cannot be said of civil society. Although civil
society is mentioned in the Treaty for East African Co-
operation, its role has not been specified in concrete
terms. Moreover, unlike the private sector, no
institutional framework exists for the participation of
civil society in the processes of the EAC. There is thus an
urgent need to analyse the opportunities and constraints
for NGO collaboration across the region in land policy
advocacy and lobbying.
The second section sets out the context in east Africa for
land policy advocacy and lobbying. I argue that the three
countries share a common heritage of colonialism, which
was driven in large measure by an interest in land and
natural resources. The resulting imposition of colonial
property laws and systems interfered with traditional
norms and frameworks for the management of land and
other natural resources. The result was a dualistic system
that undermined traditional frameworks for sustainable
resource management.
The third section identifies the major issues for advocacy
and lobbying across the region. While there are specific
issues peculiar to each country, the three countries have
many issues in common. Moreover, as the EAC takes
form, with its emphasis on opening up the region to
investors as a single market, the region is increasingly
having to face and address common challenges.
I then discuss the experiences of NGOs in the three
countries with regard to land policy and advocacy and
lobbying in section four. It is acknowledged that the
experience of civil society in Uganda has been the most
outstanding in the region. The institutional framework of
the Uganda Land Alliance (ULA) offers a model upon
which Tanzania and Kenya could build. The recent
regional initiative of LandNet East Africa is also
examined and its prospects considered.
Section five identifies and analyses the lessons learned
from the experience of land policy advocacy and
lobbying in east Africa. Effective civil society lobbying
and advocacy must be informed by shared vision and
ideological commitment developed through a process of
consultation. In this connection, I recognise a need for
capacity building on issues of land policy development,
analysis and administration. This is because civil society
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organisations (CSOs) can only lobby and advocate
effectively if they are able to propose viable policy and legal
options grounded in research and analysis of the concrete
realities of the local farmers and herders.
The last section derives conclusions from the discussion
and suggests a way forward. It is evident that much
progress has been made at the national level but that a lot
of the lobbying and advocacy work still has to be done at
the sub-regional level. However, much more still needs
to be done in linking the local struggles at the national
level in the three countries, to the wider regional picture
and framework in East Africa and pan-Africa wide. Ini-
tiatives like LandNet and the Pan African Programme on
Land and Resource Rights (PAPLRR) need to be suppor-
ted and strengthened for greater effectiveness.
Context
Land and natural resources occupy an important place in
the political history, social organisation and economics of
the three east African countries. All three were colonised
because of their natural resources, principally land and
minerals. Over the years, the politics of land has
pervaded the discourse at the national level in each of the
countries. The main components of the national
economies of these countries are based on land/
agriculture, mining, tourism, fisheries and forestry.
A large proportion of the population of these countries
lives in the rural areas and derives their livelihood directly
from land. Subsistence farming and pastoralism
constitute a substantial component of the livelihoods of
the local people. Even the quest for industrialisation in
these countries is based in large measure on land, the
greatest potential as an entry point in this regard being
industries for adding value to primary commodities.
These states recognise the importance of productive land
to livelihoods and economies, so policy and legal
stipulations for the sustainable management of land and
natural resources are constantly being reviewed.
The common colonial heritage of the region has ensured
that the existing policy, legal and institutional framework
for the management of land and natural resources is an
interface between colonial jurisprudence and political
economy on the one hand, and traditional norms,
systems and institutions of natural resources governance
on the other.
At the local level, population increase has resulted in
greater pressure on land, while concern for sustainable
land-use practices has heightened with the rise in
environmental awareness. At the global level, the
pressures for liberalisation of economies have translated
into a push for privatisation of the management of land
and natural resources, specifically with a view to putting
land in the market place.
Uganda was the first of the three countries to undertake
a comprehensive review of the framework for the
management of land, leading to the enactment of the
Land Act in 1998. Tanzania followed with the enactment
of the Land Act and the Village Land Act in 1999. Kenya
was, for a long time, the only country in the region that
had in place an elaborate institutional and legal
framework for the management of land. However, over
the years it has become clear that this framework failed to
ensure equitable access to land. In 1999 the Presidential
Commission of Inquiry into Land Law Systems was
appointed to review the legal framework and to put
together a national land policy. This initiative, coupled
with the ongoing process of reviewing the constitution,
has opened up possibilities for a fresh look at the policy,
legal and institutional framework for managing land and
natural resources.
Even in Uganda and Tanzania where new land legislation
has been enacted, the debate on the management of land
and natural resources continues. The implementation of
the new land laws in the two countries, including funding
the institutions created under these laws, have provided
their own challenges. Uganda is presently developing a
new land policy.
The pressure for reform of land policy is closely linked to
the democratisation process, which offers a good
opportunity for civil society to play an important role in
these reforms. The demand by citizens for a greater say
in decisions affecting their livelihoods has implications
for control of land. This provides an opening for CSOs
to affect both the process and direction of change.
Issues for policy advocacy
The issues for land policy advocacy in east Africa can, for
ease of analysis, be divided into two major categories. In
the first category are issues that affect all the three
countries jointly. These are mainly issues arising from
global imperatives to which the three countries, like
other countries in the developing world, are subject.
Others are issues that emanate from the common
colonial history of the three countries. A number of these
issues are listed in Box 1.
Box 1: Issues for land policy
advocacy in east Africa
Securing land tenure for land-based commu-
nities.
Land use for poverty alleviation.
Customary land use systems and institutions.
The state and the administration of land,
especially public land.
Land markets and foreign investors.
Land use, planning and environmental
sustainability.
Land administration and management.
Democratisation of the management of land.
Conflict management.
Source: Odhiambo 1999
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The issues may manifest themselves differently in each
country, depending on a variety of circumstances, but
they are pertinent to all the three countries. In particular,
the governance structure in each country determines the
level of NGO involvement with these issues, and the
impact of such involvement. Uganda has had the most
vibrant NGO involvement in issues of land policy. In
Tanzania, NGO involvement peaked during the run-up
to the enactment of the Land Act and the Village Land
Act, but tapered off as a result of differing perceptions of
how effective the exercise was.
In Kenya, individual NGOs have been actively engaged
in land issues for a long time, but only in the last four
years has an organised national framework emerged – the
Kenya Land Alliance (KLA). Because Kenya went
through a land reform process in the 1950s and has had
a comprehensive statute for the administration of land
since independence, the major issues for land policy
advocacy relate to the implementation of that frame-
work. After more than three decades of operating under
the existing regime of land law, it has become evident that
the system has failed to secure the rights of land users,
especially the poor who depend on land for their
livelihoods. What has emerged is a bloated bureaucracy
that is acknowledged to be among the most corrupt in the
government. Major issues for advocacy in Kenya are
listed in Box 2.
Box 2: Issues for land policy
advocacy in Kenya
Security of tenure for customary land holders.
Linking land access to food security and
poverty alleviation.
The grabbing of public land.
Informal settlements and labour tenants
(squatters).
Democratisation of the management of land.
Historical injustices.
Landlessness and inequitable land distribution.
Land rights of married women and widows.
Sustainable land use and environment
management.
Hoarding of land by the political and
commercial elite.
Inefficiency of land registries and registration
systems.
The constitutional basis of land administration.
The need for a national land policy.
Source: Republic of Kenya 2000
In Tanzania, apart from the colonial heritage, two factors
that have defined the issues for land policy advocacy are
Ujamaa and villagisation.1 With the advent of libera-
lisation, these issues have been exacerbated. The main
problem, as was confirmed by the Presidential
Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters, is one of
tenure, especially for the smallholder farmer and pa-
storalist. The commission defined the problem as one of
governance, arising from the need for land users to have
control and say over the management of land. Box 3 sets
out the issues for land policy advocacy in Tanzania.
Box 3: Issues for land policy
advocacy in Tanzania
Governance of land, including issues of title
and the centralised and bureaucratic frame-
work for the management of land.
Land markets, alienation of land to foreign
investors and liberalisation.
The relationship between village lands and
national lands.
Land accumulation and distribution.
Land administration: survey, adjudication
and registration.
Customary land rights under the new land laws.
The land rights of married women and widows.
Urban expansion and issues of peri-urban land.
Protected areas and the rights of indigenous
peoples.
Sustainable land-use and environment man-
agement.
Source: Odhiambo 1999
In Uganda, the processes leading to the passing of the
Land Act of 1998 helped define the major land issues for
the country. Although major problems relating to
implementation emerged after the legislation was
enacted, even these have helped define the agenda for
government and NGOs. Efforts to draft a national land
policy have come about as a direct consequence of the
difficulties experienced in implementing a comprehen-
sive land law without a national policy framework to lead
the process. Box 4 sets out the major issues for land
policy advocacy in Uganda.
Box 4: Issues for land policy
advocacy in Uganda
The need for a national land policy and
environment policy.
Women’s land and property rights.
Institutions and infrastructure for the
implementation of the Land Act.
The impact of decentralisation on national
imperatives over the management and
administration of land.
Customary land tenure and its
operationalisation under the Land Act.
Implementing title to land among the citizens
of Uganda.
The efficacy of the multiple tenure systems re-
cognised by the Constitution and the Land Act.





It can be asserted that NGO advocacy for land rights
predates the post-colonial state in east Africa. CSOs
existed in the three countries, in the form of local
associations, before the colonial state. No doubt they
were not as organised as they are today, but communities
have organised themselves in pursuit of common
interests for as long as they have been in existence. It was
CSOs in the form of trade unions, farmers’ and herders’
associations, and neighbourhood organisations that
spearheaded the mobilisation of African communities to
agitate for political independence, long before Africans
were allowed to form political parties. Even when
political parties were formed in the early 1950s, they
relied heavily on CSOs for mobilisation. At least in this
sense, governments and states can be said to be creations
of civil society formations.
CSOs have an important role to play in policy
formulation, implementation, monitoring and evalua-
tion. This is particularly true in the area of land policy,
which has a bearing on the livelihoods of every individual
in society. The complexity of the modern global political
economy means that it can no longer be assumed that
east African governments will always serve the interests
of their citizens or even the majority of them. Instead,
governments have to make choices between different
ideas, ideals and priorities from various sectors of the
citizenry.
In this competition, it is the best organised interests that
are capable of mobilising public opinion and political
processes that triumph. Influencing political processes in
favour of specific interests has thus become a major
engagement in modern governance, resulting in the
emergence of civil society groupings that address specific
interests, including land rights (Kanji et al. no date).
CSOs mobilise members of the public to participate
effectively in processes of policy formulation and review,
ensuring that the diverse interests within society are
properly represented in these processes. They ensure
that the policy formulation process is undertaken in such
a way as to facilitate the meaningful participation of the
public in making inputs to the process. In this way, the
involvement of CSOs in policy processes ensures public
ownership and identification with the outcome. With
respect to land and natural resource policy, this is an
important means of empowering the public for
management of the resources.
While in the past, governments were the only real sources
of material and human resources, in recent years CSOs
have become alternative sources of resources. They are
thus in a position to make meaningful intellectual inputs
into policy processes in which they become involved.
Failure to involve CSOs may in fact deny the countries of
valuable contributions.
At the end of the policy making process, CSOs are able
to follow up the output to ensure that it represents the
will of the public as expressed in the formulation process.
Once the output of the policy process is ready, these
organisations educate the public on the new policy and
how they can benefit from it. Thereafter they monitor
implementation and enforcement and ensure that the
public receives the benefits promised.
While all these processes take place at the national level,
there is a lot to be gained from networking between
national advocacy groups at the sub-regional and
regional levels. Frameworks for such networking, where
they exist, allow advocacy groups in different countries
to learn from the experiences of other countries in
tackling the same issues. Moreover, as countries inte-
grate, these frameworks become important means for
engaging with regional policy processes (MWENGO
1999a; 1999b).
LandNet East Africa
Networking on land policy as a specific area of concern
is a new phenomenon in east Africa. While networks on
different sectoral resources have existed across the
region for a long time, the idea of a sub-regional network
on land policy can be traced to the formation of LandNet
East Africa in 2001. Although still in its infancy, the
network, when fully operational, aims to fill the existing
gap with respect to a regional framework for civil society
engagement between organisation and with govern-
ments on land policy.
The origin of LandNet East Africa can be traced to the
Land Tenure Conference organised by the UK De-
partment for International Development (DFID) in
Sunningdale, London, in February 1999. The conference
identified the need for an African land tenure network to
provide a framework for networking around land issues.
An east African sub-regional land tenure networking
study commissioned by DFID at the end of the
conference found that while the need for a networking
framework was appreciated, there was a general
scepticism about the practical utility and feasibility of an
Africa-wide network. More enthusiasm was expressed
for networking at the sub-regional level to share
experiences across countries of the sub-region, and at the
national level. Most importantly, concern was expressed
about the ownership of the network, and how this could
be made manifestly African, both in substantive and
process terms.
Similar consultancies were conducted in west and
southern Africa, with similar findings. A regional
planning workshop was subsequently held in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia, in January 2000, bringing together
delegates from all over sub-Saharan Africa. The regional
planning workshop endorsed the idea of a sub-regional
approach to the implementation of networking and
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called for sub-regional planning processes to be
organised in east Africa, west Africa, southern Africa and
the Horn of Africa.
A sub-regional planning workshop for east Africa was
held in Nairobi, Kenya, in August 2000, bringing
together delegates from Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and
Rwanda. The planning workshop provided an op-
portunity for potential participants in the network and
other stakeholders to consider, endorse and internalise
the idea of the network. The participants defined the
issues and activities for the network and agreed on the
structure, membership, management and infrastructure
needed to operationalise it.
Following the August 2000 planning workshop, an
interim co-ordinator and a steering committee were
constituted and mandated to oversee the institu-
tionalisation of LandNet East Africa as a framework for
networking on land issues within the east African region.
An inaugural meeting was held in Naivasha, Kenya in
August 2001. The network was formally launched, a
secretariat and steering committee constituted, and a
workplan agreed.
Under the agreed workplan, the co-ordinator and
secretariat are required to develop a strategy for the
network to function effectively within the region. At a
meeting organised by the World Bank and other donors
in Kampala, Uganda, a number of donors expressed the
desire to work with the network, but little has been
forthcoming in terms of real support. It is, however,
envisaged that the network, once it takes off in earnest,
will provide a useful framework for CSOs in the sub-
region to influence processes relating to land ad-
ministration and management.
LandNet initiated a regional programme on pastoral land
rights with the support of the sub-regional office for the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) in eastern and southern Africa, which saw a
review of the policy, legal and institutional framework for
managing pastoral land conducted in Kenya, followed by
a national stakeholder workshop. Similar reviews and
workshops were planned for Uganda and Tanzania,
leading to a regional workshop on the issue, but these
never took place.
While interest in the work of LandNet is still strong in the
sub-region, the restructuring of DFID in the last couple
of years, especially with regard to work on land policy,
affected the impetus for the work of LandNet. (At that
time, DFID was LandNet’s primary source of support.)
The secretariat for the network transferred from the
Resource Conflict Institute (RECONCILE) in Kenya to
Uganda Land Alliance.
A regional initiative that has supplemented and scaled up
the work that LandNet East Africa was doing is
PAPLRR. This regional initiative is organised at the pan-
African level and covers eastern, southern, western and
northern Africa. Funded by the Ford Foundation, the
programme seeks to provide a forum and mechanism for
Africans to think through and design their own policy
and institutional solutions to problems pertaining to land
and natural resources. It is working with African CSOs to
build capacity for effective engagement with regional and
global policy processes that have a bearing on land and
natural resources.
Kenya Land Alliance
Until 1999, advocacy on land issues in Kenya was done
by individual CSOs, each with its own sectoral focus.
Groups like the Greenbelt Movement, the East African
Wildlife Society, Mazingira Institute and the Kenya
Human Rights Commission have undertaken various
useful initiatives, but these have not translated into a
long-term programme of advocacy for meaningful
change. While these individual initiatives made a
commendable contribution to the land policy discourse
in the country, they were sporadic and not focused on
any particular programme. As such, they did not last long
and had little impact on actual policy formulation.
In order to address this anomaly, a consultation was held
in Nairobi in May 1999, with funding support from
Oxfam. The consultation provided an opportunity for
CSOs involved in land policy issues, from different
backgrounds – research, advocacy and activism – to
conduct a situational analysis of the status of land policy
advocacy in Kenya, and design a way forward. The
consultation meeting concluded that the country lacked
an organised framework for effective advocacy, change
and reform of the policy and legal framework for the
management of land and natural resources. It re-
commended the establishment of an umbrella body to
coalesce the activities of CSOs to push for an all-
embracing, participatory and thoroughgoing land policy
and law reform process. Thus was born the Kenya Land
Alliance, formed on the model of the Uganda Land
Alliance.
When KLA was mooted, one of its major envisaged
objectives was to mobilise the government and people of
Kenya for a comprehensive land policy review process.
Given the hostility and sensitivity of the government of
the time to discussions about land, and the highly
politicised nature of the land question in Kenya,
persuading the government to initiate a process of
reform of land policy and law was expected to be
difficult. Surprisingly, before the end of 1999, the
government announced the appointment of a Presiden-
tial Commission of Inquiry into Land Law Systems. The
commission’s terms of reference covered the entire
gamut of land policy concerns, many of which KLA had
proposed as areas for advocacy activities.
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After some hesitation, KLA focused its work around
facilitation of community engagement with the com-
mission. KLA monitored the sittings and activities of the
commission and mobilised the public to raise specific
issues. In June 2002, the alliance hosted a national
conference on the land question, again with the objective
of focusing the attention of the presidential commission
and the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission on
issues of land.
The effectiveness and impact of KLA can be judged
from the fact that it is now recognised by government as
a key stakeholder in land policy formulation processes.
Following the change of government in December 2002,
the new government launched a presidential commission
to investigate illegally acquired public lands and ap-
pointed KLA’s co-ordinator as a member. A national
land policy formulation process is currently under way, in
which KLA is working closely with the Ministry of Lands
and Settlement. That this process is under way is partly
on account of the work of the alliance, as it has
consistently insisted that the solutions to the land
problems bedevilling the country can only be addressed
comprehensively through the formulation of a national
land policy.
Uganda Land Alliance
The Uganda Land Alliance emerged from the dis-
cussions and processes of engagement that preceded the
enactment of the Land Act. The Constitution of Uganda,
passed in 1995, had provided that within two years of its
first sitting, Parliament would enact a comprehensive
land law.
ULA started off in 1995 as an informal group of
interested individuals who met in the offices of its
different members. In time, however, it grew into an
important framework for civil society engagement with
government on the land issue. It was registered in May
1999 as an umbrella NGO with a membership of 39
NGOs and two individuals.
The founding of ULA was informed by a concern over
the implications of land policy on the poor and
disadvantaged. It set out to ensure that land policies and
laws are reviewed to address the land rights of the poor
and to protect access to land for vulnerable and
disadvantaged groups and individuals. During its
existence, ULA has evolved into a major player on land
issues in Uganda. Its model is being used in other
countries in the region. It has cultivated such good
relations with the government that it now sits in major
policy formulation and implementation committees.
Bazaara (2000) has studied the contribution of ULA to
the process of formulating the Uganda Land Act, and
identified six areas of focus in its campaigns on the Land
Act:
1. It attacked the principles upon which the different
versions of the Land Bill were based and sought to
demonstrate that these were detrimental to the poor.
2. It critiqued the institutional framework for con-
trolling land and mediating the land market.
3. It sought to demonstrate the need to protect the
rights of wives and children, suggesting that land
should be co-owned by the spouses and proposing
that the consent of wives and children be a require-
ment for sales of land.
4. It advocated that communities should obtain titles
to their land.
5. It advocated for, and succeeded in getting, the
number of years during which non-citizens could
hold land reduced from 999 to 99 years.
6. It pressurised members of Parliament to ensure that
certificates of occupancy carried the same weight as
existing land titles.
Although fears have been expressed in certain circles that
ULA risks being co-opted by government, there is no
dispute that it has played an important role in rallying
CSOs around the land issue. In recent times, ULA has
started to redefine its role and place in Uganda to ensure
that it remains relevant and useful to its constituency.
Issues of sustainability have had to be addressed. It has
also taken a more active part in networking at the sub-
regional and regional levels, thereby spreading its in-
fluence and expanding learning base.
Tanzania
The National Land Forum (NALAF) was born out of the
efforts of NGOs to engage the process of land law
formulation in Tanzania. The Presidential Commission
of Inquiry into Land Matters identified the problems of
land management in Tanzania, singling out governance
problems and the absence of a policy and legislative
framework as key areas for intervention. The com-
mission was funded from the public budget, and did a
thorough job. But once the commission’s report had
been presented to the President, it became clear that
government was not keen to implement the recommen-
dations. Indeed, it transpired that at the same time as the
commission had been doing its work, a parallel process
was going on within the Ministry of Lands, headed by a
British consultant paid by DFID (Shivji 1998). It was this
parallel process that gave rise to the National Land
Policy, which became the basis of the new Land Act.
NALAF was driven by a commitment to see the
recommendations of the commission acted upon. The
intention of government to sidestep the recommenda-
tions of its own commission became clear when the Land
Bill was published. A number of gender, media and
pastoral NGOs came together to campaign against the
proposed Land Act and to promote a national debate on
land. They issued a declaration entitled Azimio la Uhai2
setting out the issues that needed to be addressed by the
government in the framework of new legislation, and
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offering a comprehensive critique of the Land Bill. They
resolved to form the National Land Forum to be known
by its Kiswahili acronym UHAI3 and elected a National
Land Committee to co-ordinate their activities. The
committee would be known by its Kiswahili acronym
KATAA (Kamati ya Taifa ya Ardhi).4
Although NALAF managed to raise public awareness
over pertinent issues of the land law, in the end, its efforts
were defeated as differences emerged among members
of the coalition on what its priorities should be. Issa
Shivji, who was a central figure in the coalition, has
blamed donors for the collapse of the coalition. His views
on this point merit quoting in full:
In the case of NALAF, foreign funding bodies – mostly
associated with their governments or IFIs [international
financial institutions] – had invested in the process of land
legislation with their own ideological agendas. They could
not therefore see the process taken over by independent
minded civil society with an alternative social vision. At the
same time they needed a modicum of legitimacy by involving
the NGOs… Hence some of the funding agencies went out
of their way to make offers of funds and set timetables
within which they ought to be spent. A number of us
therefore got busy writing proposals and organising
seminars, workshops, printing tee-shirts, etc. (and
duplicating efforts) to justify getting and spending funds.
The spending spree had to be conspicuous so that our
erstwhile funding ‘partners’… could send home glorious
reports of their ‘achievements’ (Shivji 1999).
Whichever way one looks at it, the collapse of NALAF
was a real shame. It pushed back the advocacy for land in
Tanzania many years, and its impact is still felt today. A
Gender Land Task Force was created by gender or-
ganisations after the collapse of the forum, to carry on
the debate from a gender perspective. The organisations
that were involved in NALAF have continued with land
advocacy, and they continue to reach out for each other,
with the hope that a national framework for advocacy
over land issues will once again emerge.
Lessons learned
The experience of NGOs in east Africa shows that
advocacy at national or sub-regional levels is best
undertaken within a networking framework. Individual
NGOs, however powerful and well-endowed, cannot
have the same impact on governments and other policy
bodies as networks can. Operating within a networking
framework allows CSOs to take advantage of numbers,
while pooling resources, both human and material, and
sharing expertise and experiences. As a democratic
process, policy making is a game of numbers, and
networks give NGOs the leverage they need to deal with
governments.
Yet, therein lies the tragedy for NGOs interested in
advocacy. Networks are difficult to operate and difficult
to fund. Member NGOs are themselves starved for
funding, with no funding bases of their own. They have
to raise funds through writing proposals for their own
programmes and projects. They are thus not likely to
have funds to spare for networks. Moreover, as no
organisation exists solely for the purpose of networking,
NGOs consider their involvement in networks as
creating additional responsibilities that invariably take
second place to their own programmes. Donors, too, are
wary of networks. Few donors will fund networking as a
distinct activity, as it is not considered an end in itself.
Thus the first great challenge for advocacy NGOs is the
funding of networks which are so essential for
effectiveness. The difficulties associated with accessing
funding may compromise the independence of the
NGOs as they position themselves to be eligible for
donor funding. Discussing this aspect of the matter with
respect to the Uganda Land Alliance, Bazaara (2000)
makes an observation which applies across the board:
The dependence on donors equally diminishes its capacity
to operate. In turn the money from donors may serve to
undermine the ability of membership to address real issues.
Membership of ULA is mainly institutional organisations
which have no direct core interest. Some may be in ULA
as public relations. Some of these organisations do not have
land as part of their in-house activities. Donor money may
actually cause internal strife and conflicts that will
undermine ULA.
Land remains a very sensitive issue in east Africa. Even
where donor funds are available for work on land policy,
questions arise about the real intentions of the donors.
This is especially true of the bilateral donors. For
instance, in recent years, DFID has become a major
player in land policy advocacy in east Africa, funding not
only the Kenya Land Alliance but also the Uganda Land
Alliance, and even LandNet East Africa. What is
interesting about the role of DFID in this regard is that it
is also providing support to the governments to address
the land question in each of these countries. It has
provided support to the Presidential Commission of
Inquiry in Kenya, the Land Act Implementation Unit in
Uganda, and the regulation-making process in Tanzania.
None of this is likely to have raised any questions were it
not for the fact that, until a few years ago, DFID would
not provide support for any activity touching on land,
arguing that it was too politically sensitive. The question
in the minds of most observers is: Why the change of
heart?
This is not an idle question, especially in the light of
pressures from Western-based multinational corpora-
tions for the liberalisation of the land market in east
Africa. That these pressures may be influencing the
agenda of bilateral donors in their support for land policy
advocacy cannot be ruled out. That the World Bank has
also joined the bandwagon in working on land policy just
serves to strengthen these fears.
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The diversity of national NGOs in their focus, interests,
priorities and approaches is another major challenge in
this area. This produces substantial difficulty in creating
a common vision, a problem that becomes compounded
in a regional network like LandNet. The experience of
the National Land Forum in 1999 when the Land Act
and the Village Land Act were passed by the Tanzanian
Parliament demonstrates this problem. While gender
NGOs were happy and celebrated the new legislation as
marking an important threshold for gender equality,
pastoral and other NGOs in NALAF saw little cause for
celebration. These differences saw to the collapse of the
forum.
The national political governance environment has much
to do with the effectiveness of NGO advocacy on land
issues. The impact of ULA is due, at least in part, to the
specific circumstances of Uganda in the middle of the
1990s when, emerging from long years of repression, the
government of the National Resistance Movement
brought a breath of fresh air to the political arena. The
national debate on the new Constitution and sub-
sequently on the new land law was characterised by an air
of openness and receptiveness to ideas that may only be
explained by the specific circumstances of the moment.
Similarly, it took the change of government in Kenya for
the Kenya Land Alliance to be acknowledged by the
government as a legitimate player in the policy debate.
During the rule of the Kenya African National Union
(KANU) led by Daniel arap Moi, individual government
officials may have been receptive to ideas from CSOs,
but the official government position was one of
suspicion and hostility towards NGOs. In spite of the
rhetoric about participatory processes of policy-making
in the wake of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
(PRSP), the government never got to accept that NGOs
had a legitimate role in policy processes. In Tanzania,
there is space for NGO engagement in policy processing,
but the extent to which NGO positions affect the final
policy product depends in part on the level of
government interest in the issue, as the land policy debate
has amply demonstrated.
Conclusion
This paper has traced NGO experience of land policy
advocacy in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania in recent years,
and identified lessons learned and challenges faced. In
each of the countries discussed, a networking framework
has emerged to coalesce CSO initiatives for advocacy
over land issues. At the sub-regional and regional levels,
LandNet East Africa and PAPLRR have potential to
offer new forums for sharing experiences and expertise.
A number of challenges have been identified both at the
regional level and at the national level. In particular, it has
been observed that problems of funding are a major
impediment to land policy networks. Where they obtain
funding from donors, especially bilateral donors, they
have to contend with agendas that may not necessarily
concur with local interests. The risk that the financial
support may be aimed at achieving objectives other than
those that inform the advocacy processes is quite real.
It is nevertheless clear that CSOs need to be intimately
involved with land policy processes if they are to make
their input into securing the livelihoods of the rural poor
as Shivji (1999) observes:
…there is now a need to think in terms of a Grand
Coalition based on and integrating the triangular set of
burning questions around Land, Food and Democracy.
This trio constitutes the most urgent burning issues of our
societies. Within their fold, many other issues are
embedded. We need to engage in struggles and a discourse
around these issues, which will in turn generate a cohesive
social vision to guide the struggle of the working people for
emancipation in our countries.
1Under the leadership of founding President Julius
Nyerere, Tanzania pursued a socialist policy known as
‘Ujamaa’ (Kiswahili for ‘familyhood’) under which rural
populations were encouraged to move into villages and
villages became communal production units. The system
failed in delivering rural development but is widely
acknowledged for creating a sense of nationhood among
Tanzanians (see, for instance, Hyden 1980).
2Literally, the Life Declaration, although it is also a play
on the Kiswahili acronym for the National Land Forum.
3Stands for Ulingo wa Kutetea Haki za Ardhi, meaning
Forum to Advocate for Land Rights (National Land
Forum).
4Kiswahili for National Land Committee.
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THE TYRANNY OF EGYPTIAN
LAW ON CIVIL SOCIETY
ABDEL MAWLA ISMAIL
Introduction
Civil society is one of the most important elements in the
evolution of developed and developing societies. This is
especially true in the light of the destructive global
economic changes wrought by the Bretton Woods
institutions (the International Monetary Fund and World
Bank). The neo-liberal policies of these international
financial institutions were adopted by the Egyptian
authorities in June 1991 in the belief that such policies
would attract foreign investment and maintain the
balance between available resources and the needs of the
population. But the adoption of neo-liberalism has
diminished the influence and power of the government,
opening more space for the private sector to enhance its
own interests. This shows up the role of civil society as an
independent sector of society.
Studies show the importance of civil society and its ability
to promote the growth of the economy, especially by
enhancing people’s lives and assisting them to fully enjoy
their human rights. I believe that the Egyptian gover-
nment should make space for civil society, in line with
international practice. However, the Egyptian govern-
ment still has a narrow view. It still maintains laws that
oppress the civil society movement and impedes its
progress.
The experience of Egypt, especially between the first
quarter of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th,
reflects the important role civil society played in the
growth and development of the nation.
There are numerous examples of what Egyptian civil
society has done to challenge repression and mobilise
creative energies. The Egyptian civil law of 1875
underscored the importance of the role of civil society
and provided a number of rights. The 1932 Constitution
was one of the best Egypt has ever had, but in 1958 new
laws severely undermined the country’s institutions of
civil society, causing them to regress enormously.
This paper addresses the relationship between the civil
society movement in Egypt and the law. I first discuss the
development of the laws that enabled the movement and
then discuss the laws which have subsequently impeded
civil society, especially Act 153 of 1999. Finally, I discuss
the future of the movement in the aftermath of Act 84 of
2002.
Stage One
The National Association of Egypt and the Greek
Association of Alexandria were established in 1828. The
Egyptian Association began in 1859, followed by the al-
Ma’arif Association in 1868, and the Geographical As-
sociation in 1878 (Qandil & bin Nafisa, no date:51).
These associations were established before the civil law
of June 1875 was issued, and were responsible for the
work of the National Association in Egypt. They drafted
Article 54, which states: ‘The Association is in every
party; it is permanent and has many members. It is
natural and legal but it should not be aimed at
materialistic profit. Article 58 of the law grants the
Association its legal personality immediately from the
time of its establishment’.
About 95 years ago, the Egyptian civil law was the first to
put in place the foundations and criteria for establishing
associations, including the right of individuals and
groups to establish such organisations. This accords with
the rules of international contracts concerning civil
rights, issued in 1968. The Egyptian civil law encouraged
the formation of many national associations – such as the
Benevolent Islamic Association of 1878. The Coptic
Association was established with similar charitable
objectives. Shaykh Muhammad Abdu and others were
the forerunners in the renaissance of modern Egypt
(Qandil & bin Nafisa, no date:51). Thereafter, many
associations that played an important role in political and
social activities were established. This development
helped in the progression of political life in Egypt at the
time and instilled an Egyptian spirit. Among the
associations were leftist and progressive ones such as al-
fajr al-jadid.
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The legislation of 1923 legalised institutions of civil
society, and acknowledged their rightful place. Egyptians
could then formalise their associations and other civic
institutions. The 1923 legislation also provided many
rights, including the right to have a legal personality, and
the right of individuals to freely become members. It
excluded the military associations, which serve specific
political parties according to Act 17 of 1938. The 1923
legislation futher provided rights for civil institutions not
working for profit. The monies of charitable org-
anisations had to be allocated to charitable work and
general welfare in perpetuity according to Acts 69–78 of
the Egyptian civil law.
Stage Two
Act 32 of 1964 was issued 12 years after the inauguration
of Jamal Abd al Nasir,1 who became President of the
Arab Republic of Egypt in July 1952. He removed the
system of kingship and brought about social changes for
the benefit of workers and farmers. However, the
government established control over all institutions. It
abolished all parties established before 1952, and
nationalised political activity. Act 32 of 1964 changed the
goal and foundation of national associations to orientate
them to serve the policy of the state, and to serve the one
legal political party. This served to restrict the activity of
all civic organisations.
Establishment of associations
Article 8 of the 1964 law specified that permission had to
be granted by the Ministry of Social Affairs before an
association with legal personality could be established.
Reasons given for refusing registration included no need
for such an association; opposition to government
reforms; or that it did not meet security requirements.
Article 13 also imposed restrictions on who could
establish an association. People working for professional
organisations or organisations of workers had no right to
establish national associations of their own. This went
against the international standard which gives individuals
the right to establish civic organisations of their choice
(Abboud, no date:11).
These were not the only restrictions placed on
organisations. It was not sufficient for the Ministry of
Social Affairs to accept an application. All other relevant
administrative authorities also had to agree, including the
security apparatus.
Activities of associations
The law placed many restrictions on the activities of
national associations. The associations could work only
in one particular field. If the associations wanted to
engage in activities beyond the one field, they could only
do so with the permission of the relevant administrative
authority (Abboud, no date:17). The associations were
not permitted to receive gifts of charity from overseas
and also were not allowed to link themselves with any
associations outside the country. In addition, the
administration had the right to combine associations if
they were considered to be similar.
Withdrawal of registration
Article 57 of the Act allowed the Minister of Social Af-
fairs to withdraw registration of any association that was
not able to achieve the purpose for which it was
established; if it used its money for purposes that were
not in accordance with its aims; if it had not had a general
meeting in two years; and if it had committed a crime.
After terminating the registration of an association, the
authorities could take its money and documents and
association members had no right to appeal in court. The
effects of Act 32 of 1964 still reverberate in subsequent
legislation governing civil society organisations (Awad
2002:63).
Stage Three
Civil society opposition to Act 32 of 1964 started with an
international conference in 1994. A committee of 400
national associations was formed to demand the repeal of
the law. The new Minister of Social Affairs (Dr Mervat al-
Talawi) formed a committee to study the provisions of
the Act. By the end of May 1998, the ministry had
prepared a draft law. Egyptian civil society organisations
were surprised that the draft had many restrictions and
was not very different from the existing law (Isaac 2000).
As a result of these developments, a group of civil society
organisations issued a document entitled Defence of the
National Work. They brought together 70 organisations in
what was known as the Meeting of National Work
(MNW). The Minister then called a meeting of 80
national organisations, called the hearing committee
(Masirah tatwir:5).
The MNW challenged the Minister’s committee
proposals by issuing a number of documents rejecting
clauses of the draft law. It prepared its own document
with alternative proposals (Masirah tatwir:37). The
MNW invited many national organisations to confer-
ences where the government’s proposals were
denounced. It published Announcement of the National
Work Principles. It insisted on recognition as an
independent body with the right to determine its own
policy and activities and to appoint its own administrator
(Masirah tatwir:49).
Many civil society organisations criticised the draft law
and representatives of different political parties were also
present at Parliament hall to oppose the Bill. But
Parliament passed Act 153 of 1999 anyway. The Act was
not very different from Act 32 of 1964 in so far as the
restrictions imposed on civil society associations was
concerned.
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Under the new Act, only the courts, not the
administrative authority in the Ministry of Social Affairs,
had the right to withdraw the registration of an
association. The Ministry had to apply to the courts for
an order before it could terminate the registration of an
association.
Although Act 153 was slightly more observant of human
rights, it was just as restrictive as Act 32 in many ways.
Civil society pressurised the Egyptian government to
repeal the Act, and presented its own alternative
proposals. In April 2000, the committee on economics
and social rights discussed the MNW report at the United
Nations, and recommended the repeal of Act 153. One
of the organisations challenged the Act in the supreme
legislative court and, in June 2001, the court rejected the
Act and put forward certain principles and criteria that
had to be followed in drafting a new law.
The court’s principles for the establishment of a future
law included the following:
citizens should have the right to establish
associations without conditions from the adminis-
trative authorities
associations are intermediaries between individuals
and the government
associations alone are responsible for their own
development, and this is very important for the
progress of the whole society
democracy is an essential value in associations to
spread awareness of a culture of democracy through
the organisations of civil society, which are to
promote social and economic progress
clear accounting is required for public money inside
the government system
(Al-jarida al-rasmiyyah, June 2002.)
The court also ruled that the Act contravened the
Constitution and it therefore had to be sent back to
Parliament. The ministers of the executive authority
passed it to the Egyptian parliament via the Council of
the People. However, it was not passed through the
Council of Consultation.
Stage Four
When it was finally passed, the new Act 84 of 2002 did
not meet the expectations of many people, especially
those working in civil society. Its basic philosophy is no
different from Act 32, and it omitted some of the good
points of Act 153. Act 84 was intended to be a rejection
of Act 153, but it implicitly included the more repressive
rules of Act 32.
Associations can only be established with government
consent. No association by individuals is recognised,
unless they have the agreement of the authorities. The
government also has the right to close an association
without reference to a court, contrary to the rights which
apply in many democratic countries.
Another problem is that a list of names for candidate
office bearers must be given to the administrative
authority, and the authority has the right to exclude
certain candidates from standing for election. If office
bearers fail to comply with government policy, the
association may be closed. This conflicts with the
international law principle of the right of individuals to
stand for office, a principle which the Egyptian govern-
ment has agreed to adhere to.
Article 84 states that an association cannot get finance
from inside or outside Egypt without the permission of
the administrative authority. Such permission is also
required if the association wants to network with other
associations outside Egypt. It is not clear how the
authorities could possibly know about every one of the
estimated 36 000 networks in the world (Kendil 2002).
How can the administrative authority decide what the
association can join or not? Furthermore, it is not
permissible for any association to engage in political
activities.
Since the passing of this law, opposition parties and civil
society have formed a committee to defend democracy
and human rights in Egypt. The committee hosted a
conference the day after the law was passed, and
threatened to use the courts against its provisions. The
press conference hosted by the committee was sup-
ported by 20 civic organisations, including political
parties and national organisations.
Emerging issues
Civil society had more freedom in 1952 than it does
today. This regression has taken place within a so-called
democratic context. Civil society organisations, espe-
cially human rights organisations, are facing many
obstacles with the new registration regulations and loss
of the little freedom of movement that existed before the
law was passed.
Human rights organisations and civil society are trying to
have the law overturned by the high legislative court. I
wish civil society success with its cause, especially on
those aspects which contravene the Egyptian Constitu-
tion and international human rights law. The ‘committee
for defence of democracy’ should lend its support to all
the institutions that can challenge this law.
Jabal (1998:21) has made the following suggestions for
civil society advocacy on a new law:
Individuals and institutions must have the right to
obtain financial help internationally without the
permission of the authorities.
Individuals and institutions must have the right to
participate in local and international networks.
Members of public associations must have the right
to freely stand for office without any government
restriction.
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Only the courts should have the power to finally
adjudicate on unresolved disputes.
Associations should only have their registration
terminated if a court orders this.
Given that the activities of associations are vol-
untary, all disincentives must be eliminated.
1Frequently spelt ‘Nasser’ in English
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COMMUNAL LAND RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY
AND TRADITIONAL LEADERS IN POST-
APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA
BEN COUSINS AND ANINKA CLAASSENS
Introduction
This paper discusses debates over land rights, democracy
and traditional authority in communal tenure systems in
South Africa from the colonial era through to the
present, with a particular focus on the changing character
of state policies in relation to these systems. This sets the
scene for a discussion of current controversies over
communal land rights and democracy in the communal
areas of the ex-bantustans, and in particular on key
provisions of the recently approved Communal Land
Rights Bill (CLRB).
Communal tenure is shown to have two faces – one
revealing advantages for ruling (or aspirant) elites,
including traditional authorities, and one revealing key
strengths for the rural poor – although these broad
groupings are not homogeneous, but internally dif-
ferentiated in various ways. Contrasting perspectives
result in very different policy prescriptions, and precisely
which policies come to be implemented depends on the
outcome of struggles between contending interest
groups. These struggles take place both at the local level,
and within the broader national political arena, as
demonstrated by the intense behind-the-scenes lobbying
and public debates accompanying the recent passage
through Parliament of the CLRB.
What is ‘communal tenure’?
Most land tenure systems in Africa are still ‘communal’ in
character, although, as Bruce (1993) points out, this is in
some respects a misnomer, since it is taken to imply
common ownership of all resources and collective
production, which is rarely the case. What ‘communal’
generally means is a degree of community control over
who is allowed into the group, thereby qualifying for an
allocation of land for residence and cropping, as well as
rights of access to the common property resources used
by the group. Groups often restrict alienation of land to
outsiders, and thus seek to maintain the identity,
coherence and livelihood security of the group and its
members.
In these systems, allocations of residential and arable
land usually result in strong and secure rights for
individuals or families, the household being the basic unit
of production. Families and larger clusters of households
sometimes also have preferential rights to some common
pool resources such as water points, or areas of dry
season grazing. The result is that ‘communal tenure’
systems are mixed tenure regimes, comprising bundles of
individual, family, sub-group and larger group rights and
duties in relation to a variety of natural resources.
The overall character of communal tenure is that rights
to land and natural resources are shared and relative, with
flexible boundaries between a variety of social units, but
nevertheless conferring high levels of security of tenure.
Relative rights are nested within a hierarchy of social and
administrative units or levels. Okoth-Ogendo (2002:2)
puts it thus:
…. the [African] commons are managed and protected by
a social hierarchy…. the family, the clan and lineage, and
the community… are decision-making levels designed to
respond to issues regarding allocation, use and management
of resources comprised within the commons on the basis of
scale, need, function and process.
Sansome (1974) describes the nested nature of the land
administration dimension in pre-colonial southern Af-
rican societies in terms of a set of ‘estates’. The supreme
independent political authority (for example, a chief or
paramount chief) controlled a primary estate of ad-
ministration, the entire ‘tribal territory’, which was
divided into estates of lower orders (for example, sub-
chiefs or district heads), or secondary estates of
administration. In some societies a third, or tertiary
estate, existed. Administrators did not (unlike feudal
lords) own their estates, but regulated access to resources
and protected individual and communal rights. A key
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element of land administration was the setting of
boundaries for resource use, in both space and time, and
these could vary by season and by type of land use.
Western ideas about property tend to equate it with
‘ownership’ and, even more narrowly, with private
ownership. Western legal systems often do not recognise
non-Western systems of property rights, and this has
been widely used to discriminate against indigenous land
rights holders. One important difference between Wes-
tern and non-Western systems of property is the degree
of exclusion involved. Key features of private property
and the ‘ownership’ model are clearly defined (often
surveyed) physical boundaries between areas of land,
unambiguous definitions of who has what kinds of rights
and who does not, and the exclusion of non-owners. As
Peters (1998) points out, this is not necessarily the case
with non-Western systems, where inclusivity and the
‘right not to be excluded’ are often core features.
These tenure systems are ubiquitous in Africa, where,
despite rapid rates of urbanisation, the majority of
households still derive the bulk of their livelihoods from
land-based activities (cropping, livestock production and
natural resource harvesting). Common property re-
sources make a vital contribution, providing grazing and
browse for livestock, water for domestic use, livestock
and irrigation, habitats for wildlife (yielding food, cash
and medicines), building materials, medicinal plants, fuel,
edible plants, and raw materials for tools and handicrafts.
The role of communal tenure systems in securing access
to these resources is often underestimated (Cousins
2000).
Thus communal tenure systems in all their diversity must
be understood in terms of their embeddedness within
social relations, the manner in which they articulate with
characteristic modes of production and livelihood, and
the central role of political authority in their day-to-day
administration.
Historical dynamics
Conquest and incorporation of African polities in South
Africa by the colonial state brought the imposition of
new forms of authority, law and economic organisation,
and the subordination of indigenous forms of land
tenure and governance. Over two centuries whites took
possession of the bulk of the land, and state policies
attempted to mould African livelihood and land tenure
systems to the needs of the dominant classes. These
policies were actively resisted by rural communities, in
high profile rebellions or less obviously in ‘hidden
struggles’ of various kinds (Beinart & Bundy 1987). Both
kinds of struggle shaped policies and their outcomes.
Subordination of indigenous land rights took place in
two main ways. Firstly, African ‘reserves’ were created, at
first as a way of containing resistance to dispossession,
and later as reservoirs of cheap labour for the emerging
capitalist economy. The reserves also facilitated the
creation of a system of indirect rule, in which traditional
leaders undertook local administration on behalf of the
colonial state. Some core elements of the indigenous
tenure systems survived, but the governance and land
administration components in particular were severely
distorted. Those leaders who collaborated with the
colonial state tended to wield their power in support of
their personal and political interests. Some chiefs led
resistance to domination, and were then deposed by
government officials as a result (Mbeki 1964; Levin &
Mkhabela 1997:156; Mamdani 1996:195–6)
Secondly, many Africans continued to live on white-
owned land outside the reserves, and for decades
remained the main agricultural producers on that land,
either as sharecroppers or as labour tenants. The new
owners were either speculators or Boer farmers unable to
use much of the land productively. As capitalist
agriculture slowly took root in the countryside, African
producers were gradually stripped of their rights to
engage in farming and transformed from being
sharecroppers or labour tenants into highly exploited
farm workers (Morris 1976).
Colonial land tenure
Within this overall pattern there were many regional
variations in policies and their impacts. In the Cape
Colony, for example, various measure attempted to
restructure land tenure and to provide individual titles.
The Native Locations and Commonage Act of 1879
allowed the Governor to divide land in the Ciskei into
individual ‘quitrent’ titles with areas reserved as com-
munal grazing but quitrent was extended to Africans in a
diluted and discriminatory form – no conversions to
freehold were allowed, and a key condition was that the
title-holder could not alienate the land without per-
mission. The response was disappointing to policy
makers. There was a widespread failure to take up titles,
in part because of reluctance to pay the costs of survey
and titling. One of the reasons for this state of affairs was
a ‘preference for tribal or common tenure’ (cited in
Delius 1997:10).
The Glen Grey Act of 1894 also sought to introduce
individual tenure. The act was portrayed as ‘modernising’,
but in fact sought to reduce the size of individual arable
lands and facilitate the supply of migrant workers to the
emerging mining industry. Married men were entitled to
only one arable plot, and only title-holders were entitled
to graze their livestock on the commonage. Security of
tenure was not very strong – titles could be revoked for
rebellion, non-beneficial occupation and non-payment
of quitrent or surveying costs.
In Natal, by contrast, individualisation of land rights was
not pursued. The British recognised customary law, the
role of chiefs in local administration, and pre-existing
systems of land tenure. Attempts were made to give
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chiefdoms jurisdiction over clearly defined territories,
but in reality boundaries were ill-defined and members of
different chiefdoms intermingled, leading to many
conflicts (Delius 1997:19).
In the Transvaal, a relatively weak Boer state and
determined resistance by Africans meant that for much
of the 19th century ‘competing systems and conceptions
of land rights co-existed in varying degrees of tension
and conflict’ (Delius 1997:24). There were debates about
establishing reserves for African settlement, but none
were designated until after 1881. Before then, to secure
their independent land rights many Africans had no
choice but to attempt to purchase farms. Since only white
burghers could buy land, many communities requested
missionaries to purchase farms on their behalf, using
monies collected from cattle sales or migrant wages.
Large areas of land were set aside for blacks because they
were already owned and occupied. After 1881 Africans
were allowed to acquire land, as long as it was registered
in the name of the Superintendent of Natives. Although
the boundaries of African land were established through
market transactions or administrative fiat, internally the
tenure systems continued to operate along customary
lines (Delius 1997:19).
Increasing state regulation
The 1913 Land Act was intended to lay the basis for a
‘segregationist social order’ in the newly established
Union of South Africa. It did not create the reserve
system so much as entrench the existing locations and
overall distribution of land. The Act was a holding
measure while the Beaumont Commission developed
recommendations for a permanent land dispensation.
The scheduled ‘native areas’ covered 7% of the land area
of the country, but Africans actually occupied a much
larger area.
There were long delays in the making of policy, and the
impasse created a need to allow African land purchases
outside the scheduled areas, which was possible if the
Governor General gave his approval. Land so acquired
was held in trust by the Minister of Native Affairs, and
had to be effected on a ‘tribal’ basis rather than as a
purchase as community or a partnership.
The 1936 Land and Trust Act added another 6% of the
country to the area in which Africans would be allowed
land rights. A body called the South African Native Trust
was established, in which all crown land set aside for
‘native occupation’ would vest. The Act also allowed
regulations to ‘prescribe the conditions on which natives
may hire, purchase or occupy land held by the Trust’ and
to control soil erosion. The Native Affairs Department
was determined that land purchased by the trust, in order
to be allocated and occupied by Africans, ‘will not be
ruined by malpractices’. Proclamations followed in 1939
that allowed the department to declare ‘betterment’
areas, in which stock numbers could be assessed and
surplus animals culled.
Regulations were passed that drastically reduced tenure
security. Land-holders’ rights to transfer or bequeath
land were limited, the size of allotments were set, and
women’s land rights were severely circumscribed.
Access to land depended upon the whims of white officials
and strict observation of a host of regulations’, and there
was ‘a reduction in the scope for flexibility and diversity in
land holdings which had characterized ‘customary’ systems
(Delius 1997:38).
Resentment of this pattern of intensified state
intervention in land tenure helped provoke major rural
revolts (as in Sekhukhuneland and Pondoland) from the
1940s to the early 1960s (Chaskalson 1987). Trust land
was also used by the state to accommodate the victims of
forced removals or farm evictions from the 1950s
onwards.
Large numbers of farms purchased and long-settled by
Africans became known as ‘black spots’. They were
targeted for forced removals when apartheid policies
were implemented after 1950. Often operating systems
of communal tenure within their boundaries, these areas
also accommodated large numbers of evictees from
farms, usually as tenants, partly due to the continuing
strength of an African ‘land ethic’. The high population
densities that resulted often led to severe strains on the
tenure system (TRAC 1992).
The drive towards uniform approaches and increased
levels of state interference in the operation of communal
tenure systems was evident in the Native Administration
Act of 1927. Africans were to be governed in a distinct
domain legitimated by ‘custom’ and chiefly rule, but
control was exerted from above. The Governor General,
as ‘supreme chief of all natives in the provinces of Natal,
Transvaal and the Orange Free State’ could recognise or
appoint anyone as a chief or headman and define the
boundaries of any tribe or location.
The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, coming on top of
betterment planning and authoritarian regulation of land
rights under trust tenure, was the last straw for many
rural residents, and a key factor in the rural rebellions of
the 1950s (Mbeki 1964). It involved the establishment of
‘tribal authorities’. The version of ‘traditional rule’
imposed was highly authoritarian,
stripped of many of the elements of popular representation
and accountability which had existed within pre-colonial
political systems and which had to some extent survived
within… the reserves (Delius 1997:39).
Many chiefs used their newfound powers and reduced
accountability to allocate better quality land to
themselves and their supporters, and to demand higher
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payments for allocations. Tenure security and the
legitimacy of customary systems were thus further
weakened.
Proclamation R188 of 1969, issued under the powers
vested in the State President (formerly the Governor
General) under the Native Administration Act and the
1936 Land Act, was intended to regulate further the
operation of land tenure in black areas. Two forms of
tenure were defined – quitrent for surveyed land and
‘Permission to Occupy’ (PTO) for unsurveyed land.
Severe limitations on the content of the rights of holders
were laid down, for example, one man-one lot; re-
strictions on plot size; a rigid system of male primo-
geniture to govern inheritance; and no recognition of
land for women. Officials were given extensive powers
to appropriate land and to cancel quitrent titles and
permissions to occupy. Chiefs and headmen undertook
the task of allocation, agricultural officers surveyed the
boundaries of sites and fields, and magistrates issued
PTOs. Registers of permit holders were kept at the
magistrate’s offices.
In the bantustan era large areas of land occupied by
Africans (including, in the Transvaal in particular, a large
number of purchased farms) were transferred to the
jurisdiction of ‘self-governing territories’ and many
communities were placed under the jurisdiction of
government-recognised chiefs and tribal authorities. The
governments of the bantustans often passed laws to
further regulate the operation of land tenure systems, but
none undertook fundamental reforms of the prevailing




High levels of state interference in and regulation of
‘traditional’ tenure systems in the colonial era and in the
subsequent decades of white minority rule emerge
clearly in this brief historical overview. Interventions
took two very different forms: (a) largely unsuccessful
attempts were made to create forms of individual title
and do away with communal tenure, which was seen as
backward and constraining of capitalist-style develop-
ment and enterprise; and (b) the dominant type of
intervention was a policy of preserving communal
tenure, with chiefs and headmen playing key roles in land
administration, but increasingly under the direct su-
pervision of government officials. Communal land rights
were increasingly circumscribed and limited by go-
vernment regulations. A distorted and legally insecure
form of communal tenure resulted.
What were the underlying motivations of these policies,
and what were the wider political and economic
dynamics that informed them? These are issues of
ongoing controversy and debate. Three strands of
thought will be summarised here.1 Firstly, Wolpe (1972)
and others have argued that early processes of capitalist
accumulation depended upon the maintenance of pre-
capitalist relations of production in the reserves.
Traditional social and economic relationships provided a
significant proportion of the means of reproduction of
the migrant labour force, through agricultural produc-
tion together with a range of ‘social security’ functions
(for example, care of the young, the aged, the sick, and
‘resting’ migrants). This meant that employers could pay
wages to migrants that were significantly lower than they
would have to have been if workers and their families had
been permanently resident in urban and mining centres.
Access by migrants to both agricultural production and
social service functions depended on the preservation of
networks of reciprocal obligation between migrants and
family. This is why the state recognised African law and
custom, enhanced the powers of chiefs, and accepted the
existence of communal tenure.
However, the rough equilibrium between production,
distribution and social obligation in the reserves was
fragile. The absence of male migrants, together with
growing population pressure, led over time to im-
poverishment of the reserve economy, and a decline in its
capacity to contribute to the reproduction of the work
force. At the same time, a number of workers began to be
permanently urbanised, with reduced access to rural
social networks. Both factors led to increased levels of
conflict over wages. According to Wolpe, apartheid
polices developed by the National Party government
after 1948 were a response to this political challenge, and
the function of the reserves was now:
exercising control over a cheap African industrial labour
force in or near the ‘homelands’, not by means of preserving
the pre-capitalist mode of production, but by the political,
social, economic and ideological enforcement of low levels of
subsistence (Wolpe 1972).
By contrast, Mamdani (1996) stresses the political rather
than the economic significance of communal tenure. He
suggests that across Africa policies of indirect rule and
the creation of native reserves created a ‘bifurcated’ state.
Power in urban areas was characterised by the discourses
and institutions of civil society, citizenship rights and the
separation of powers; but in rural areas by community,
custom and the fusion of powers in a unitary traditional
authority. Communal tenure rather than private property
was deemed the appropriate system for holding land.
Traditional authority, based in part on control over land,
constituted a ‘decentralised despotism’ of subjects ruled
by chiefs. These measures considerably lowered the cost
of colonial rule.
Mamdani also discusses democratic struggles against the
‘clenched fist’ of repressive traditional authority. These
took the form of a ‘civil war within the tribe’, and as in the
South African cases he cites (for example, the
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Witsieshoek, Sekhukhuneland and Pondoland revolts),
could involve violence against collaborationist chiefs.
Notions of the accountability of chiefs to the community
at large were often invoked in the course of these
struggles: ‘a chief is a chief by the people’ (Mamdani
1996:195). Thus,
… the customary was never a single, non-contradictory
whole. Not only the Native Authority but also many
peasant movements spoke the language of the customary.
For every notion of the customary defined and enforced by
the state, one could find a counternotion with a subaltern
currency. A democratic appreciation of the customary must
reject embracing modernism or traditionalism. As a start,
it needs to disentangle authoritarian from emancipatory
possibilities (Mamdani 1996:299).
In a third line of argument, Beinart (1982) asserts that
social change in rural social formations and the trajectory
of class formation in South Africa was not determined
solely by the needs of capital or the state, but was
moulded in part by the internal character of these
societies, and the active responses by their members to
larger processes. In a detailed study of Pondoland he
describes how capitalist penetration was met with
tenacious resistance when it threatened communal
access to land and resources, since these forms of
independent livelihood provided rural people with a
defence against loss of control over their lives.
Communal tenure and the ethic of ‘universal access’ to
land also constrained emerging class differences between
rich and poor peasants, peasants and proletarians.
Beinart argues that the specific form taken by
proletarianisation in South Africa (migrant labour) arose
from the internal dynamics of rural society as much as
from state policy. Similarly, the retention of communal
tenure is explained in part by the pressure that the people
and chiefs maintained on the state. The interests of chiefs
and the people in protecting access to rural resources
coincided to a degree, and
the chiefs could, on some issues, serve as a spearhead of
popular opinion. It was partly for this very reason that the
state found it necessary to incorporate them into the
administrative hierarchy (Beinart 1982:6).
In this discussion the two faces of communal tenure are
clearly revealed. On the one hand, the retention of a form
of communal tenure facilitated cheap labour policies and
cost-effective control of rural populations from above;
on the other, systems of communal land rights
underpinned independent land-based livelihoods, and
facilitated resistance to policies of exploitation and
external control, and were therefore often actively
defended by rural communities. Rural struggles some-
times showed the ‘emancipatory possibilities’ of
invocations of custom and community (Mamdani 1996).
Chiefs were caught  between these contending forces,
and played different roles in different times and places in
response to local political realities.
The legacy of colonial and
apartheid policies
By the early 1990s a range of problems afflicted com-
munal tenure systems in rural South Africa, and these
persist today, forming the backdrop to contemporary
policy debates and struggles. Central to these are
unresolved questions of jurisdiction and authority, the
key actors being: (i) elected local government, (ii)
traditional authorities; and (iii) a range of interest groups
at community level who are in favour of land
administration being the responsibility of either local
government, or traditional leaders, or democratically
elected local committees. At present land administration
is a ‘messy matrix’ of institutional relationships cha-
racterised by ambiguity, confusion, uncertainty and
ongoing power plays, which contributes in large part to
insecurity of land tenure within communal areas
(Cousins 1997; Claassens 2001).
The fundamental legacy of past interventions in systems
of communal land rights is the second-class status of
these rights in law, which provides few protections from
arbitrary decisions by those wielding authority over land
allocation or land use. Underlying historical rights of
occupation have never been adequately recognised in
law, and are still not acknowledged by bodies such as
provincial departments or local government authorities.
Closely linked to the weak legal status of black land rights
is the overcrowding and forced overlapping of rights that
derives from South Africa’s history of conquest, forced
removals and evictions. While some accommodation
between original residents and new arrivals often took
place in the apartheid years, when both groups resisted
forced removals, latent tensions over land rights have
emerged strongly since the advent of democracy.
A consequence of past policies of control from above is
the partial breakdown of the legitimacy of group systems
of land tenure. One manifestation of the malaise is
corruption and abuse of authority by chiefs and tribal
authorities (Levin & Mkhabela 1997; Ntsebeza 1999),
sometimes challenged by civic organisations or local
residents’ associations, which can lead to a vacuum in
legitimate authority. Communal tenure is also subject to
internal pressures for individualisation in some areas –
from aspirant entrepreneurs who seek titles as collateral
for bank loans, from women who cannot own land in
their own name under ‘traditional’ tenure and seek
greater security through titling, and in areas near towns
and cities where an informal land market already exists
(Cross 1998).
Tenure insecurity is increased by the near-collapse of
land administration systems in the former homelands,
where magistrates no longer play a role in land matters.
PTOs are not issued in some areas, in others the
procedures followed are ad hoc and unclear, and registers
are often not kept up to date (Turner 1999). In peri-urban
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areas that are nominally under traditional tenure, as well
as in some densely settled rural areas, it is not uncommon
to find shacklords allocating land in return for cash and
warlords building a power base through control over
land. Discrimination against women in the allocation of
land and the holding of rights is a fundamental feature of
tenure systems in most of rural South Africa (Meer
1997).
Lack of clarity on land rights is constraining in-
frastructure and service provision in rural areas, and
there are tensions between local government bodies and
traditional authorities over the allocation of land for
development projects (for example, housing, irrigation
schemes, business centres and tourist infrastructure)
(Oomen 2000:66). It constrains effective management of
common property resources, which are key to rural
livelihoods. Other problems include constraints on
investment in small-holder irrigation schemes; poor
performance of agricultural projects; under-utilisation of
arable land; and tensions over mineral rights or benefits
from mining on communal land.
How widespread are these problems? The available
evidence (for example, analysis of 61 cases brought to the
Department of Land Affairs (DLA) between 1995 and
1999 – see Cousins 1999) suggests that tenure-related
problems receive recognition only when the underlying
lack of clarity in respect of legal status is brought to the
fore by development planning or investment projects on
communal land, such as Spatial Development Initiatives
(Kepe 2001), or within land reform programmes such as
restitution or redistribution (Lund 1998). It may be the
case that the majority of occupants of communal land
have a degree of de facto tenure security, because existing
systems, many of them now informal as a result of the
breakdown of administrative systems, work reasonably
well on a day-to-day basis. However, there is also
evidence that these systems are failing to facilitate
efficient use of arable land (for example, through share-
cropping or land rental) and that lack of clarity is
negatively affecting management of common property
resources (Turner 1999).
Tenure insecurity in the communal areas of South Africa
thus takes two forms: (a) a relatively small number of
high profile cases where conflicts and contestations over
land rights and competing jurisdictions are explicit and
obvious, and (b) a larger number of chronic, low profile
situations where lack of clarity and certainty are con-
straining land-based livelihoods, but no immediate threat
to occupancy and use is evident.
Tenure reform after 1994
Between 1994 and 1998 tenure reform by the newly
created Department of Land Affairs focused mainly on
securing the rights of labour tenants and farm workers, as
well as creating a new form of legal entity for holding land
rights in common. Since 1998 the main focus has been
reform of communal tenure, both in the former
‘coloured’ reserves and in the former African ‘homeland’
areas.
1994–1998
Between 1994 and 1998 laws and programmes to secure
the tenure rights of labour tenants and farm workers
were actively pursued (see Box 1). In addition, legislation
passed in 1996 allowed for the formation of communal
property associations (CPAs) as a mechanism for group
land holding. These were intended primarily for use by
Box 1: Key tenure legislation since 1994
Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 – protects the land rights of labour tenants on privately-owned farms
and provides a process whereby such tenants can acquire full ownership of the land they occupy. Labour
tenants are largely concentrated in Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal.
Communal Property Association Act 28 of 1996 – a new legal mechanism whereby groups of people can acquire and
hold land in common, with all the rights of full private ownership. CPAs have been established by groups
receiving land under both restitution and the redistribution programme. By late 2002, a total of about 500
CPAs had been registered.
Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996 – intended as a temporary measure to secure the rights
of people occupying land without formal documentary rights, pending the introduction of more
comprehensive reform. In the absence of such legislation, the Act has been extended annually and remains in
force.
Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 – protects occupants of privately-owned land from arbitrary eviction
and provides mechanisms for the acquisition of long-term tenure security. Experience has been mixed: some
cases of illegal eviction have not come before the courts and few permanent settlements have been approved
to date.
Transformation of Certain Rural Areas Act 94 of 1998 – provides for the repeal of the Rural Areas Act 9 of 1987
that applied to the 23 so-called coloured reserves in the Western Cape, Northern Cape, Eastern Cape and Free




beneficiaries of land restitution and redistribution pro-
grammes, and designed as an alternative to trusts, which
were seen as allowing too much control to trustees as
opposed to members of land-holding groups. CPAs and
trusts take full private ownership of land, on behalf of
their members, and are governed by constitutions.
Group titles have been issued to over 500 CPAs and
community land trusts, but many of these are now
dysfunctional. Constitutions have been poorly drafted
and often misunderstood by members, and the rights of
members (especially in relation to land and resource use)
are often ill-defined. Members have often retained ties to
their original communities, rather than seeing themselves
as belonging to the new social entity. In some cases
traditional leaders have contested the authority of elected
trustees, and in others elites have captured the benefits of
ownership (Cousins & Hornby 2002). A policy lesson
often drawn is that the main problems in CPAs and trusts
derive from inadequate government oversight of and
levels of support to these groups.
The Land Rights Bill of 1999
Since 1998 the major focus of attention in tenure reform
policy has been a new law to provide improved security
of tenure in communal systems, and thus give effect to
the Bill of Rights (Section 25(6) of the Constitution):
A person or community whose tenure of land is legally
insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or
practices is entitled, to the extent provide by an Act of
Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to
comparable redress.
Key concerns have once again been the nature of the
rights to be created in the new law, the vexed issue of
jurisdiction over land administration, and the question
‘who will benefit from reform?’
Drafting of a Land Rights Bill (LRB) was initiated in early
1998. It attempted to embody the principles of tenure
reform set out in the White Paper on Land Policy of 1997
and provide full recognition of the underlying land rights
of people who occupy areas registered as ‘state land’ in
the Deeds Registry. The land rights specified in the LRB
were thus to be vested in the members of group systems,
not in institutions such as legal entities, the chieftaincy or
tribal authorities. From the distinction between owner-
ship and governance set out in the White Paper flowed
the result that group members have the right to choose
which institution should manage and administer land
rights on their behalf. Group systems had to provide
‘bottom line’ protections for their members, consistent
with constitutional principles of democracy, equality
(including gender equality) and due process. In situations
of overlapping and contested rights, transfer would only
take place after a rights inquiry, with government
providing incentives to local stakeholders to negotiate
solutions, mainly in the form of funds for additional land
to relieve overcrowding.
At first policy was based on a paradigm of transferring
ownership from the state to its rightful owners. How-
ever, experience in a number of test cases revealed
inherent difficulties (Claassens 2000), and as a result the
1999 LRB did not adopt a ‘transfer of title’ paradigm. One
major difficulty arose in relation to defining the ‘unit of
ownership’ in communal areas: should land be trans-
ferred to ‘tribes’, or ‘nations’, often consisting of
hundreds of thousands of people, or to wards, or to
villages, or to groups at tribal authority level? Vesting
land ownership in the larger group could make it difficult
for smaller groups to make meaningful decisions about
land within their own localities; conversely, vesting rights
at the local level might deny some rights inherent in the
larger group. These questions derive from the nested and
hierarchical character of land rights in communal
systems. The test cases provided important lessons in
relation to the processes involved in land transfers.
Investigation and consultation with the prospective
rights holders was necessarily resource-intensive, in-
tricate and time-consuming. They showed that the
prospect of transfer triggers intractable conflicts; ‘…. the
irrevocable nature of land transfer is an effective alarm
clock for latent social tensions’ (Claassens 2000:254).
As a result of these difficulties, the drafters of the LRB
moved towards a paradigm based on statutory rights
which are secure but do not convey full ownership. The
law would create a category of protected rights, for which
the majority of those occupying land in the former
‘homelands’ would qualify. Rights holders would be the
key decision makers on matters related to their land, and
derive the full benefit from its use or transfer. The
Minister of Land Affairs would continue to be the
nominal owner of the land, but with strictly delimited
powers. Her ownership would be an ‘empty shell’, with
high-content statutory rights held by the occupants.
These protected rights would vest in the individuals who
use, occupy or have access to land, but in group systems
these rights would be subject to those shared with other
members, that is, individual rights would be relative to
‘group rules’, as decided upon by the majority of
members. These in turn would require the definition of
the boundaries of the group – also a key difficulty, as
pointed out above, for the ‘transfer of ownership’
paradigm. The solution proposed in the LRB was as
follows:
… ‘boundaries’ must be seen as flexible. In other words,
the boundary of the group would be determined with
reference to who (which group of people) is affected by the
particular decision. Thus, if the decision is about a change
in grazing practice then the people affected by the change
must be consulted, not the entire ‘tribe’ (Claassens
2000:255).
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Protected rights, defined by statute, would thus confirm
in law the rights of the 2.4 million households (the de facto
rights holders), occupying and using land in the com-
munal areas of South Africa, without having to first
resolve, in each and every case, disputes over the extent
of rights. The possible content was set out in the LRB and
allowed for rights to occupy and use land, to bequeath,
transact and mortgage the right, to benefits from the
land, and to evict others. To balance individual and group
rights, and to maintain a necessary element of flexibility,
a local process of defining or limiting the specific detail of
the content of rights would have to take place.
The LRB established the right of those with protected
rights to choose or create their own preferred local
institution for the purpose of managing land rights.
Where existing local institutional structures were able to
meet certain criteria (for example, majority support),
they would be accredited by government, but were
thought to require ongoing support from government in
order to carry out their functions (Cousins 1997; Sibanda
2000). This would be through ‘land rights officers’, who
would help rights holders enforce their rights and assist
(and monitor) accredited structures.
There is a constitutional imperative for the state to
provide tenure security or ‘comparable redress’ to those
whose tenure was made insecure as a result of previous
policies, for example, forced removals and the over-
lapping rights that resulted. The LRB attempted to
provide a mechanism for unpacking these situations
through recognition of legitimate claims, albeit of
differential strengths, and allowing for ‘tenure awards’ to
protected rights holders who cannot all be accommo-
dated on the same land, commensurate with their rights
(Makopi 2000). Awards were envisaged as involving a
combination of the confirmation of the occupation
rights of some rights holders together with compensa-
tion or additional land for others.
The Communal Land Rights
Bill of 2002
In June 1999 a new Minister of Agriculture and Land
Affairs took office,2 and work on the LRB was stopped.
The Minister’s view was that the LRB was too complex,
that it would be too costly to implement, and that it
assumed that a ‘nanny state’ would protect people’s
rights on their behalf. She was in favour of a law that
transferred title of state land to ‘tribes’, that gave a key
role in land administration to traditional leaders, and that
did not require such high levels of institutional support to
rights holders. In her view ordinary people, including
women, should take greater responsibility for protecting
their rights themselves.
Following several false starts, a Communal Lands Rights
Bill was drafted and discussed at a national conference in
Durban in 2001. This third draft included several pro-
visions that appeared to privilege traditional leaders, for
example it allowed ‘traditional communities’ operating
under ‘customary law’, as well as authorised representa-
tives (chiefs), to be recognised as ‘juristic persons’ for the
transfer of state land in full ownership. This pleased the
traditional leader lobby at the conference, but was seen
by many other delegates as highly problematic, sparking
heated debates.
In August 2002 the CLRB was published for public
comment, and many civil society organisations sent
submissions to government. Critical articles on the
CLRB appeared in the media, initiating a public debate
on communal tenure reform for the first time since 1994.
At the same time a civil society grouping initiated a
project3 to promote awareness of the Bill amongst
affected communities in five provinces, and to assist
them to express their views on tenure problems and on
the CLRB proposals. In this period government made no
attempt to convene community consultation processes,
but met several times with traditional leaders.
The August 2002 draft provided for ‘transfer of title’ of
communal land from the state to its current occupants.
Complex procedures for transfer included a rights
inquiry, community meetings, and adoption of com-
munity rules on tenure. Registration of these rules would
convert the community into a ‘juristic person’ capable of
owning land. Once the rules were registered a land
administration committee could be elected, made up of
community members.
Traditional leaders had to be on the committee in an ex-
officio capacity, but could comprise no more than 25% of
members. This was been controversial: groups such as
the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa
(Contralesa) argued for the transfer of title to traditional
authorities, on the basis that they have always held land
rights in trust for their communities, and that they are not
inherently undemocratic and unaccountable.4 This lobby
objected vehemently to the ‘25%’ rule.
Civil society organisations as well as many members of
rural communities expressed highly critical views of the
CLRB (Claassens 2003), and a large number of written
comments on the Bill was submitted to government. A
range of problems was identified, including inadequate
provisions for land administration. One key flaw
identified in the Bill was the underlying paradigm of a
transfer of freehold title, requiring clear boundaries
between communities to be drawn. This could open up
and exacerbate boundary disputes and ethnic differ-
ences. In addition, community representatives, and in
particular elected councillors, feared that transferring
title would effectively ‘privatise’ communal land. Since
government refuses to provide services and infrastruc-
ture on privately owned land, the effect would be to
insulate poor rural areas from local government
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development programmes. This would force rural
people to choose between ownership rights and infra-
structural development.
Other problems were identified as the long-winded and
intricate procedures for transfer of title,5 and until
transfer occurred, the unclear status of people’s existing
rights to occupation and use. In addition, women’s land
rights were not adequately provided for. Civil society
submissions generally approved of the provisions for
awards of alternative land as a form of comparable
redress for tenure insecurity, citing the need for tenure
reform to contribute in a significant manner to land
redistribution ‘beyond the 13%’ of land allocated to
Africans in the past.
The 30% limit on traditional leader representation on
land administration committees was welcomed by some
civil society organisations as a victory for democracy, but
others were concerned that this measure did not in itself
deal adequately with the problem. This was due to the
fact that it was unclear what impact this rule would have
in areas where traditional leaders are contested, or in
areas where land administration functions are under-
taken by traditional leaders that have significant support.
Alternatives to the approach adopted in the CLRB were
discussed in community meetings (Claassens 2003). One
approach would be for the new law to recognise existing
occupation and use rights and give them the status of
secure property rights, without waiting for a time-
consuming and expensive process of transfer of title for
which government is unwilling to devote sufficient funds
or to create enough capacity to meet demand. Measures
to secure individual rights could be complemented by
mechanisms to support management of common
property and other land matters of common concern.
This approach would require ongoing support from
government officials to rights holders and to local land
administration bodies, as one component of a coherent
programme of rural development. These proposals were
similar to the approach taken in the 1999 Land Rights
Bill.
Amendments and debates in 2003
In response to mounting civil society criticism, the Bill
was amended in several drafts between August 2002 and
October 2003. In April 2003 the South African Local
Government Association (Salga), representing all the
country’s local government bodies, asked for a legal
opinion on the powers granted in the Bill to land
administration committees. This opinion expressed
concerns that a ‘fourth tier of government’ was being
created, and indicated that the privatisation of communal
land via titling would create difficulties around service
provision by local government. In response, a June 2003
draft of the Bill introduced the provision that a
‘communal general plan’ (that is, a land use plan) must be
registered with the Surveyor-General prior to any trans-
fer of title. This would allow the Minister to reserve part
of the land for the state, this for the provision of
infrastructure and municipal services, and it was hoped
that this would be a solution to the service provision
problem.
Other changes resulted from attempts to shorten the Bill,
and many provisions were now to be dealt with in
separate sets of regulations. Civil society critics pointed
out that a critical omission was the absence of com-
munity consultation on whether or not they desired a
transfer of title, or on the form and content of land rights.
The Minister was given sweeping powers of deter-
mination in relation to a range of key decisions, including
the boundaries of the land to be transferred to
‘communities’. A continuing problem was the lack of
clarity on how the different processes set out in the Bill
(for example, the drawing up of the communal general
plan, the rights enquiry, the drafting of community rules,
the making of determinations by the Minister) relate to
one another, and in what sequence these different
processes were supposed to occur. On the other hand,
the Bill still did not recognise the complexity and onerous
nature of the land administration tasks (registration,
recording, land use and development planning, and
dispute resolution) to be carried out by local committees,
and did not provide for a dedicated system of govern-
ment support to these committees.
In a presentation to the Deputy Minister of Land Affairs
and senior officials in July 2003, community members
pointed out that women’s land rights were not adequately
secured by the Bill. For example, it provided for the
registration of existing rights, which generally vest in
men, without any proviso that women’s rights should be
asserted or registered. Earlier sections explicitly barring
discrimination in community rules had disappeared.
Concerns were also expressed that the status of people’s
land rights prior to transfer and registration remained
unclear and hence potentially insecure; this called into
doubt the constitutionality of the Bill.6
Government drafters paid little heed to these concerns.
A 13th draft of the CLRB, similar in all important respects
to the June 2003 version, was approved by Cabinet in
early October 2003, and published in the Government
Gazette. Notice was given that the Bill would be debated
in Parliament within a matter of weeks. However, within
days another version, containing a highly contentious
new provision, was submitted to and approved by
Cabinet. This was in relation to the land administration
committees that the Bill required all communities to
establish, to ‘represent the community owning com-
munal land’, and which would have ‘ownership and
administrative powers conferred on it by the rules of the
community’.7 The new clause stated that where a
community has a ‘traditional council’, the functions and
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powers of the land administration committee ‘must be
performed by such a council’.8
This provision cross-referred to the Traditional Lea-
dership and Governance Framework Bill (TLGFB) then
being debated in Parliament’s portfolio committee on
local government. This Bill (subsequently adopted by the
House of Assembly on 11 November 2003, and now an
Act) sets out to clarify the long-unresolved issue of the
roles and powers of traditional leaders and their
relationship to local government (Murray 2004). The Act
provides for the establishment of ‘traditional councils’,
sets minimum requirements with which such councils
must comply, and lists the functions of traditional leaders
and councils. These functions are fairly ‘soft’ (Murray
2004:11), including such roles as ‘facilitating develop-
ment’. However, they include the wider function of
‘administering the affairs of the traditional community’
(including in relation to land).
The final version of the TLGFB required that 40% of the
members of the traditional councils be elected and that
30% be women, and these are seen by government as
‘transforming’ traditional leadership to bring them into
line with the country’s democratic dispensation. The Act
also contains a provision for a transitional arrangement
which deems existing tribal authorities, created in terms
of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, to be traditional
councils, and gives these authorities a year to ‘transform’
(but without any specified sanctions should they fail to
do so).
The proposal that land administration committees be
traditional councils wherever these existed was greeted
with jubilation by the traditional leader lobby, and
considerably reduced their unhappiness over the
‘softness’ of the somewhat vaguely defined powers
conferred on them by the TLGFB. Control over land has
long been seen to be the material basis of the power of
traditional authorities (Levin & Mkhabela 1997; Ntse-
beza 1999; Mamdani 1996) and their reaction to the new
legislation would appear to confirm this diagnosis. In
contrast, the new clause was met with dismay by NGOs
and community groups, provoked considerable public
controversy, and became one of the key aspects of the
Bill that was debated in parliamentary portfolio
committee hearings in November 2003.
Civil society groupings saw the new clause as the
imposition of structures dominated by un-elected
traditional leaders, undermining fundamental demo-
cratic rights. According to a press release, the clause
‘deprives rural people of the right to choose who will
administer their land rights’. The press statement pointed
out that the Bantu Authorities Act, which established
tribal authorities and gave them considerable power over
rural communities, was prime apartheid legislation
designed to secure rule from above, and had provoked
rural revolts across South Africa in the 1950s (Mbeki
1964). Together with the sweeping powers of deter-
mination given to the Minister, this lack of choice over
how a land administration committee should be
composed gave the Bill an authoritarian character at odds
with the strong emphasis on democratisation of decision
making within communal tenure in previous policy
documents (for example, the 1997 White Paper on South
African Land Policy).
NGOs and community groups were also angry that so
little consultation with rural communities had taken
place, and that the new clause on traditional councils had
been introduced so late in the process. It seemed to them
that the Bill was being rushed through Parliament at the
last possible moment because of wider political dynamics
and ‘deal-making’ in the run-up to the general election of
April 2004. According to Murray (2004:15), three issues
appeared to underlie government’s willingness to
accommodate traditional leaders: the need to avoid pre-
election violence in KwaZulu-Natal;9 the fact that
traditional leaders are perceived to command votes in
rural areas; and the need for government to work with
traditional structures in delivering services to rural
people, given the real weakness of elected local govern-
ment in many rural municipalities. Murray speculates
that another reason may have to do with culture and
identity, since ‘many South Africans are in search of a
political culture that feels less imposed than the one we
inherited from our colonial rulers’ (2004:16).
The character of the portfolio committee hearings and
subsequent passage of the Bill through Parliament
confirmed the suspicion that a political decision to pass
the Bill had been made at the highest levels of the African
National Congress (ANC). Concerted opposition to the
Bill from the ANC’s partners in the Tripartite Alliance –
the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu)
and the South African Communist Party (SACP) – and
from within the ANC itself (for example, members of
Parliament’s joint monitoring committee on the status of
women) did not lead to a postponement of this clearly
controversial piece of legislation until after the election,
when more debate and consensus building could have
occurred.
Parliamentary debates
A total of 35 submissions were made to public hearings
on the Bill called by Parliament’s portfolio committee on
agriculture and land affairs in the last two weeks of
November 2003. These included 13 submissions by
community groups10 and 12 by NGOs.11 Other bodies
which presented submissions were two statutory bodies
(the Commission for Gender Equality and the Human
Rights Commission), a committee of Parliament itself
(the Joint Monitoring Committee on the Status of
Women), Cosatu, two academic research institutes,12 the
Coalition for Traditional Leaders, and the railway
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parastatal Spoornet. Of these, 32 submissions were
highly critical of the Bill on a variety of grounds, and were
unanimous in calling for its withdrawal and a fresh start.
Only three submissions were in favour of the Bill, those
by Spoornet, the traditional leader lobby, and the
Bafokeng Royal Nation (a ‘community group’ repre-
sented by their monarchy, and closely aligned to the
traditional leader lobby).
The critics argued that the Bill was deeply and
fundamentally flawed, and was probably unconstitu-
tional in a number of respects. In addition to the
criticisms mentioned above, the following arguments
were made:13
The nature and content of the ‘new order rights’ to
be created in the Bill are not clearly defined, and
instead the Minister of Land Affairs is given wide
and sweeping powers to determine these rights on a
discretionary basis.
The Minister is not explicitly required by the Bill to
define land rights in a manner consistent with the
Bill of Rights, and leaves decisions on equal land
rights for women to the discretion of the Minister.
The wide discretionary powers given to the Minister
to make determinations on a range of issues central
to the security of people’s land rights are probably
unconstitutional, in so far as the Bill of Rights
requires the law to define clearly the extent of the
land rights to be secured. No clear criteria and
factors to guide the Minister’s decisions are pro-
vided, and few opportunities to either participate in
making these crucial decisions or to challenge them
are provided in the Bill.
The measures in the Bill for achieving gender
equality in relation to land rights are weak and
unconvincing and are likely to be overridden by the
provision that traditional councils dominated by
traditional leaders will allocate land, and can do so on
the basis of custom. In addition, many of the ‘old
order rights’ which the Bill seeks to secure, such as
PTOs, vest exclusively in men, and their upgrading
to registered ‘new order rights’ will be at the expense
of the informal use and occupation rights of women.
The Minister will make determinations on who has
land rights, on what these land rights will be, and on
the boundaries of the ‘community’ that will have
ownership of communal land transferred to it, and
will be guided by the report of a land rights enquiry.
However, the people whose rights are to be decided
in this manner have no right to view or challenge the
report that the enquirer sends to the Minister, and no
opportunity to agree or disagree with a decision to
transfer title. The terms of community participation
in the land rights enquiry are not made clear. There
are no provisions that ensure that people will have a
real choice over the nature of their tenure system or
the content of their land rights.
Communities are required to adopt community
rules to govern land use and administration, that will
set out who can hold new order rights, but there is no
requirement that the community must agree to the
content of these rules, and no procedure for
adopting these rules is provided. In addition the
Minister may impose a standard set of rules on a
community (as adapted by the Minister) should a
community fail to adopt a set of rules.
The constitutional requirement that tenure legisla-
tion provide for comparable redress in the event that
land rights cannot be secured due to overlapping
rights (Section 25(6) of the Bill of Rights) is not met
in the Bill, which devotes only two clauses to this
issue, and does not define the extent of such redress
nor provide any clear basis for doing so. Once again,
the Minister has wide discretionary powers, and no
guidelines are provided to direct ministerial
decisions.
Democratic and accountable institutions for land
administration are not adequately provided for in
the Bill.
The Bill undermines the existing property rights of
communities who own communal land historically,
or through trusts and communal property as-
sociations; many of the latter have had their land
restored to them through the restitution component
of the land reform programme, and many do not
support or recognise traditional leaders who were
imposed on them in the apartheid era.
Despite attempts in the Bill to address the problem
of municipal service delivery on communal land
transferred from the state into private ownership by
communities (for example, Section 37), the problem
will remain where undivided blocks of land are
transferred, since in South African law ownership of
infrastructure (for example, water pipes) and
buildings (for example, schools) attaches to the
owner of the underlying land.
Where land for ‘development’ by local government
is excluded from transfer of title, long delays in
compiling a communal general plan will result while
detailed and long term land use planning is carried
out, far in advance of any development actually
taking place, and without clear guidelines from the
Integrated Development Plan for the area. In many
cases such long term planning will be seen to be
inappropriate and untimely and will probably not
happen at all.
In addition to questions of substance, most submissions
were highly critical of the non-consultative nature of the
process through which the Bill had been developed. The
memorandum to the Bill claimed that a total of 50
consultative workshops had been held, together with
civil society organisations. These involved ‘traditional
leaders and their communities, the National House of
Traditional Leaders, the Coalition of Traditional
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Leaders, Contralesa14 and the Ingonyama Trust Board.
However, NGO s and community representatives were
sceptical, said they were unaware of such meetings, and
called on government to release details of the dates and
location of such meetings. Members of Parliament also
requested such information, and on the final day of the
portfolio committee’s deliberations a large file said to
contain the information was given to the chairman of the
committee. No summary was provided, the file was not
available to the public, and civil society suspicions that
these meetings were largely fictitious were not allayed.
Another contentious issue was the financial implications
of the new law. The memorandum to the Bill stated that
the annual costs of implementation were estimated to be
R68 million, but portfolio committee members queried
this, and the Director-General of Land Affairs admitted
that it was a ‘guesstimate’ only and that there was no
systematic basis for the calculation.
Amendments, controversy and
passage of the Act
As the final parliamentary session of 2003 came to a
close, the portfolio committee deferred further discus-
sion of the Bill until January 2004. The Department of
Land Affairs commissioned legal opinions on the con-
stitutionality of the Bill, and officials began to draft a
number of amendments. The portfolio committee met in
late January to discuss these as well as the financial
implications and other unresolved issues (such as the
composition of land boards) and eventually approved an
amended Bill. This went to the National Assembly in
mid-February, in the final two-week session of
Parliament before campaigning for the 2004 general
election began. The amended Bill was then passed by
both the National Assembly and the National Council of
Provinces, and at the time of writing15 is awaiting the
signature of the President before it becomes law. Before
its final passage through Parliament, the Bill continued to
be dogged by controversy and intense behind-the-scenes
lobbying, over issues of both substance and procedure.
Amendments sought to address a number of issues. On
the question of women’s rights, one amendment
provides that ‘old order rights’ are deemed to be held by
all spouses in a marriage, not by the husband alone.
However, no provision is made for securing the current
use and occupation rights of single women (widows or
unmarried women), and no requirement that land
administration committees allocate land on the same
basis as men was inserted. The Women’s Legal Centre
raised doubts about these amendments, and their
attorney Sibongile Ndashe said that one problem was
that the status of women married under customary law is
still legally in question (Mail & Guardian, 30 January
2004).
Other amendments also seek to address potential
challenges on constitutional grounds. Rewording of
certain sections attempts to create greater certainty that
Section 25(6) of the Bill of Rights (requiring clear
definition of the extent and content of ‘security of
tenure’) are being given effect, but may still not be
adequate, according to lawyers from the Legal Resources
Centre. Amendments were also made in relation to
decisions and determinations of the Minister. For
example, a land rights enquiry must seek to establish the
majority views of a community, and these must inform
the making of community rules. However, there is still no
requirement that majority consent is necessary for the
decision to transfer title, or when a land administration
committee is established, or prior to the Minister
reserving part of communal land for state use. One
amendment states that the Minister may not make a
determination on land rights until outstanding disputes
have been resolved, but no definition of dispute or clarity
on who determines whether or not a dispute exists is
provided.
The final version of the law also contains a definition of
‘land administration committee’ that avoids specifying
that it will be a traditional council in all areas where these
exist. However, the law still does not specify clearly that
an alternative structure (such as an elected committee)
may administer communal land, and is open to
competing interpretations.
Departmental officials told the portfolio committee that
the real costs of implementing the law would probably be
seven or eight times higher that the original estimate of
R68 million, that is, closer to R500 million, but could still
not provide a detailed breakdown of costs. Opposition
MPs sharply criticised government for ‘such an
incredible discrepancy’ (Cape Times, 27 January 2004).
There was also controversy over whether or not the Bill
should have been tagged as a ‘Section 76’ Bill, thereby
requiring to further public hearings by the National
Council of the Provinces. The Constitution requires this
of laws affecting functional areas of ‘concurrent com-
petence’ between national and provincial governments,
of which traditional leadership is one, but land is not. In
the end the Bill was not re-tagged and was passed
unanimously by both houses of Parliament.16
Unprecedented public interest in the passage of the Bill
saw wide media coverage, editorials calling for it to be
scrapped or ‘substantially amended’,17 angry articles by
gender activists,18 and a statement by the Commission for
Gender Equality that it had ‘taken an executive decision
to challenge the Bill constitutionally’.19 It appears likely
that constitutional challenges to the law will be also
mounted in due course by public interest lawyers acting
on behalf of some of the communities that presented
submissions to Parliament.
The traditional leader lobby was also outspoken in public
– but in support of the new law. Patekile Holomisa, an
ANC MP and chair of Contralesa, wrote that:
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the bill confirms the long-standing historical fact that
African land belongs to the African communities jointly
with their African traditional leaders. The three entities –
land, people, traditional leaders – are inextricably bound
together .20
However, a critic of the Bill pointed out that the law
could:
cut the nexus that keeps traditional leaders responsive to
their ‘subjects’ … control over land administration
provides traditional leaders with a guaranteed power and
resource base, regardless of whether their ‘subjects’ support
them or not.21
Controversy over the role of traditional leaders in land
administration continues to rage.
Conclusion
Informing the politics of tenure reform policy are
competing understandings of both land rights and of
institutional arrangements for land administration. In
relation to land rights, one view is that only land titling
(that is, private ownership) provides adequate tenure
security – but forms of group title must be made
available, as well as individual title, given the strong rural
demand for a community-based form of tenure. Interest
groups in favour of titling include emergent commercial
farmers, businessmen, chiefs (on condition that titles are
issued to themselves or traditional councils), and
occasionally, women (some of whom feel that freehold
can best provide land rights free from the constraints of
patriarchal traditions). The strongest demand from the
ground, however, is for security of rights of families and
individuals, within a system that secures access to
common property (Claassens 2003). This need not take
the form of titling.
Land administration systems that are based on local
institutions are viewed as cheap and cost-effective by
policy makers, and attractive in the context of dominant
neo-liberal doctrines of development. Rural communi-
ties also stress the importance of local institutions, but
with far more emphasis on the need for them to be
accountable and responsive to people’s needs.22 Pro-
posals to build on institutional arrangements that already
exist make sense to both sides, but community calls for
adequate funding and support by government for local
institutions stand in stark contrast to the minimalist
provisions of the CLRB.
Most controversial remains the issue of traditional
authority and its role in communal tenure regimes.
Political deals may have informed the rapid progress of
the Communal Land Rights Bill through Parliament, but
the long-term prospects for chiefs and headmen are not
at all clear. At stake are some of the fundamentals of
South Africa’s new democracy, as Murray (2004:18)
points out:
It may be possible to marry the idealised notions of an older,
different democratic order eulogised as an intrinsic part of
an original, untainted, form of pre-colonial traditional
leadership with the requirements of a modern, democratic
state. But such an amalgamation should not be the product
of either short-term horse trading or transparently sectional
interests for whom tradition is little more than a shield from
the demands of democratic accountability. We must guard
against the possibility that a new order revelling in its
emancipation from (neo) colonial rule will abrogate its
responsibility to its citizens in the name of a new
Africanisation. The danger is that settlement with the
lobby of traditional leaders will be a smokescreen for the
failure to implement democracy where it really matters: at
grassroots, in the material conditions of the ordinary
existence of women and men.
The African experience of tenure reform has largely been
one of ineffective law and policy, in which interventions
have failed to bridge the gap between de facto realities and
de jure rights, and tension and conflict over competing
jurisdictions persist (Berry 1993). This has arisen partly
from inadequate funding or weak state capacity, both
underpinned by lack of political will, but another reason
is the persistent lack of understanding by policy makers
and legislators of the realities of African systems of land
rights (Okoth-Ogendo 2002). However, although usually
ineffective, state interventions are not simply ignored –
the confusion that results is often used by elites as an
opportunity to feather their own nests (Peters 2002).
They are the clear winners, and the losers are usually the
poor and desperate. A widening difference between
strong rights on paper and weak or non-existent rights in
practice then calls into question the meaning of
‘democracy’ (Mamdani 1996; Cousins 2003).
Property rights and their distribution are a key issue for a
new democracy such as South Africa’s – but what form
should these rights take? It is now widely accepted that
freehold title is not a ‘magic bullet’ for increasing security
of tenure in Africa and other developing countries
(World Bank 2003). This has resulted in wider ac-
ceptance of the core features of communal tenure: rights
to land and natural resources are shared and relative,
flexible boundaries exist between a variety of social units,
and rights are nested within a hierarchy of social and
administrative units or levels (Okoth-Ogendo 2002).
Emerging policy recommendations call for greater
recognition in law of such rights, the strengthening of
local institutions for land administration and land
management, and support for institutions and pro-
cedures for mediation and negotiation, particularly at the
local level (IIED 1999).
Translating these general prescriptions into law and
policy is far from straightforward. Some suggest co-
dification, others registration either centrally or at the
local level, but these can backfire and as an unintended
consequence produce increased unpredictability and
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institutional incoherence (Lund 1998). Local institutions
are vulnerable to the power plays of elites, as well as to a
‘politics of exclusion’ (Lavigne Delville 1999; Peters
2002) and measures to promote transparency and
accountability (that is, democratisation) are required
(Ribot 2002).
This means that central government has a key role to play
in ensuring accountability, through oversight of local
bodies and the application of sanctions (Ribot 2002:18).
Some analysts emphasise the key role of ongoing
processes of negotiation and conflict resolution for
securing land rights, and stress the importance of state
support for local institutions to mediate conflicting
interests (Berry 1993; Moore 1998). This resonates
strongly with the view that democracy in Africa requires
a strong and capable state, both willing and able to
empower citizens through locally accountable, represen-
tative institutions (Luckham 1998). An emancipatory
version of democratisation is thus integral to the politics
of communal tenure reform, as the South African case
demonstrates so clearly.
1Arguments on these questions are complex and wide-
ranging, and at the heart of long-standing debates on the
political economy of capitalist development in South
Africa. Only a simplified and condensed version can be
presented here.
2Thoko Didiza, formerly Deputy Minister.
3The project was organised by the National Land
Committee (NLC) and the Programme for Land and
Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) at the University of the
Western Cape. Partners include NLC affiliates, the Trust
for Community Outreach and Education, the Legal
Resources Centre, the Transkei Land Service Organi-
sation, the Legal Entity Assessment Project, and others.
4Holomisa, P. 2003. Resolving communal land rights a
vital link in reform process. Business Day, 21 May.
5Over 30 administrative steps were required before title
could be transferred to a community, requiring a mini-
mum of 12 months (and the likelihood that bureaucratic
slippage would result in delays of at least two years).
6See requirements to create tenure security in section
25(6) of the Bill of Rights, quoted above.
7According to section 25.3 of the Communal Land
Rights Bill of 8 October 2003, these had to include
allocating new rights to land, registering such rights,
maintaining registers and records of rights and trans-
actions, liaising with municipalities, resolving disputes,
and other functions.
8Section 22.2 of Communal Land Rights Bill of 8
October 2003
9Pre-election violence in KwaZulu-Natal had marred
both the 1994 and 1999 general elections.
10The NLC/PLAAS consultation project provided sup-
port for community groups and NGOs to prepare their
submissions through joint workshops to discuss the Bill
and its implications. Different views emerged on some
key issues (for example, the role of chiefs), and broad
consensus on others; the project did not attempt to
resolve differences and the principle that diverse views
could be held was accepted by all participants in these
workshops.
11The NGO grouping included the South African Coun-
cil of Churches, the Legal Resources Centre and the
Women’s Legal Centre, in addition to land activist
organisations such as the National Land Committee and
many of its affiliates
12The Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies
(PLAAS) from the University of the Western Cape, and
the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) of the
University of Witwatersrand.
13Most civil society submissions can be found at
www.uwc.ac.za/plaas
14The Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa.
15In May 2004.
16The National Assembly and the National Council of
Provinces.
17Cape Times. 2004. The wrong direction. 29 January; This
Day. 2004. Land Bill turns back the clock. 30 January.
18Govender, P. 2004. Parliament gives rural women a raw
deal. Sunday Times, 15 February.
19Sunday Independent. 2004. United front to oppose
controversial land bill. 29 February.
20Holomisa, P. 2004. Chiefs bill gives pride of place to
traditional leaders and customs. Business Day, 11
February.
21Claassens, A. 2004. Land rights bill gives excessive
power to traditional leaders and erodes women’s rights.
Cape Times, 19 February.
22This was a key issue in community submissions to
Parliament.
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